

This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the information in books and make it universally accessible.

GoogleTM books

<https://books.google.com>



B 1,565,834

PROPERTY OF
*University of
Michigan
Libraries*
1817

ARTES SCIENTIA VERITAS

THE MUSEUM
of
FAR EASTERN ANTIQUITIES
(Östasiatiska Samlingarna)
STOCKHOLM



Bulletin No. 31

STOCKHOLM 1959

Fine Arts

715
501
586
no. 31

THIS VOLUME HAS BEEN PRINTED WITH A GRANT FROM
»HUMANISTISKA FONDEN»

PRINTED BY
ELANDERS BOKTRYCKERI A.-B., GÖTEBORG
PLATES MADE BY A.-B. MALMÖ LJUSTRYCKSANSTALT, MALMÖ

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page:
Hans Bielenstein: The Restoration of the Han Dynasty	1
Bernhard Karlgren: Marginalia on some Bronze Albums	289

THE RESTORATION OF THE HAN DYNASTY

VOLUME II

THE CIVIL WAR

BY

HANS BIELENSTEIN

GÖTEBORG 1959
ELANDERS BOKTRYCKERI AKTIEBOLAG

2100 - 1
8818
Recd

PREFACE

This book is a direct sequel to *The Restoration of the Han Dynasty*¹), which will be referred to as vol. I. The first volume discussed the reasons for the fall of Wang Mang and the restoration of Han. The present work treats the period from the enthronement of the Keng-shī Emperor on March 11, A. D. 23 to the end of the civil war in A. D. 36.

It is not fashionable today to write political history, and perhaps an apology is due for my having embarked on such a course. My reasons for doing so are mainly these: the years A. D. 22—36 cover a period which is largely unexplored. An analysis of its history may throw some light on the dynamics of one of China's major civil wars. I also feel that it is dangerous to investigate other aspects of a period's history before its political framework has been well established. The present work is, in this sense, to be regarded as a background study to volume III, which will concentrate on the political, social and economic developments under Emperor Kuang-wu.

I continue to follow Professor H. H. Dubs in rendering Chinese titles. My reason for doing so are given in the introduction to vol. I.²)

Maps have been drawn for all military operations, showing the sites of places, the movements of armies, etc. I also give in footnotes the position of prefectural cities, districts, mountains, passes, etc., so that the reader may check my results. Where such information has already been supplied in the notes to vol. I, it has not been repeated.

If not otherwise indicated, all years refer to the Han calendar (e. g. a reference to the year 27 would normally be to the Chinese year, though this in fact overlaps the year 28 in the Western calendar).

The Council of the Canberra University College has helped to finance the printing of this work for which I wish to express my sincere thanks. I am also deeply grateful to my friend Otto van der Sprenkel who again has read and corrected the manuscript.

¹) Published in a limited edition in Göteborg 1953 and subsequently included in the Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, no. 26, Stockholm 1954, pp. 1—209.

²) 105. Hulswé (p. 14) has recently corrected Dub's translation of *ch'eng siang* from «Lieutenant Chancellors» to «Chancellors». Although his reasons are convincing, the adoption of the term «Chancellors» would give rise to confusion. The administrators of kingdoms, whose duties were the same as those of the Grand Administrators, had the special title of *siang* or «Chancellors». In order to keep the offices of *ch'eng siang* and *siang* apart, I have in the present volume continued to render the former as «Lieutenant Chancellors».

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	11
 Chapter I. A. D. 23, the rise of the Keng-shi Emperor.	
1. The emperor and his court	15
2. Early conquests and rewards	20
3. The death of Liu Po-sheng	23
4. Secondary rebellions	24
5. Military and political expansion	31
6. Summary	44
 Chapter II. A. D. 24, the emergence of Liu Siu.	
1. The transfer of the capital to Ch'ang-an	49
2. The court loses ground	57
3. The Wang Lang crisis	61
4. Liu Siu independent	76
5. Disintegration of imperial power	86
6. Summary	88
 Chapter III. A. D. 25, the fall of the Keng-shi Emperor.	
1. The defeat and death of the Keng-shi Emperor	91
2. The heirs of the Keng-shi Emperor	102
Liu Siu	102
Liu P'en-tsi	106
Liu Yung	106
Kung-sun Shu	107
3. Summary	109
 Chapter IV. The Red Eyebrows.	
A. D. 26, movements in the northwest	113
A. D. 27, surrender	118
 Chapter V. Military operations in East China.	
1. Campaigns on the northern plain	121
A. D. 26, rebellions of «Goitre Yang» and P'eng Ch'ung	121
A. D. 27, prominence of P'eng Ch'ung	126
A. D. 28, victory and defeat of P'eng Ch'ung	128
A. D. 29, death of P'eng Ch'ung	131
2. Campaigns on the southern plain and the Shan-tung peninsula	131
A. D. 26, first campaign against Liu Yung	131
A. D. 27, second campaign against Liu Yung	137
A. D. 28, operations against Chang Pu, Liu Yü, Tung Hien, and Li Hien	139
A. D. 29, campaigns against Tung Hien and Chang Pu	142
A. D. 30, death of Li Hien and Tung Hien	149

	Page
3. Campaigns in southern Ho-nan and northwestern Hu-pei	150
A. D. 26, the first campaign	150
A. D. 27, campaign against Teng Feng and Ts'in Feng	154
A. D. 28, status quo	156
A. D. 29, defeat of Ts'in Feng and T'ien Jung. Surrender of the south	156
 Chapter VI. Military operations in West China.	
1. Campaigns in the northwest against Wei Ao	159
A. D. 26—29, the diplomatic phase	159
A. D. 30, the first campaign	167
A. D. 31, counteroffensive	172
A. D. 32, the second campaign and the rebellion on the southern plain	173
A. D. 33—34, the third campaign	178
2. Campaigns in the west against Kung-sun Shu	181
A. D. 26—29, the diplomatic phase	181
A. D. 30—34, limited military contacts	184
A. D. 35—36, the great offensive	188
 Chapter VII. Military techniques of the civil war.	
1. Organization	199
2. Tactics	212
3. Appraisal of the military actions	225
4. Psychological warfare	228
 Chapter VIII. Evaluation and conclusion	249
 Quoted literature	260
 Index	261

MAPS

	Page
1. Liu Siu's and Teng Ch'en's operations in A. D. 23 (after the battle of K'un-yang on July 7)	22
2. Secondary rebellions in A. D. 23	25
3. Secondary rebellions in Nan-yang and Nan, A. D. 23	27
4. Military and diplomatic activities of the Keng-shī Emperor in A. D. 23 (after the battle of K'un-yang on July 7)	34
5. The political situation at the end of A. D. 23	46
6. The kingdoms of the Keng-shī Emperor, A. D. 24	55
7. Liu Siu's operations against Wang Lang in A. D. 24	66
8. Movements of the Red Eyebrows in A. D. 24	85
9. The political situation at the end of A. D. 24	89
10. Operations against the Keng-shī Emperor in A. D. 25	93
11. Ch'ang-an in Han times	98
12. Operations in the Lo-yang area I, A. D. 25	103
13. Operations in the Lo-yang area II, A. D. 25	104
14. Military measures of Kung-sun Shu in A. D. 25	108
15. The political situation at the end of A. D. 25	111
16. Movements of the Red Eyebrows in A. D. 26	116
17. Movements of the Red Eyebrows in A. D. 27	119
18. Operations on the northern plain in A. D. 26	125
19. The political situation on the northern plain at the end of A. D. 27	127
20. Operations on the northern plain in A. D. 28	129
21. Operations on the southern plain in A. D. 26	134
22. The political situation on the southern plain and the Shan-tung peninsula at the end of A. D. 26	136
23. Operations on the southern plain and the Shan-tung peninsula in A. D. 28	141
24. The political situation on the southern plain and the Shan-tung peninsula at the end of A. D. 28	143
25. Operations on the southern plain in A. D. 29	146
26. Operations in Shan-tung, A. D. 29	148
27. Operations in the Nan-yang area, A. D. 26	152
28. Operations in Nan-yang and Nan, A. D. 27—29	155
29. Prefectural cities in the Land Within the Passes held by gentry clans, A. D. 27	160
30. Operations against Wei Ao, A. D. 30—32	170
31. Operations against Wei Ao and on the southern plain in A. D. 32	174
32. Operations in the northwest, A. D. 33—34	179

	Page
33. Operations against Kung-sun Shu, A. D. 29—34	185
34. The great offensive against Kung-sun Shu in A. D. 35.	190
35. Operations against Kung-sun Shu in A. D. 36	195
End maps: The commanderies and kingdoms of A. D. 2	{ 258 259

TABLES

1. Activities of the 15 bandit groups and the Red Eyebrows	82
2. Number of sieges during the civil war	225
3. Number of military actions for each year of the civil war	226

ABBREVIATIONS

SK	= Shi ki
HS	= Ts'ien Han shu
HHS	= Hou Han shu
TKK	= Tung kuan Han ki
SHS	= Sū Han shu
HHK	= Hou Han ki
SKC	= Shui king and its commentary
HYKC	= Hua yang kuo chi

If not otherwise indicated, all quotations are from the HHS.

23, 53: 1 b means page 1 b in chapter 23 of the Ki ku ko edition of the HHS (as used by the Hou Han shu tsi kie) which corresponds to chapter 53 of the Palace edition.

EXPLANATION OF MAPS

The maps are based on the atlas of 90. Ting, and on sheets 22, 23, 34, 46 of the Map of Asia (Geographical Section General Staff, War Office, London 1926). Map 11 is derived from 96. San fu huang t'u (1: 6 b—8 b), 104. Herrmann (p. 21, map III), and 97. Utsunomiya (p. 150). All maps are drawn by the author.

- prefectural city
- settlement smaller than prefectural city
- || ford
- △ mountain
-)(pass
- ↗ military forces
- ✕ battle
- siege

INTRODUCTION

In A. D. 22, a rebellion broke out in the Nan-yang commandery, situated in southern Ho-nan and northern Hu-pei. Two groups of what seem to have been independent anti-Wang Mang¹⁾ factions of the Nan-yang gentry merged, resulting in a concentration of power sufficiently large to attempt a revolt. One faction was led by the influential Li clan of the Wan prefecture, its leaders being Li T'ung and his father's brother's son Li Yi. The other consisted of local members of the Liu clan, the former imperial family, who had obvious reasons to oppose Wang Mang as a »usurper« of the throne. The active leadership of the rebellion fell into the hands of the ambitious Liu Po-sheng.

At a very early stage, Liu Po-sheng found it necessary to secure the support of roaming bands of commoners. Although these were known under the names of »Troops from Sin-shi« and »Troops from P'ing-lin«, they had little organization. Most of their leaders were uneducated men who so far had harboured no political ambitions of their own. The united armies were at first successful, but subsequently suffered a disastrous defeat at Siao-ch'ang-an. Liu Po-sheng was forced to repeat his tactics and to summon the aid of still another group of commoners, the so-called »Troops from the Lower [Yang-tsī-]kiang«. This enabled him in the beginning of A. D. 23 to win two major victories and to begin the siege of Wan, the capital of Nan-yang.

It was at this time that the political need for proclaiming an emperor became urgent, as this would legitimize the rebellion, provided it remained successful, and prepare the ground for a wide response from the officials and people all over the empire. The obvious candidate of the Nan-yang gentry was Liu Po-sheng. The chieftains of the commoners, whose assistance had been decisive in the previous victories, were well aware of the fact that they could expect no benefit from any man sponsored by the gentry. If Liu Po-sheng were to be installed as emperor, the junkers of Nan-yang would automatically form the inner circle around him, and the chieftains could only hope for minor spoils. It so happened that a certain Liu Hüan was a member of the Troops from P'ing-lin. He belonged to a branch of the former imperial clan settled in Nan-yang and was, like Liu Po-sheng, a descendant of Emperor King (156—141).²⁾ Both had the same great-great-grandfather, Liu Mai.³⁾ Liu Hüan had formerly been involved in one of the long-lasting

¹⁾ Wang Mang had in A. D. 9 displaced the Former Han dynasty, ascended the throne himself, and proclaimed the establishment of the Sin dynasty.

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, genealogy of the imperial clan (henceforth quoted as: genealogy), nos. 78 and 81.

³⁾ Cf. vol. I, genealogy, no. 18.

feuds typical of this period. After much bloodshed, he had finally escaped, joined the Troops from P'ing-lin, and with them taken part in the civil war. The leaders of the commoners now made a coup which seems to have taken the gentry by surprise. In spite of Liu Po-sheng's hurried protests, they proclaimed Liu Hsuan emperor on Mar. 11, A. D. 23.

As has been shown in the first volume of this work, the background to these events, which culminated in the fall of Wang Mang, had been a deep unrest among the common people in certain parts of the empire. This unrest, in turn, was the result of the change of the course of the Yellow River which had taken place in two stages, one between A. D. 2 and the beginning of A. D. 6 and the other in A. D. 11. Nearly half of the total population had been affected in some way by the flood. Tremendous numbers of starving peasants had evacuated the stricken areas. Some were cut off on the Shan-tung peninsula through the two new arms of the Yellow River, while others slowly migrated southwards. The government could not possibly cope with relief work on such a gigantic scale, and so the famine continued to spread. The situation finally became explosive when, at the end of A. D. 22, two major groups of commoners converged upon the Nan-yang commandery. The so-called Red Eyebrows had at last withdrawn from the Shan-tung peninsula and were approaching from the east, while the Troops from Sin-shi and from the Lower [Yang-tsi-]kiang came from the south. This created an abnormal atmosphere of fear and excitement in Nan-yang which could be exploited by the local gentry. The rebellion broke out, and Liu Po-sheng was able to canalize against Wang Mang the great current of insurgents coming from the south. However, once politically awakened, the chieftains of the commoners realized the disadvantage of supporting the former's candidacy to the throne. By proclaiming Liu Hsuan as emperor, they thought to insure their own future prominence.

Faced with this *fait accompli*, only two choices were open to the gentry of Nan-yang: either it could continue to rally around Liu Po-sheng who, from its point of view, would have made by far the better emperor, or it could drop him resolutely and join the victorious side. Since a total split at this stage would result in immediate annihilation by the troops of Wang Mang, the decision was not hard to make. The Nan-yang gentry moved *en bloc* into the other camp, and Liu Po-sheng found himself deserted. Actually, the gentry could have fared much worse. Although the former leaders of the commoners would constitute the most powerful clique below the throne, this did not exclude the existence and influence of other pressure groups. The chieftains were no longer in command of their original bands. With the ascension of Liu Hsuan, the situation had been changed, and the previously more or less independent troop contingents had been integrated. The future influence of the chieftains rested on the fact that they formed a clique which was conscious of its common interests as well as of its right to the gratitude of the emperor. At the same time, these former chieftains, who now were to receive noble rank and official position and come to be a new gentry, were mostly rough and simple men, quite unable to grasp the organisatory and administrative intricacies of a highly bureaucratic government. The educated Nan-yang gentry could therefore supply

the skills in which the former were lacking, and gradually try to regain what at present was lost. A truce was formed between the new gentry and the old, since their interests had temporarily merged, and, instead of various bands with separate designations, a united army of Han stood ready to launch the final attack on Wang Mang.

Liu Hūan never received any posthumous or temple name and is known in history by his title of reign (nien hao) as the Keng-shī Emperor. Although technically the first ruler of Later Han, he was not the founder of the dynasty. The actual restorer, Kuang-wu, and his successors were far from anxious to grant him any important place in history. In fact, the HHS is clearly biased against the Keng-shī Emperor and does not even supply him with a pen ki (or Basic Record) of his own, but only with a biography. This has had a most unfortunate result. It must be remembered that the History concentrates on those people who played an important positive or negative role during the dynasty. The lives of the emperors, with special stress on their official aspects, are recorded in the pen ki, while the biographies describe the activities of men, and in some cases women, who for some reason or other were eminent or notorious during that time. Wherever possible, the pen ki, but not the biographies, give exact dates, which provide an important chronological framework for the period. Space is devoted to pretenders, warlords, and other enemies of the dynasty, and their biographies sometimes permit the reconstruction of at least the general outlines of their careers. The best example is Wang Mang's biography in the HS, covering chapters 99 A—C and comprising 95 double-pages. This seems at first sight quite impressive when compared with pen ki 1 A—B of Emperor Kuang-wu in the HHS which includes no more than 50 double-pages. The great difference is that, while in all about one third of the HHS is devoted to Kuang-wu and his time, relatively little is told about Wang Mang outside his biography and as good as nothing about his chief assistants and high officials.¹⁾ Practically all one ever will know about the latter is what is mentioned in Wang Mang's biography itself. The historiographical principle behind this phenomenon is that, although the historian registers everything which, for good or bad, affected the dynasty, the emphasis is always on legitimacy. Those who failed to achieve the Mandate of Heaven, simply because in the long run they were not successful, are from this theoretical point of view never considered as more than pretenders. They are never given a pen ki, although in reality they might have been emperors for years with fully established courts and an administrative system in full operation. Hence, no more than a special biography records the rise to power of a «pretender», how he came to oppose the «true» Mandate of Heaven, placed himself outside the realm of orderly relations, became an «outlaw», and finally had to pay for his audacity. Further the historian does not go. Those who were the chief assistants of the «outlaw» are not permitted additional biographies of their own and receive no more than passing notice in the chapter devoted to the man they served. Their activities would have been fully treated in the orthodox manner if their overlord had been victorious and if the Mandate of Heaven could

¹⁾ Cf. 99. Dubs, III, p. 90.

therefore have been claimed for him. Whenever this was not the case, any detailed description of their careers fell outside the scope of a history of the «legitimate» dynasty. Summed up, this historiographical rule can be compressed into one simple sentence: If a man has no pen ki, his followers have no biographies.

Applying this to the HHS, one finds oneself in the uncomfortable situation that a civil war raged from A. D. 22 to 36, and that although no less than eleven emperors at one time or another fought for supremacy, only one of them has a pen ki. Not all of the pretenders were important, yet the fact remains that Liu Siu, who eventually defeated his rivals and as Emperor Kuang-wu is known as the founder of the dynasty, played a very undistinguished role in the beginning. He was a younger brother of Liu Po-sheng and at first was completely overshadowed by the latter. Only from the middle of A. D. 24 did Liu Siu begin to grow into a political figure of consequence. Nevertheless, since he was the future legitimate emperor, the history heavily concentrates on him and his followers from the very outbreak of the rebellion, while relatively little or nothing is known about the men, and their adherents, who originally wielded the real power or later independently rose to prominence. This would be equivalent to a modern historian describing a number of decisive military campaigns and political events mainly from the viewpoint of a subaltern, in whose favour he furthermore twists or even falsifies the evidence in order to place him in as favourable a light as possible. In fact, three of the rival emperors, Liu Wang, Liu Ying and Sun Teng, do not even have biographies and are only mentioned *en passant* in other contexts.¹⁾ Although the other emperors have biographies, one still knows desperately little about the political vicissitudes, human ambitions and destinies under the «reigns» of Wang Lang, Liu Yung, Lu Fang and Li Hien, and above all of the Keng-shi Emperor, Liu P'en-tsi, and Kung-sun Shu. What one has instead is an account in which the attention of the historian is always fatally off centre, especially for the first few crucial years.

Under these circumstances, the function of the modern scholar must be to collect the sparse material for all those men and their adherents who have been neglected in the HHS and its sources, to reconstruct the events wherever possible, and to attempt to regain a balanced perspective on a complicated and fascinating period, rather than a one-sided focus on the future Emperor Kuang-wu. It is therefore proposed first to describe and analyse the shifting fortunes of the civil war, and then, against this background, to appraise the roles of its leading actors. One chapter is devoted to the military techniques of the period. The third volume of this work will take up for discussion the reorganization of the empire under Kuang-wu and the contributions he made, for better or worse, as founder of the dynasty.

¹⁾ E. g. the only reference to Sun Teng in the entire HHS consists of two sentences in I A: 20 b – 21 a.

CHAPTER I. A. D. 23, THE RISE OF THE KENG-SHĪ EMPEROR

1. *The emperor and his court*

Since only a biography is devoted to the Keng-shī Emperor, very little information has been preserved about his chief adherents, provided these did not later become the followers of the «legitimate» Emperor Kuang-wu. The biography also shares the shortcoming of all other biographies: a distinct lack of important dates. The few exact dates which are extant have been recorded, almost exclusively, in Kuang-wu's pen ki. One may count oneself lucky if at least the months are known in which the various incidents occurred. One single event is chronologically certain: the Keng-shī Emperor ascended the throne on Mar. 11, A. D. 23. The ceremony was held on the shore of the Yü River, south of the besieged city of Wan. An amnesty was granted to the empire, and the title of reign chosen was «keng-shī», «A New Beginning» (1 A: 4 a; 11, 41: 2 a).

Although the new Son of Heaven at this stage controlled no more than parts of the Nan-yang commandery, it was a matter of relative urgency to set up a central government. A ruler without a court could never be more than an emperor in name, and would have been unable to command the prestige and awe due to his exalted rank. This psychological fact was realized by all pretenders who during this period strove for imperial power. It was also hoped that the officials of the various territories would desert Wang Mang and transfer their support to the restored dynasty. Adequate government departments were needed to handle the administrative routine of such a process. The bureaucratic duties of the new ministers would be very light in the beginning, but would grow in proportion to the success of the now legitimized rebellion.

The most important office-holders in the state were at this time the so-called Three Dukes. They did not actually possess the noble rank of dukes. The term served as a collective designation for the Commander-in-chief, the Grand Minister over the Masses, and the Grand Minister of Works. The Three Dukes were followed in the official hierarchy by the Nine Ministers who were in charge of Ceremonies, the Imperial Household, the Palace Guards, the Imperial Coaches and Horses, Justice, Feudal Protocol, the Imperial Clan, Agriculture, and the Privy Treasury. The Keng-shī Emperor was faced with the thorny problem of how to parcel out these offices. The chieftains of the commoners had helped him to the throne and therefore should be appropriately repayed. The gentry party in turn had acquiesced and thereby insured its own, if more meagre, slice of the reward. The solution throws an interesting light on the struggle for power at the court.

To start with, three entirely new offices were created above the rank of the Three

Dukes. These positions had not existed in Former Han times. Liu Po-sheng's paternal uncle Liang¹⁾ was made Thrice Venerable of the State, a nondescript man appointed to a titular office (11, 41: 2 b; 14, 44: 8 a). Wang K'uang and Wang Feng, former leaders of the Troops from Sin-shī, received the rank of Supreme Duke Who Establishes the State and Supreme Duke Who Perfects the State respectively (11, 41: 2 b). It is not clear whether any functions were connected with these eminent titles. So much is plain, that both remained prominent as leaders of armies, although Wang Feng early disappears from the sources. Among the highest dignitaries, then, the proportion of chieftains to old gentry was 2: 1. The only representative of the latter was, furthermore, an undistinguished man.

Turning to the Three Dukes, the picture is repeated. Chu Wei, a former leader of the Troops from Sin-shī, was appointed Commander-in-chief, and Ch'en Mu, a former leader of the Troops from P'ing-lin, became Grand Minister of Works. This left the position of Grand Minister over the Masses to be decided. Liu Po-sheng had failed in the struggle for the throne and was gradually deserted by his former allies among the gentry of Nan-yang. However, his influence was still a factor to be reckoned with. It was he who received this important office (1 A: 4 a; 11, 41: 2 b; 14, 44: 3 a). The proportion is again 2 chieftains to 1 member of the gentry.

In the case of the Nine Ministers, we are not so fortunate as to know the names of all the newly appointed men. This is not a peculiarity of the keng-shī period alone. It is not possible even for one single year of Later Han to reconstruct the complete list of these dignitaries. In the present context, the sources simply state that «kiu k'ing tsiang kūn» were appointed (11, 41: 2 b). This implies, as already remarked by Hu San-sing (1230—1287), that the Nine Ministers simultaneously held the rank of generals.²⁾ It is quite evident that for the time being their military duties by far outweighed their bureaucratic ones. Four of the new ministers are mentioned by name in widely different parts of the HHS. Liu Siu, younger brother of Po-sheng and the future Emperor Kuang-wu, became Grand Master of Ceremonies (1 A: 4 a).³⁾ Liu Ts'i, another member of the imperial

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I, genealogy, no. 55.

²⁾ Quoted by 11,41: 2 b, *T'ei kie*.

³⁾ A problem arises, since no less than three men are recorded to have held the rank of Grand Master of Ceremonies during A. D. 23. These are, apart from Liu Siu, Liu Ch'i and Liu Kia.

As far as Liu Kia is concerned, it is stated in 18,48: 10 b that, when the Keng-shī Emperor had ascended the throne and had appointed him as Grand Master of Ceremonies and General, Ch'en Tsūn became his Chief Clerk. Liu Kia's own biography is silent on this point. It merely says that he was appointed a Lieutenant General after the emperor had ascended the throne, and that he was promoted to General-in-chief after the fall of the city of Wan (14,44: 14 a). In other words, if Liu Kia really had received the important position of Grand Master of Ceremonies, it would seem most curious that this is not mentioned at all in his biography but only *en passant* in quite another context. There is considerable justification for Hung Yi-hūan's (1765—1837) suggestion that 太常將軍 is a mistake for 大將軍 (cf. 18, 48: 10 b, *T'ei kie*). The text of 18,48: 10 b would then have to be understood as follows: «When the Keng-shī Emperor had ascended the throne and had appointed Liu Kia of the Imperial House as General-in-chief, Ch'eng Tsūn became his Chief Clerk.» This would imply that the time element is not to be taken literally. The Keng-shī Emperor ascended the throne in March while Wan fell in July, and only then was Liu Kia promoted to General-in-chief. There is, however, nothing

clan,¹⁾ was appointed Superintendent of the Imperial Household (14, 44: 12 a). Chang Ang and Wang Ch'ang, both former leaders of the Troops from the Lower [Yang-tsü-]kiang, became Commandant of the Palace Guards and Commandant of Justice respectively (11, 41: 4 a; 15, 45: 5 b). One further office-holder may be mentioned here although strictly speaking he did not belong to the Nine Ministers. He seems to have possessed the same theoretical status in the official hierarchy and was customarily counted among them. This was the Bearer of the Gilded Mace. Liao Chan, a former chieftain of the Troops from P'ing-lin, was appointed to this position (11, 41: 4 a).²⁾ Among these five dignitaries, Liu Siu, as a Lieutenant General, had the lowest military rank. Wang Ch'ang and Liao Chan were both Generals-in-chief. Chang Ang's office had by definition a military character. Only in the case of Liu Ts'i, his military rank is unknown. Considering the proportion of the former chieftains to the old gentry, the figures are 3: 2. The scales were actually even more heavily tipped against the gentry party, since the position of Liu Ts'i was somewhat equivocal. He had assisted the present emperor in a feud before the rebellion³⁾ and, as his father's brother's son, belonged to his closest kin. This singled him out from the rest of the gentry as a special confidant of the ruler and did not make him *persona grata* among the less privileged members of the gentry clique.

Recapitulating the previous results, the proportion between the chieftains and the old gentry is as follows:

Newly created highest offices:	2: 1
Three Dukes	: 2: 1
Nine Ministers ⁴⁾	: 3: 2
Total:	7: 4

peculiar in such an ellipsis, which the historian is apt to use frequently. Taking all this into consideration, there are good grounds for the assumption that Liu Kia never was a Grand Master of Ceremonies.

This leaves Liu Siu and Liu Chi to be considered. There can be no doubt that Liu Siu preceeded the latter in the office. Soon after the middle of A. D. 23, he was assigned to other duties, while Liu Chi still was Grand Master of Ceremonies in the beginning of A. D. 24 (11, 41: 4 a). The only remaining problem would be when Liu Siu was replaced. Liu Chi's biography says that when the Keng-shi Emperor had ascended the throne, he appointed him as Grand Master of Ceremonies and General and anew made him a marquis of Ch'ung-ling (a rank which he had lost under Wang Mang in A. D. 10) (14, 44: 10 b). It is probable that this again is an ellipsis. The first enfeoffment of marquises took place after Wan had been conquered in the 6th month (July 7—August 5) and the Keng-shi Emperor had chosen this city as his temporary capital. It was presumably at this occasion that Liu Chi's former marquisate was restored to him. Liu Po-sheng was executed soon afterwards. Hence, everything points to the fact that Liu Siu was dismissed after the execution of his brother and subsequently replaced by Liu Chi. This indicates in turn that Liu Chi's enfeoffment preceded his appointment as minister. The text might therefore seem somewhat inaccurate, but in a highly compressed sentence like this the historian is not to be taken verbatim. All he wants to say is that Liu Chi became a Grand Master of Ceremonies and that, at some time or another, he also became a marquis.

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I, genealogy, no. 80.

²⁾ In the case of Chang Ang and Liao Chan, the time of their appointment is not given. Both are mentioned as occupying their respective offices by the beginning of A. D. 24. In all probability, they were installed soon after the Keng-shi Emperor had ascended the throne.

³⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 97.

⁴⁾ As far as their names are known, plus the Bearer of the Gilded Mace.

For the time being, the former chieftains were quantitatively in an unassailable position. There is, however, another aspect to be considered.

Care had evidently been taken in the distribution of offices to evaluate the individual capacity of the various men. Here the old gentry had the great advantage of being educated. The former chieftains, with the possible exception of two,¹⁾ were illiterate commoners who knew how to command their troops but who would have made poor officials wherever specialized knowledge was required. It is therefore symptomatic that specific high, yet titular, offices were created for Wang K'uang and Wang Feng. In practice, they continued to lead soldiers and hence were not out of their depth. It is also suggestive that among the Three Dukes the Commander-in-chief was a former chieftain. His duties were, at least for the time being, of a military nature. The Grand Minister over the Masses, on the other hand, supervised the administration of the empire, kept a close check on the officials, and was in charge of finance. No leader of the commoners could, by the wildest stretch of imagination, possess the necessary capacity for such an office. Liu Po-sheng was therefore selected for this exacting position. As to the Grand Minister of Works, he was responsible for drains, irrigation, canals etc. but also had other duties. It is doubtful whether Ch'en Mu possessed the specialist knowledge required, but the chieftains may have insisted on the proportion 2: 1.

Turning next to the offices of the Nine Ministers, almost all of these demanded education. One patent exception was the post of Commandant of the Palace Guards, and it can be no coincidence that the chieftain Chang Ang received this appointment. The only other leader of commoners who, as far as the sources tell, became one of the Nine Ministers was Wang Ch'ang, the Commandant of Justice. It is not impossible that he had a gentry background, so that his selection for this office would be entirely consistent with the emerging picture. Liu Siu as Grand Master of Ceremonies and Liu Ts'i as Superintendent of the Imperial Household represented the old gentry in offices not suited to the chieftains. Finally, the Bearer of the Gilded Mace had mainly police duties outside the palace, which hardly required any special training. It is not surprising to find Liao Chan, a former chieftain, in this office.

It is obvious from the above that the old gentry, although outnumbered, had been able to manoeuvre itself into several key positions. A division of offices according to specific lines was already presupposed by the very nature of the different background of the various chieftains and members of the gentry. This does not mean that the process had been carried out mechanically. There is a distinct significance in the apportioning of offices to the two cliques, and it is clear that what the chieftains commanded in numbers, the old gentry had almost been able to regain in weight. It occupied those posts which dominated the management of, as well as the recruitment to, the official apparatus. This could be of paramount importance for the future. The close balance between the two groups is also exemplified by the fact that the Commandant of the Palace Guards controlled the gates to the palace while the Superintendent of the Imperial Household protected the doors within the palace itself. The former was a chieftain (Chang Ang), the latter a member

¹⁾ Wang Ch'ang (cf. vol. I, p. 110) and Ma Wu (cf. vol. I, p. 106).

of the old gentry (Liu Ts'ï). This means that neither of the cliques had complete physical power over the person of the Son of Heaven.

The sources do not permit any direct conclusions as to whether this division of influence was brought about by a kind of collective bargaining between the two groups or whether the Keng-shī Emperor himself had played an active part. This problem is in the last instance connected with the question to what extent the emperor is to be considered as a wavering pawn or as a man of some ability, a point which will be taken up in a later chapter. It may be emphasized, however, that the existence of two cliques, temporarily allied and both conscious of the role they hoped for in the future, was by no means disadvantageous for the ruler. If he proved himself a good politician, the cliques could be played against each other, and this would actively strengthen his position. It is precisely here that the Keng-shī Emperor seems to have overlooked the possibilities of the situation. He was right in one respect: there was no hope of governing the empire without the assistance of the official class. The fact that the junkers joined his camp with so little friction can only indicate that he, as well as they, were fully aware of this. The emperor may also have shown a cautious preference for the Nan-yang gentry. It probably is not without significance that the Superintendent of the Imperial Household, charged with enforcing the immediate personal safety of the sovereign, was Liu Ts'ï. Perhaps the emperor preferred at this stage to entrust his life to a man who, although a member of the gentry party, was also his nearest relative and long-standing ally, and therefore occupied a unique position. The fact remains that the Keng-shī Emperor may not have recognized the full advantage which the struggle between the cliques could bring him. It is possible that he considered the Nan-yang gentry as a counterweight against the chieftains, without realizing that this was also true in reverse.

One final point of interest may be brought up. It looks as though the leaders of the commoners were rewarded in almost direct relation to the time at which they and their bands had joined the rebellion. The first of these groups consisted of the Troops from Sin-shī which had been reinforced by the numerically far inferior Troops from P'ing-lin,¹⁾ but only after the defeat of Siao-ch'ang-an were the Troops from the Lower [Yang-tsī]-kiang persuaded to make common cause with the rebels of Nan-yang.²⁾ Among these various chieftains, the two highest offices went to Wang K'uang and Wang Feng, leaders of the Troops from Sin-shī. On the level of the Three Dukes, the position of Commander-in-chief fell to Chu Wei, still another leader of the Troops from Sin-shī, while the post of Grand Minister of Works was given to Ch'en Mu of the Troops from P'ing-lin. Among the Nine Ministers, lower in rank than the others previously mentioned, the two chieftains were Chang Ang and Wang Ch'ang. Both were leaders of the Troops from the Lower [Yang-tsī]-kiang and relative late-comers to the revolt. The Bearer of the Gilded Mace, Liao Chan, was a chieftain of the Troops from P'ing-lin. This only leaves two former leaders of commoners unaccounted for, Ma Wu, a minor chieftain of the Troops from Sin-shī,

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 106, 136.

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 109—110, 136.

and, significantly enough, Ch'eng Tan of the Troops from the Lower [Yang-tsi-]kiang.¹⁾ Ma Wu was after the battle of K'un-yang appointed a General Who Inspires Awe (22, 52: 10 a). Ch'eng Tan held in the beginning of A. D. 24 the title of General-in-chief of Waters and Parks, but might have received this office earlier (11, 41: 4 a).

Considering the party of the Nan-yang gentry, it will have been observed that all the men known to have received positions among the highest dignitaries belonged to the imperial family. Members of other clans had to content themselves with military titles. Li T'ung was appointed General-in-chief Who Is Pillar of State (15, 45: 2 b) and Li Yi General of the Five Majestic [Principles] (1 A: 5 b). Li Pao, who might have belonged to the same clan, became General Who Is Pillar of Heaven (26, 56: 13 a). Tsung Tiao received the rank of General-in-chief of Agile Cavalry, and Shen-t'u Kien that of General-in-chief Who Shields Westwards (11, 41: 3 a).²⁾ So much is certain, that in the military field the former chieftains wielded greater power than the old gentry; the latter, although outnumbered, were an influential factor in the civilian administration.

The high officials had thus been appointed, and the new ruler was surrounded by a court. As far as he and his adherents were concerned, he was the only legitimate emperor of the realm. Through military operations and political persuasion it was now necessary to gain universal acceptance for this claim.

2. *Early conquests and rewards*

While Liu Po-sheng continued the siege of Wan, various generals conquered the major part of the Nan-yang commandery. An expeditionary corps marched in a half circle through the Ju-nan and Ying-ch'uan commanderies and subsequently returned to the army outside Wan³⁾ (14, 44: 3 a—3 b; 25, 56: 13 a—13 b; 32, 62: 8 b). In the 3rd month (Apr. 10—May 8), Liu Siu entered the Ying-ch'uan commandery (HS 99 C: 21 b; HHS 1 A: 4 a).⁴⁾ This meant that the base of operations had been drastically widened, which was not only important from the military and psychological point of view, but also guaranteed a new flow of badly needed provisions and recruits. To expand or perish was a cardinal rule of all uprisings, forced as the rebels were to live off the land as long as the administration remained aloof or hostile.

During the 4th month (May 9—June 7), a general lull in military events prevailed, which lasted until Wang Mang's great army approached from the north. The siege and the decisive battle of K'un-yang have already been described.⁵⁾ On July 7, A. D. 23, the Han troops won an overwhelming victory, the credit for which seems greatly to belong to Liu Siu. The latter was still no more than a Lieutenant General,

¹⁾ It is, of course, not out of the question that these two also were among the Nine Ministers although their offices have nowhere been recorded.

²⁾ In the last three cases, the home commanderies are unfortunately unknown.

³⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 118.

⁴⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 118—119 and *ibidem* map 4.

⁵⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 74—81, 119—120.

which meant that no less than four officers of higher rank than he participated in the action.¹⁾ The attempt of the HHS to portray him as the chief commander of this entire operation can therefore only be an almost ludicrous exaggeration. The fact remains, however, that it seems to have been Liu Siu who first realized a disastrous tactical mistake of the enemy and, acting accordingly, won the day. It was the first time that he had proved his outstanding military talents.

Three days before the battle of K'un-yang, i. e. on July 4, Liu Po-sheng had taken the city of Wan. Soon afterwards, the Keng-shi Emperor entered this town and chose it as his temporary capital. As usual, the sources provide no exact date and simply place the event in the 6th month (July 7—Aug. 5) of A. D. 23.

The emperor's first step was to reward his followers. It is stated that he enfeoffed the members of the imperial house and the various officers, and that those who became Full Marquises (lie hou) were more than 100 men (11, 41: 2 b). The HHS in only eight cases records the names and titles of these new nobles:

Liu Chi²⁾ was reinstalled as marquis of Ch'ung-ling, a fief which he had lost under Wang Mang (14, 44: 10 b).

Liu Ts'i became Marquis Who Makes Han Far-reaching (14, 44: 12 a).

Liu Kia³⁾ became Marquis Who Elevates Virtue (14, 44: 14 a).

Li T'ung became Marquis Who Supports Han (15, 45: 2 b).

Li Pao⁴⁾ became Marquis Who Is Pillar of Merit (13, 43: 14 a).

Chao Hi became Marquis Who Is Brave and Meritorious (26, 56: 13 b).

Ts'en P'eng⁵⁾ became Marquis Who Attaches Himself to Virtue (17, 47: 10 b).

Wang Ch'ang became Marquis Who Knows the Mandate (15, 45: 5b).

It is a great pity that no more information has been preserved, since no conclusions can be based on this small number. If any inference can be drawn at all, it would be that perhaps a tendency existed to grant honorific literary titles rather than definite fiefs. The Keng-shi Emperor may have made the sensible rule not to parcel out to his followers the relatively little area under his control nor to bestow marquises in regions which had not yet been conquered. This impression is reinforced by the fact that the emperor in other connections adopted similar principles and that Liu Siu later followed exactly the same policy.

Either now, or in any event not much later, the Keng-shi Emperor also seems to have enfeoffed a number of kings although only a reference to one single man has been preserved. It is stated that Chang Ang went out on a campaign to Huai-yang, and in this connection his name is suddenly prefixed by the three characters «the King Who Establishes Majesty» (17, 47: 10 b). Chang Ang was a former leader


¹⁾ The Supreme Duke Who Perfects the State Wang Feng, the Commandant of Justice and General-in-chief Wang Ch'ang, the General-in-chief of Agile Cavalry Tsung Tiao, and the General of the Five Majestic [Principles] Li Yi (1 A: 5 b).

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, genealogy, no. 73 and supra p. 16, note 3.

³⁾ Cf. vol. I, genealogy, no. 77 and supra p. 16, note 3.

⁴⁾ In this case, the title is not mentioned before A. D. 24, but it might very well have been granted in 23.

⁵⁾ He and a certain Yen Shuo had led the defence of Wan. Cf. vol. I, pp. 118—120.



Map 1. Liu Siu's and Teng Ch'en's operations in A. D. 23 (after the battle of K'un-yang on July 7).

of the Troops from the Lower [Yang-tsī-]kiang, and if he was made a king, it must be assumed that other prominent chieftains received this rank as well. Since the most important relatives of the Keng-shī Emperor and the leading members of the Nan-yang gentry already are accounted for in the list of marquises,¹⁾ this permits a definite conclusion: the chieftains had again been singled out for special honours, over and above the members of the old gentry. It should be observed that Chang Ang's title, just as in the case of the marquises, was purely honorific and did not imply the existence of a definite kingdom.

Meanwhile, Liu Siu had continued his campaign from K'un-yang²⁾ and received the surrender of Ying-yang (1 A: 7 a; 17, 47: 1 a; 20, 50: 5 b; 37, 67: 9 a). He proceeded to the city of Fu-ch'eng, which he was unable to take³⁾ (17, 47: 1 a—1 b). It is not clear whether Liu Siu was in sole command or whether the HHS has suppressed the name of the real leader. For instance, his brother-in-law Teng Ch'en

¹⁾ Wang Ch'ang is also mentioned in this list. He was only a minor leader of the Troops from the Lower [Yang-tsī-]kiang and may therefore, at this early stage, not have been in line for a kingdom.

²⁾ For this and the following events cf. map 1.

³⁾ In vol. I, p. 121, I stated by mistake that Fu-ch'eng already had been conquered at the time of the execution of Liu Po-sheng.

seems also to have been in Ying-yang (TKK 1: 3 b). The latter was a Lieutenant General and therefore had exactly the same rank as Liu Siu. Teng Ch'en separately attacked and conquered Yang-ti, the capital of Ying-ch'uan, as well as King¹⁾ and Mi²⁾ (15, 45: 8 a). Still another Lieutenant General seems to have cooperated in these engagements (22, 52: 9 a). Whoever had the highest authority, it is evident that Liu Siu in Ying-ch'uan, both before and after the battle of K'un-yang, established contacts with a number of men who later were to become his trusted generals and chief followers.

3. *The death of Liu Po-sheng*

The close cooperation between the former chieftains and the old gentry, the support both cliques gave to the new sovereign, and the recent military triumphs must have notably increased the prestige and power of the Keng-shi Emperor. Liu Po-sheng had become dispensable. Although he simply might have been dismissed, complete removal seemed much more attractive. He was an ambitious, brave and capable man, and would always remain a potential danger. This not only concerned the emperor himself, but also the former chieftains who had frustrated his plans for the throne, as well as the Nan-yang gentry which had sold him out. It is symptomatic that the charges against Liu Po-sheng were made by Chu Wei, a chieftain, and by Li Yi, who was prominent among the gentry. It even is possible that the two cliques in a united effort forced the emperor's hand. Otherwise it would be hard to explain why he faltered in the last moment when the first attempt was made to dispose of Liu Po-sheng, or why he later gave influential posts to Liu Siu. In any case, Liu Po-sheng was arrested on clearly trumped-up charges and promptly executed (1 A: 7 a; 11,41: 2 b; 14,44: 3 b—4 a).³⁾

A new Grand Minister over the Masses had to be selected, and it is interesting to notice that the choice fell on Liu Ts'i (14,44: 12 a). This left the proportion between the former chieftains and the old gentry still at 2: 1. However, Liu Ts'i was the closest relative of the emperor and his especially trusted assistant and adviser. The appointment must therefore have resulted in a strengthening of the Keng-shi Emperor's hold over the government.

As soon as Liu Siu heard the news of his brother's death, he hurried from Fu-ch'eng to Wan. He was clearly afraid for his own life, since he did not dare to wear any mourning (1 A: 7 a). It seems plausible to deduce, although it is not

¹⁾ The King prefecture during Han belonged to the Ho-nan commandery and was situated SE of the present Yung-yang hien, Ho-nan.

²⁾ The Mi prefecture during Han belonged to the Ho-nan commandery and was situated SE of the present hien with the same name, Ho-nan. Actually, Mi must have been taken before King, since it was situated on a straight line between Yang-ti and King.

³⁾ For details see vol. I, pp. 120—121. Again neither the date nor even the exact month are known with certainty. In Kuang-wu's pen ki and in the biographies of the Keng-shi Emperor and Liu Po-sheng, the description of the execution is preceded by entries for the 6th month. This is in 11,41: 2 b followed by an entry for the 8th month. In all probability, the execution occurred in the 6th month, although it is possible that it took place as late as the 7th.

mentioned in the sources, that Liu Siu at this time was dismissed, or permitted to resign, from his office as Grand Master of Ceremonies. He was replaced by Liu Chī who simultaneously received the rank of general (14,44: 10 b).¹⁾ Again the proportion of former chieftains to old gentry remained unchanged. Neither of the two recent appointments involved men from other clans. The replacements came from the imperial family itself.

The emperor soon took the rather surprising step of again promoting Liu Siu. The HHS states that he felt ashamed (1 A: 7 a), a remark which can hardly be based on any documentary evidence and therefore must be a private reflection of the historian. It so happens that it is the only explanation which fits the facts. The Keng-shī Emperor could not possibly have been so foolish as not to realize that Liu Siu resented the death of his brother. He may at the same time genuinely have regretted the political necessity of liquidating Liu Po-sheng, and therefore wished to conciliate Liu Siu through a generous gesture. Whatever his motive, he appointed him as General Who Routs the Caitiffs²⁾ and enfeoffed him as Marquis Who Is Martial and Trustworthy³⁾ (1 A: 7 a). Liu Siu was after all a very minor figure who had not even been considered important enough to be executed together with his brother. His rank was no longer among the ministers, and he became a mortal danger only through a later and, in the last instance, unforeseeable turn of events. There was nothing in his character which would have made him a relentless avenger of his brother's death. It will be seen that at a later stage he was quite willing to forgive Chu Wei for his part in the plot, when such an action was politically opportune.

4. *Secondary rebellions*

One very important incident of the 6th month remains to be mentioned. The first of a number of secondary rebellions occurred. In the parts of the Hung-nung commandery adjacent to Nan-yang, two men rose in revolt, obtained troops, entered the Wu pass⁴⁾ leading towards Ch'ang-an, and invited the Han troops to join them in an attack on the capital.⁵⁾ This was soon followed by another secondary revolt, led by Wei Ao, in the T'ien-shui commandery. Influenced by a certain Fang Wang whom he had summoned to become his Master of the Army, Wei Ao recognized the Han dynasty, although not necessarily at this stage the Keng-shī Emperor. Together with his paternal uncles Wei Ts'ui and Wei Yi, and some intimate followers, he issued a proclamation on Aug. 6 which contained


¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 16, note 3.

²⁾ 1 A: 7 a states that his title was General-in-chief Who Routs the Caitiffs, while 1 A: 8 a refers to him as General Who Routs the Caitiffs. Although it seems improbable that Liu Siu would have been promoted from Lieutenant General directly to General-in-chief, the contradiction must remain unsolved. There is a possibility that the historian as usual tried to improve on Liu Siu's background. He may have added a 大 (in-chiefs) to his title in the first case but overlooked to do so in the second.

³⁾ This proves indirectly that Liu Siu had been by-passed when after the fall of Wan the emperor had enfeoffed his followers.

⁴⁾ Situated 100 li E of the present Shang hien, Shen-si. It is shown in 90. Ting, map 29.

⁵⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 127 and *ibidem* map 4.



Map 2. Secondary rebellions in A. D. 23.

sweeping accusations against Wang Mang.¹⁾ He and the other leaders all assumed impressive titles (13,43: 2 a).²⁾

Wei Ao's first important military action was to attack and kill Wang Mang's Shepherd of the Yung province.³⁾ He then sent a letter to the administrator of An-ting, who did not react to this overture.⁴⁾ Wei Ao's troops captured him, he was executed, and the entire An-ting commandery surrendered (HS 99 C: 24 b; HHS 13,43: 4 b).⁵⁾ After Wang Mang's death, the officers of Wei Ao also conquered the Lung-si, Wu-tu, Kin-ch'eng, Wu-wei, Chang-ye, Tsiu-ts'üan, and Tun-huang commanderies (13,43: 4 b). This placed him in possession of almost the whole of present Kan-su.

It was probably at this time that another man appeared on the scene whose

¹⁾ For a translation of this proclamation and further details see vol. I, pp. 123-126.

²⁾ For this and the following events cf. map 2.

³⁾ Wang Mang had changed the name of the Liang province to Yung. It roughly comprised the area of present Kan-su.

⁴⁾ His name, according to HHS 13,43: 4 b, was Wang Hiang. HS 99 C: 24 b refers to him as Wang Sün. Cf. 99. Dubs, III, p. 456. Wang Hiang (alias Wang Sün) was the son of T'an who in turn was Wang Mang's father's brother.

⁵⁾ In contrast to HHS, HS places these events before the above-mentioned proclamation.

ambitions were to soar still higher than Wei Ao's. His name was Lu Fang. Either now, or more likely in later years, he invented a remarkable genealogy for himself. He claimed to be a certain Liu Wen-po, great-grandson of Emperor Wu (140—87) and his empress, who was a Hiung-nu princess. The latter supposedly had three sons. During the witchcraft persecution, her eldest son, the Heir-apparent, was executed, and she herself condemned to death. Her second son, Ts'i-k'ing, was the future Emperor Sūan (73—49). The third son, Hui-k'ing, escaped to the Left Valley of the San-shui prefecture.¹⁾ When the regent Ho Kuang had placed Ts'i-k'ing on the throne, he summoned Hui-k'ing to return, but the latter refused to do so. He had a son by name of Sun-k'ing who in turn was the father of Wen-po (12,42: 10 b). This genealogy is an extraordinary concoction of plain nonsense, which clearly marks it as spurious and as the invention of a man with little knowledge of the court. Although Ts'i-k'ing was the style of Emperor Sūan, he was not the brother but the grandson of the Heir-apparent. Emperor Wu's unfortunate empress belonged to the Wei clan and certainly was not a princess of the Hiung-nu. Nor does the HS make any reference to Hui-k'ing. He and his descendants are undoubtedly a complete invention. The most interesting part of Lu Fang's imaginative genealogy is, clearly, the insistence on his descent not only from Emperor Wu but also from a Hiung-nu princess. He probably expected that this would facilitate his recognition by both the Chinese and the Hiung-nu. It will be seen that the latter played a most important role in the years that followed. For the present, Lu Fang was content to raise troops, including Tibetans (K'iang) and other non-Chinese tribesmen (Hu), in his home prefecture San-shui (12,42: 10 b)²⁾ which in the northeast directly bordered on the area dominated by Wei Ao.

While the Keng-shī Emperor so far had no reason to feel any direct worry at this development in the north and northwest, some difficulties had also arisen in the south and east. A certain Yen Ts'en from Chu-yang³⁾ seems to have rebelled in, or near his home prefecture.⁴⁾ Nothing is known about his background. He was defeated at Kuan-kün and surrendered (14,44: 14 a). This, however, was not the end of his career. In the years to come, he developed into one of the most adventurous troublemakers of this period.

The most powerful insurgent in the south was Ts'in Feng, who belonged to the gentry. His home was in the Li-k'iu district⁵⁾ of the Ki prefecture⁶⁾ in Nan com-

¹⁾ This prefecture is shown on map 4.


²⁾ The text states that he raised soldiers in the Dependent State of San-shui. This, as pointed out by Ts'ien Ta-chao, is an ellipsis. He assembled troops in the San-shui prefecture, which at this time was the capital of the Dependent State of An-ting. Cf. 12,42: *Kiao pu*.

³⁾ The Chu-yang prefecture during Han belonged to the Nan-yang commandery and was situated 4 li S of the present Kuang-hua hien, Hu-pei.

⁴⁾ For Yen Ts'en, Ts'in Feng and T'ien Jung (the latter two discussed in the next paragraph) cf. also map 3.

⁵⁾ The HHS 17,47: 12 b simply states that he was a native of the Nan commandery. The TTK 23: 5 a says that he was from the Ki prefecture. Most detailed is the Siang yang ki (by Si Tso-ch'i, ± 383) which records that his home was in the Li-k'iu district (cf. 1 A: 11 b, *Commentary*). The HHK 1: 14 a writes Li district instead of Li-k'iu.

⁶⁾ Identical with the present Yi-ch'eng hien, Hu-pei.



Map 3. Secondary rebellions in Nan-yang and Nan, A. D. 23.

mandery. He had studied law in Ch'ang-an as a young man and after his return received an office. In A. D. 23, he raised troops and conquered, apart from Ki, eleven cities in the Nan and Nan-yang commanderies. These included Sin-ye and Hu-yang, which previously had been in the hands of the Han armies¹⁾ (TKK 23:5a;

¹⁾ The other nine prefectures were:

Yi-ch'eng in the Nan commandery, situated S of the present hien with the same name, Hu-pei.

Jo in the Nan commandery, situated SE of the present Yi-ch'eng hien, Hu-pei.

Pien in the Nan commandery.

Lin-tsü in the Nan commandery, situated NW of the present Tang-yang hien, Hu-pei.

Chung-lu in the Nan commandery, situated SW of the present Siang-yang hien, Hu-pei. The commentary of the Ki ku ko and Palace editions (quoting the TTK) writes Chung-tsü-lu, a mistake corrected by Shen K'in-han. Cf. 17,47: 12 b, *Tsi kie*. The commentary of the Shao-hing edition (lie chuan 7: 19 b) correctly has Chung-lu.

Siang-yang in the Nan commandery, identical with the present hien with the same name, Hu-pei.

Teng in the Nan-yang commandery, situated N of the present Siang-yang hien, Hu-pei.

Jang in the Nan-yang commandery, situated SE of the present Teng hien, Ho-nan.

Ts'ai-yang in the Nan-yang commandery.

HHS 17,47: 12 b). Ts'in Feng had thus achieved a foothold in the Nan-yang commandery, and he was able to maintain this for several years. Either now, or in any event not much later than the beginning of 24, he proclaimed himself King of Ch'u-li¹⁾ (1 A: 11 a; 17,47: 12 b).

Directly south of the area controlled by Ts'in Feng, another adventurer was active: T'ien Jung, a native of Ju-nan. Together with Ch'en Yi from the same commandery, he had lived as a «guest» in Yi-ling²⁾ and in A. D. 23 took possession of this prefecture (1 A: 11 b; 13,43: 16 a). Both men might have belonged to the displaced persons who had migrated southwards. T'ien Jung proclaimed himself General-in-chief Who Sweeps the Earth, while Ch'en Yi assumed another title³⁾ (TKK 23: 8 a). A later source⁴⁾ states that subsequently they called themselves kings. The exact time is unknown, but it was in all probability at an early stage that T'ien Jung joined Ts'in Feng and received one of his daughters in marriage (13,43: 16 a). The two allies were able to maintain their independence until A. D. 29. Ch'en Yi, however, is not again referred to in the records.

Further towards the east, one of Wang Mang's dignitaries by the name of Li Hien had taken advantage of the disorder in the empire to gain independence for himself. He had originally been a high official in Lu-kiang. When towards the end of Wang Mang's reign bandits assembled and looted this commandery, Li Hien had been made a Lieutenant General and promoted to administrator. The unrest was successfully put down (12,42: 7 a—7 b).⁵⁾ During the civil war, Li Hien began to pursue a course of his own. He took possession of the Lu-kiang commandery but did not ally himself with the Han troops nor with any other powers. His ambitions drove him eventually to enter the contest for the imperial

¹⁾ He possessed this self-assumed title with certainty by the middle of A. D. 24 (1 A: 11 a). The *Commentary* (ibidem) points out that Ts'in Feng's home district Li-k'iu was situated within the area of the former Ch'u State and that this was the reason for his choice.

²⁾ The Yi-ling prefecture during Han belonged to the Nan commandery and was situated E of the present Yi-ch'ang hien, Hu-pei.

³⁾ According to TKK 23: 8 a, his rank was General-in-chief of Li-k'iu. This is mystifying, since Li-k'iu was the home of Ts'in Feng while Ch'en Yi, as far as is known, had no connections with this place. Perhaps the title was granted later by Ts'in Feng after T'ien Jung and Ch'en Yi had made common cause with him. This actually might be true of T'ien Jung's appellation also. The technical term employed in instances like these is «X styled himself . . . » 自稱. Such stylization (cf. vol. I, pp. 41—42) merely implies that the title was not conferred by the legitimate emperor. It is not impossible that in the present very terse account the historian simply wishes to indicate that the ranks in question were not granted by the Han court.

⁴⁾ The Siang yang k'i kiu ki (also by Si Tso-ch'i; cf. supra p. 26, note 5), quoted by 17,47: 13 b, *Commentary*. According to this text, T'ien Jung called himself the King Who Succeeds Everywhere and Ch'en Yi the King Who Is Near to the [Yang-tsi] River. These titles are not mentioned in the HHS.

⁵⁾ This is another proof of the fact that, after the change of the course of the Yellow River, unrest sprung up along the routes on which the displaced people migrated southwards. One of these went along the northern shore of the Yang-tsi to the area north of the P'o-yang Lake, and from there southwards into Kiang-si, i. e. right through the Lu-kiang commandery where the bandits operated. Cf. vol. I, pp. 151—152.

throne, although at present he merely proclaimed himself King of Huai-nan¹⁾ (1 A: 11 a; 12,42: 7 b).

The Lu-kiang commandery bordered on the Yang-tsi, south of which the Yü-chang commandery was situated. Liu Liang of the house of the marquises of Ch'ung-ling²⁾ was at this time for unknown reasons in Yü-chang. He mobilized troops, either in support of his clan or for purposes of his own, and styled himself the General-in-chief Who Approaches Han. However, he soon died from a sudden illness (14,44: 13 b).

Meanwhile, Chang Pu had assembled soldiers on the Shan-tung peninsula, presumably in or near his home prefecture Pu-ki.³⁾ He began his career by attacking and conquering several prefectures, assumed the title of General of the Five Majestic [Principles], and subsequently took possession of the entire Lang-ya commandery (12,42: 5 b). In the years to follow, he was to become a powerful warlord.

Directly east of Nan-yang, in the Ju-nan commandery, another man had risen to power. His name was Liu Wang, former marquis of Chung-wu and member of the imperial clan. Wang Mang's ministers and generals Yen Yu and Ch'en Mao had joined him after the defeat at K'un-yang (HS 99 C: 28 b; HHS 11,41: 2 b).⁴⁾

Still another member of the imperial clan, Liu Mao,⁵⁾ had made himself independent in the Ho-nan commandery, although for the time being he presented no military problem for the emperor. In spite of his youth — he was only 18 years old⁶⁾ at the outbreak of the rebellion — he proclaimed himself General Who Detests the Sin [Dynasty]⁷⁾ and operated between the King and Mi prefectures⁸⁾ (14,44: 11 b).

Finally, mention must be made of Kung-sun Shu, the great claimant to imperial power, who at this stage had not yet shown his hand. He was a member of the gentry, and his ancestors had held high posts for many generations. Kung-sun Shu had been a Gentleman⁹⁾ and a Member of the Suite of the Heir-apparent, a

¹⁾ Wang Sien-k'ien points out that the Kiu-kiang commandery corresponded to the former Huai-nan kingdom (1 A: 11 a, *Tsi kie*). It bordered on Lu-kiang in the east. On the basis of this appellation it probably is justified to infer that Li Hien had taken not only Lu-kiang but Kiu-kiang as well.

HS 99 C: 28 a—28 b states that Wang Mang's administrator of Kiu-kiang, Kia Meng, was killed by the Han troops. However, Kiu-kiang was situated far outside the area in which the armies of the Keng-shi Emperor then were operating. It seems more probable that Kia Meng was killed by Li Hien, who perhaps pretended to carry out the wishes of the court.

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, genealogy, no. 50.

³⁾ The Pu-ki prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Lang-ya commandery and was situated SW of the present Tsi-mo hien, Shan-tung. It is shown on map 4.

⁴⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 126—127.

⁵⁾ Cf. vol. I, genealogy, no. 57.

⁶⁾ Chinese reckoning.

⁷⁾ I. e. the dynasty which Wang Mang had attempted to establish.

⁸⁾ Since Teng Ch'en previously had conquered these two prefectures (cf. *supra* p. 23), Liu Mao cannot have begun his activities before the end of A. D. 23.

⁹⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 49, note 1.

Prefect, and eventually Wang Mang's administrator of Tsun-kiang.¹⁾ His residence was in Lin-k'iu²⁾ (TKK 23: 6 b; HHS 13,43: 13 a).

When the Keng-shi Emperor had ascended the throne, a certain Tsung Ch'eng from the Nan-yang commandery called himself a Tiger's Teeth General and raided the Han-chung commandery (13,43: 13 a—13 b). At this time, disorganization spread through the empire in ever-widening circles. A major chain reaction had been set off by the change of the course of the Yellow River and led, through the unrest of the commoners, to the rebellion in Nan-yang and the fall of Wang Mang. Along this train of events, secondary revolts flared up which were sometimes to have far-reaching political consequences. The rise of men like Wei Ao, Lu Fang, Yen Ts'en, Ts'in Feng and T'ien Jung, Li Hien, Liu Liang, Chang Pu, Liu Wang, Liu Mao and others to follow, all had been sparked to life in this manner. Now a new reaction branched off from the main current and led in a series of incidents through Tsung Ch'eng to Kung-sun Shu, and so to the emergence of still another centre of power.

The appearance of Tsung Ch'eng in Han-chung in turn created disturbances in Lo³⁾, which was the capital of Yung-pu.⁴⁾ A man who was not a native of this prefecture⁵⁾ assembled troops, called himself the General Who Establishes Han, killed Wang Mang's Shepherd of the province, and joined Tsung Ch'eng. Kung-sun Shu reacted to this by dispatching messengers who welcomed Tsung Ch'eng and his troops. These arrived at Ch'eng-tu but continued to plunder. Here, the HHS inserts a lengthy paragraph, according to which Kung-sun Shu took objection to the looting and held a conference with the prominent men of his commandery. He is said to have declared himself against Wang Mang and to have admitted his mistake in inviting Tsung Ch'eng. This he blamed on the fact that he had believed him to be a *bona fide* general of the Han forces. He proposed to take action against the bandits, asking for and receiving the support of those present. Subsequently, he arranged for a messenger to arrive, pretending that he had come from the east, i. e. from the Keng-shi Emperor. The false envoy not only recognized Kung-sun Shu as Grand Administrator of Shu but also appointed him as Shepherd of the Yi province and General Who Supports Han. Kung-sun Shu then attacked and defeated Tsung Ch'eng in Ch'eng-tu. The latter was murdered by one of his officers, and his troops surrendered⁶⁾ (13,43: 13 b—14 a).

¹⁾ I. e. Shu in Han terminology.

²⁾ The Lin-k'iu prefecture during Han belonged to the Shu commandery and is identical with the present K'iu²-lai hien, Si-ch'uan. It is shown on map 14.

³⁾ The Lo prefecture during Han belonged to the Kuang-han commandery and was situated 2 li N of the present Kuang-han hien, Si-ch'uan. It is shown on map 14.

⁴⁾ Wang Mang had changed the name of the Yi province to Yung-pu. The Yi province comprised the Han-chung, Pa, Kuang-han, Shu, Kien-wei, Tsang-ko, Yüehi and Yi-chou commanderies. Hence, a Yi-chou commandery was situated in the Yi province, both written with the same characters, a fact which can lead to confusion.

⁵⁾ This was Wang Ts'en from the Shang prefecture. The latter during Former Han belonged to the Hung-nung commandery and was situated 85 li E of the present hien with the same name, Shen-si.

⁶⁾ Nothing is known about the fate of Wang Ts'en.

The description of Kung-sun Shu's conference contains some very doubtful elements. However, in the present case it is less important whether for instance the speech of Kung-sun Shu is genuine, and hence a clever piece of deception, or whether it in part or in whole is the invention of a puzzled historian who did not understand the motive behind these events. The facts of the situation speak for themselves. Kung-sun Shu was an educated and, to all appearance, intelligent man who was in the process of carefully preparing the ground for his own claim to the Mandate of Heaven. He foresaw the imminent fall of Wang Mang, and, if the circumstances in any way favoured an independent course, had no intention of recognizing the restored Han dynasty. In order to achieve his primary objective of political autonomy, a lever was needed, and this was unwittingly provided by Tsung Ch'eng. Kung-sun could hardly have been ignorant about the likely results of admitting this man into his own administrative domain. On the contrary, he had probably planned it so. By ridding the people of a marauding crowd of bandits, he first of all could pose as a model official and gain the popular support he needed; and secondly, by mobilizing troops in order to attack Tsung Ch'eng, place himself in possession of an army which by the surrender of Tsung Ch'eng's troops was drastically increased. Finally, the entire series of events created a situation in which the arrival of a messenger from the Keng-shi Emperor could only seem most credible.¹⁾ Kung-sun Shu was able not only to confirm his own rank as Grand Administrator of Shu, but also to make himself a general and even to promote himself to authority over the entire Yi province. This master-stroke gave him apparent legal control over a tremendous area as well as indemnity for the future. If the Han troops, contrary to his expectations, were to gain swift victories and secure general acceptance for the Keng-shi Emperor all over the empire, Kung-sun Shu could always claim that he had accepted the messenger in good faith as a representative of the court. What is more, he could demand a reward for his good services to the dynasty.

These, from Wei Ao to Kung-sun Shu, are the forces which had been unleashed through the civil war and Wang Mang's failing hold on the empire.

5. *Military and political expansion*

It now is necessary to return to the Keng-shi Emperor and his strategy. Wang Mang had made his last preparation for the defence of Ch'ang-an and, in addition, had ordered his Grand Master, Wang K'uang,²⁾ and the State General, Ai Chang, to defend the city of Lo-yang. Consequently, in the 8th month (Sept. 4—Oct. 3) two armies were dispatched from Wan. The first was led by the General-in-chief Who Shields Westwards, Shen-t'u Kien, and by the Director of Service of the

¹⁾ It seems most probable that the messenger really was false and acted under the instructions of Kung-sun Shu. As will be seen later, the movements of the more important Han messengers are fairly well known. Si-ch'uan was still a very peripheral area from the Keng-shi Emperor's point of view, and it was not before the autumn of 24 that he turned his attention to this region.

²⁾ Not to be confused with the Supreme Duke Who Establishes the State of the Keng-shi Emperor. Cf. vol. I, p. 128, note 1.

Lieutenant Chancellor,¹⁾ Li Sung²⁾ (11,41: 2 b—3 a; 15,45: 2 b). This force went through the Wu pass (HS 99 C: 26 a). The other army, under the command of the Supreme Duke Who Establishes the State, Wang K'uang, attacked Lo-yang (11,41: 3 a).³⁾

The last days of Wang Mang have already been described. His generals were defeated, and new rebellions broke out in the prefectures around Ch'ang-an. Members of the various great clans led their followers and closed in on the capital which fell even before the arrival of the Han troops. On Oct. 6, A. D. 23, Wang Mang met with his death on a terrace of his palace, defended by faithful adherents to the end. His head was sent to Wan.⁴⁾ When the Keng-shi Emperor saw it, he was disappointed with its features and subsequently had it displayed on the market-place. In the same month (the 9th: Oct. 4—Nov. 1), Wang K'uang and Ai Chang surrendered in Lo-yang. They were brought as prisoners to Wan and executed (HS 99 C: 28 a—28 b; HHS 11,41: 3 a).

The fall of Lo-yang was an event of some importance. The largest city in the empire after Ch'ang-an, its name was glorious in history as a capital of the Chou kings. Wang Mang had even harboured plans to transfer the seat of government there. He had issued orders in A. D. 14 for an imperial tour of inspection, with the intention of subsequently remaining in Lo-yang. Although persuaded to postpone these measures for seven years, he had sent two high officials to build temples and altars in anticipation of the change of capital (HS 99 B: 22 a—23 a).⁵⁾ Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the Keng-shi Emperor decided to move from Wan to Lo-yang, once this city had fallen to his armies. To make the necessary arrangements for the transfer, he granted Liu Siu the temporary post of Acting Colonel Director of the Retainers⁶⁾ in addition to his permanent position as a general. This officer, responsible to the emperor alone, was normally in charge of the commanderies of the capital province and of inspecting and impeaching officials in general (ch'i 27: 8 a—9 a).⁷⁾

Immediately after his appointment, Liu Siu was sent ahead to Lo-yang with specific orders to repair the palaces and yamen (1 A: 7 b—8 a). His route passed by way of the city of Fu-ch'eng⁸⁾, whose defenders now surrendered to him (17,47: 1 b). Somewhat later, the Keng-shi Emperor himself arrived at Lo-yang (1 A: 8 a; 11,41: 3 a—3 b).⁹⁾ It is not clear whether at this time he considered it a permanent or temporary capital.

¹⁾ This is actually an anachronism. The title of the Grand Minister over the Masses had not yet been changed to Lieutenant Chancellor. Cf. *infra* p. 49.

²⁾ He was a son of Li T'ung's father's brother.

³⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 127—128 and *ibidem* map 4.

⁴⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 128—132.

⁵⁾ Cf. 99. Dubs, vol. III, p. 122.

⁶⁾ The technical term for 'Acting' is 行 . . . 事, i. e. 'to practise the affairs of that and that office'. Often it is abbreviated by dropping the 事.

⁷⁾ Cf. 88. Wang, pp. 156—158.

⁸⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 21—22.


⁹⁾ Kuang-wu's pen ki (1 A: 8 a) places this event in the 9th month (Oct. 4—Nov. 1), while the biography of the Keng-shi Emperor (11,41: 3 a—3 b) lists it under the 10th (Nov. 2—Dec. 1). Wang

Simultaneously with these events, the Keng-shī Emperor was engaged in widening the geographical area under his control. This was a crucial point, since success or failure still hung in the balance. Wang Mang was dead and the Han dynasty in theory restored. The question remained whether the high officials of the provinces and commanderies would switch their support to the new emperor and accept his claim to be the legitimate ruler of the realm. It was obviously in their interest, as long as contending factions fought for the throne, to adopt a policy of waiting rather than to choose an early commitment which they might later have to regret. Once the outcome seemed certain, the officials would scuffle to join the victor, as this normally would mean reinstatement in their posts and possibly early advancement. It therefore was important for the Keng-shī Emperor to start a snowball movement for his recognition. If the gap created by the fall of Wang Mang was not swiftly filled, the centrifugal forces in the empire would gain strength and years of civil war would lie ahead. Two different methods were employed in order to achieve this purpose: military operations on the one hand, and political persuasion on the other. In the first case the agents were imperial generals, in the second personal messengers of the ruler. These important activities, from the battle of K'un-yang on July 7 onwards, are presented on map 4.

Turning first to the military operations, some of these have already been described. They are the attack on Ch'ang-an, the siege of Lo-yang, the operations against Ying-yang and Fu-ch'eng, the conquest of Mi and King, and the victory over Yen Ts'en at Kuan-kün. These campaigns had enlarged the base of the Han troops mainly towards the west and north. To the south, all progress was blocked by Ts'in Feng, and no attempt seems to have been made to fight him. In the east, however, new victories were won. It has already been mentioned that Liu Wang of the imperial clan had taken possession of the Ju-nan commandery.¹⁾ In the 8th month (Sept. 4—Oct. 3), this man proclaimed himself Son of Heaven. Nothing else is known about him and his court except that Yen Yu was appointed Commander-in-chief and Ch'en Mao Lieutenant Chancellor (11,41: 2 b). Liu Wang was the very first pretender to appear after the Keng-shī Emperor had ascended the throne, and such a challenge had to be dealt with firmly in order to prevent the repetition of such an outrage. The Grand Minister over the Masses, Liu Ts'ī, was immediately dispatched to conquer the Ju-nan commandery. Shortly before

Mang was killed on the 3rd day of the 9th month (i. e. Oct. 6), and it may be assumed that Lo-yang surrendered as soon as this news was received. Furthermore, the distance from Wan to Lo-yang is no more than about 200 km, which the imperial cortege could cover in a few days. It is therefore quite possible that the date of the pen ki is correct and that the Keng-shī Emperor arrived in Lo-yang at the very end of the 9th month. Until the restoration of the dynasty, the historian dates all events in the HHS according to Wang Mang's calendar, but from the enthronement of the Keng-shī Emperor onwards according to the Han calendar (cf. vol. I, p. 104). Since the 9th month of the Han calendar corresponds to the 10th month of Wang Mang's calendar, it is conceivable that the original sources for the time under discussion still used the latter. If this is true, the historian converted the date in the pen ki but overlooked doing the same in the biography of the Keng-shī Emperor.

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 29.



Map 4. Military and diplomatic activities of the Keng-shi Emperor in A. D. 23 (after the battle of K'un-yang on July 7).

the emperor moved to Lo-yang, Liu Ts'i was replaced by Liu Sin¹), who soon defeated and killed Liu Wang (HS 99 C: 28 b; HHS 11,41: 3 a; 14,44: 12 a).

It was probably about this time²) that troops attacked and put to death Wang Mang's Shepherd of the Yang province.' The battle must have been somewhere in Huai-yang, since the text goes on to say that the cities of this commandery were taken (HS 99 C: 28 a; HHS 17,47: 10 b).³) Somewhat later, a new contingent was dispatched to subdue the same area, which indicates that the first conquest had not been entirely successful (17,47: 10 b).⁴) Forces also entered Ch'en-ting⁵) and killed its administrator (HS 99 C: 28 a—28 b).

Another army took 21 prefectures in the Ying-ch'uan, Ho-nan, and Ch'en-liu commanderies. It may also have been the first to cross the Yellow River, but no details are preserved (37,67: 9 a).

Finally, Li Yi in a thrust northeastwards entered the Tsi-p'ing commandery⁶), where Wang Mang's administrator Keng Ai surrendered. Although reinstated in his rank, he was transferred to another commandery⁷) (21,51: 7 b).

In contrast to the generals conducting military operations, the messengers were not in command of troops. The success of their missions depended on their personal flexibility and diplomatic skill. They went out into a no man's land where the various local officials had not yet taken sides with the Keng-shī Emperor, the objective of their assignment being to bring about a complete recognition of and support for the new dynasty. Not only this, they were often given a free hand to reorganize the local administration, to abolish the regulations of Wang Mang, and to confirm officials in their ranks or to replace them where necessary (cf. e. g. 16,46: 17 a; 81,111: 7 b). In order to extend protection to these messengers and to create awe among the local officials, they sometimes were invested with special powers which otherwise were the sole prerogative of the emperor. The outward sign of this power was the Staff of Authority.⁸) Three messengers are recorded to

¹) Cf. vol. I, pp. 97, 127, and genealogy no. 115.

²) The following event is not dated in the HHS, but the HS places it clearly in A. D. 23. This can also be established through cross references within the HHS itself. Ts'en P'eng and Chang Ang both participated in the campaigns under discussion and, since their movements during A. D. 24 are accounted for, the action must have taken place in A. D. 23.

³) HS 99 C: 28 a also states that Wang Mang's Director of Mandates, K'ung Jen, was defeated either together with the Shepherd or separately. He surrendered and committed suicide.

⁴) During this campaign, led by Chang Ang, the general Yao Wei rebelled and defeated his commander. Ts'en P'eng (cf. *supra* p. 21), who by Chu Wei had been appointed Chief Commandant of Huai-yang, overpowered in turn Yao Wei and saved the commandery.

⁵) I. e. Liang in Han terminology. Wang Mang had abolished the Liang kingdom and changed it into the Ch'en-ting commandery.

⁶) The *Commentary* remarks that Wang Mang had changed the Ting-t'ao kingdom to Tsi-p'ing. Hung Liang-ki (quoted by *Tsi kie*) corrects this statement and points out that the Ting-t'ao kingdom had been abolished as early as 5 B. C. Therefore, the unit changed by Wang Mang can only have been the Tsi-yin commandery.

⁷) Tsi-nan; cf. *infra* p. 45, note 1.

⁸) The technical term for this was *ch'ī tsie* 持節, literally 'holding the insignia'. This insignia consisted of a long piece of bamboo from the top of which hung a pendant (cf. 1 A: 8 a, *Commentary*). As will be seen later, the Staff of Authority was not only given to messengers but occasionally also to

have received these extraordinary rights in A. D. 23¹⁾, which does not exclude the possibility that others were similarly entrusted although this is not specifically stated in the texts.

The Keng-shī Emperor dispatched his messengers to various parts of the realm, proclaiming that those who capitulated first would keep their former rank and position (16,46: 17 a). Consequently, Wang Mang's Grand Administrator of Tung, Wang Hung, offered to surrender.²⁾ This official was in a vulnerable position since, as the son of Wang Mang's father's brother T'an, he was a close relative of the former emperor (12,42: 7 a). In addition, when Wei Ao proclaimed himself for Han in the northwest, his own brother Wang Hiang refused to submit and was arrested and executed.³⁾ Some facts, however, counted in the favour of Wang Hung. Under Emperor Ai he had been a Regular Palace Attendant. When this ruler was on his deathbed, he gave the imperial seal to his favourite and catamite Tung Hien in a desperate attempt to make him his successor.⁴⁾ Wang Hung had promptly interfered and forced Tung Hien to surrender the seal which he in turn delivered to the empress dowager.⁵⁾ Such loyalty to the Han dynasty was hardly apt to endear him to Wang Mang, and when the latter had become emperor there was a decided coolness between the two. Although Wang Hung received offices, he is said to have been constantly afraid for his life (12,42: 7 a). Wang Hung is thus the perfect example of a high local functionary whose administrative unit was close enough to the centre of events to force him to choose sides early. He was somewhat compromised, but not to the extent that he did not stand a reasonable chance of getting into the good graces of the new emperor, or at least of saving his life through swift surrender. His fate would now depend on the messenger who acted with the authority of the ruler. Another part of the HHS describes the arrival of this nameless messenger in Tung.⁶⁾ His first intention was to execute Wang Hung, but he changed his mind (81,111: 7 b). Wang Hung became later an entrusted official of the Keng-shī Emperor. The episode is a good illustration of the freedom of the messengers to choose their course of action on the spot without having to seek imperial approval.

generals in command of troops. Cf. also 68. Chavannes, II, p. 129, note 3. Further information can be found in *«Les insignes en deux parties sous la dynastie des T'ang»* by R. Des Rotours (T'oung Pao, no. XLI, 1952).

¹⁾ Keng Ch'un, Liu Siu and Han Hung.

²⁾ Ts'ien Ta-hin points out that Wang Mang's biography in HS (99 C: 21 a) mentions the Shepherd of the Yen province and Director of the Confederation of Shou-liang, Wang Hung, who evidently is the same person. Shou-liang was originally one of the prefectures of Tung. Wang Mang had divided this former commandery and established the Shou-liang commandery, while the remainder became the Ch'i-t'ing commandery. The HHS has simplified matters in this instance by using the Han title and name, although this has led to the inadvertence of presenting Wang Hung as the administrator of a larger area than really was the case. Cf. 12,42: 7 a, *T'ai kie*.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 25.

⁴⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 157–158.

⁵⁾ This entire event is not mentioned in the HS.

⁶⁾ Although the name of the Grand Administrator is not given here, it obviously must have been Wang Hung.

Sometimes the messengers were selected because they belonged to powerful and respected clans and thus could help to bring about the surrender of their home areas. For instance, the administrator of Tsi-p'ing, Keng Ai, who had submitted to Li Yi¹⁾, belonged to a great gentry family in the Kū-lu commandery. Li Yi therefore sent his son, Keng Ch'un, with the Staff of Authority to cross the Yellow River, to go to the Chao and Wei commanderies,²⁾ and to agitate for the recognition of the Keng-shī Emperor.³⁾

In the 10th month (Nov. 2—Dec. 1), a messenger dispatched to the area north of the Yellow River was no other than Liu Siu. After his arrival in Lo-yang, the Keng-shī Emperor had expressed his wish to send a relative into the north. The Grand Minister over the Masses, Liu Ts'i, recommended Liu Siu (14,44: 12 a), and the Master of Writing, Ts'ao Hū, also intervened for him (17,47: 1 b).⁴⁾ Liu Siu seems to have been active on his own behalf. It is stated that he was advised to be on good terms with Ts'ao King and Ts'ao Hū (17,47: 1 b). To send the brother of the executed Liu Po-sheng on an independent mission seems a somewhat quixotic move. The project was opposed by the Commander-in-chief Chu Wei and others, and the emperor himself is said to have harboured doubts (14,44: 12 a). Once before, however, the Keng-shī Emperor had attempted to reconcile Liu Siu by appointing him General Who Routs the Caitiffs and later had also made him an Acting Colonel of the Retainers. It therefore may have seemed only logical to continue this policy of keeping Liu Siu occupied with tasks which absorbed his energy but gave him no real influence. Liu Siu was appointed Acting Commander-in-chief⁵⁾ and with the Staff of Authority dispatched to the north of the Yellow River. He still retained his rank of General Who Routs the Caitiffs (1 A: 8 a; 14,44: 12 a).

In retrospect the choice of Liu Siu appears as a monstrous mistake and one of the main reasons for the Keng-shī Emperor's loss both of his throne and life. In all fairness it must be pointed out that at the time in question the perspectives were quite different. Liu Siu was only one messenger among many. At least two other men were sent to the north of the Yellow River in a similar capacity,⁶⁾ not

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 35.

²⁾ Wei bordered on Chao, and Chao on Kū-lu.

³⁾ This shows indirectly that Li Yi himself must have possessed extraordinary authorities if he in turn could send Keng Ch'un on such an errand.

⁴⁾ He was the son of the Lieutenant Chancellor of the Left Ts'ao King, and both are stated to have been influential (17,47: 1 b). The family came from the Shan-yang commandery. Ts'ao King later met his death in the disorder of the Red Eyebrows (HS 72: 26 b). It should be pointed out that at the time under discussion the title of the Grand Minister over the Masses had not yet been changed to Lieutenant Chancellor. Most probably, Ts'ao King received this rank only in A. D. 24. In the beginning of that year, the offices of a Commander-in-chief of the Left and of the Right were created. It can be assumed that the same was done for the Lieutenant Chancellor's office. The present text must therefore be an ellipsis and should be understood as [the future] Lieutenant Chancellor of the Left.

⁵⁾ It is interesting to observe that the official system at this time permitted the existence of an Acting Commander-in-chief in addition to the regular office-holder. The same is attested for the Lieutenant Chancellor's office. Cf. *infra* p. 49.

⁶⁾ Keng Ch'un, cf. above; Han Hung, cf. *infra* p. 38.

to speak of those who went to other parts of the empire. He had no troops under his command and travelled only with a small retinue. It would have been highly imprudent for him to oppose the central government since, in fact, he was powerless. No one could have foreseen that circumstances would soon offer Liu Siu his great chance and crucial test for the future.

As Liu Siu was the future Emperor Kuang-wu, one has in this fortunate case a detailed description of the powers of a special messenger. Wherever Liu Siu went, he saw without ceremonies the Grand Administrators of the commanderies, the chief officials, the Thrice Venerable, and the lower officials all the way down to the Accessory Clerks. He visited the Regional Divisions and prefectures. He investigated, demoted and promoted, just as if he had been the Shepherd of a province on a tour of inspection. He freed convicts, abolished the laws of Wang Mang, and reintroduced the official system of the Han. The HHS adds to this somewhat starry-eyed description that the officials and people rejoiced, a stereotyped formula in favour of the man who was later to receive the Mandate of Heaven (1 A: 8 a—8 b).

Messengers were not only sent into areas relatively close to Lo-yang but also far to the north and east. There, the pattern of events was somewhat different. While officials close to the new centre of power were forced to declare themselves at an early stage, this incentive did not exist on the periphery. The Grand Administrators of distant commanderies had much to gain by maintaining a certain degree of independence until the situation had become more clarified in the empire. Once they had given formal allegiance, they were committed and henceforth risked a sudden transfer or summons to the capital. There could be no objection to this as long as the Keng-shī Emperor stayed in power, but the situation would be quite different if he were to be defeated by a rival. The officials concerned would then have lost their former relatively strong bargaining position, based on intact commanderies under their personal control. While they were not unwilling to be recognized in their offices by the Keng-shī Emperor, these considerations made their cooperation with the court anything but warm. In fact, it may be said that the emperor over-reached himself by sending messengers into the more distant regions since, as a rule, they there were quite unable to exercise the authority which they in theory possessed.

The HHS gives a fairly detailed description of the mission of a certain Han Hung who was appointed Internuncio and with the Staff of Authority dispatched to the north. He was entitled on his own initiative to appoint officials from the rank of Grand Administrator and down. When he arrived in the northern part of the Great Plain, he met two old friends, P'eng Ch'ung¹⁾ and Wu Han,²⁾ from his home

¹⁾ P'eng Ch'ung's father Hung had been Grand Administrator of Yü-yang under Emperor Ai. Later, he was executed by Wang Mang. P'eng Ch'ung himself had filled office under Wang Mang and participated in the battle of K'un-yang against the Han troops. He had escaped to Yü-yang and returned to the minor office which he there had occupied in the time of his father (12,42: 8 a).

²⁾ Wu Han, later one of Emperor Kuang-wu's chief assistants, had become a fugitive towards the end of Wang Mang's reign because followers of his had broken the law. He had escaped to Yü-yang and there made a living as a horse dealer (18,48: 1 a).

prefecture.¹⁾ He installed the former as Acting Lieutenant General and Acting Grand Administrator of Yü-yang and put the latter in charge of a prefecture in the same commandery (12, 42: 8 a; 18, 48: 1 a). Nothing is known about the fate of the former Grand Administrator of Yü-yang. It is indicative that P'eng Ch'ung, although an appointee of the Keng-shi Emperor, soon began to follow an independent course in his commandery, situated as it was far from the capital.

In another section, the HHS describes the arrival of a messenger to the Shang-ku commandery, situated directly west of Yü-yang. His name is not recorded but it is quite possible that he was the same Han Hung just mentioned. Wang Mang's Grand Administrator of Shang-ku, Keng K'uang, met the messenger at the Kü-yung pass²⁾ and surrendered his official seal and ribbon. He expected, of course, that these would promptly be returned to him, thereby confirming his former rank. However, the envoy withdrew and took no action for a whole night. Keng K'uang's Head of the Department of Merit, K'ou Sün, led troops and went to see the messenger. The latter was still unyielding, whereupon K'ou Sün invited the Grand Administrator to enter, took the seal and ribbon by force, and restored them. Since the messenger had been unable to prevent this, he made the best of a bad business and confirmed the reappointment (HHS 16, 46: 17 a—17 b; SKC 14: 1 b). Keng K'uang's Chief Clerk was also reinstated, as well as, in all probability, the other subordinate officials (22, 52: 2 b—3 a). The whole episode illustrates the fact that, having no soldiers under his command, the authority of a messenger rested exclusively on psychological factors. Once this authority was challenged, he was powerless. The only thing he could then do was either to withdraw or give imperial sanction to decisions made by others. This is also exemplified by the following case.

The Keng-shi Emperor had sent an Internuncio to go to Huai-p'ing³⁾ and summon Wang Mang's administrator, Hou Pa, to the court. This commandery was situated far away, around the mouth of the Huai River. When the messenger arrived, he discovered that Hou Pa was extremely popular and that the people were opposed to his leaving. The HHS gives an exaggerated description of their despair⁴⁾ and goes on to say that the Internuncio did not dare to carry out his orders (TKK 13: 1 b; HHS 26, 56: 6 b). It is quite possible, of course, that Hou Pa was liked in his commandery, but it is equally probable that he simply did not wish to risk a premature alignment and therefore used his popularity as a pretext. This left the messenger no choice. Rather than have the imperial orders disobeyed, he wisely preferred not to hand them over at all (26, 56: 6 b).

In all the instances described, the instructions of the messengers had been more or less the same. They received special authority to go to certain parts of the empire and there to reorganize the local administration. There remains to be discussed another type of mission which was not intended for the regular local officials but

¹⁾ Wan in Nan-yang.

²⁾ Situated NW of present Peking. Its southern end is now known as Nan-k'ou. The railroad Peking-Kalgan goes through this pass.

³⁾ I. e. Lin-huai in Han terminology.

⁴⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 62, no. 21.

for warlords and leaders of independent forces whose submission was eagerly sought by the court. For A. D. 23 only one diplomatic success of this type is recorded, but it was an important one: the surrender of the leaders of the Red Eyebrows.

It will be remembered that the Red Eyebrows had evacuated the Shan-tung peninsula and that their arrival east of Nan-yang had been instrumental in kindling the rebellion of the gentry in this commandery.¹⁾ Although factions actually had entered Nan-yang, the main bulk of the Red Eyebrows had swerved off to the north. They had marched from Ju-nan through the Ying-ch'uan and Ch'en-liu commanderies, and towards the end of 23 arrived in the outskirts of the Tung commandery.²⁾ There they seem to have taken the P'u-yang prefecture (11, 41: 10 a). Another source³⁾ adds that they also attacked the Yung district.⁴⁾ P'u-yang was situated directly south of the break of the Yellow River.⁵⁾ It is therefore not impossible that the Red Eyebrows had intended to return eastwards but were stopped at the edge of the flood. When the Keng-shī Emperor arrived in Lo-yang, he dispatched messengers to the Red Eyebrows. Fan Ch'ung and other leaders, in all more than 20 men, came to the capital and offered their submission (11, 41: 10 a). This was an outstanding triumph for the imperial side which, if cleverly exploited, would have as good as guaranteed the final victory. The Red Eyebrows were the greatest independent force in the country. They had crushingly defeated the troops of Wang Mang and until now constituted a considerable potential danger to the Keng-shī Emperor. The arrival of their leaders, then, created a situation which could hardly have been more favourable. At this stage, the emperor committed a second serious mistake, in the last analysis as disastrous as Liu Siu's mission to the north. He could have rewarded the leaders of the Red Eyebrows so liberally that it would have been worth their while to remain his permanent adherents; or he could have isolated them from their troops; or again he could have used a combination of these methods. Instead, he merely made them Full Marquises without even granting them any specific fiefs (11, 14: 10 a). It has been seen before that, as far as any conclusions can be drawn from the recorded cases, the Keng-shī Emperor had wisely avoided parcelling out land to his new nobles, and had shown a preference for granting merely honorific titles. His policy towards the leaders of the Red Eyebrows appears therefore to be well in keeping with the steps which he had taken previously. If this is true, such salutary moderation, looked at abstractly, makes a favourable impression

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 140—142, and *ibidem* map 7.

²⁾ A statement in 11,41: 10 a to the effect that they took the Lu prefecture is quite impossible. Lu was situated in Shan-tung (it is identical with the present K'ü-fou hien), far away from the area in which the Red Eyebrows were then operating. Rather, it here must be a question of separate bandits who had remained in Shan-tung. Possibly Li Tsi-tu is meant. He had originally been an ally of the Red Eyebrows and by HS is counted among them. Cf. vol. I, p. 137.

³⁾ Sie Shen's Hou Han shu 2 b.

⁴⁾ The Yung district was located in the Nan-yen prefecture whose name in Later Han was changed to Yen. This prefecture belonged to the Tung commandery and was situated 35 li E of the present Yen-tsin hien, Ho-nan.

The Yung district and the P'u-yang prefecture are shown on map 8.

⁵⁾ SKC 5: 30 a.

when contrasted with the avalanche of fiefs squandered by the Han rulers before and after his time. In this one case, however, moderation was an evil. When the leaders of the Red Eyebrows discovered that their troops, in their absence, were beginning to disperse, they had to consider whether it was reasonable to lose the power and freedom of action, which depended on those armies, for nothing more than empty titles at court. They were not prevented from leaving the capital and rejoined their camps.¹⁾ Although the present calm seems to have lasted into the following year, the moment was near when the Red Eyebrows were to turn against the imperial forces.

News of the achievements of the Han armies spread quickly through the empire, and incited the leaders of several minor bandit groups to surrender. This meant that, while the main flow of messengers was from the capital into the country, a trickle of envoys was also moving in the opposite direction.

Among these lesser chieftains was Yüan Tseng, whose style was Tsi-lu. Standing on the city wall of the Lu prefecture,²⁾ apparently in order to address the populace, he had originally assembled soldiers, together with a certain Liu Hü. This gave him the nickname «Tsi-lu On the City Wall». He sent messengers, capitulated to the Keng-shi Emperor, and as a reward was appointed Grand Administrator of the Tung-lai commandery. Liu Hü became Grand Administrator of Tsi-nan. Both obtained, in addition, the title of Acting General-in-chief. In spite of the fact that Tsi-lu On the City Wall had been accepted into the official hierarchy, he clearly remained a warlord in command of troops, and was in fact soon murdered by his officers. Liu Hü was elected chieftain in his place. The Keng-shi Emperor sanctioned this substitution and made him the Marquis Who Assists the State, another empty title without fief. He also instructed him to demobilize his troops (21, 51: 2 a). It looks as if Liu Hü obeyed this order since hereafter he is not mentioned in the sources.

Another chieftain, Li Tsi-tu, also sent messengers and offered his surrender.³⁾ He is mentioned for the first time in A. D. 18, when he was the leader of commoners on the Shan-tung peninsula and then for a while seems to have cooperated with the Red Eyebrows (HS 99 C: 4 a, 4 b). However, he remained in Shan-tung when the latter evacuated this area.⁴⁾ After his submission to the Keng-shi Emperor, he was appointed Shepherd of the Sü province (21, 51: 2 a).⁵⁾

¹⁾ One of the minor leaders remained in Lo-yang. This was Liu Kung, a member of the imperial clan. The Keng-shi Emperor installed him as marquis of Shi, a fief which his father had lost under Wang Mang (11, 41: 8 b, 10 b). Cf. *infra* p. 95.

²⁾ The Lu prefecture during Former Han belonged to the T'ai-shan commandery and was situated within the area of the present Ch'ang-ts'ing hien, Shan-tung. Cf. map 4. It is not the same prefecture mentioned on p. 40, note 2.

³⁾ The Ki ku ko edition writes consistently *Tiao* 刁 instead of *Li* 力. All other editions as well as HS have *Li*. Liu Pin believes that *Tiao* is the correct form of the name, but he is contradicted by Sun Mien and Shen K'in-han. Cf. 21, 51: 1 b, *Tsi kie*; 21, 51, *Kiao pu*.

⁴⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 137, and *supra* p. 40, note 2.

⁵⁾ It should be observed that the bands of Tsi-lu On the City Wall and Li Tsi-tu operated in Shan-tung, within the two new arms of the Yellow River. Evidently their adherents were starving peasants who had been cut off by the flood on this peninsula (cf. vol. I, p. 152). It is furthermore symptomatic that Tsi-lu On the City Wall was a native of the Tung-p'ing commandery and that Li Tsi-tu came

There was, then, a certain amount of traffic from the various territories of the empire to Lo-yang. This was made up not only of messengers from independent chieftains who sought an affiliation with the imperial forces, but probably also of untold numbers of fortune hunters who hoped to gain positions and influence under the new dynasty. Among them, various prominent and lesser members of the imperial clan claimed their share in the spoils of victory. Wang Mang had demoted all nobles belonging to the Liu family, and these or their descendants eagerly expected reinstatement in their former ranks. Such a matter could most satisfactorily be pushed at the court itself, and it must therefore be assumed that imperial relatives flocked to Lo-yang. One of these men was Liu Yung,¹⁾ a direct descendant of Emperor Wen. His father Liu Li had been the last king of Liang and had lost this fief and his life in the time of Emperor P'ing.²⁾ When Liu Yung came to the capital, the Keng-shi Emperor installed him anew in the kingdom of his ancestors. He subsequently went to Liang and took up his residence in Sui-yang³⁾ (12, 42: 3 a). Other heirs to kingdoms abolished by Wang Mang may also have been reinstated in this manner⁴⁾, although no direct references are given in the sources.

The preceding pages throw light on some of the important changes involved in the substitution of one administration by another. It will be necessary to return to this whole complex of questions in connection with Emperor Kuang-wu's reorganization of the government, where the pattern is similar, although not entirely identical. Since a detailed discussion may suitably be reserved until it can be placed into this wider frame, I restrict myself at present to a few general remarks.

To begin with, it is clear that Wang Mang's chief assistants and trusted advisers were deeply compromised in the eyes of the Han party. Not a single one of them was able to win the good graces of the new dynasty. Several fought loyally for Wang Mang and either died in battle⁵⁾ or committed suicide;⁶⁾ others surrendered in the hope of saving their lives, but were put to death.⁷⁾

The situation is quite different when it comes to the less exalted officials, such as the administrators of the various commanderies. They belonged as a rule to the

from the Tung-hai commandery (21,51: 2 a). Both regions had suffered the effects of the flood and had lost people through death and migration. The geographical origin of these two chieftains gains additional importance when the fact is remembered that three of the leaders of the Red Eyebrows had also escaped from the Tung-hai commandery (cf. vol. I, p. 153).

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I, genealogy, no. 140.

²⁾ Emperor P'ing's mother belonged to the Wei clan. Wang Mang had prevented her coming to the court and, together with her most important relatives, had isolated her in the Chung-shan kingdom. In A. D. 3, a plot was discovered to bring the Wei clan to the capital, involving Wang Mang's son Yü and many others. All were executed including Liu Li. Cf. vol. I, p. 156; HS 99 A: 16 a—16 b; 99. Dubs, III, pp. 46—48, p. 80, note 8.4.

³⁾ Cf. map 4.

⁴⁾ E. g. in the kingdoms of Ch'ang-sha and Chen-ting. Cf. *infra* p. 47, note 3, and p. 70, note 5.

⁵⁾ Wang Sün (cf. vol. I, p. 120), Chang Han, and Wang Yi (cf. vol. I, p. 131).

⁶⁾ K'ung Jen (cf. *supra* p. 35, note 3).

⁷⁾ Ts'ui Fa and Wang Lin (cf. vol. I, p. 132), Wang K'uang and Ai Chang (cf. *supra* p. 32), Shi Shen, Wang Yen, Wang Wu and Chao Hung (HS 99 C: 28 b).

gentry and were affiliated with other influential clans. These men and their relatives often fought on different sides during the more confused stages of the civil war, which meant that the family itself would survive whoever was the winner. What is more, those who had sided with the eventual victor usually managed to keep in touch with their relations and members of their clique, and advised them when the psychological moment had come to change allegiance. The gentry was therefore as a general rule able to weather the political storms and preserve its influence. It follows then that strong forces were at work to facilitate a smooth changeover from Wang Mang's administration to that of the Keng-shī Emperor, with as little bloodshed and loss of family status as possible. Once victory seemed certain, the officials would move into the successful camp almost *en bloc*, becoming the adherents of the new emperor in this theoretical sense, aided by family ties and clique connections.

Furthermore, whichever faction won the civil war, it would have been utterly impossible to make a clean sweep of the old officials. Not only was this out of the question because of the considerations already mentioned, it was also technically infeasible because there existed only a limited number of educated men in the empire capable of fulfilling official functions. On these men the ruler had perforce to depend. He recruited his chief ministers from a very limited circle, but for the rest was compelled to employ the old officials. Some might have been demoted or replaced. In a few cases warlords were, at least temporarily, absorbed into the official hierarchy. Generally speaking, however, the old officials were able to maintain their positions, and the lower their rank the less difficult it proved. A few figures will substantiate the point.

At the time of Wang Mang's fall, the empire consisted of one hundred odd administrative units, known as commanderies.¹⁾ In twenty cases it is known how their administrators reacted to the civil war. Their fate is set out in the following table:

Killed	6	} 20
Independent	2	
Joined the Han forces	11	
Joined Wei Ao	1	

As far as the first group is concerned, two of the officials were killed by Wei Ao, who was in the process of carving out a domain of his own in the northwest.²⁾ One was murdered in A. D. 24 by a local rebel in the southeast,³⁾ and another died possibly at the hands of Li Hien.⁴⁾ This means that four of the administrators had the bad luck to fall foul of local warlords. Of only two can we say with certainty that they were put to death by Han troops, and it is indicative that one of these

¹⁾ In A. D. 2, the total was 83 commanderies and 20 kingdoms. Wang Mang later abolished the kingdoms and increased the number of commanderies by dividing some of them.

²⁾ Li Yü (cf. vol. I, p. 123) and Wang Hiang (cf. *supra* p. 25).

³⁾ Mei Ken. Cf. *infra* p. 60 and *ibidem* note 1.

⁴⁾ Kia Meng. Cf. *supra* p. 29, note 1.

died in the very initial stage of the rebellion, i. e. at a time when there was as yet no incentive to change sides.¹⁾

The two administrators who chose independence were, of course, Kung-sun Shu and Li Hien.²⁾ Not counting one man, who for unknown reasons preferred to join Wei Ao,³⁾ this leaves a remainder of eleven administrators, all of whom made common cause with either the Keng-shi Emperor⁴⁾ or later with Kuang-wu.⁵⁾ In other words, 55 % of the known cases joined the Han forces.

In fact, this percentage is certainly too low. It must be remembered that the histories concentrate on the more spectacular cases, such as violent death or tricky diplomatic situations in the lives of prominent men. The great number of those who quietly slipped from one party to another is therefore not recorded.

One may look at this question from another angle. Apart from the somewhat doubtful cases of Southern China and Korea, twenty-nine commanderies were with certainty under the practical or theoretical control of the Keng-shi Emperor at the end of A. D. 23. In ten cases, the names of their Grand Administrators are recorded,⁶⁾ and it turns out that eight of these were former officials of Wang Mang. It therefore seems safe to conclude that the vast majority of Wang Mang's officials found no difficulty in accepting, or being accepted by, the Han dynasty.

6. Summary

Map 5 presents the political situation at the end of A. D. 23. It indicates, on the one hand, the territory controlled by the Han forces and, on the other, the areas held by their rivals. In order to ascertain the size of the domain of the Keng-shi Emperor, two methods have been followed. All regions which according to the preceding description and maps had been conquered through military action, obviously belonged to the new state. To this have been added all those commanderies, not necessarily taken by the armies, for which the emperor during A. D. 23 appointed or reinstated Grand Administrators and where these administrators

¹⁾ This was Chen Fou, killed in the battle between the rivers at the end of A. D. 22 (cf. vol. I, p. 111). The other man, Shen Yi, was killed in Ch'en-ting during A. D. 23 (cf. supra p. 35).

²⁾ Cf. supra pp. 28 ff and 29 ff.

³⁾ Ku Kung (13,43: 6 a).

⁴⁾ Ch'en Tsun (27,57: 3 a).

Hou Pa. Cf. supra p. 39.

Keng Ai. Cf. supra p. 35.

Keng K'uang. Cf. supra p. 39.

P'ei T'ung (1 A: 9 b; 21,51: 5 a). Cf. infra p. 64.

Wang Hung. Cf. supra p. 36.

Wang K'in (HS 99 C: 28 b).

⁵⁾ Chao Yung (19,49: 2 b). Cf. infra p. 77 and ibidem note 5.

Ma Yüan 馬員 (24,54: 2 a).

Ma Yüan 馬援 (24,54: 2 a).

Wen Ts'i (86,116: 14 a).

⁶⁾ Cf. infra p. 45, note 1.

were able to take up or to maintain their offices.¹⁾ It furthermore must be assumed that a limited area²⁾ on the Great Plain directly north of the Yellow River and surrounded by commanderies demonstrably in the hands of the Keng-shī Emperor³⁾ also belonged to his domain. No names of the local officials have been preserved for this area, but the region was crisscrossed by messengers reorganizing the local administration.

Having integrated these various factors on the map, it appears that from Lo-yang the direct sphere of influence of the Keng-shī Emperor extended, in practically equal distance, to the west, northeast and southeast. This again demonstrates the cardinal rule that rebel forces had a tendency to push in all major directions in order to widen their military and economic base of operations. Lo-yang, situated almost in the dead centre, was the logical place for the capital, and it only needed the conquest of the southern parts of Shan-si to complete the circle. That region was relatively sparsely populated and therefore not a primary target for the Han forces. The Keng-shī Emperor, then, controlled numerically at least 40 % of the total population and some of the most fertile and economically important sections of the realm, including the former capital Ch'ang-an with its surrounding area.⁴⁾

It is furthermore apparent that outside this central domain certain outlying regions had recognized the Keng-shī Emperor. These were two commanderies⁵⁾ in the mountainous zone north of the Great Plain, one commandery on the tip of

¹⁾ I. e. in Yü-yang: P'eng Ch'ung (12,42: 8 a).

In Shang-ku: Keng K'uang (16,46: 17 a—17 b).

In Ch'ang-shan: Teng Ch'en (15,45: 8 a).

In Ho-jung: P'ei T'ung (21,51: 5 a).

In Sin-tu: Jen Kuang (21,51: 1 a).

In Tsi-nan: Keng Ai (21,51: 7 b). Later during the year, he seems to have been replaced by Liu Hü (21,51: 2 a).

In Tung-lai: Yüan Tseng, i. e. Tsi-lu On the City Wall (21,51: 2 a).

In Lin-huai: Hou Pa (26,56: 6 b).

In addition, one should include Liu Yung's kingdom Liang (cf. supra p. 42) and two commanderies where the exact date of the appointment of their Grand Administrators is not known although it must have occurred in 23 or not much later:

In Tso-p'ing-yi: Kuo Ki (31,61: 1 a).

In P'ing-yüan: Fu Chan (26,56: 1 a).

No regional appointments below the rank of Grand Administrator are known for any other area, except in the case of K'uai-ki where Jen Yen became a Chief Commandant (76,106: 3 a). According to TTK 15: 6 a he was appointed Chief Commandant of the Western Regional Division, and according to SHS 5: 8 b of the Southern Regional Division. He took up his office, which indicates that the influence of the Keng-shī Emperor extended to this commandery.


It may further be remarked that, although Shepherds were appointed for some of the provinces during A. D. 23, this fact does not lend itself to the same kind of interpretation as in the case of the Grand Administrators. The provinces were extremely large, and the instalment of a Shepherd does not necessarily mean that the entire area was pacified.

²⁾ Comprising the Ho-nei, Kuang-p'ing, Kū-lu, and Ts'ing-ho commanderies.

³⁾ I. e. Ch'ang-shan, Ho-jung, Sin-tu and P'ing-yüan.

⁴⁾ I. e. the so-called Three Adjuncts: King-chao-yin, Tso-p'ing-yi, and Yu-fu-feng.

⁵⁾ Yü-yang and Shang-ku.



the Shan-tung peninsula,¹⁾ and two commanderies immediately north and south of the mouth of the Yang-tsi.²⁾ As remarked earlier, it is here not a question of unconditional, but of provisional, recognition. The commanderies involved were not directly linked to the central domain, and the court had been unable to enforce full obedience in these regions. The officials cooperated sufficiently to be *personae gratae* if the Keng-shi Emperor were to be finally victorious, yet they preserved enough freedom of action to choose their own course in the event of his defeat. These considerations might be relevant also for Korea and China south of the Yang-tsi, although there one is on much weaker ground.³⁾

Finally, considering the regions controlled by rivals of the Keng-shi Emperor, one finds that within the central imperial zone he was opposed in three enclaves: by Liu Mao in a small area in the Ho-nan commandery; by the Red Eyebrows,

¹⁾ Tung-lai.

²⁾ Lin-huai and K'uai-ki.

³⁾ As far as Korea is concerned, there only exists one relevant entry in the HHS: «When the Keng-shi [Emperor] was defeated, a native [of Lo-lang], Wang T'iao, killed the administrator of the commandery, Liu Hien, and styled himself a General-in-chief and Grand Administrator of Lo-lang» (76,106: 5 a). This may be understood as a simple chronological reference, i. e. that the event occurred subsequent to the death of the emperor. At the same time, judging from parallels, the phrase can very well have a wider, political connotation and imply that Liu Hien was one of the Grand Administrators of the Keng-shi Emperor. One would still not know when he had been appointed or whether he was one of Wang Mang's officials who in a theoretical sense had recognized the Keng-shi Emperor. In any event, it may be safely assumed that Liu Hien in practice enjoyed complete independence.

Turning to southern China, the HHS is even less informative. It merely states that, in the time of Emperor P'ing, a certain Si Kuang had been appointed Grand Administrator of Kiao-chi, that at the end of Wang Mang's time he closed the borders and protected himself (76,106: 4 a—4 b), and that in A. D. 29 he and other administrators in southern China surrendered to Emperor Kuang-wu (17,47: 14 b; 76,106: 4 b). According to Hua yang kuo chi p. 12: 2 (henceforth quoted as HYKC; for this source cf. *infra* p. 107, note 1), his rank seems to have been confirmed by the Keng-shi Emperor. If this is true, the emperor may also have reinstated the other administrators in the south. Unfortunately, the HYKC is not a very reliable source. There is, however, another point to be considered. In A. D. 29, when the administrators of southern China surrendered to Kuang-wu, the Palace Commandant of Ch'ang-sha, Feng Tsün, led troops and came to the assistance of an imperial army (TKK 15: 7 a). Furthermore, among the southern administrators, one finds the Chancellor of Ch'ang-sha, Han Fu, (17,47: 14 b). It is important in this connection that Chancellor and Palace Commandant are distinct titles which correspond to Grand Administrator and Chief Commandant respectively. Although their functions were exactly identical, the special terminology was used in order to indicate that the officials in question served in a kingdom and not in a commandery. Ch'ang-sha must therefore have been a kingdom in 29, and since it only then submitted to Kuang-wu, he cannot have been the one who enfeoffed its king. The HHS further records that on April 1, A. D. 37, Kuang-wu demoted the King of Ch'ang-sha, Liu Hing, to the rank of marquis (1 B: 9 a—9 b). The family connections of this Liu Hing are not known, and no reference is made to the time when he was originally installed. It must be assumed that he was the heir to the kingdom of Ch'ang-sha and that he was reinstated before A. D. 29. This leaves only one possibility open, namely that Liu Hing was enfeoffed by the Keng-shi Emperor, a possibility already suggested by Ts'ien Ta-hin (1 B: 9 a, *Tsi kie*). These considerations strengthen the impression that southern China had recognized the Keng-shi Emperor, even if this recognition was far from implying any direct control exercised over the region from the capital. In fact, although Ch'ang-sha theoretically was a kingdom, Liu Hing may never have gone to his fief.

Since no absolute certainty can be obtained for Korea and southern China, I have preferred not to indicate their status on the map.

who at this time were stationary south of the Yellow River; and by Wang Lang, who had risen in the former kingdom of Chao. Liu Mao at this time was no danger. The Red Eyebrows were still quiet and were not to erupt again in full force until the following year. Wang Lang had been proclaimed Son of Heaven on Jan. 16, A. D. 24.¹⁾ His rise set off a series of events which grew into a deadly danger for the Keng-shi Emperor.

In various places surrounding the imperial domain, but at a considerable distance from Lo-yang, other warlords were active. In the northwest, Wei Ao controlled a tremendous but sparsely inhabited area. Although in theory he had proclaimed himself for Han, in practice he took no orders from the court. Lu Fang had rebelled in the small Dependent State of An-ting. South of the Ts'in-ling Range, Kung-sun Shu had made himself independent in the fertile and populous Shu commandery. In the east, Chang Pu had taken possession of the Lang-ya commandery. In the south, Li Hien dominated the Lu-kiang and perhaps also the Kiu-kiang commanderies, while T'ien Jung and Ts'in Feng had conquered Nan and parts of Nan-yang.

This raises one last point. In other connections I have described the major routes of migration into southern China. Various roads penetrated the Ts'in-ling Range into Si-ch'uan and continued from there to Yün-nan. Another route went from the Great Plain southwestwards between the foothills of the Ts'in-ling-shan and the Huai-shan, passed through the Nan-yang and Nan commanderies, crossed the Yang-ts'i, and continued southwards along the Siang River. A third followed the northern bank of the Yang-ts'i to the area north of the P'o-yang Lake and went from there over the river into Kiang-si.²⁾ It now should be observed that by the end of A. D. 23 all these routes were closed for any practical administrative purposes. Kung-sun Shu was in the process of putting an effective stop to all communications into Si-ch'uan; and Ts'in Feng and Li Hien, as effectively, had barred the two other roads to imperial envoys. Those parts of the empire situated south of the Yang-ts'i were therefore almost completely isolated from the north. Communication from Che-kiang into Kiang-si was possible along the Ts'ien-t'ang River, but this route was not effectively opened before the Sui and T'ang dynasties.³⁾ The fact remains that, although messengers could, exceptionally, get through on hazardous paths, southern China was *de facto* isolated and played no active role in the civil war. It may, in the loosest possible sense, have recognized the Keng-shi Emperor, but in practice the local officials were on their own. These conditions lasted until A. D. 29, when Ts'in Feng was finally defeated and one of the main roads into the south was again opened to official messengers as well as to the imperial armies. It is symptomatic that this resulted in the immediate surrender of the southern administrators.

¹⁾ I. e. in the 12th month of the Chinese year 23.

²⁾ Cf. 64. Bielenstein, pp. 136—137; vol. I, p. 151.

³⁾ Cf. 64. Bielenstein, map 1, and p. 150.

CHAPTER II. A. D. 24, THE EMERGENCE OF LIU SIU

1. *The transfer of the capital to Ch'ang-an*

A. D. 24 is the year when victory slipped through the fingers of the Keng-shi Emperor. It opened with an act of supreme folly, the transfer of the capital to Ch'ang-an.

The same day on which Liu Siu, in the 10th month (Nov. 2—Dec. 1) of A. D. 23, had been dispatched to the region north of the Yellow River, Liu Ts'i's title was changed from Grand Minister over the Masses to Lieutenant Chancellor. Li Sung became Acting Lieutenant Chancellor.¹⁾ Liu Ts'i subsequently received orders to go ahead to Ch'ang-an and repair the imperial ancestral temples and palaces (14,44: 12 a; 36,66: 1 a). This can only indicate that the emperor at this early stage already envisaged the possibility of moving westwards. Some time later, Liu Ts'i returned to Lo-yang and reported that all was ready for the change of capital (14,44: 12 a—12 b). Li Sung and Shen-t'u Kien sent the Palace [Attendants Within] the Yellow Gate and the Retinue²⁾ with the imperial chariots and clothes from Ch'ang-an to welcome the emperor (11,41: 3 b). The former also dispatched his Chief Clerk, Cheng Hing (36,66: 1 a). There are strong indications that this man had secret orders to bring about the transfer at all costs.

No actual decision had so far been reached whether or not to shift the capital, and it is clear that the question was only settled after a violent struggle between the cliques at the court. The former chieftains were firmly opposed to such a step. The HHS states that they were all men from east of the mountains, and therefore advised the emperor to stay in Lo-yang (36,66: 1 a). Their main argument is not preserved but fortunately can be reconstructed from the address in which it was countered by Cheng Hing. He remarked that »Those who discuss wish first to tranquillize the Red Eyebrows and afterwards enter the passes» (36,66: 1 b). »Those who discuss» were obviously the chieftains, and their reasoning was sound. The leaders of the Red Eyebrows had rejoined their bands, and it was only a question of time before it would come to an open clash between them and the imperial armies. Lo-yang, situated in the very centre of the domain controlled by the Keng-shi Emperor, was the logical place from which to plan further expansion and to coordinate the defence against the Red Eyebrows. In Ch'ang-an, the court would be far removed from the events on the Great Plain, which at this delicate stage could prove fatal. The Land Within the Passes formed a bastion, to which only a few

¹⁾ He was at this time in Ch'ang-an.

²⁾ Cf. 72. Dubs. II, p. 316, note 6.9.

defiles gave access. Its geographical position made Ch'ang-an eminently suited as a capital in times of peace. It was easy to keep a check on those who went in and out of the passes, thus maintaining a firm hold on the territory. No proper fiefs were granted in this area, which was reserved for the emperor alone. If rebellions broke out in distant commanderies and were not promptly put down by the local authorities, the court could, in relative safety, organize the necessary military operations. These considerations had proved their validity during the long and tranquil era of Former Han. The situation was completely reversed in periods of deep and persistent unrest. Then the Land Within the Passes became a trap. Once rebels succeeded in breaking through the defiles, the emperor and his armies were caught within the ring of mountains which previously had been their protection, while at the same time they were isolated from the populous and fertile regions on the Great Plain. This had been the fate of Wang Mang, and it was again to be that of the Keng-shī Emperor.

The former chieftains of the commoners seem to have been sufficiently aware of the military exigency to oppose a transfer of the capital at this stage. Until the Red Eyebrows were pacified, Ch'ang-an was unsafe. Furthermore, the Keng-shī Emperor was not even in sole control of the Land Within the Passes. Lu Fang, and especially Wei Ao, were powerful in the northwest, and although they might be induced to «surrender» they would never make more than doubtful allies. Every strategical consideration militated against a transfer of the capital, and to decide on this now was to take an unjustified gamble, with the high stakes only on the side of the Keng-shī Emperor.

There were, however, other ramifications to this question. It has been seen that the party of the Nan-yang gentry consisted of two factions: members of the imperial Liu family on the one hand and members of powerful clans in the commandery on the other. Their combined weight was not so great as that of the clique of the former chieftains, but they had been able to secure a number of key offices in the civilian administration. As far as the sources reveal, these were all in the hands of the imperial family. Members of the influential Li clan and others had to content themselves with military posts. It now is obvious that both factions of the Nan-yang clique were in favour of the transfer. The imperial relatives were represented by their foreground figure, the Lieutenant Chancellor Liu Ts'i, the Li clan and its allies by Li Sung. Liu Ts'i returned from Ch'ang-an to «welcome» the emperor, while Li Sung had sent the imperial paraphernalia, the emperor's retinue, and, not least, his personal representative Cheng Hing. The latter seems to have presented his argument along traditional lines, emphasizing the prestige of Ch'ang-an and the possible repercussions were it to fall into the hands of anyone else (36,66: 1 a—1 b). Such remarks served as a screen for the real intentions of the old gentry, whose leading members cannot have been blind to the military dangers of their proposal. The fact that they persisted in it, indicates that they had some other powerful motive, strong enough to override all objections and forebodings. This motive is nowhere mentioned in the sources, but it can be inferred from the events that followed: the gentry party believed that a transfer to Ch'ang-an would result

in its victory over the clique of the former chieftains. Lo-yang was a makeshift capital. It probably resembled a large military camp where generals came and went, and where access to the emperor was relatively easy. Once in the great and renowned Ch'ang-an, the Keng-shi Emperor would reside in one of the ancient palaces of Former Han where the weight of tradition would work against the chieftains. The emperor would be surrounded by experienced courtiers who would enforce a strict etiquette. He would be far removed from the scene of the military actions on the Great Plain in which the former chieftains played a leading role. All this would tend to separate the ruler from the chieftains and tip the balance in favour of the old gentry. It is certainly not without relevance that Li Sung had hurried to send the imperial retinue to Lo-yang. The sooner the emperor was attended and, if possible, isolated by the courtiers, the better for the gentry. The chieftains can hardly have understood the real purpose of these manoeuvres. They were still stronger than the gentry party and, had they possessed an inkling of the truth, should have been able to thwart the designs of their opponents.

The Keng-shi Emperor finally made his decision in favour of the transfer (36,66: 1 b). This was the third of his great blunders. Its effect was to upset the delicate balance of power between the two cliques, to put him increasingly under the influence of the gentry party, and to disillusion the chieftains who were to withdraw their support from him. From the strategic point of view it was a disaster whose consequences soon became apparent.

In the 2nd month (Feb. 29—Mar. 28) of A. D. 24, the emperor left Lo-yang and moved to Ch'ang-an, accompanied by his high officials, relatives, and probably by the usual crowd of supplicants and parasites.¹⁾ Li Sung had meanwhile returned, perhaps to be on hand in case the emperor showed any last minute sign of faltering. He was sent on ahead of the imperial suite to lead the way (11,41: 3 b).

The records state that only the Wei-yang Palace had been damaged at the time of Wang Mang's death. All the other palaces were intact. There still remained several thousands of Palace Ladies who had put the harem courts in order. The bells, drums, curtains, chariots, vessels and garments, i. e. the entire equipment of the palaces, were preserved. The official yamen, the Great Granary, and the Arsenal were all ready to be put to use. When the Keng-shi Emperor arrived, he chose the Ch'ang-lo Palace as his residence (HS 99 C: 28 b—29 a; HHS 11, 41: 3 b).²⁾ He was surrounded by the pomp and splendour of the Han dynasty in its traditional setting. The gentry party had achieved its first objective.

The struggle between the two cliques soon reached its climax. It was preceded by a ceremony in which the emperor heaped new honours on the leading men of both parties. Not even the month is recorded when this took place, but it may be assumed to have occurred fairly soon after the arrival in Ch'ang-an. The overtures were made by Li Sung and Chao Meng of the gentry party, not without friction with the chieftains. Li Sung was in the process of by-passing his relatives Li T'ung and Li Yi and becoming a leader of that faction of the Nan-yang clique which con-

¹⁾ Cf. e. g. 14,44: 8 a, 10 b, 11 a, 13 b; 15,45: 2 b, 9 a.

²⁾ Cf. map 11.

sisted of those who were not members of the imperial house. Chao Meng was also from Nan-yang and now emerged as an influential member of its party.¹⁾ These two men, who were to become intimate allies, advised the emperor to enfeoff all deserving men as kings. Their proposal was contested by the Commander-in-chief Chu Wei. He is stated to have remarked that according to the covenant of the Eminent Founder²⁾ only members of the imperial Liu clan should be kings (11, 41: 3 a—3 b).³⁾ It is quite true that this covenant, which is often mentioned in the histories, was a very weighty factor in the political thinking of the Han dynasty. On the other hand, a hard-headed and self-made chieftain like Chu Wei would not easily have been impressed by any agreements which were adverse to his fortunes and those of his clique. He was not steeped in the tradition of the Han dynasty and was hardly interested in re-establishing a system which, though sanctioned by age, meant little to him personally. It would seem, therefore, that the single compressed sentence in the HHS presents no more than the argument used by Chu Wei, and that his actual motive cannot have been merely to draw attention to the covenant. Since the real motive is unfortunately not indicated in the sources, an attempt must be made to reconstruct it.

It has been pointed out that a number of kings had been created in A. D. 23. At least one heir to a former kingdom, and in all probability others as well, had been reinstated in the fiefs of their ancestors.⁴⁾ These men stood outside the struggle for power at the court and did not compete for influence with either of the cliques. It is more important that the former chieftain Chang Ang seems to have been made a king, and the obvious conclusion presents itself that the other chieftains must have received similar titles. This should be contrasted with the fact that the leading members of the gentry party had only been enfeoffed as marquises.⁵⁾ At the time of Li Sung's and Chao Meng's proposal the situation was therefore that, apart from the heirs to former kingdoms, who at present were politically negligible, only the leaders of the clique of the former chieftains seem to have been kings. This throws quite another light on the petition of Li Sung and Chao Meng and on the attitude adopted by Chu Wei. The leading men of the gentry party must have wished to counteract the power and prestige of the former chieftains by having members of their own clique made kings as well. Chu Wei tried to prevent this at all cost. When he quoted the covenant of Emperor Kao, he can only have meant that the titles already granted should be left intact and that, if further enfeoffments were to be made at all, only members of the imperial clan should benefit from them. Such a procedure would have excluded those men from the Nan-yang clique who did not belong to the imperial Liu clan. They had become the most dangerous opponents

¹⁾ The sources mention nothing of his background, except that he had been a general under Shen-t'u Kien and had participated in the attack on Ch'ang-an (HS 99 C: 28 a). His home was in the Ki-yang prefecture (11,41: 3 b).

²⁾ I. e. Emperor Kao (206—195).

³⁾ Cf. 68. Chavannes, II, p. 414; 72. Dubs, I, p. 201, note 3.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 42, 47 note 3, and *infra* p. 70, note 5.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 21.

of the former chieftains, and Chu Wei's intention must have been to thwart their ambitions for the future. He was not successful. The Keng-shī Emperor seems at this stage to have been too deeply influenced by the gentry party to question the wisdom of Li Sung's and Chao Meng's proposal. Alternatively, he might have thought the time ripe for easing out the former chieftains from their powerful positions and erroneously have believed that he himself was strong enough to control the gentry clique. The enfeoffment of the kings was thus decided upon (cf. map 6).

The members of the imperial clan¹⁾ who became kings were:

Liu Chi	: king of Ting-t'ao (11, 41: 4 a; 14, 44: 10 b).
Liu Hi	: king of Yüan-shī ²⁾ (11, 41: 4 a; 14, 44: 11 a).
Liu Kia	: king of Han-chung (11, 41: 4 a; 14, 44: 14 a).
Liu K'ing	: king of Yen ³⁾ (11, 41: 4 a; 14, 44: 13 a).
Liu Sin	: king of Ju-yin ⁴⁾ (11, 41: 4 a; 14, 44: 12 b).
Liu Ts'ī	: king of Wan (11, 41: 4 a; 14, 44: 12 b).

The former chieftains who became kings were:

Chang Ang	: king of Huai-yang (11, 41: 4 a).
Chu Wei	: king of Kiao-tung (11, 41: 4 a).
Ch'en Mu	: king of Yin-p'ing ⁵⁾ (11, 41: 4 a).
Ch'eng Tan	: king of Siang-yi ⁶⁾ (11, 41: 4 a).
Liao Chan	: king of Jang (11, 41: 4 a).
Wang Ch'ang	: king of Teng. He received an appanage of eight prefectures and was granted the imperial surname of Liu. (11, 41: 4 a; 15, 45: 5 b).
Wang Feng	: king of Yi-ch'eng (11, 41: 4 a).
Wang K'uang	: king of Pi-yang ⁷⁾ (11, 41: 4 a).

Others who became kings were:

Hu Yin	: king of Sui ⁸⁾ (11, 41: 4 a).
Li Yi	: king of Wu-yin (11, 41: 4 a; 15, 45: 2 b).

¹⁾ All from Nan-yang.

²⁾ The Yüan-shī prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Ch'ang-shan commandery and was situated NW of the present hien with the same name, Ho-pei.

³⁾ No Yen prefecture existed during the period in question. However, the Nan-yen prefecture was during Later Han changed to Yen, and the text may very well refer to this place. Cf. *supra* p. 40, note 4.

⁴⁾ The Ju-yin prefecture during Han belonged to the Ju-nan commandery and is identical with the present Fou-yang hien, An-hui.

⁵⁾ The Yin-p'ing prefecture during Han belonged to the Tung-hai commandery and was situated 30 li SW of the present Yi hien, Shan-tung.

⁶⁾ The Siang-yi prefecture during Han belonged to the Ch'en-liu commandery and was situated 1 li W of the present Sui hien, Ho-nan.

⁷⁾ The Pi-yang prefecture during Han belonged to the Nan-yang commandery and was situated W of the present T'ang-ho hien, Ho-nan.

⁸⁾ The Sui prefecture during Han belonged to the Nan-yang commandery and is identical with the present hien with the same name, Hu-pei.

Li T'ung : king of Si-p'ing¹⁾ (11, 41: 4 a; 15, 45: 2 b).
 Shen-t'u Kien: king of P'ing-shī (11, 41: 4 a).
 Tsung Tiao : king of Ying-yin²⁾ (11, 41: 4 a).
 Yin Tsun : king of Yen (11, 41: 4 a).

In the last group, two men are mentioned for the first time: the Master of Writing Hu Yin, and Yin Tsun whose official position is not known. Their background is nowhere recorded in the HHS, and it cannot be established whether they were from Nan-yang or not. One may suppose that they, as well as Shen-t'u Kien and Tsung Tiao, belonged to the Nan-yang clique or were its hangers on. The numerical strength of the new kings within the two parties would then have been as follows:

Nan-yang clique : 12
 Clique of the former chieftains: 8


It is clear that the proportion was unfavourable for the latter. Chu Wei went so far as to register his dissatisfaction by refusing to accept a kingdom at all.³⁾ According to the HHS he gave as his reason that he did not belong to the imperial Liu clan (11, 41: 4 a), but this could, of course, have been remedied. Wang Ch'ang had been granted the family name of Liu in recognition of his services. The same could probably have been arranged for Chu Wei if his argument had been genuine. It is much more probable that he simply resented the defeat of his clique. He repeated his previous contention, which had been no more than a cover for his real purpose, and turned down the offer of a kingdom in a huff.

It is worth observing that although new kingdoms had been established they were, as a rule, extremely small. Most consisted of only one prefecture, while during Former Han kingdoms had been created from whole commanderies. The emperor continued to show restraint in parcelling out land to his nobles. The only exceptions are the kingdoms of Han-chung, Huai-yang and Kiao-tung, the last mentioned being the one refused by Chu Wei. Han-chung was the largest in size but not in population. It had in A. D. 2 about 301,000 inhabitants, against 323,000 in Kiao-tung and 981,000 in Huai-yang. Liu Kia, of the imperial house, who had received Han-chung, was therefore not favoured beyond the others. His kingdom was at this time still outside the sphere of influence of the Keng-shī Emperor. Liu Kia had proved himself a capable general, and it is probable that he was simply dispatched to conquer this area, with the added incentive that it was to become his fief. Apart from Han-chung, all the major kingdoms were offered to former chieftains: Huai-yang to Chang Ang, and Kiao-tung to Chu Wei. Wang Ch'ang should also be mentioned here since he received an appanage of eight prefectures. One is therefore left with the impression that the pill intended for the former chieftains

¹⁾ The Si-p'ing prefecture during Han belonged to the Ju-nan commandery and was situated 45 li W of the present hien with the same name, Ho-nan.

²⁾ The Ying-yin prefecture during Han belonged to the Ying-ch'uan commandery and is identical with the present Hū-ch'ang hien, Ho-nan.

³⁾ If my previous conclusions are correct, he still would have retained the title of a king although this was not connected with any fief.



Map 6. The kingdoms of the Keng-shi Emperor, A. D. 24.

had been sweetened. It is also interesting that Li Sung and Chao Meng are absent from the list of kings. They may not have wished to antagonize those men in their own clique who still could have checked their rise to power.

As far as the geographical distribution of the kingdoms is concerned, they had, with only a few exceptions, been granted in areas which were under the direct or indirect control of the emperor. Most of them were situated between the Yellow River and the Han River, 7 or 35 % of the total in Nan-yang alone.¹⁾

The time was soon ripe to strike the final blow, not only against the clique of the former chieftains, but against another group of influential men as well. Probably on the instigation of Li Sung and Chao Meng, the emperor introduced a number of sweeping changes in the high administration. Chu Wei had so far been Commander-in-chief and one of the most important dignitaries at the court. Now his office was divided into at least three branches. Chu Wei himself became Commander-in-chief of the Left. Chao Meng was appointed Commander-in-chief of the Right. This was not all: Liu Ts'i lost his position as Lieutenant Chancellor and received instead the office of Commander-in-chief of the Van²⁾ (11, 41: 4 a; 14, 44: 12 b). These measures automatically resulted in a loss of power and status for Chu Wei as well as for Liu Ts'i. The office of Lieutenant Chancellor had become vacant through the transfer of Liu Ts'i, and as his successor the emperor chose no other than Li Sung (11, 41: 4 a). His department also may have been divided, since it was probably at this time that Ts'ao King became Lieutenant Chancellor of the Left.³⁾ It is not clear whether the former chieftain Ch'en Mu remained Grand Minister of Works or not. Another chieftain, the Bearer of the Gilded Mace, Liao Chan, may have been replaced at this time⁴⁾ (13, 43: 5 b).

The advantage gained was quickly followed up. Under various pretexts, the most dangerous rivals of Li Sung and Chao Meng were removed from the capital. Chu Wei was ordered to pacify the land east of the passes, i. e. those parts of the Great Plain which had not yet surrendered (11, 41: 4 a). Wang Ch'ang was appointed Acting Grand Administrator of Nan-yang (15, 45: 5 b). It seems probable that in these circumstances he could not have retained his post of Commandant of Justice. Even Liu Ts'i, the former Lieutenant Chancellor, who only recently had been appointed Commander-in-chief of the Van, was sent with the Staff of Authority to his kingdom of Wan in Nan-yang (14, 44: 12 b). Li T'ung was dispatched with the Staff of Authority to pacify the King province (15, 45: 2 b). One after another, the leading actors disappeared from the political scene. Among the Commanders-in-chief, Chao Meng alone remained in Ch'ang-an. He and Li Sung had obtained

¹⁾ Apart from the list given above, the HHS mentions only two other kings who were enfeoffed during the reign of the Keng-shi Emperor. One of them was Liu Siu, who during the middle of A. D. 24 was installed as king of Siao (cf. *infra* p. 78). The other was a certain T'ien Li (cf. *infra* p. 87), who at the end of A. D. 24 is mentioned as the king of Lin-k'iu (the Lin-k'iu prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Tung commandery and was situated SE of the present Fan hien, Shan-tung). Siao and Lin-k'iu are both shown on map 6.

²⁾ If a Commander-in-chief of the Rear was appointed, his name has not been preserved.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 37, note 4.

⁴⁾ By Teng Ye.

complete control of the government. Not only had they succeeded in breaking the power of the former chieftains, they had also been able to outmanoeuvre the members of the imperial clan within the Nan-yang clique itself. Liu Ts'i had been unseated from his influential place as Lieutenant Chancellor, shifted to a much less important office, and finally sent away to his kingdom. Li Sung, as his successor, became the most powerful member of his clan, and prudently arranged to have its former leaders Li T'ung and Li Yi transferred to a safe distance from the capital. This completed the upheaval. As against the chieftains, the Nan-yang gentry had won, and within the gentry the members of the imperial family had lost.

The emperor had squandered his chances of himself steering the future course of events. Unlike Liu Pang before him and Kuang-wu after him, he had not risen to the throne aided by loyal followers. There were no men who had shared his hardships during the years of disorder and who were prepared to partake of his power as trusted and trustworthy assistants. On the contrary, he had become emperor through a historical accident. The chieftains had hurriedly agreed on his candidacy in order to forestall the claims of Liu Po-sheng. The leaders of the Nan-yang gentry had been forced to acquiesce. Neither of the two cliques had any reasons to feel particular loyalty to the ruler. Only his relative Lu Ts'i seems to have been close to him. The wisest policy would have been to retain Liu Ts'i as Lieutenant Chancellor, and to preserve a balance between the parties. This would have forced each of the cliques to look to the emperor for support. For no good reason, this policy was abandoned, and the balance destroyed. The chieftains lost their power at the court, although they still commanded imperial armies. Liu Ts'i was removed from the capital. Li Sung and Chao Meng, probably in cooperation with their allies among the Nan-yang gentry, were in control of the official apparatus. No other organized groups seem to have existed to check their power. This was fatal in a government where the ruler usually acted on the advice of his chief ministers. Even if the emperor had been strong enough to break the deadlock and recall the chieftains, it was probably too late to bridge the differences and bring about a reconciliation, for the Nan-yang gentry was politically shortsighted, and the chieftains were embittered and deeply disappointed. The rivalry of the cliques had found open expression; centrifugal forces were in full motion, and little more was needed to overturn the emperor and once more throw the country into chaos.

2. The court loses ground

It was soon apparent that the Han movement had lost its impetus. During A. D. 23, a real and impressive progress had been made, and, except for outlying areas, the recognition of the Keng-shi Emperor had been swift and genuine. All this began to change in 24. The court was removed from the key strategical area and torn by a violent struggle between the cliques. The prestige of the emperor began to decline, and this at a time when continued success was imperative to keep enthusiasm from waning and waverers in line. There is then a distinct difference between the activities of A. D. 24 and those of the preceding year. What at first sight might

appear as evidence of further expansion, was, in reality, only a series of makeshift expedients on the part of a steadily weakening government.

Once the Keng-shī Emperor was installed in Ch'ang-an, he attempted to gain full control over the northwest. He summoned Lu Fang, who previously had risen in the Dependent State of An-ting,¹⁾ and appointed him a Chief Commandant of Cavalry. Lu Fang was then permitted to return with orders to pacify all the territory from An-ting westwards (12, 42: 10 b). This meant that the emperor not only recognized Lu Fang's *de facto* regional position but also granted him extensive powers to conquer additional areas, unchecked by the presence of imperial armies.

The Keng-shī Emperor also dispatched messengers to summon Wei Ao and his uncles Wei Ts'ui and Wei Yi. Their Master of the Army, Fang Wang,²⁾ opposed any affiliation with the emperor, but his advice was not accepted. He resigned his position and is not again heard of until the beginning of A. D. 25. The others arrived with their followers in Ch'ang-an. Wei Ao was appointed a General of the Right, while Wei Ts'ui's and Wei Yi's self-assumed titles were confirmed (13, 43: 4 b—5 b). This implied that almost the entire area of present Kan-su³⁾ had for the time being been brought into the ambit of the Han state, which could be construed as a major diplomatic victory for the Keng-shī Emperor. It had been won, however, at the cost of granting considerable authority to Wei Ao and his relatives and followers, none of whom was a wholehearted supporter of the Han cause. It will be seen that the emperor's hold on the northwest was ephemeral.

In the preceding year, Chang Pu had seized the Lang-ya commandery.⁴⁾ The Keng-shī Emperor, continuing his policy of granting titles to independent warlords, appointed him as General-in-chief Who Supports Han, and bestowed other distinctions on his brothers. Thereupon Chang Pu enlarged the area under his control by annexing T'ai-shan, Ch'eng-yang, Tung-lai, Kao-mi, Kiao-tung, Pei-hai, Tsi, and Tsi-nan (HHK 2: 4 b; HHS 12, 42: 3 a). This meant that he now dominated the major part of present Shan-tung. The court soon made a test of his loyalty, which proved negative, as should have been obvious from the beginning. Wang Hung, who had previously surrendered to a Han messenger,⁵⁾ was appointed Grand Administrator of Lang-ya, but was prevented from taking up his office by Chang Pu. He countered this by issuing a call-to-arms, instructing the officials and people of the commandery to surrender. The results were meagre. He was able to assemble some troops and to conquer Kan-yü⁶⁾ and five other prefectures, but in spite of some engagements his strength was quite inadequate to overcome Chang Pu (12, 42: 5 b—6 a). After these events, it was no longer possible to maintain the fiction that Chang Pu was an official and supporter of the emperor.

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 26 and map 5.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 24.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 25 and map 5.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 29 and map 5.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 36.

⁶⁾ The Kan-yü prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Lang-ya commandery and is identical with the present hien with the same name, Shan-tung. It is shown on map 25.

In A. D. 24, another warlord is mentioned for the first time, though he may have been active earlier. This was Tung Hien. He seems to have belonged to the gentry as, in order to revenge the murder of his father, he was involved in one of the feuds typical for this class (HHK 1: 14 a). Tung Hien originally rose in his home commandery Tung-hai (1 A: 11 b; 12,42: 3 a). He was appointed Grand Administrator of Lin-huai by the Keng-shī Emperor in A. D. 24 and subsequently attacked and conquered some prefectures in Tung-hai¹⁾ (HHK 2: 4 b). This made him master of the lower reaches of the Great Plain, from Shan-tung southwards to the Yang-tsi River.

In all the instances mentioned, the Keng-shī Emperor had delegated authority and received little or nothing in return. Wei Ao was temporarily at the court, but Lu Fang, Chang Pu, and Tung Hien were as independent as ever, and had even been able, in some instances, substantially to enlarge their territories under the guise of imperial sanction. This continuous weakening of the prestige of the court soon brought new repercussions. The first man to take advantage of the changed conditions was Liu Yung. In A. D. 23, the emperor had made him king of Liang, a fief which had been held, and later lost, by his father.²⁾ He now turned against the Keng-shī Emperor and began to act on own authority (1 A: 11 a). Assembling armies and appointing generals, he conquered Tsi-yin, Shan-yang, Lu, P'ei, Ch'u, Huai-yang, and parts of Ju-nan. He installed his youngest brother as king of Lu, and appointed another brother General-in-chief. He also formed an alliance with Chang Pu and Tung Hien who, at least in theory, recognized him as their leader. They must have felt that some kind of affiliation was preferable to complete autonomy, even though it was an affiliation only in the loosest possible sense. There was never any effective cooperation between the three during the years to follow, and this inability to form a united front eventually brought about their fall. Liu Yung confirmed the title which the Keng-shī Emperor had conferred upon Chang Pu, made him a Marquis Who Is Loyal and Continent, and placed him in charge of the Ts'ing and Sū provinces.³⁾ Tung Hien was appointed General-in-chief Who Shelters Han (12,42: 3 a, 6 a). These latest developments meant that the unfortunate Wang Hung was completely surrounded by enemy territory and that his life was in danger. He finally had a face-to-face meeting with Chang Pu, following which a *modus vivendi* was arranged, and he was permitted to carry out his duties as Grand Administrator of Lang-ya. Although the pretence was maintained that he acted for the Keng-shī Emperor, his chief from now on was Chang Pu (12,42: 6 a).

Liu Mao,⁴⁾ who previously had operated in the Ho-nan commandery, also saw

¹⁾ These were:

The Li-ch'eng prefecture, situated 40 li W of the present Kan-yü hien, Kiang-su.

The K'ü-yang prefecture, situated 110 li SW of the present Tung-hai hien, Kiang-su.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 42.

³⁾ It will be remembered that the Keng-shī Emperor in A. D. 23 had appointed Li Tsi-tu as Shepherd of the Sū province (cf. *supra* p. 41). He had meanwhile been killed by his followers (21,51: 2 a).

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 29.

his opportunity and succeeded in conquering the Yü-g-ch'uan commandery as well as parts of Ju-nan (14,44: 11 b; 17,47: 10 b—11 a). This was a new blow for the emperor, who now had lost not only the Shan-tung peninsula but also practically the whole of the Great Plain south of the new northern branch of the Yellow River.

In Si-ch'uan, Kung-sun Shu dispensed with the fiction of official status under the Han dynasty. He proclaimed himself king of Shu and Pa and chose Ch'eng-tu as his capital (1 A: 11 a; 13,43: 14 a).

Southwest of this new kingdom, the Yüe-hi commandery was still governed by one of Wang Mang's administrators.¹⁾ He had appointed a certain aborigine, by name Jen Kuei,²⁾ as a Captain. During A. D. 24, Jen Kuei at the head of his tribe, killed the administrator, proclaimed himself king of K'üing-ku, and took possession of Yüe-hi (86,116: 18 b—19 a).

Not even the capital commanderies were free from disorder. The HHS states that the Three Adjuncts³⁾ were tyrannized by the former chieftains Wang K'uang and Chang Ang (11,41: 4 b). They were in all probability embittered by the fall of their clique and were beginning to relapse into their former role of bandits.

The direct achievements which could be put to the credit of the court were few. A certain Pao Yung, who was reckoned a paragon of virtue, was summoned to the capital and appointed Acting General-in-chief. He was dispatched with the Staff of Authority to the southern and central parts of Shan-si, which he pacified (28 A, 58 A: 7 b, 9 b—10 a; 29,59: 5 b). Liu Kia had conquered his kingdom of Han-chung and chosen Nan-cheng⁴⁾ as his capital (14,44: 14 a). Liu Sin⁵⁾ took the Yü-chang commandery (14,44: 13 a). All these regions were peripheral: Shan-si was relatively sparsely populated; Han-chung was situated within present Shen-si, directly south of the Ts'in-ling Range; and Yü-chang occupied the area of present Kiang-si. Their temporary pacification in no way counterbalanced the loss of the Shan-tung peninsula and the southern part of the Great Plain.

Meanwhile, Li Sung and Chao Meng sunned themselves in the almost absolute authority they had achieved within the central government. The latter strengthened his position by introducing a daughter into the imperial harem. She was favoured by the emperor and made a Lady, the highest rank of concubine below the empress⁶⁾ (11,41: 4 b). Chao Meng's power seems to have eclipsed even that of Li Sung. He ruthlessly persecuted his personal enemies (11,41: 4 b) and advanced his supporters. Among the latter was Tou Jung.

Tou Jung belonged to one of the two most powerful families of the northwest. His ancestors had been high officials during Former Han, and a girl of his clan

¹⁾ His name was Mei Ken.

²⁾ In contrast to all other passages, 86,116: 19 a writes Chang Kuei.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 45, note 4.

⁴⁾ The Nan-cheng prefecture was situated 2 li E of the present hien with the same name, Shen-si. It is shown on map 6.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 35.

⁶⁾ Cf. 68. Chavannes, II, p. 490, note 2.

had become the empress of Emperor Wen (179—157) (23,53: 1 a). Tou Jung himself had taken part in the battle of K'un-yang on Wang Mang's side (23,53: 1 b). He had subsequently held an independent command and, after his defeat by the Han troops,¹⁾ had surrendered to Chao Meng. The latter wished to recommend him for the post of Grand Administrator of the Kū-lu commandery, but Tou Jung shrewdly suggested another position for himself. Kū-lu was situated on the Great Plain north of the Yellow River, an area which was the scene of continuous fighting during A. D. 24. Tou Jung feared that, if appointed there, he would inevitably become involved not only in the military but also in the political struggles of the civil war. To avoid this, he persuaded Chao Meng to arrange instead his appointment as Chief Commandant of the Dependent State of Chang-ye in present Ning-hia²⁾ (23,53: 1 b—2 a). Tou Jung remained in the far northwest until A. D. 36. His much delayed political alignment contributed to Emperor Kuang-wu's victory and profoundly influenced the fortunes of his clan.

The HHS introduces Tou Jung's departure for the Kan-su corridor by a description of a conference between himself and his brothers. In this he is supposed to have outlined his views on the present and plans for the future.³⁾ It has been demonstrated that no written records of a secret conference of this type could possibly have been prepared. In all probability, the entire description is a free invention of the historian, who in this way suggests the motive for Tou Jung's decision. Helped by his knowledge of the later events, the historian is able to offer an explanation which may very well be close to the truth. Tou Jung wanted above all to preserve the influence of his clan, and gain time until he could make a safe political choice. The court could hope for little active support from such a man.

In summing up, it may be said that the Keng-shī Emperor had lost ground in almost every one of the moves described above. The most shattering blow to his power is still to be described: the emergence of Liu Siu as a decisive factor on the political scene.

3. *The Wang Lang crisis*

Liu Siu, in his capacity as Acting Commander-in-chief, and with the Staff of Authority, had crossed the Yellow River in the 10th month (Nov. 2—Dec. 1) of A. D. 23. His orders were to pacify the northern part of the Great Plain, and since he had no troops under his command, his mission was a purely diplomatic

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 130.

²⁾ According to HHS chf 23 A: 40 a, «Emperor Wu appointed a Chief Commandant of the Dependent State in order to be in charge of those Man and Yi who had surrendered». This Dependent State is not listed in the administrative survey of A. D. 2 in the geographical treatise of the HS, but it is shown in the corresponding list of A. D. 140 in the HHS. All commentators agree that it is not clear which area this Dependent State comprised. Its subordinate prefectures are recorded in the HHS, but this is no help, since their sites are no longer known. The *Chung kuo ti ming ta ts'i tien* (p. 341: 3) believes that the Dependent State was situated within the borders of the present Kū-yen hien in Ning-hia, i. e. close to the Salt Lakes shown on 104. Herrmann, map 22—23.

³⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 56—57, 60.

one. He first went to the city of Ye¹⁾ (16,46: 1 a) and proceeded from there to Han-tan (1 A: 8 b). The latter was the capital of Chao and one of the most important towns of the empire.²⁾

It is unfortunate that, for the most crucial stage of Liu Siu's career, one has often to rely on secondary sources. A situation was soon to arise where Liu Siu and a handful of loyal followers had to flee for their lives. During this emergency he was cut off from the court. It is out of the question that any firsthand reports of his activities could have reached the emperor and thus been preserved in the archives. Nevertheless, the HHS and its sources give an extraordinarily vivid description of Liu Siu's adventures, which means that the historian must have embellished the meagre secondary sources at his disposal by free invention of his own. After the final victory of Liu Siu, attempts must also have been made to reconstruct this important phase of his life. Some of his chief assistants seem to have given accounts of their experiences, but, since these can only have been written down a considerable time after the events in question, they are in some points confused and contradictory.³⁾

There is not only ambiguity about simple and straightforward questions, such as Liu Siu's escape route or what happened at a certain time in a certain place, but also, and more seriously, for Liu Siu's intentions and motives at a given moment. It stands to reason that he resented the death of his brother and the defeat of his original party. From this it is a long step to harbouring imperial ambitions. During the first few months after the execution of Po-sheng, Liu Siu was fully occupied with the problem of his own survival. He skilfully cultivated the acquaintance of influential men and eventually was dispatched on his mission to the north. That he was entrusted with this assignment was in itself no indication that his fortunes were now on the mend. Only after the successful completion of his campaign against Wang Lang, which will presently be described, did it become possible for Liu Siu to embark on an independent course of action. Indeed the *pen ki* states unequivocally that it was only after Wang Lang's defeat and death that Liu Siu's double-dealing with the emperor began (1 A: 11 a). One would therefore expect that, up to that moment, he would, if only in his own interests, have acted with the greatest circumspection. In fact, however, two independent entries date the beginning of Liu Siu's insubordination from the very moment he crossed the Yellow River.

One of Liu Siu's early friends and co-students, Teng Yü,⁴⁾ decided to throw in his lot with him, followed northwards, and caught up with Liu Siu in Ye. Teng Yü's biography describes their meeting in detail, stating that the two men stayed together all night and that they talked privately. Teng Yü remarked that the empire was in disorder, the Keng-shī Emperor incompetent, and

¹⁾ The Ye prefecture was the capital of the Wei commandery and situated SW of the present Lin-chang hien, Ho-nan. For this and the following events cf. map 7.

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 83.

³⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 69–74.

⁴⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 100.

that Liu Siu ought to make plans for the throne himself. The latter was pleased (16,46: 1 b).

Another man who was later to gain great influence is Feng Yi. He also followed Liu Siu northwards. His biography records that he secretly talked to Liu Siu, pointing out the people's loss of trust in the Keng-shī Emperor, and urging that this had created a situation which was favourable to Liu Siu's own candidacy. When Liu Siu arrived in Han-tan, he dispatched Feng Yi and another follower, ostensibly to carry out an inspection. Secretly he instructed them to prepare a list of those high officials who were prepared to give him their support (17,47: 2 a).

In both cases, the recorded speeches took place in complete privacy. Teng Yü spent the night alone with Liu Siu, and Feng Yi spoke to him secretly. It would be absurd to believe that any notes were made, since treason was advocated in each of these discussions. The historian can therefore have had no primary sources at his disposal. He may simply have invented the speeches himself. However, in other contexts he has manifestly used the accounts of Liu Siu's chief followers. This may well be so in the present case also. The two passages would then be based on the much later personal recollections of Teng Yü and Feng Yi. Had one single account been preserved, faulty memory might be suspected, but two records would tend to complement and strengthen each other. Thus there would seem to be good grounds for the assumption that Liu Siu was foolhardy enough secretly to oppose the emperor at a stage when he had no effective power to do so.

This does not necessarily mean that Liu Siu already entertained conscious ambitions for the throne. It seems clear that his plans only began to crystallize after the defeat of Wang Lang, i. e. at exactly the time indicated by the pen ki. On the other hand, it also seems evident that, pushed by his followers, he began to play a game of his own from the moment he left the court. Apart from vague dreams for the future, he must mainly have been spurred by his resentment against the Keng-shī Emperor, and his personal ambitions can hardly have been aimed very high. He could have had little hope that his secret activities would remain undiscovered for any length of time. There are, in fact, strong indications that, if found out, Liu Siu would either have tried to assemble an independent band or entered one of the many groups of marauders active on the plain.¹⁾ Whatever Teng Yü and Feng Yi may have argued, it is probable that Liu Siu saw himself as a possible leader of a minor band among many others, rather than as the rising founder of a new dynasty. He was never a man of great vision, but often showed an astute sense for what was practicable at the moment, or could be successful at short range.

There were, then, various forces at work, with currents and undercurrents, which in the normal course of events would have come out into the open and which might have relegated Liu Siu to a minor role in history. However, an incident occurred which not only completely changed the situation on the northern plain but also had a far-reaching effect on the future of China.

¹⁾ Cf. *infra* p. 68.

While Liu Siu was in Han-tan, he was approached by Liu Lin,¹⁾ an ambitious member of the imperial clan. Nothing came of their meeting (1 A: 8 b). Liu Siu proceeded instead to Hia-k'ü-yang, the capital of a commandery which had been founded by Wang Mang.²⁾ Its administrator, P'ei T'ung, was still in office. Liu Siu reappointed him (21, 51: 5 a) and went on to Chen-ting³⁾ (1 A: 8 b).⁴⁾

Liu Lin had clearly expected to gain some influence through his meeting with Liu Siu, but the interview was disappointing. He quickly adjusted himself to another course of action. It so happened that a native of the Chao state had begun to create a certain stir at this time. His real name seems to have been Wang Ch'ang, but he is generally referred to as Wang Lang.⁵⁾ A soothsayer and physiognomist who understood astrology, he seems to have had a considerable reputation in the north. Wang Lang claimed to be a son of Emperor Ch'eng (32—7 B. C.). The background to this was an event in A. D. 10, when a man had professed himself to be Emperor Ch'eng's son Ts'i-yü. It was a well-known fact that no sons of this ruler were alive, and an investigation showed that the claimant in reality was a certain Wang Chung from Ch'ang-an. Wang Mang had him executed. Wang Lang now insisted that he was the real Ts'i-yü and fabricated a suitable genealogy. His mother, he said, had been a singing girl in the harem of Emperor Ch'eng. One day, as she was lying down, her whole body became covered by a yellow emanation which did not disappear for half a day. She became pregnant and gave birth to Ts'i-yü. This boy was able to grow up unharmed, as he was exchanged for another baby. At the age of twelve, he was taken to Shu in present Si-ch'uan by the Gentleman-of-the-Palace Li Man-k'ing. When he was seventeen, he went to Tan-yang, situated in present An-hui south of the Yang-ts'i. He returned northwards at the age of twenty (HS 99 B: 13 a—13 b; HHS 1 A: 8 b; 12, 42: 1 a—1 b).

Whether or not Liu Lin was naive enough to believe this highly imaginative genealogy, it is patent that he saw in Wang Lang the means to further his own ambitions. He made contacts with two powerful men in Chao, Li Yü and Chang Ts'an, and with them plotted to proclaim Wang Lang Son of Heaven. Some time later it was rumoured that the Red Eyebrows were about to cross the Yellow River, and a great panic swept over Chao, preparing the ground for the coup. The conspirators spread the news that «Liu Ts'i-yü» would be acceptable to the Red Eyebrows as emperor. On Jan. 16, A. D. 24, they entered the city of Han-tan with a large cortege, and Wang Lang ascended the throne in the palace of the former kings of Chao. Liu Lin was appointed as Lieutenant Chancellor, Li Yü as Commander-in-chief, and Chang Ts'an as General-in-chief (1 A: 8 b; 12, 42: 1 b—2 a).

¹⁾ TTK 1: 4 a, in contrast to HHS and HHK, writes 臨 instead of 林.

²⁾ He had divided the Kü-lu commandery and established the Ho-jung commandery (TKK 10: 4 a). TTK 10: 4 a, HHS 1 A: 9 b, and SKC 10: 19 b all agree that the name was Ho-jung. Only HHK 2: 2 b and HHS 21,51: 5 a write Ho-ch'eng.

³⁾ The Chen-ting prefecture during Former Han was the capital of the Chen-ting kingdom and is identical with the present Cheng-ting hien, Ho-peï.

⁴⁾ The text does not make it clear whether Liu Siu first went to Hia-k'ü-yang and subsequently to Chen-ting or the reverse.

⁵⁾ HHK 1: 18 a says that his name was Ch'ang and his style Lang.

An edict was issued in the name of the new emperor which restated his claim to be Liu Tsī-yü and announced the event of his ascension to the throne. It repeated the apparently widely held belief that Chai Yi had not died in the rebellion of A. D. 7 against Wang Mang¹⁾ but still lived in hiding. It also referred to a previous edict in which the Keng-shi Emperor and Chai Yi had been ordered to present themselves, together with all meritorious subjects, at the new court (12, 42: 2 a).

Liu Siu had meanwhile arrived in Lu-nu.²⁾ There a meeting took place which later contributed to his victory over Wang Lang. It has already been described how a messenger of the Keng-shi Emperor had been forced to recognize Keng K'uang as Grand Administrator of Shang-ku.³⁾ The latter decided to send his twenty-one year old son Keng Yen to the court with a memorial and presents. Keng Yen had reached Sung-tsī⁴⁾ on his journey when Wang Lang was proclaimed emperor. Two officials who accompanied him decided to surrender to the new pretender. Keng Yen, on the other hand, had heard that Liu Siu was in Lu-nu, hurried there and joined his retinue (19, 49: 1 b). Subsequently Liu Siu withdrew from what had now become a dangerous area, and arrived with his followers at Ki, in the very north of the Great Plain (1 A: 9 a).

Keng Yen tried to arrange a meeting between his father Keng K'uang and Liu Siu, but it is not clear whether this took place. According to one source (SHS 2: 9 b), Keng K'uang went to Ch'ang-p'ing⁵⁾ and saw Liu Siu. Another text (HHK 1: 19 b) states that he arrived in Ch'ang-p'ing, and from there dispatched his youngest son with horses as a present, apparently to Ki, but without himself meeting Liu Siu. The latter also wrote to the Acting Grand Administrator of Yü-yang, P'eng Ch'ung (12, 42: 8 a). His commandery bordered on Shang-ku in the east. It was a relatively wealthy area, and its support would have been valuable. P'eng Ch'ung made preparations to see Liu Siu, but all diplomatic activities were cut short by the very rapid political development.

Wang Lang had enjoyed a spectacular success. His messengers roamed the northern part of the plain, where almost all commanderies submitted to him as far north as the mountains and as far east as, and including, Liao-tung⁶⁾ (1 A: 8 b; 12, 42: 1 b—2 a). He had also offered a reward of the income of 100,000 households for the head of Liu Siu (1 A: 9 a; 20, 50: 3 a). The latter was in desperate straits. Without troops and cut off from the imperial armies by a large stretch of enemy territory, he was not even safe in Ki. Troops were raised locally in response to

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 89—91.

²⁾ Lu-nu during Han was the capital of the Chung-shan kingdom and is identical with the present Ting hien, Ho-pei.


³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 39.

⁴⁾ The Sung-tsī prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Kū-lu commandery and was situated N of the present Chao hien, Ho-pei. Cf. map 7.

⁵⁾ The Ch'ang-p'ing prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Shang-ku commandery and was situated SE of the present hien with the same name, Ho-pei.

Keng K'uang must have come from Tsü-yang, the capital of his commandery. Tsü-yang was situated S of the present Huai-lai hien, Chahar.

⁶⁾ The present Liao-ning.



Map 7. Liu Siu's operations against Wang Lang in A. D. 24.

Wang Lang's call-to-arms (1 A: 9 a), while his own attempt to mobilize soldiers proved an utter failure (20, 50: 3 a—3 b). In this situation, Liu Siu seems to have taken counsel with his followers. Keng Yen advocated withdrawal northwards where an army could be brought together in the Shang-ku and Yü-yang command-

eries.¹⁾ All the others were in favour of escaping south (19, 49: 1 b). Soon afterwards, serious disorders broke out in Ki. Liu Siu and his followers made haste to leave the town. They were able to get out through the southern gate but had to abandon most of their equipment (1 A:9 a; 20, 50: 1 a; SHS 2: 9b). Keng Yen alone went north and rejoined his father (19, 49: 2 a).

Liu Siu's escape has already been described and analyzed²⁾ and can therefore be treated briefly here. Considerable confusion exists concerning the route, due probably to the contradictory versions which were later given by the various participants. The most reasonable account seems to be that the fugitives reached the Wu-lü commune, crossed the Hu-t'o River on newly formed ice, passed west of the Hia-po prefecture, and finally reached Sin-tu, the capital of the commandery of the same name.

Sin-tu had refused to submit to Wang Lang, and its Grand Administrator, Jen Kuang, had ordered the execution of one of Wang Lang's messengers in the marketplace as a warning to the people. Subsequently he mobilized some troops (21, 51: 1 a—1 b). As soon as he and his subordinates heard that Liu Siu was approaching, they opened the city gates, went out to meet him, and installed him at an inn (1 A: 9 b; 12, 42: 2 a; 21, 51: 1 b). Another commandery on the northern plain which had resisted Wang Lang was Ho-jung. As soon as its Grand Administrator P'ei T'ung, previously reappointed by Liu Siu,³⁾ heard about his escape, he dispatched from Hia-k'ü-yang two of his officials with cavalry. Soon afterwards he himself met Liu Siu in Sin-tu⁴⁾ (21, 51: 5 a).

Liu Siu's situation was greatly improved. The fugitive who had barely escaped with his life, suddenly found himself supported by two high officials, with at least minor troop contingents under his command. At the same time, he and his followers still formed an isolated enclave within the territory of Wang Lang, and an immediate decision had to be taken as to what course to follow. Liu Siu seems to have thrown the question open for general discussion. Again it is highly improbable that the various opinions expressed at this conference, hurried and strained as it must have been under the looming shadow of Wang Lang, were preserved in contemporary documents. Even if this had been so, it can hardly be assumed that these would have survived the vicissitudes of the following months. The HHS describes the discussion in the biographies of Jen Kuang and P'ei T'ung, and its sources most probably were the personal recollections of these two officials.⁵⁾ As pointed out before, the historian did not hesitate to invent speeches when reconstructing the motives for the actions of the leading individuals, but it is not very likely that he did so in this case. The reason is that Liu Siu cuts such a poor figure. The historian was anxious to place him in the most favourable light and to improve on reality

¹⁾ The Grand Administrator of Shang-ku was his own father. The Acting Grand Administrator of Yü-yang, P'eng Ch'ung, came from the same commandery as Liu Siu. Cf. *supra* p. 39.

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 69—73.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 64.

⁴⁾ SKC 10: 19 b—20 a places the meeting in the An-ch'eng district of Sin-tu.

⁵⁾ These must have been requested soon after Liu Siu had ascended the throne in A. D. 25. Jen Kuang died as early as A. D. 29 (21,51: 2 b) and P'ei T'ung between A. D. 30 and 32 (21,51: 6 a).

whenever necessary. Far from inventing the present account, he would either have excluded it altogether or introduced suitable alterations in favour of Liu Siu. Since he did not do this, he must either have overlooked the passage, or perhaps did not grasp its implications. It seems safe to conclude that the description of the conference presents what Jen Kuang and P'ei T'ung later remembered of this occasion.

Liu Siu seems to have been extremely discouraged. He remarked that the troops were few and suggested that they all should join the bands of either Tsi-lu On the City Wall or Li Tsi-tu¹⁾ (21, 51: 1b). Both were probably dead by this time,²⁾ but this might not have been generally known. Others proposed that they should try to fight their way westwards to Ch'ang-an (21, 51: 5 a). Jen Kuang and P'ei T'ung opposed these suggestions. The latter observed that an evacuation would result in the permanent loss of the land north of the Yellow River, which might have serious repercussions on the so recently restored dynasty³⁾ (21, 51: 5 a—5 b). Jen Kuang argued that soldiers should be raised in the neighbouring prefectures. If some of the cities were unwilling to surrender, the threat of being sacked would quickly bring results (21, 51: 1 b). Liu Siu was swayed and decided to take up the fight against Wang Lang.

Liu Siu's ignominious proposal illustrates that, whatever his chief followers might have thought in this matter, he himself was prepared to give up his ambitions and become a bandit. He was still psychologically far from ready to regard himself as a contestant for the throne. Nevertheless, around him a clique was beginning to form whose members were aware of the political possibilities. Fully realizing their advantage in supporting a man who just possibly might become the future emperor, they were interested in preventing decisions which could endanger, or place beyond reach, this ultimate goal.

Once Liu Siu had taken his stand, he acted with determination and speed. A call-to-arms was issued, and troops were mobilized in the surrounding area (1 A: 9 b; 12, 42: 2 a; 16, 46: 1 b; 17, 47: 2 b). The army then marched out from Sin-tu and captured the cities of T'ang-yang⁴⁾ and Shi⁵⁾ (1 A: 9 b; 21, 51: 2 a, 6 a). These initial successes brought new followers into his camp. Two gentry clans took possession of their respective home towns and joined the Han troops. The Liu clan⁶⁾ in Ch'ang-ch'eng⁷⁾ was led by Liu Chi, his younger brother, and a paternal

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 41.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 41 and p. 59, note 3.

³⁾ P'ei T'ung's address is presented very much in the stereotyped form which was typical for the memorials of this time. It is not probable, however, that the conference was a very formal one. This would seem to strengthen the interpretation offered above. When P'ei T'ung later gave his version of the discussion, he preferred to couch the advice he had given to the future sovereign in terms almost identical with those used in memorials to a reigning emperor.

⁴⁾ The T'ang-yang prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Kü-lu commandery and was situated W of the present Sin-ho hien, Ho-peï.

⁵⁾ The Shi prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Kü-lu commandery and was situated SW of the present Shu-lu hien, Ho-peï.

⁶⁾ No relation to the imperial house is recorded.

⁷⁾ The Ch'ang-ch'eng prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Sin-tu kingdom and was situated NW of the present Ki hien, Ho-peï.

cousin. They and their followers collected soldiers, captured their city, and merged forces with Liu Siu (1 A: 10 a; 21, 51: 6 b—7 a). Keng Ch'un¹⁾ together with three paternal cousins also assembled the members of his clan and their followers. They met Liu Siu in Shī²⁾ (21, 51: 8 a). Subsequently, Keng Ch'un arranged the surrender of his home town Sung-tsi. Liu Siu advanced without delay and took Hia-k'ü-yang, K'u-hing,³⁾ and Lu-nu (1 A: 10 a; 21, 51: 3 b, 8 b).

Up to this point, the troops had been marching in almost the opposite direction from the stronghold of their enemy. At Sin-tu, the distance to the enemy fastness of Han-tan had been 150 km. Liu Siu's manoeuvres had now increased it to 230 km. The reason is a phenomenon remarked upon before: during a military emergency of the type described, the first step was normally to widen the base of operations. The main objective was not the mere conquest of territories and cities but the mobilization of fresh troops and the requisition of supplies. This was exactly what Liu Siu did. In Sin-tu, he had been too weak to launch a direct attack on Wang Lang. Now with his army and economic resources increasing with each new region brought under his control, he was strong enough to turn southwards from Lu-nu and to take the Sin-shi,⁴⁾ Yüan-shi,⁵⁾ and Fang-tsi⁶⁾ prefectures. All this time he continued to enlist new soldiers (1 A: 10 a).

With the conquest of Fang-tsi, Liu Siu had reached his nearest point so far to Han-tan. His movements had taken him on an approximately circular course from Sin-tu. He next made a temporary halt before pushing his advance into the most crucial stage, and it is clear, indirectly, from the sources that he must have felt the need for filling the gap inside the circle. His follower Yao K'i was dispatched with a separate contingent to Sung-tsi, which had already surren-

¹⁾ He had previously been dispatched to the north as a messenger with the Staff of Authority (cf. *supra* p. 37). When Liu Siu first came to Han-tan, he and Keng Ch'un met (21,51: 8 a). The latter stayed behind in Han-tan until Wang Lang was proclaimed emperor. He then escaped from the city by night, confiscated a number of chariots for himself and his personal officials, and returned to his home town Sung-tsi (TKK 10: 1 a).

²⁾ The text has Yü 育, but no prefecture existed with this name. Shen K'in-han corrects Yü to Shī (cf. 21,51: 8 a, *T'ai kie*). TTK 10: 1 a places the meeting in Lu-nu. However, according to HHS (21,51: 8 a—8 b) Keng Ch'un saw Liu Siu after the latter had accomplished his escape from Ki but before Hia-k'ü-yang was taken, an attack in which he participated. Since Liu Siu reached Lu-nu only after he had been in Hia-k'ü-yang, the entry in the TTK must be wrong.

³⁾ The K'u-hing prefecture during Han belonged to the Chung-shan kingdom and was situated NE of the present Wu-ki hien, Ho-pei. During Later Han, its name was changed to Han-ch'ang.

⁴⁾ The Sin-shi prefecture during Han belonged to the Chung-shan kingdom and was situated 45 li SW of the present Sin-lo hien, Ho-pei. The *Commentary* identifies this place with a prefecture in the Kū-lu commandery which had the same name. This is a mistake as already realized by Wang Sien-k'ien.

⁵⁾ The Yüan-shi prefecture during Han was the capital of the Ch'ang-shan commandery (during Later Han changed to a kingdom) and was situated NW of the present hien with the same name, Ho-pei.

⁶⁾ The Fang-tsi prefecture also belonged to Ch'ang-shan and was situated SW of the present Kao-yi hien, Ho-pei. The text has incorrectly 防 for 房.

dered. From there he attacked and took Fei-lei,¹⁾ Kao,²⁾ Chen-ting, and Lo-yang³⁾ (20, 50: 1 b).⁴⁾

Another weighty reason lay behind these manoeuvres. The Chen-ting prefecture was the capital of the Chen-ting kingdom, and a certain danger had arisen in the person of its king Liu Yang.⁵⁾ This man had a swelling on his neck and was known as »Goitre Yang» (21, 51: 9 a). He seems to have been an ambitious, although gullible, man who had begun to enlist great numbers of troops in order to assist Wang Lang. Apart from the immediate military danger, this would have had the most serious repercussions for Liu Siu. It might have swayed the local gentry whose support he badly needed, and who had only just begun to give him active, if limited, aid. It is indicative that in this situation Liu Siu sent as his envoy to the king of Chen-ting no other than Liu Chi, the leader of one of the gentry clans which had recently joined him. Liu Chi's diplomatic mission was successful. Liu Yang changed front in favour of Liu Siu, who went to Chen-ting in person to cement the new alliance. The king's sister had married a member of the great Kuo clan in the kingdom, and their daughter Kuo Sheng-t'ung was now offered to Liu Siu. The event was celebrated with a large banquet in the home of the Kuo clan, the Ts'i hamlet.⁶⁾ Later the girl became Liu Siu's first empress (10 A: 4 a; 21, 51: 7 a).⁷⁾

With his troops increased, but still weaker than the enemy, Liu Siu advanced and conquered the Ho prefecture.⁸⁾ There he met with his first serious opposition. The greater part of the gentry was still in favour of Wang Lang, and a member of the influential Su clan in Ho secretly agreed to open a gate to a contingent of the

¹⁾ The Fei-lei prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Chen-ting kingdom and was situated SW of the present Kao-ch'eng hien, Ho-pei.

²⁾ The Kao prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Chen-ting kingdom and was situated SW of the present hien with the same name, Ho-pei. HS 28 Ba: 17 a writes Kao-ch'eng. The name of this city is only mentioned twice in HHS (apart from the present case in 10: 3 b), and each time it is given as Kao. The prefecture was later abolished by Kuang-wu.

³⁾ The Lo-yang prefecture (written with other characters than the great Lo-yang in Ho-nan) during Former Han belonged to the Ch'ang-shan commandery and was situated NE of the present Huo-lu hien, Ho-pei.

⁴⁾ The prefectures are not mentioned in this order, but Yao K'i's movements become quite clear when followed on a map. Teng Yü is also stated separately to have attacked Lo-yang (16,46: 1 b). He and Yao K'i must have cooperated in this operation.

⁵⁾ Cf. vol. I, genealogy, no. 124. This is the first time that the king is mentioned in the HHS. He was a descendant of Emperor King, had inherited the Chen-ting kingdom from his father, and had been demoted by Wang Mang (HS 14: 19 a). The fact that he is again mentioned as a king must indicate that his rank had been renewed by the Keng-shi Emperor. Cf. supra p. 42 and p. 47, note 3. He remained king until A. D. 26, when he was executed by Emperor Kuang-wu.

There exists considerable confusion as to how Liu Yang's name was written. HS 14: 19 a and HHS 1 A: 19 b have 楊, HS 53: 19 b 陽, and HHS 21,51: 7 a, 9 a—9 b 揚.

⁶⁾ Situated in the Kao prefecture (10 A: 3 b).

⁷⁾ It is nowhere stated exactly when Liu Siu went to Chen-ting. However, Yao K'i had been dispatched from Fang-tsi. It may be assumed that Liu Siu followed up this expedition and Liu Chi's subsequent mission before he continued the attack southwards.

⁸⁾ The Ho prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Ch'ang-shan commandery and was situated N of the present Po-hiang hien, Ho-pei. Its name was changed to Kao-yi in A. D. 25 (cf. infra p. 104).

pretender. The plot was discovered, and the troops were intercepted and defeated (21, 51: 8 b).

Liu Siu now entered the state of Chao, the fastness of Wang Lang. The move proved to be premature. In order to march against Han-tan, the army had to pass the city of Po-jen¹⁾ which, unknown to Liu Siu, was defended by Wang Lang's Commander-in-chief. The van of the Han troops blundered into the enemy lines, was defeated, and lost its stores. Liu Siu reassembled the scattered soldiers and succeeded in taking back the stores in a battle below one of the suburban gates of Po-jen, but was quite unable to conquer the city itself. After another discussion with his officers, he swerved eastwards and captured Kuang-o²⁾ (1 A: 10 a—10 b; 12,42: 2 a).

Liu Siu lived in a tower over a city gate of Kuang-o. He seems to have been very depressed. The TTK and HHS mention in Teng Yü's biography an episode which is not exactly flattering to Liu Siu and which therefore can hardly be an invention of the historian. More probably it was later told by Teng Yü. According to this account, Liu Siu unrolled a map of the commanderies and kingdoms of the empire and showed it to Teng Yü. Remarking that of all these areas he possessed only one, he reminded Teng Yü somewhat ironically of the time when the latter had first advised him to make plans for the empire.³⁾ Teng Yü maintained that the people longed for an enlightened ruler (TKK 8: 1 b; HHS 16,46: 2 a). Liu Siu was clearly far too worried by his current problems to give much serious thought to the future, and it is equally obvious that his chief followers used every opportunity to suggest to him that the throne was within reach.

While Liu Siu was in Kuang-o, his fortunes took a turn for the better. The two previously mentioned commanderies of Shang-ku and Yü-yang in the mountainous region of the Great Plain came out openly against Wang Lang. Their decision was precipitated by the appearance of officers who attempted to mobilize soldiers for the pretender. The Acting Administrator of Yü-yang, P'eng Ch'ung, was advised by Wu Han to refuse any cooperation with Wang Lang, and instead to give military support to Liu Siu. The majority of his subordinates, however, was in favour of Wang Lang. It is interesting to keep in mind that the officials in charge of the various departments in the commandery administration were usually recruited from among the local gentry. The fact that these came out for Wang Lang therefore fits in well with the prevailing attitude of the gentry on the plain. Regional alignments were, of course, a main theme of the civil war. This also explains the behaviour of P'eng Ch'ung and Wu Han, neither of whom was from the north. They were both from Nan-yang, in fact from the same prefecture, and had little to gain from joining the outer fringes of the fully formed regional party around Wang Lang. The junkers of their own commandery had already thrown in their lot with

¹⁾ The Po-jen prefecture during Han belonged to the Chao kingdom and was situated W of the present Yao-shan hien, Ho-pei.

²⁾ The Kuang-o prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Kü-lu commandery and was situated 12 li E of the present Lung-p'ing hien, Ho-pei.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 62—63.

the Keng-shī Emperor who, like them, was from Nan-yang. Once a definite, and in all probability unwelcomed, choice had been forced on P'eng Ch'ung, it was only logical that he would support Liu Siu. This does not mean that he joined the latter's personal party. Most likely, he saw in him a representative of the Keng-shī Emperor. A theoretical decision had thus been reached, but the difficulty remained that Grand Administrators were strictly forbidden to mobilize troops without authority. Wu Han got around it by enlisting the help of a travelling and half-starved scholar who forged a call-to-arms in the name of Liu Siu (12,42: 8 b; 18,48: 1 a—1 b).

The situation in Shang-ku was similar. Although the Grand Administrator, Keng K'uang, was not from Nan-yang, neither was he from the northern part of the Great Plain; he had no more incentive, therefore, than P'eng Ch'ung to join Wang Lang. He was also swayed by the fact that his son Keng Yen had temporarily belonged to the retinue of Liu Siu¹⁾ and had continued to be active for the Han cause.²⁾ Consequently an agreement was concluded between Keng K'uang and P'eng Ch'ung to set up a joint force, mainly consisting of cavalry. The horse-men of the north, hardened through continuous skirmishes with the Hiung-nu and other nomadic tribes, were famous in the empire and would form an invaluable addition to Liu Siu's forces. The troops of the two commanderies were further augmented after Wang Lang's representative in Shang-ku had been killed and his soldiers incorporated. The combined armies then marched southwards and made their way to Liu Siu in Kuang-o. It is stated that during the advance more than 400 of Wang Lang's officials were executed, 125 seals³⁾ were taken, and 22 prefectures conquered. The arrival of the northerners outside Kuang-o created some panic until it was realized that they were not hostile (TKK 9: 5 b; HHS 1 A: 10 b; 12,42: 8 b; 16,46: 17 b; 18,48: 1 b; 19,49: 2 a—2 b; 22,52: 3 a, 4 a).

The troops of the two commanderies were led by officers who all came to join Liu Siu's personal party. This party was now almost formed. Of the total of 35 men who in history are known as his chief followers,⁴⁾ 25 had linked up with him before the campaign was continued from Kuang-o. Liu Siu began at this stage to be more liberal with his rewards, partly in recognition of services rendered, but probably also in a conscious attempt to strengthen the bond between his followers and himself. As a specially empowered messenger, he undoubtedly acted within the limits of his authority, although he now started to use his prerogatives for his personal advantage. Relatively few people had so far been enfeoffed as marquises. Wang Pa had been made Marquis Within the Passes after the successful crossing of the Hu-t'o River, in which he had played a prominent part (20,50: 3 b).⁵⁾ The

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 65—67.

²⁾ It is indicative, however, that Wang Lang must have had some following among Keng K'uang's subordinates who represented the local gentry. Cf. the event described above (p. 65) where the two officials accompanying Keng Yen sided with the pretender.

³⁾ I. e. the insignia of rank of the various officers and officials.

⁴⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 26—27.

⁵⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 71—72.

Grand Administrator of Sin-tu, Jen Kuang, and his Chief Commandant, Li Chung, had been made Marquis Who Is Martial and Accomplished and Marquis Who is Martial and Solid respectively after they had given shelter and support to Liu Siu (21,51: 1 b, 3 b). Liu Chi and his two relatives were enfeoffed as Full Marquises (21,51: 7 a),¹⁾ and Keng Ch'un became marquis of the Keng district²⁾ (21,51: 8 a), in each case after these men had brought their clans into the camp of Liu Siu.³⁾ All of these persons had well deserved their titles. In Kuang-o, however, Liu Siu enfeoffed no less than seven marquises at one and the same time:

P'eng Ch'ung became Marquis Who Establishes Loyalty (12,42: 8 b).

Keng K'uang became Marquis Who Elevates Righteousness (19,49: 2 b).

K'ou Sün became Marquis Who Observes Righteousness (16,46: 17 b).

Yen Sün became Marquis Who Establishes Faithfulness (18,48: 8 a).

Ko Yen became Marquis Who Establishes Merit (18,48: 8 b).

Wan Siu became Marquis Who Institutes Righteousness (21,51: 4 b).

King Tan became Marquis Who Conforms to Righteousness (22,52: 3 a).

The first two of the new nobles certainly had a right to their rewards as, in their capacity as Grand Administrators of Yü-yang and Shang-ku respectively, they were mainly responsible for Liu Siu's increased military potential. Not all the others could have had similar expectations. Yen Sün, for instance, is only mentioned as Chief Commandant of Yü-yang, as one of the commanders of the northern troops, and as one of the marquises created in Kuang-o (12,42: 8 b; 18,48: 8 a). Thereafter no single reference is made to him in the entire HHS. One is therefore under the impression that Liu Siu more purposefully than before tried to cement and extend his personal party.

It may also be observed that at this initial stage Liu Siu, in the majority of cases, preferred to grant honorific titles just as the Keng-shi Emperor had done

¹⁾ The exact time is not given in this case, but the analogy of Keng Ch'un's reward would seem to indicate that it must have been immediately after they had joined Liu Siu.

²⁾ According to SKC 10: 24 b, the Keng district was situated N of the Ch'eng-lang River. This is quoted by the *Commentary* in HHS 21,51: 8 a, which adds that the site of the district was SW of the Kao prefecture (cf. map 7). The *T'ai k'ie* quotes Shen K'in-han to the effect that, according to the Kao ch'eng hien ch'i, the old Keng district was situated 1 li W of the old site of the Kao prefecture. However, if one follows the course of the Ch'eng-lang River on a map, it does not pass anywhere near the Kao prefecture. SKC 10: 24 b makes it quite clear that the river ran N of the Kuan prefecture which in turn was situated SW of the Fei-lei prefecture (this latter is indicated on map 7). After having passed the Kuan prefecture, the river then continued S of the Keng district and N of the Sung-tsai prefecture. In other words, the Keng district cannot possibly have been located in the Kao prefecture but was, as clearly stated by SKC, situated N of the Ch'eng-lang River somewhere between the Kuan and Sung-tsai prefectures. It so happens that Sung-tsai was the home prefecture of Keng Ch'un (21,51: 7 b). This does not mean that he was a native of the actual prefectural city. In the opening of each biography, the historian never states the subdivision of the prefecture which was the home of the person he describes but merely lets the name of the prefectural capital serve as a general term for the entire prefectural area (cf. vol. I, p. 48). The conclusion seems therefore logical that Keng Ch'un was made the marquis of the Keng district which actually must have been his ancestral home within the Sung-tsai prefecture and which had received the name «Keng» from its native Keng clan.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 68—69.

before him. This may have been due to his restricted authority as a special messenger, but could equally well have been dictated by common sense.

While Liu Siu was in Kuang-o, additional and very important reinforcements arrived. These had been dispatched by the Keng-shī Emperor and were led by the Prefect of the Masters of Writing,¹⁾ Sie Kung. The size of this army can be gathered from the fact that Sie Kung had no less than six generals under his command (1 A: 10 b; 12,42: 4 a; 18,48: 2 b; 22,52: 10 a). This contingent seems to have operated separately and not to have taken its orders from Liu Siu. Sie Kung's role is played down by the HHS since it wishes to give the entire credit for the defeat of Wang Lang to the future Son of Heaven. It will presently be seen that without the imperial troops the outcome might have been entirely different.

Liu Siu judged his position sufficiently powerful to continue the interrupted campaign southwards. He advanced and surrounded the Kü-lu prefecture,²⁾ but the siege, lasting more than a month, proved unsuccessful (1 A: 10 b; 12,42: 2 a—2 b). The Han troops had moved deep into enemy territory, and this gave Wang Lang a chance temporarily to outmanoeuvre his opponents. He dispatched officers who made a surprise attack on the Sin-tu prefecture, the very place from which Liu Siu had initiated his military operations. A certain Ma Ch'ung, member of a great gentry clan in Sin-tu, opened the gates. The city fell, and all the Han officials were arrested. Wang Lang installed a king in the town, possibly Ma Ch'ung himself (21,51: 3 b, 6 a). Enemy troops had thus entrenched themselves in Liu Siu's rear at a distance of no more than 80 km. The Grand Administrator of Sin-tu, Jen Kuang, had participated in Liu Siu's campaign and was at present among the besieging troops below Kü-lu. Liu Siu put him in command of soldiers with orders to recapture the capital of his commandery. This must have seemed a sensible step, since Jen Kuang knew the terrain and presumably had connections in the city. Nevertheless the attack came to nothing. The soldiers dispersed without having put up a fight and went over to Wang Lang's side. Jen Kuang returned with empty hands (21,51: 4 a). Clearly Wang Lang still had considerable support, both among the gentry and the common people.

This latest development might well have proved disastrous for Liu Siu had it not been for the presence of the imperial army. In a single sentence the HHS dismisses Sie Kung's role in this war as unimportant: »In the beginning, the Keng-shī [Emperor] dispatched the Prefect of the Masters of Writing, Sie Kung, in command of six generals, to attack Wang Lang. He was not able to subdue him. After a while, Kuang-wu (i. e. Liu Siu) arrived, and together they tranquillized Han-tan» (12,42: 2 b). This statement is grossly misleading. Fortunately it is almost always possible to detect bias, simply because of the wealth of material embodied in the HHS. For the historian to deviate successfully from the truth,

¹⁾ 12,42: 4 a; 18,48: 2 b; and 22,52: 10 a all write Prefect of the Masters of Writing. Only 1 A: 10 b has Supervisor of the Masters of Writing which was a lower rank. It would seem that either the pen ki is mistaken or that Sie Kung had been promoted after his departure from Ch'ang-an.

²⁾ The Kü-lu prefecture during Han was the capital of the Kü-lu commandery and is identical with the present P'ing-hiang hien, Ho-pei.

he would also have to insert the necessary twists and changes in all parallel texts referring to the same episode. This is impossible as the ancient historian has to rely on his memory alone, and unaided memory cannot cope with the staggering amount of information incorporated in the various parts of his work. He might think that he has satisfactorily accomplished his purpose, but one will usually find that he contradicts himself in some other section of the history. This is precisely the case here. The biography of Li Chung states that officers of the Keng-shī Emperor attacked and captured Sin-tu (21,51: 4 a). As no other imperial troops were present, the army can only have been Sie Kung's. He won the day and saved the Han forces from what in the worst case would have been an utter defeat, and in the best a drawn out war during the course of which Liu Siu's chances for the throne would probably have evaporated. Because the latter became the actual founder of the Later Han dynasty, it was necessary for the historian to present him as master of his own fate at all times. Therefore he attempts to suppress Sie Kung's share in the operation.

After the victory, Liu Siu appointed Li Chung as Acting Grand Administrator of Sin-tu. He carried out a veritable slaughter among the gentry who had assisted in the coup (21,51: 4 a).

One last attempt was made by Wang Lang's officers to check the Han troops and to relieve Kū-lu. They attacked from the north. Liu Siu met them at Nan-luan¹⁾, where the enemy at first was successful. The Han forces began to withdraw, and some of their stores were lost (SHS 2: 13 a). At that stage, the northern horsemen went to attack, and the charge of this famous cavalry decided the battle. Wang Lang's army had to withdraw with heavy losses (1 A: 10 b—11 a; 20,50: 1 b; 22,52: 3 a).

Liu Siu now adopted a bold plan suggested by one of his officers. Troops were left behind to guard the still unconquered Kū-lu, while the main bulk of the army advanced to Han-tan and in the 4th month (Apr. 28—May 26) of A. D. 24 began the siege of Wang Lang's capital. Liu Siu personally encamped at the northern suburban gate (1 A: 11 a; 12,42: 2 a). P'eng Ch'ung sent provisions for the troops from Yü-yang (12,42: 8 b). It must be assumed that Sie Kung and his army took part in the siege, but this is again silently passed over in the HHS. The defenders of Han-tan made several sallies which were unsuccessful, and Wang Lang decided to seek terms for surrender. His Grandee Remonstrant and Consultant, Tu Wei, presented himself before Liu Siu with the Staff of Authority to discuss conditions. This was a solemn moment, and it seems probable that scribes wrote down the substance of the verbal exchange for the report to the court. The description given in the HHS should in this case therefore be close to the truth. During the discussion, Tu Wei referred to Wang Lang as the actual son of Emperor Ch'eng. Liu Siu is said to have answered: »Supposing that it could be brought about that Emperor Ch'eng again came to life, the empire could not be obtained [by him]; how much less [by] the one who is a false Tsi-yü!» Tu Wei next asked for his emperor a

¹⁾ The Nan-luan prefecture during Han belonged to the Kū-lu commandery and was situated N of the present Kū-lu hien, Ho-pei.

marquisate of 10,000 households, but Liu Siu insisted on unconditional surrender. This was unacceptable, and Tu Wei withdrew with dignity (12,42: 2 b).

The attacks on the city were increased but for the next twenty odd days proved a failure. Finally Wang Lang's Junior Tutor, Li Li, turned traitor and on May 27 opened a gate for the Han troops. The pretender escaped by night. He was pursued and decapitated, and his imperial seal was taken (1 A: 11 a; 12,42: 2 b; 20,50: 4 a).

4. *Liu Siu independent*

The defeat of Wang Lang marked the decisive turning point in the fortunes of Liu Siu. Surrounded by faithful followers and in command of an army, he was at last in a position to act independently if he so wished, and a decision was soon forced upon him. All this had been brought about by a series of unexpected historical accidents. For these Liu Siu had not been responsible, nor, to begin with, had he welcomed them. Victory had not even been won through his efforts alone, but only with the effective help of an imperial army. The fact remains that assisted, and sometimes persuaded, by his advisers, Liu Siu had taken up the challenge. From an insignificant messenger he had grown into a military leader of consequence, who increasingly realized the potentialities of his position. With growing purposefulness he began his climb to the throne.

After the fall of Han-tan, Liu Siu's first step was to distribute additional rewards to the members of his party.¹⁾ The enfeoffments were not restricted to the areas under his immediate control, a fact which may reflect his growing ambitions. It also was an urgent matter for Liu Siu to gain the support of the gentry on the northern part of the Great Plain. This he achieved by a calculated act of generosity. Whenever a pretender or warlord was defeated by a rival, it was a matter of policy to take possession of his archives. These were preserved and studied, in spite of occasional protests from pedantic officials. For instance, Emperor Kuang-wu

¹⁾ Wang Liang was enfeoffed as Marquis Within the Passes (22,52: 4 a).

Wang Pa, who previously had been made a Marquis Within the Passes (cf. *supra* p. 72), now became marquis of the Wang district (20,50: 4 a). The *K'ao cheng* of the Palace edition (cf. vol. I, p. 19) remarks in this connection that according to the geographical chapters of the HS and HHS no place existed with this name and that the *wang* character is probably wrong. It is, however, quite possible that the Wang district was simply the ancestral home of Wang Pa's clan and thus lay within Ying-yang. The latter is given as Wang Pa's home prefecture in HHS 20,50: 3 a. Liu Siu at this stage seems more than once to have enfeoffed his followers with their home districts (cf. *supra* p. 73, note 2, and *infra* the next paragraph), a policy which was reversed later.

Feng Yi was enfeoffed as marquis of Ying (17,47: 2 b). It so happens that Fu-ch'eng had a Ying district (HHS *chi* 20:5 b; SKC 31: 4 b), and Fu-ch'eng was the home prefecture of Feng Yi (17,47: 1 a). It is therefore probable that he also was enfeoffed with his home district (which, however, had not received its name from the Feng clan).

P'ei T'ung was enfeoffed as Marquis Who Is Martial and Righteous (21,51: 6 a).

Wu Han became Marquis Who Establishes Plans (18,48: 1 b).

At some time during A. D. 24, though it is unknown exactly when, Chai Tsun was made a Full Marquis (20,50: 6 a) and Chu Yu the marquis of An-yang (22,52: 1 b). (The An-yang prefecture belonged to the Ju-nan commandery and was situated SW of the present Cheng-yang hien, Ho-nan.)

at a later date was criticized by his Grand Minister over the Masses, Han Hin,¹⁾ for reading documents of Wei Ao and Kung-sun Shu (26,56: 7 a), a proof that these had been brought to the capital. The conquest of Han-tan is no exception to this rule, and it is stated that several thousands of documents were seized. These included the correspondence of officials and other people who had recognized Wang Lang, and provided evidence that could have been used against the writers. Li Chung's massacre among the gentry of Sin-tu²⁾ must still have been fresh in people's memory. Liu Siu announced that he would not have the documents examined. He assembled his officers and burned the records, or at any rate made a show of destroying them³⁾ (1 A: 11 a).

It was the more important for Liu Siu to extend his influence among the gentry of the northern plain, as he was not sole master of this area. As long as Sie Kung and his army were present, something resembling a balance existed between the two camps. This would have made an open clash dangerous for either side. Liu Siu could only hope to reach his objective by roundabout methods.

Sie Kung and Liu Siu had partitioned the city of Han-tan between themselves so that each was in control of one sector. The HHS remarks in this connection that Sie Kung's officers looted and that Liu Siu *hated it deeply* (18,48: 2 b). This is one of the usual twists and very unfair as such, since Liu Siu's troops were no exception. Liu Siu played a very cautious policy at this time, flattering Sie Kung at every opportunity. He was apparently quite successful in dispelling the latter's distrust (18,48: 2 b). Simultaneously he planned to eliminate his rival. When on one occasion he gave a banquet in honour of Sie Kung, an incident took place which unfortunately is only alluded to vaguely in the HHS: *Consequently [Liu Siu] wished thereby to scheme against [Sie] Kung. He was not able to* (22,52: 10 a). It looks as though under the cloak of a friendly gathering some attempt was made against the life of Sie Kung which did not succeed. Remarkably enough, Sie Kung's suspicions seem not to have been aroused. Liu Siu for the time being abandoned further attempts, and concentrated instead on wooing Sie Kung's generals. He seems to have been able to make a bargain with at least one of them, Ma Wu⁴⁾ (22,52: 10 a—10 b).

Liu Siu at this time scored the diplomatic success of gaining control of the Tai commandery, situated in the very north of present Shan-si and bordering on Shang-ku in the west⁵⁾ (19,49: 2 b).

The Keng-shi Emperor was forced to recognize the important part which Liu Siu had played in the campaign against Wang Lang. He furthermore was brought

¹⁾ He held this office from A. D. 37—39.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 75.

³⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 68.

⁴⁾ Ma Wu, like Liu Siu, was from Nan-yang. He had been one of the leaders of the Troops from Sin-shi but seems to have belonged to the gentry (cf. vol. I, pp. 106, 134, 136). The HHS gives a highly imaginative description of the secret discussion between Liu Siu and Ma Wu after a banquet (cf. vol. I, p. 56).

⁵⁾ The Grand Administrator of this commandery, Chao Yung, had been summoned by the Keng-shi Emperor but preferred instead to join Liu Siu.

to realize that Liu Siu could become one of his most dangerous enemies. Unforeseeable as the events on the northern plain had been, the emperor had only himself to blame that this situation had arisen at all. By sending Liu Siu on an independent mission, the court had lost control over him, and it was now highly desirable to bring him back to the capital. The emperor and his ministers seem totally to have misjudged their strength, an illusion fostered by early victories. The presence of Sie Kung's imperial army must have seemed a sufficient guarantee that Liu Siu would obey orders. This proved a mistake, and by delivering the summons the conflict was irrevocably brought out into the open.

The Keng-shī Emperor dispatched an Attending Secretary with the Staff of Authority to enfeoff Liu Siu as king of Siao¹) and at the same time order him unconditionally to demobilize his troops and appear, together with all meritorious officers, at the court (1 A: 11 a; 19,49: 2 b). Concurrently he appointed a Shepherd of the Yu province and Grand Administrators for Shang-ku and Yü-yang respectively (19,49: 2 b). This implied that the existing administrators Keng K'uang and P'eng Ch'ung were held to have been compromised by their collaboration with Liu Siu, and for this reason were being relieved of their offices. The three new dignitaries were on their way north.

The situation had now come to a head, and Liu Siu was forced to make the most important decision of his life. He was under strong pressure from his followers to disobey the imperial command and instead embark on an active and determined policy with the empire as his goal. The HHS states that Keng Yen entered the Wen-ming Hall of the former royal palace in Han-tan, where Liu Siu rested on a bed. He stepped forward and in a lengthy address advised him against demobilizing his troops, and also to raise his ambitions to the throne. Liu Siu was pleased (19,49: 2 b—3 a). The TTK (8: 6 a—6 b) describes the same episode, but in this account, although Keng Yen's speech has the same spirit, it is quite different in detail. This is a typical example of how the historian can give his fantasy free play, inventing, or at least embellishing, a speech so as to provide a motive for Liu Siu's subsequent action. The authors of the TTK chose one version, while Fan Ye preferred another. If Keng Yen's actual words are not preserved, it is nevertheless plausible that he especially would have been anxious to influence Liu Siu. Not only did he belong to the latter's intimate party, but his own father was in danger of losing his post as Grand Administrator of Shang-ku to one of the trusted officials of the Keng-shī Emperor. Keng Yen had therefore a double reason for acting as he did. He was certainly not the only one to prompt Liu Siu. It must be assumed that Liu's entire party was bitterly opposed to the Keng-shī Emperor.²)

Liu Siu reached his decision. He accepted the kingdom but refused to demobilize his troops or to come to court. His argument was that the land north of the Yellow River was still unpacified (1 A: 11 a). As a matter of fact, Liu Siu was strongly

¹) Cf. map 6. This was undoubtedly a courtesy, since Liu Siu, having lost his father, had been educated in Siao by his uncle (cf. vol. I, p. 99).

²) E. g. Yao K'i is also stated to have advised Liu Siu (20,50: 1 b).

urged to ascend the throne without delay. The HHS is silent on this point, but the TKK (1: 5 a) states that all officers wished to proclaim him emperor. This he was not yet ready to permit. He appointed Wu Han and Keng Yen as Generals-in-chief and ordered them to go to the Yu province in order to enlist troops. Wu Han executed the new Shepherd of this province, who was subsequently replaced by one of Liu Siu's followers.¹⁾ Keng Yen, in turn, decapitated the two Grand Administrators designate (1 A: 12 a; 18,48: 2 a; 19,49: 3 b). It is interesting that Liu Siu was able to withhold this information from Sie Kung, who seems to have had no inkling of the new developments, and made no move to interfere.

The relations between Liu Siu and the Keng-shi Emperor now entered their last phase. The first blood had been shed. Liu Siu had dropped all pretence and had become a soldier of fortune in the civil war. Events began to accelerate, and the Keng-shi Emperor moved swiftly towards his destruction.

Liu Siu's claim that the land north of the Yellow River had not yet been pacified, was a pretext but not an untruth. Various groups of bandits, composed of, and led by, commoners, had for years crisscrossed the country, searching for food and loot. Their designations were sometimes fanciful and are often untranslatable as the etymology of the names is unknown. The HHS enumerates fifteen groups in all (1 A: 11 b):

1. *T'ung-ma*, the «Bronze Horses». They included remnants of the band of Mother Lü²⁾ and therefore probably originated on the Shan-tung peninsula. In A. D. 24, they operated immediately north of the Yellow River.
2. *Ta-t'ung*.³⁾ In A. D. 24, they operated immediately north of the Yellow River.
3. *Kao-hu*. This appellation may have been derived from a place name.⁴⁾ In A. D. 24, they operated immediately north of the Yellow River.
4. *Chung-lien*.⁵⁾ In A. D. 24, they operated immediately north of the Yellow River.
5. *T'ie-hing*, the «Iron Legs». In A. D. 24, they operated immediately north of the Yellow River.
6. *Ta-ts'iang*.⁶⁾ the «Large Spears». In A. D. 25, they operated some 200 km north of the Yellow River.
7. *Yu-lai*. This was the name of a mountain on the Shan-tung peninsula. When years before the Red Eyebrows had risen, they sought (according to SKC 24: 24 b) protection on the Yu-lai Mountain.⁷⁾ It is clear, therefore, that the

¹⁾ Chu Fou (33,63: 1 a).

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 140, note 2.

³⁾ In some instances, the name is given as Ta-yung.

⁴⁾ 15,45: 8 a writes 胡 instead of 湖. The *Kiao pu* to kuan 15,45 remarks that HS (16: 32 a) mentions a Kao-hu marquisate. This was not a prefecture but a smaller unit, and its site is unknown. The name may have been taken over by bandits rising in this area.

⁵⁾ HHK 2: 11 b writes Tung-lien.

⁶⁾ In some instances *ts'iang* is written with radical 64 instead of 75, which gives no meaning.

⁷⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 137, note 3.

Yu-lai bandits were one of the original components of the Red Eyebrows but later split off from them, retaining their old name. Further evidence is provided by TTK (23: 8 a), which states that Fan Ch'ung was the original leader of the Yu-lai. This man is no other than the famous chief of the Red Eyebrows. Evidently he remained with the Red Eyebrows when his former band broke away. In A. D. 24, the Yu-lai operated immediately north of the Yellow River.

8. *Shang-kiang*, the «Troops of] the Upper River». In A. D. 24, they operated immediately north of the Yellow River.
9. *Ts'ing-tu*, the «Green Calves». They included remnants of the band of Mother Lü and therefore probably originated on the Shan-tung peninsula. In A. D. 24, they operated immediately north of the Yellow River.
10. *Wu-hiao*. At the end of A. D. 24, they operated in the area between present Peking and Tientsin.
11. *T'an-hiang*. This appellation is derived from a place name. The band originally consisted of the followers of Li Tsi-tu. He had temporarily cooperated with the Red Eyebrows but remained on the Shan-tung peninsula when the latter evacuated this area. In A. D. 23, Li Tsi-tu had surrendered to the Keng-shi Emperor and was subsequently murdered.¹⁾ His band reassembled in the T'an district (i. e. T'an hiang),²⁾ which became the name of this group. Its new leader was a certain Tung Ts'i-chung who had risen in Ch'i-p'ing,³⁾ a prefecture which was situated directly south of the new northern branch of the Yellow River. In A. D. 24, the T'an-hiang bandits crossed the Yellow River and operated immediately north of it.
12. *Wu-fan*, the «Five Banners». In A. D. 24, they operated immediately north of the Yellow River.
13. *Wu-lou*, the «Five Towers». In A. D. 25, they operated immediately north of the Yellow River.
14. *Fu-p'ing*. This appellation is derived from a place name. The activities of these bandits were entirely restricted to the P'ing-yüan commandery, situated directly north of the new northern branch of the Yellow River. Their stronghold seems to have been the Fu-p'ing prefecture.⁴⁾
15. *Huo-so*. They operated in A. D. 26 on the Shan-tung peninsula.

Although few details are known about the early movements of the various groups, one fact is very striking: 12 of the 15 bands operated immediately north of the Yellow River, and at least 4 of these had originally come from Shan-tung. One group had remained on the peninsula. Only 2 of the bands, the Ta-ts'iang and the Wu-hiao, were active further north on the plain. This does not, of course, mean that they

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 41 and 59, note 3.

²⁾ According to the *Commentary* this district still existed in T'ang times. It was situated N of the present Ts'yang hien, Shan-tung. The T'an district is shown on map 8.

³⁾ The Ch'i-p'ing prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Tung commandery and was situated 20 li W of the present hien with the same name, Shan-tung. It is shown on map 8.

⁴⁾ The Fu-p'ing prefecture during Han belonged to the P'ing-yüan commandery and was situated SE of the present Hui-min hien, Shan-tung. It is shown on map 18.

must have risen in that area. In fact, a very definite conclusion can be drawn: the unrest which was Liu Siu's excuse for not demobilizing his army belongs to the same general pattern of popular upheaval as that which had erupted in the time of Wang Mang, i. e. it can be traced back to the change in the course of the Yellow River.

It has been shown in the preceding volume that the break of the Yellow River dikes had resulted in two new arms which held the Shan-tung peninsula between them. Great parts of the plain were flooded. Famine ensued, and the great Han migration was set in motion. Impoverished peasants left their home areas. They wandered slowly southwards, and unrest sprung up along the routes of migration. On the Shan-tung peninsula the situation was even worse, since starving peasants poured into the area and were cut off by the two new arms of the Yellow River. The famine gradually grew worse and affected displaced persons and sedentary farmers alike. The people began to form various small bands which slowly grew through cooperation and incorporation until finally the Red Eyebrows emerged as the largest and most powerful unit.¹⁾

The fifteen bands of commoners enumerated by the HHS clearly fit into this general picture. Many if not most of them came originally from the Shan-tung peninsula, and their members were recruited from the same kind of people as those of the Red Eyebrows, Ch'i Chao-p'ing,²⁾ and Tsi-lu On the City Wall. They and their chieftains were displaced persons³⁾ or former sedentary farmers who were victims of the sudden overpopulation and resulting famine. Some of these bands, like the Yu-lai and probably others as well, had actually belonged to the Red Eyebrows and only later broken away from them. Nor would it be a coincidence that the leader of the Ta-t'ung was a certain Fan Chung. He and the well-known chieftain of the Red Eyebrows, Fan Ch'ung, had the same clan name and could very well have been relatives. Like the Red Eyebrows, all the bands except one (the Huo-so) had eventually evacuated the Shan-tung peninsula. In the autumn of 24, five of the groups were to hold a great rendezvous with the Red Eyebrows north of the river, when, in all probability, they resumed a cooperation which had existed before. Finally, some of the bands, like the Fu-p'ing, may have originated directly north of the new northern branch of the Yellow River in areas which also had been affected by floods and famine.

It is evident, therefore, that the unrest in the north has a clear-cut geographic-economic explanation which corroborates the conclusions presented in the preceding volume.

The subsequent history of most of the fifteen bandit groups can be reconstructed in considerable detail. To do so, however, would burden this work with lengthy descriptions of marches and countermarches, alliances and battles. These, although

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 151-153 and *ibidem* maps 8-9.

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 143, 153 and *ibidem* map 8.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 41, note 5. It is also significant that Tung Ts'i-chung, leader of the T'an-hiang, came from a prefecture whose area was affected by the change in the course of the Yellow River, situated as it was directly south of the new northern branch.




Table 1. Activities of the 15 bandit groups and the Red Eyebrows.

quite vexing for Liu Siu for several years to come, had no influence on the civil war generally.¹⁾ The time span during which the various groups were active, and the alliances and amalgamations which took place, are instead presented in the form of a simple diagram (table 1).

Returning now to Liu Siu, we find that he was engaged in a campaign against the T'ung-ma, Kao-hu, Chung-lien and Wu-hiao during the autumn of A. D. 24. With the exception of the Wu-hiao, the major part of these bandits surrendered. Liu Siu enfeoffed their chieftains as Full Marquises and incorporated their troops into his own army. When this news reached the capital, Liu Siu was mockingly referred to as the «T'ung-ma Emperor» (1 A: 12 b).

The recent campaign carried Liu Siu over the greater part of the northern plain and at last gave him the opportunity of arranging a meeting with Yü-yang's Grand Administrator, P'eng Ch'ung. The latter's assistance up to this point had been of the greatest importance in the civil war, and this seems to have increased his expectations of a generous reward. Liu Siu did not fulfil his hopes, and this was to be a ground for future trouble (12,42: 8 b).

Meanwhile a new menace had arisen in the form of the Red Eyebrows. Towards the end of A. D. 23, they had arrived south of the Yellow River and occupied the area between the P'u-yang prefecture and the Yung district.²⁾ Their leaders had surrendered to the Keng-shi Emperor, but no serious attempt seems to have been made to ensure their future loyalty or permanently to separate the leaders from their bands. They had finally returned to their camps and resumed command over the Red Eyebrows.³⁾ These leaders were simple and uneducated commoners who had only gradually become aware of the role they could play in the civil war. Even so they hardly entertained clear objectives, and their ambitions were never matched by political experience or astuteness. The fact remains that the Red Eyebrows were the most feared single concentration of power in the empire. The very rumour of their approach had contributed to the rebellion in Nan-yang and the rise of Wang Lang. Now, as they began to move again, a new and, for the time being, decisive element was added to the political struggle.

The HHS states that the Red Eyebrows split up into two groups.⁴⁾ The first was under the command of Fan Ch'ung and P'ang An. They marched southwest-

¹⁾ In one battle fought in the beginning of A. D. 25 against the Wu-fan, Yu-lai and Ta-ts'iang, Liu Siu was defeated because he had misjudged the strength of the enemy and advanced too fast. He barely escaped with his life and was for several days feared lost by his officers (1 A: 13 a—14 a; 19,49: 3 b; 22,52: 10 b). This was an accident rather than one of the important or inevitable contests of the civil war.

²⁾ For this and the following events cf. map 8.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 40—41.

⁴⁾ The Keng-shi Emperor arrived in Lo-yang not earlier than the end of the 9th month, A. D. 23 (cf. *supra* p. 32, note 9). He departed for Ch'ang-an in the 2nd month of A. D. 24. The leaders of the Red Eyebrows surrendered to him in Lo-yang and returned to their camps before the move to Ch'ang-an. This, in addition to the fact that the Red Eyebrows always marched extremely slowly, indicates that they could not have resumed hostilities earlier than A. D. 24. 11,41: 10 a must therefore be wrong in listing all their subsequent activities, until they entered the passes, under A. D. 23.

ward, conquered Ch'ang-she,¹⁾ and attacked Wan. The prefect of this city seems to have joined battle, and was killed, but Wan itself apparently was not taken. The other group was led by Sū Sūan, Sie Lu, and Yang Yin. They took the Yang-ti and Liang²⁾ prefectures and killed the Grand Administrator of Ho-nan (11,41: 10 a).

Although only two groups are mentioned in the biography devoted to Liu P'en-tsi and the Red Eyebrows, it can be established that a third existed, and that this one crossed the Yellow River. The early rumours that the Red Eyebrows were coming north³⁾ had therefore at least been partly true. This group was in the area of the She-k'üan agglomeration⁴⁾ in the autumn of A. D. 24, at the time when Liu Siu had completed his operations against the T'ung-ma and other bandits. A great rendezvous was held at She-k'üan where the Ts'ing-tu, Shang-kiang, Ta-t'ung, T'ie-hing and Wu-fan all joined forces with the Red Eyebrows. For Liu Siu this was an emergency of the first order. His strategy was to gain sole control of the plain north of the river in order to possess a safe and easily defended base for future operations. He had to prevent the Red Eyebrows from gaining a foothold and push them back over the river. A battle was fought which lasted for one night and one day and resulted in complete victory for Liu Siu (1 A: 13 a; 17,47: 18 b; 18,48: 2 b; 19,49: 3 b; 20,50: 2 a; 21,51: 8 b—9 a). The enemy forces were temporarily scattered. The Ts'ing-tu attempted to march westwards but were defeated by the imperial general Pao Yung⁵⁾ (29,59: 5 b). It is clear from later events that they were forced to turn back and that most of them rejoined the Red Eyebrows, who absorbed them as well as the Shang-kiang and Ta-t'ung.⁶⁾ Although nowhere recorded, it is also evident that this large force withdrew across the river and marched westwards.⁷⁾ After his victory, Liu Siu took possession of the entire Ho-nei commandery, where the Grand Administrator and a General-in-chief of the Keng-shi Emperor surrendered (17,47: 11 a—11 b).

The representative of the court, Sie Kung, had not taken part in any of the recent campaigns. His army was stationed in Ye. Before Liu Siu went out to attack the Red Eyebrows at She-k'üan, he and Sie Kung had reached an agreement. It so happened that the Yu-lai bandits were in the area of the Shan-yang prefecture.⁸⁾ They were probably on the verge of rejoining the Red Eyebrows, but this was prevented by Liu Siu's victory. Sie Kung had agreed that if the Red Eyebrows

¹⁾ The Ch'ang-she prefecture during Han belonged to the Ying-ch'uan commandery and was situated 1 li W of the present Ch'ang-ko hien, Ho-nan.

²⁾ The Liang prefecture during Han belonged to the Ho-nan commandery and was situated 40 li W of the present Lin-ju hien, Ho-nan.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 64.


⁴⁾ The She-k'üan agglomeration according to ch'i 19: 12 b was situated in the Ye-wang prefecture. The latter during Han belonged to the Ho-nei commandery and is identical with the present Ts'in-yang hien, Ho-nan.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 60.

⁶⁾ The Wu-fan and T'ie-hing broke away and operated separately.

⁷⁾ Cf. *infra* p. 87.

⁸⁾ The Shan-yang prefecture during Han belonged to the Ho-nei commandery and was situated 35 li NW of the present Siu-wu hien, Ho-nan. Cf. map 8.



Map 8. Movements of the Red Eyebrows in A. D. 24.

and their allies were defeated, he himself would attack the Yu-lai. When the latter heard the news of the battle at She-k'üan, they withdrew from Shan-yang to the Lung-lü Mountain.¹⁾ Sie Kung honoured his promise and marched against them. He was not successful and suffered great losses. Meanwhile, Liu Siu had hurriedly dispatched Wu Han and others who took possession of Ye. Troops were concealed within the city. When Sie Kung returned, he entered Ye without suspicions, escorted by only a few hundred cavalymen. Wu Han had him arrested and killed him with his own hands (1 A: 12 b; 18,48: 2 b—3 a). His troops surrendered, and his former general Ma Wu²⁾ hurried to She-k'üan to pay his respects (22,52: 10 b). Liu Siu for all practical purposes was now the master of the northern plain.

5. *Disintegration of imperial power*

The storm had finally broken. The Keng-shi Emperor and his ministers had lost the initiative since the transfer to Ch'ang-an, and their policies had become fumbling and out of step with reality. They could not adjust themselves to the changed situation, and still in a grand and somewhat pathetic manner dispatched officials and messengers. In the fateful autumn of A. D. 24, an Inspector was appointed for the Yi province, placed in command of some troops, and sent off to enforce submission in the vast area of what roughly today is Sī-ch'uan and Yün-nan. This appointment disregarded the fact that Kung-sun Shu was firmly entrenched in the south, and would certainly not be willing to take orders from Ch'ang-an. His younger brother Hui met and defeated the Inspector (13,43: 14 a). That winter, two high officials were dispatched to the Shan-yü of the Hiung-nu in order to deliver a new imperial seal from the restored Han dynasty. The Shan-yü treated them with great arrogance. He is reported to have said that times had changed and that it was now the turn of Han to honour him (HS 94 B: 22 a).

As if these rebuffs were not enough, a rebellion broke out in the T'ien-shui commandery, the stronghold of Wei Ao, and its Grand Administrator was murdered (36,66: 1 b). It looks as though this revolt had ramifications in the capital. Wei Ao's biography records that his uncles Ts'ui and Yi wished to rebel and return to T'ien-shui, i. e. join the insurgents in their home commandery, who quite possibly had acted on their orders. Since Wei Ao knew about this, he must have been partly involved. The incident gave him the opportunity of ridding himself of his two relatives, who clearly were his rivals for power in the northwest. He reported the plot to the emperor, whereupon Wei Ts'ui and Wei Yi were executed (13,43: 5 b). The text goes on to say that »the Keng-shi [Emperor] was touched by

¹⁾ The Lung-lü Mountain according to SKC 9: 35 b was situated N of the prefecture with the same name (cf. map 8). The Lung-lü prefecture during Han belonged to the Ho-nei commandery and is identical with the present Lin hien, Ho-nan.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 77.

the loyalty of [Wei] Ao and selected him to become Grandee Secretary¹⁾ (13,43: 5 b). There were probably other and more weighty reasons for this. The clique of the Nan-yang gentry had been in sole control of the central government since the beginning of the year, but its position must have been greatly shaken by the continuous setbacks. Li Sung and Chao Meng were not prepared to readmit the clique of the former chieftains, which they had outmanoeuvred at such great cost. Instead, they attempted to strengthen their hand by sharing their power with Wei Ao, whose influence was great in the northwest. Even in the best of circumstances, however, Wei Ao was not a reliable ally; and in the present situation, where the last vestiges of imperial power were soon torn to shreds, Wei Ao quickly realized that his profits lay in other directions.

One final attempt was made to retain a firm foothold outside the passes and check any possible move by Liu Siu to cross the Yellow River. The Commander-in-chief of the Left, Chu Wei, the king of Wu-yin, Li Yi, the king of Lin-k'iu, T'ien Li, and the White Tiger Duke, Ch'en K'iao, were placed in command of a large army and ordered to encamp in Lo-yang, to protect this city in cooperation with the Grand Administrator of Ho-nan, Wu Po. Liu Siu countered this by appointing his follower Feng Yi as General of the Meng Ford, with orders to protect it²⁾ and prevent any crossing by enemy forces. He also installed K'ou Sün as Acting General-in-chief and as Grand Administrator of the Ho-nei commandery,³⁾ which faced Ho-nan from the northern side of the Yellow River. K'ou Sün imposed a land tax, collected great numbers of horses, trained soldiers in shooting with the bow, and used the bamboo of the K'i Park⁴⁾ for arrows⁵⁾ (1 A: 13 a; 16,46: 17 b—18 b; 17,47: 3 a).

The year 24 closes with the Red Eyebrows entering the passes (cf. map 8). In the autumn, the first group went through the Han-ku pass⁶⁾ (1 A: 12 b—13 a). This is the identical force which had been defeated at She-k'üan by Liu Siu and subsequently had crossed the river again, as is made clear by the statement that the Ts'ing-tu and Red Eyebrows entered the pass together. Neither of the other two groups of the Red Eyebrows had cooperated with the Ts'ing-tu. In the 12th month (Jan. 18, A. D. 25—Febr. 16)⁷⁾, Fan Ch'ung's force entered through the Wu pass and Sü Sün's unit through the Lu-hun pass⁸⁾ (11,41: 5 b, 10 a).

¹⁾ This office is identical with that of Grand Minister of Works. It seems probable that the title was altered simultaneously with the change from Grand Minister over the Masses to Lieutenant Chancellor (cf. *supra* p. 49). The office had previously been held by the former chieftain Ch'en Mu. It is not known whether he was replaced at the time when his clique fell from power or whether he stayed in office until the appointment of Wei Ao.

²⁾ Situated south of the present Meng hien, Ho-nan. Cf. *Chung kuo ku kin ti ming ta ts'i tien*, p. 446: 3.

³⁾ Cf. also vol. I, pp. 59—60.

⁴⁾ This park was situated 35 li NW of the present K'i hien, Ho-nan. Cf. *Chung kuo ku kin ti ming ta ts'i tien*, p. 822: 2.

⁵⁾ The Ho-nei commandery, Meng Ford and K'i Park are shown on map 12.

⁶⁾ Situated 12 li SW of the present Ling-pao hien, Ho-nan. It is shown in 90. Ting, map 29.

⁷⁾ 13,43: 5 b places this event in the summer of 25, which is patently wrong.

⁸⁾ Situated 70 li N of the present Sung hien, Ho-nan.

Liu Siu had every reason to be pleased. He had been able to prevent the Red Eyebrows from turning north and had been lucky to have to face only one contingent out of three. A decisive clash between the imperial forces and the Red Eyebrows was imminent. Time worked for Liu Siu, and he could afford to wait until his great rivals for power had weakened or destroyed each other. His first objective was to overthrow the Keng-shī Emperor, and he therefore took active steps to prevent the latter from concentrating all his attention on the Red Eyebrows. He gave Teng Yü command of an army consisting of élite troops, entrusted him with the Staff of Authority, and ordered him to make preparations for an attack due west from Ho-nei (1 A: 13 a; 16,46: 2 b—3 a). This meant that the assault of the Red Eyebrows south of the Yellow River would be paralleled by an offensive north of the River, bound to bring about a fatal split in the imperial defence.


The Keng-shī Emperor was trapped within the passes, and the stage was now set for the final tragedy.

6. *Summary*

Map 9 presents a survey of the situation at the end of A. D. 24, prepared on the same principles as map 5, with which it should be compared. One year earlier, the emperor had dominated a large and fertile area in the heart of China, containing some 40 % of the total population. Much of this had now been lost. Almost nothing remained of his positions on the plain north of the Yellow River and only little of those to the south. In theory he controlled the Land Within the Passes, Kan-su, the southern and central parts of present Shan-si, and Han-chung along the Han River south of the Ts'in-ling Range. But in practical political and economic terms he was restricted to the so-called Three Adjuncts,¹⁾ i. e. Ch'ang-an and its surrounding area. This territory had been very important during Former Han but had lost much of its weight due to the shift of the key economic area to the Great Plain. The emperor's hold on sparsely populated Shan-si and the Han River valley was tenuous in the extreme, and the far northwest was, for all practical purposes, negligible. Wei Ao and Lu Fang had made formal submission, but they maintained their strong local following. In the Kan-su corridor, Tou Jung was gaining prominence and was on the verge of becoming an independent warlord. Even if one were to consider the entire region theoretically subject to the Keng-shī Emperor, it carried no more than some 25 % of the total population, a considerable drop from A. D. 23. In reality, only a fraction of this had any direct bearing on his final stand in the civil war. It is hardly worth mentioning that, in addition, an area south of the mouth of the Yang-tsi, the confines of present Kiang-si, possibly other sections of Southern China, and perhaps a part of Korea,²⁾ in the loosest possible sense, continued to recognize the court.

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 45, note 4.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 47, note 3, and p. 60.



Map 9. The political situation at the end of A. D. 24.

In contrast to this, the change in the fortunes of Liu Siu had been spectacular. One year earlier, he had not even possessed a foot's breadth of territory. Now he controlled the major part of the plain north of the Yellow River, and adjacent areas in the mountainous north. These included regions which were extremely fertile and economically valuable, with about 13 % of the total population. In practice, Liu Siu commanded vastly more directly available manpower than the Keng-shi Emperor.

Further south, the changes had been tremendous. Chang Pu had extended his territory to embrace the greater part of Shan-tung. Tung Hien dominated a broad strip of land from Shan-tung to the Yang-tsī, and Liu Yung had conquered the central parts of the plain. These three men would have constituted a formidable bloc of power had they been willing to cooperate intimately with each other. Liu Mao, whose domain had been negligible at the end of A. D. 23, now possessed a large territory bordering on Liu Yung's kingdom in the west.

The Red Eyebrows were on the march westwards and formed an enclave within the imperial possessions.

No change had occurred in the size of the territories of Li Hien, Ts'in Feng, and Kung-sun Shu, but southwest of Kung-sun Shu's domain the aborigine Jen Kuei had taken possession of the Yüe-hi commandery and proclaimed it as the kingdom of K'iung-ku.

CHAPTER III. A. D. 25, THE FALL OF THE KENG-SHĪ EMPEROR

1. *The defeat and death of the Keng-shĭ Emperor*

The extent to which the reputation of the Keng-shĭ Emperor had declined is shown by the proclamation of a new pretender at a distance of only 210 km NW of the capital. We have already seen that Wei Ao at first had been under the considerable influence of a certain Fang Wang, about whom little is known except that he enjoyed a reputation. In A. D. 24, he had resigned in protest against Wei Ao's submission to the Keng-shĭ Emperor.¹⁾ Together with a certain Kung Lin, he went to Ch'ang-an, where he gained control over Liu Ying. This was the unfortunate Young Prince who, as a small child, had been put on the throne by Wang Mang (though not formally declared emperor) in A. D. 6 and been demoted three years later.²⁾ Fang Wang and Kung Lin escorted him to Lin-king³⁾ and, in the 1st month (Feb. 17—Mar. 17) of A. D. 25, proclaimed him Son of Heaven.⁴⁾ Fang Wang became Lieutenant Chancellor and Kung Lin Commander-in-chief. They obtained a small following. The Keng-shĭ Emperor dispatched his own Lieutenant Chancellor, Li Sung, in command of some generals who defeated and killed the pretender and his ministers (HS 80: 6 a; HHS 1 A: 13 a; 11, 41: 5 b—6 a; 14, 44: 10 b). Although insignificant, this was to be the last victory of the imperial forces.

During the 1st month of A. D. 25, the three groups of the Red Eyebrows reunited south of the Yellow River after having entered the passes. They organized themselves in 30 divisions (ying) of 10,000 men each, which would imply that their strength was 300,000 men. The figure is impossible to verify, though it certainly is lower than the «million» mentioned elsewhere.⁵⁾ Each division was under the command of a Thrice Venerable and an Attendant Official (11, 41: 10 a). This once again shows that the Red Eyebrows were simple peasants who adopted the titles of the low-ranking local officials with which they were acquainted.⁶⁾

The emperor had ordered his general Su Mao to withstand the Red Eyebrows at the Hung-nung prefecture.⁷⁾ In the 1st month, a battle was fought in this area,

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I pp. 123—124, and *supra* pp. 24, 58.

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 82.

³⁾ The Lin-king prefecture during Han belonged to the An-ting commandery and was situated 50 li S of the present Chen-yüan hien, Kan-su.

⁴⁾ For this and the following events cf. map. 10.

⁵⁾ E. g. 11, 41: 12 b.

⁶⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 183.

⁷⁾ The Hung-nung prefecture during Han was the capital of the Hung-nung commandery and situated 40 li S of the present Ling-pao hien, Ho-nan.

according to TTK (23: 2 a) below the K'u-ts'ung Mountain,¹⁾ in which Su Mao was defeated²⁾ (11, 41: 6 a). In this month also, Liu Siu's general Teng Yü was able to break through the Ki pass³⁾ north of the Yellow River. It was stubbornly defended, but after ten days of attacks Teng Yü succeeded in forcing it. He advanced and surrounded the capital of the Ho-tung commandery, An-yi.⁴⁾ The siege dragged on for many months, so temporarily holding up Teng Yü's further progress (16, 46: 3 a). Nevertheless, his offensive had achieved its purpose of splitting the imperial defence.

The Red Eyebrows continued to move with extreme slowness, and in the 3rd month (Apr. 17—May 16) were still in the area of the Hung-nung prefecture. The HHS states that the emperor dispatched Li Sung to meet Chu Wei, who would have had to come a long way from Lo-yang. A new battle was fought near Hung-nung, this time in the Mao district,⁵⁾ in which the Red Eyebrows won an overwhelming victory (11, 41: 6 a). They advanced and took the Hu prefecture (TKK 23: 2 a). It is clear from what followed that Chu Wei returned to his command in Lo-yang, if he ever had left it at all,⁶⁾ and that Su Mao joined the defenders of this city. Li Sung escaped to Ch'ang-an.

It may have been at this time that the first attempt was made to raise Teng Yü's siege of An-yi. Forestalling this attack, Teng Yü dispatched troops which met and defeated the enemy south of the Kie prefecture⁷⁾ (16, 46: 3 a).

The Red Eyebrows advanced slowly but steadily, taking the Hua-yin prefecture (11, 41: 10 b), and moving from there in the direction of Cheng.⁸⁾

The situation had become desperate for the court. In a final effort the imperial troops tried to defeat Teng Yü, and so relieve their left flank. The former chieftains Wang K'uang, Chang Ang, Ch'eng Tan and others, joined forces and attacked Teng Yü at An-yi. It probably is not without significance that so far no former chieftains had been ordered to resist the Red Eyebrows. Since the fall of their clique, they were embittered and had increasingly lost confidence in a regime which was no longer willing to delegate them any of its powers. They were uneducated men, just like the leaders of the Red Eyebrows, and if sent against the latter in battle, might well be expected to go over to the enemy. Teng Yü, on the other hand,

¹⁾ This mountain was situated within the Hung-nung prefecture. Cf. ch'i 19: 19 a.

²⁾ The Red Eyebrows had already reunited at this time, which is proved by the fact that they were led by Fan Ch'ung and Sü Süan (TKK 23: 2 a).

³⁾ This pass was situated W of the present Tsi-yüan hien, Ho-nan.


⁴⁾ Situated N of the present Hia hien, Shan-si.

⁵⁾ This district according to ch'i 19: 19 a was situated within the Hung-nung prefecture. The treatise writes *Wu* instead of *Mao*, i. e. the same character without the radical 140.

⁶⁾ It is rather improbable that 11,41: 6 a could be correct in stating that Chu Wei participated in the battle. In order to reach the imperial troops at Hung-nung, he would have had to pass the Red Eyebrows at close range and later repeat this manoeuvre for his return to Lo-yang. There hardly was any justification for exposing him to such risks, especially as his place was in Lo-yang.

⁷⁾ The Kie prefecture during Han belonged to the Ho-tung commandery and was situated 30 li SW of the present Lin-tsin hien, Shan-si.

⁸⁾ The Cheng prefecture during Han belonged to King-chao-yin and was situated N of the present Hua hien, Shen-si.



Map 10. Operations against the Keng-ahf Emperor in A. D. 25.

represented Liu Siu, who in turn was the younger brother of the murdered Liu Po-sheng. The chieftains were deeply compromised by Po-sheng's execution and had no reason to expect any mercy from his brother.

The first battle at An-yi was fought on Aug. 8. It ceased only after the setting of the sun and was on balance disadvantageous to Teng-Yü. His officers advised him to withdraw, which he refused to do. On the following day, the armies rested.¹⁾ The battle was resumed on Aug. 10 and resulted in a complete victory for Teng Yü. He obtained 500 seals and took possession of the entire Ho-tung commandery. The chieftains escaped to Ch'ang-an (1 A: 16 a; 11, 41: 6 a; 16, 46: 3 a—3 b).

Meanwhile, the Red Eyebrows were on the verge of attacking the imperial capital. Their leaders could no longer postpone the decision whether they were to gain any political advantage from this situation. So far, they were merely bandits, and the one way to legitimize their movement was to proclaim an emperor of their own. The leaders must have been vaguely aware of this possibility for some time, but it is questionable whether they would have taken the step on their own initiative. It must be kept in mind that the Red Eyebrows were simple people. They were displaced persons who had banded together because they were starving.²⁾ They had remained a peasant movement with no more than a handful of gentry supporters, and this was a main reason for their ultimate failure. They knew nothing about government except what they had been able to observe at the local level in their hamlets, and they did not possess a fraction of the expert knowledge required for organizing and maintaining a bureaucratic administration. With gentry assistance, this task may have been possible, but it is not surprising that no such support was given. A few disgruntled members of the gentry may have joined the Red Eyebrows, and some had been kidnapped by them. The gentry at large, however, had candidates of its own. It is characteristic that the entire civil war shows no more than one clear-cut case of intimate, and even then temporary, cooperation between gentry and commoners. This occurred when the Nan-yang gentry called in the Troops from Sin-shi, P'ing-lin, and the Lower [Yang-tsi]-kiang, a measure which was forced upon them by military necessity. The Red Eyebrows, then, apart from isolated bands, were the only exclusively peasant movement of the civil war.

It should again be emphasized that the Red Eyebrows were not a secret society with semi-religious overtones, as too often is maintained. Nothing indicates that they were anything but a large group of displaced peasants who had given them-

¹⁾ This day had the cyclical characters *kuei-hai*, i. e. it was the last day of a sexagenary cycle. According to 16,46: 3 b, this was the reason why the chieftains did not attack. As remarked in vol. I, p. 47, the story would make no sense if the date had referred to the day on which the report reached the capital; the HHS would therefore seem to record events for the days on which they actually occurred. I now realize that I could have gone one step further. After the description of the battle, 16,46: 3 b goes on to say: 'In this month, Kuang-wu ascended the throne in Ho'. This event took place in the 6th month which permits the dating of the last day of the sexagenary cycle: Aug. 9. Teng Yü's victory must therefore have been on Aug. 10. It so happens that the pen ki records the victory under this very day (1 A: 16 a). Consequently, there can be no doubt that dates in the HHS refer to the days of the actual events.

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 143.

selves a straightforward and simple organization. There is, in fact, only one reference to a superstitious practice. It is stated that among the Red Eyebrows was a shaman¹⁾ from Ts'i, an area on the Shan-tung peninsula traditionally known for its high-strung people. He drummed, danced, and sacrificed to a former king of Ch'eng-yang. This king was Liu Chang, a grandson of Emperor Kao.²⁾ When the shaman had worked himself into ecstasy, he said that the king was greatly infuriated because the Red Eyebrows had not proclaimed an emperor. «There were those who laughed at the shaman, but abruptly they fell ill» (11, 41: 10 b). Quite naturally the Red Eyebrows, like other people of their time, were superstitious; there is no reason why shamans should not have been among their number, rather it would be curious had there been none. Their presence, even so, would not indicate that the Red Eyebrows were a secret society. In fact, the episode with the shaman may have a simple and rational explanation.

It has been said that isolated members of the gentry were among the Red Eyebrows. They were too few to have any real influence, but for reasons of their own may have persuaded the leaders to set up an emperor. Among these was Fang Yang, who had good reasons for hating the Keng-shī Emperor. His elder brother Fang Wang had been killed in the abortive attempt to proclaim the Young Prince Son of Heaven. He, and perhaps others as well, influenced Fan Ch'ung to choose an emperor, and this may have been what finally swayed the leaders of the Red Eyebrows. It is not out of the question that some of the parties involved either exploited the presence of the shaman or perhaps had even instructed him to prepare the ground for the proclamation of an emperor.

The leaders of the Red Eyebrows decided that their candidate should be a descendant of Liu Chang, king of Ch'eng-yang. They conducted a search throughout their ranks and, according to the HHS, found more than seventy men who counted him as their ancestor. Two of these had the best claim, being direct descendants of the king. These were Liu Mao and his younger brother P'en-tsī.³⁾ Their grandfather had been enfeoffed as marquis of Shi⁴⁾ in the time of Emperor Yüan. Their father had inherited the marquisate but had been demoted to commoner by Wang Mang. In the early stages of the popular unrest in Shan-tung, the Red Eyebrows had passed the Shi prefecture and kidnapped Liu Mao and P'en-tsī, together with their eldest brother Kung.⁵⁾ The two former remained among the Red Eyebrows,

¹⁾ In lack of any better term, I reluctantly render *wu* as shaman. The *wu* were intermediaries between men and spirits. Cf. 108. Waley, p. 9.

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, genealogy, no. 7.

³⁾ Cf. vol. I, genealogy, nos. 142, 143.

⁴⁾ The Shi prefecture during Former Han belonged to the T'ai-shan commandery. It is not mentioned in the administrative survey of Later Han. However, the Tsi-pei kingdom had a Ch'eng prefecture which is not mentioned during Former Han. The commentators Ts'ien Ta-hin and Hui Tung agree that Shi and Ch'eng must be one and the same prefecture and that the name had been miswritten in one of the cases. Cf. HHS chī 21: 11 a. The prefecture was situated N of the present Ning-yang hien, Shan-tung.

⁵⁾ Cf. vol. I, genealogy, no. 141. He seems to have become a minor leader of the Red Eyebrows and had submitted with these in Lo-yang. Later, he did not return with the others but remained at

and it is stated that they were in charge of herding cattle (11, 41: 8 a—8 b, 10 b—11 a).

The Red Eyebrows, who recently had arrived in Cheng, built an altar north of this prefecture. All Thrice Venerable and Attendant Officials, i. e. the commanders of the various divisions, assembled, and a sacrifice was made to the spirit of the former king of Ch'eng-yang. After this, the brothers Liu Mao and P'en-tsi, and a third person whose name is not preserved, were placed below the altar. They were offered a box which contained three slips of bamboo or wood. Two of these were blank, but on the third the words »Supreme General» had been written. The candidates drew one slip each according to age. Liu P'en-tsi, as the youngest, drew last, and obtained the one which had been marked. He was proclaimed emperor at the age of only 15 years, and the title of reign (nien hao) »kien-shih», »Inauguration of an Epoch», was adopted. This happened in the 6th month (July 15—Aug. 12) of A. D. 25, the exact date being unknown¹⁾ (1 A: 16 a; 11, 41: 10 b, 11 a; chi 10: 5 b; chi 13: 2 b).

The Red Eyebrows proceeded to the appointment of the high ministers. Fan Ch'ung was the most prominent among their leaders, but he could neither write nor count. Sü Sün, on the other hand, had once been a jailor in a prefecture and was considered the most educated among them.²⁾ He was appointed Lieutenant Chancellor. Fan Ch'ung became Grandee Secretary,³⁾ P'ang An Commander-in-chief of the Left, and Sie Lu Commander-in-chief of the Right (11, 41: 11 b). As far as the Nine Ministers are concerned, it is only known that Yang Yin was appointed Grand Minister of Agriculture (11, 41: 11 b) and a certain Chu-ko Chi Commandant of the Palace Guards (11, 41: 12 a). Nothing is preserved about the background of Chu-ko Chi. All others were the original leaders of the Red Eyebrows.⁴⁾ If stray members of the gentry received any positions at all, this is not mentioned in the records.

The »Emperor» Liu P'en-tsi was far too young to wield any power and remained a figurehead. In practice nothing was changed. The Red Eyebrows never implemented any government, and would have failed if they had tried to do so. They remained a peasant army, living off the land, and with no practical program. Liu P'en-tsi was one of the few emperors during the civil war who was a ruler in name only, without a proper court, and without a bureaucracy. Few documents can have been produced under a system where the so-called chief ministers were mostly illiterate. It is clear, therefore, that the history of the Red Eyebrows in the HHS could not, to any notable degree, be based on contemporary sources. Rather it

the court where he became a Palace Attendant and one of the devoted partisans of the Keng-shi Emperor. Cf. *supra* p. 41, note 1.

¹⁾ Ku kin chu maintains that Liu P'en-tsi ascended the throne below the K'u-ts'ung Mountain (cf. HHS chi 19: 19 a and *supra* pp. 91—92), which is contradicted by all other evidence.

²⁾ It is stated that he understood the Yi king (11, 41: 11 b), which probably means no more than that he could make a limited use of it for divination purposes.

³⁾ Corresponding to Grand Minister of Works.

⁴⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 137.

represents a summary of the official inquest which, following normal procedure, must have been held after the surrender of the peasants.

In Ch'ang-an the first signs of open insubordination began to appear. The balance between the cliques of the Nan-yang gentry and the former chieftains had broken down in the beginning of A. D. 24 with the former's victory. As the victim of a single and powerful clique, the emperor had lost his political freedom of action, and the disillusioned chieftains had been relegated to the role of generals. From their point of view, nothing was to be gained by continued identification with a cause which, to all appearance, was doomed. The time was near for them to take their revenge.

The chieftains had escaped to Ch'ang-an after their defeat at An-yi. With the exception of Chu Wei, they were all assembled and held a conference. Chang Ang seems to have made himself their spokesman. He is recorded as having said that the Red Eyebrows were between Hua-yin and Cheng.¹⁾ They themselves possessed only Ch'ang-an and would soon be annihilated. It would be best if they looted the city and with their wealth fought their way to Wan where Liu Ts'i was king. If this scheme could not be carried out, they should again become bandits. All the others agreed, and together they submitted their plan to the Keng-shi Emperor.²⁾ He was infuriated (11, 41: 6 a). It is not impossible that this was a last attempt of the chieftains to regain control over the emperor. Even if it were too late to reconquer the empire, it would have given a theoretical legitimacy to their future actions.

Wei Ao and others³⁾ made a separate approach to the Keng-shi Emperor. They suggested to him that he should abdicate in favour of the Thrice Venerable of the State, Liu Liang, who was the paternal uncle of Liu Siu. The emperor refused this also (13, 43: 5 b). It is difficult to see what could have been gained by such a step, except possibly the appeasement of Liu Siu. If he would have agreed to call off his offensive and participate in a coordinated attack on the Red Eyebrows, the tide could still have been turned. It is, however, out of the question that Liu Siu would have been prepared to listen.


The emperor proceeded to give his final orders for the defence of Ch'ang-an. The chieftains Wang K'uang, Ch'en Mu, Ch'eng Tan, and the Commander-in-chief

¹⁾ Liu P'en-tsai had ascended the throne in the 6th month (July 15—Aug. 12) and in the Cheng prefecture (cf. *supra* p. 96). Since the former chieftains had been defeated at An-yi on Aug. 10, it follows that they could not have been back in Ch'ang-an before the end of the 6th month. Therefore, the conference cannot have been held earlier than the beginning of the 7th month, i. e. after Liu P'en-tsai had been proclaimed emperor. If Chang Ang really remarked that the Red Eyebrows were between Hua-yin and Cheng (and it is not out of the question that he did; cf. *infra* note 2), this would indicate that the latest news had not yet reached the capital.

The biography of the Keng-shi Emperor records the conference of the former chieftains after the battle of An-yi but before the entry of Liu P'en-tsai's ascension to the throne. The historian may have been misled by Chang Ang's remark.

²⁾ It must have been thanks to this audience that the main facts about the conference were preserved.

³⁾ HHK 3: 5 a says Shen-t'u Kien, Wei Ao and others.



Map 11. Ch'ang-an in Han times.

of the Right, Chao Meng, stationed their troops at Sin-feng, and the Lieutenant Chancellor, Li Sung, encamped at Tsou¹⁾ (11, 41: 6 a).

These military dispositions meant that the leaders of the Nan-yang gentry and all former chieftains, except two, were absent from Ch'ang-an. The exceptions were Chang Ang and Liao Chan. For the moment they were in a key position, and seeing their chance for the long delayed day of reckoning, plotted secretly against the emperor. It is interesting that Wei Ao, Shen-t'u Kien and Hu Yin also took part in the conspiracy, for they had not belonged to the clique of the former chieftains, and previously had acted independently. This shows the complete collapse of the Keng-shi Emperor's prestige. All agreed to rob the emperor, and then carry out the original plan of the chieftains. They chose as a suitable occasion the day of the ch'u-lou sacrifice,²⁾ but their plot was exposed by a Palace Attendant.³⁾ The emperor pretended to be ill, did not leave the palace,⁴⁾ and summoned the conspirators. Chang Ang, Liao Chan, Hu Yin and Shen-t'u Kien obeyed, but Wei

¹⁾ Without giving any reason for its opinion, the *Commentary* of 11,41: 6 a states that Tsou is identical with the Hung-men commune of the Sin-feng prefecture, mentioned in *ch'i* 19: 22 b.

²⁾ A sacrifice to the ancestors. Cf. 72. Dubs, II, p. 100, note 32.2.

³⁾ The Keng-shi Emperor's last defeat occurred soon after Oct. 11 (cf. *infra* p. 100 and *ibidem* note 2). This had been preceded by fighting in Ch'ang-an which lasted for more than one month (cf. *infra* p. 99). Therefore, the plot must have been revealed sometime in the latter half of August, i. e. long before the ch'u-lou sacrifice which was held at the autumnal equinox.

⁴⁾ I. e. the Ch'ang-lo Palace. Cf. map 11 (which is only intended as a very rough outline of Ch'ang-an).

Ao seems to have feared a trap and did not appear. The emperor made the mistake of ordering the other four to wait in the expectation that Wei Ao would still come. The suspicions of Chang Ang, Liao Chan and Hu Yin were aroused, and they left the palace. Shen-t'u Kien stayed behind and was executed (11,41: 6 a—6 b).

Wei Ao had summoned his followers and barricaded himself in his house. It was surrounded by imperial troops, but during the night Wei Ao's men broke through the ring, forced the P'ing-ch'eng Gate,¹⁾ and escaped. Wei Ao returned to T'ien-shui, where he again took control of the northwest and proclaimed himself Supreme General of the Western Provinces (1 A: 17 b; 13,43: 5 b—6 a).

The remaining conspirators Chang Ang, Liao Chan and Hu Yin led their troops and looted the eastern and western markets. During the night, they attacked the Ch'ang-lo Palace, burned down a gate, and forced their way in. The fighting continued within the palace. The Keng-shi Emperor had the worst of it, and the next morning escaped to Chao Meng at Sin-feng (11,41: 6 b).

The emperor believed that the three former chieftains stationed at Sin-feng had been involved in the plot. He summoned Wang K'uang, Ch'en Mu and Ch'eng Tan to his presence. Ch'en Mu and Ch'eng Tan²⁾ arrived first and were summarily executed. Only Wang K'uang saved himself. He withdrew his troops from their defence positions and, marching to Ch'ang-an, joined Chang Ang, Liao Chan and Hu Yin (11,41: 6 b).

The long delayed open fight between the clique of the former chieftains and the remnants of the Nan-yang party had begun. The emperor had failed in two attempts to annihilate his adversaries and was now isolated with his chief ministers Li Sung and Chao Meng. These two entered Ch'ang-an and took up the battle. It lasted for more than a month and ended with the flight of the chieftains. The Keng-shi Emperor returned to Ch'ang-an and lived in the Ch'ang-sin Palace³⁾ (11, 41: 6 b).

Meanwhile both Teng Yü and the Red Eyebrows had continued their offensive (cf. map 10). Teng Yü crossed the Yellow River at Fen-yin,⁴⁾ took Hia-yang,⁵⁾ proceeded to Ya,⁶⁾ and defeated imperial troops (16,46: 4 a). The Red Eyebrows, in turn, had outmanoeuvred the last defences of Ch'ang-an. Instead of making a frontal attack on Sin-feng, they crossed the Wei River and took Kao-ling.⁷⁾ They were there joined by the former chieftains who had fled from Ch'ang-an. Wang K'uang and Chang Ang are mentioned by name, but it is clear from what follows

¹⁾ This was another name for the Si-an Gate (96. *San fu huang t'u* 1: 7 b). Cf. map 11.

²⁾ Cf. *infra* p. 101, note 6.

³⁾ Cf. map 11.

⁴⁾ The Fen-yin prefecture during Han belonged to the Ho-tung commandery and was situated N of the present Yung-ho hien, Shan-si.

⁵⁾ The Hia-yang prefecture during Han belonged to the Tso-p'ing-yi commandery and was situated 20 li S of the present Han-ch'eng hien, Shen-si.

⁶⁾ The Ya prefecture during Han belonged to the Tso-p'ing-yi commandery and was situated 40 li NE of the present Po-shui hien, Shen-si.

⁷⁾ The Kao-ling prefecture during Han was the capital of the Tso-p'ing-yi commandery. It was situated 1 li W of the present hien with the same name, Shen-si.

that Liao Chan and Hu Yin also threw in their lot with the Red Eyebrows (11,41: 6 b, 11 b). The latter now closed in on the capital.

The emperor put Li Sung in command of his last troops and dispatched him from Ch'ang-an to seek battle with the Red Eyebrows. He was defeated and captured alive. His younger brother was at this time the Colonel of the Tung-tu Gate¹⁾ and was prepared to open this in exchange for Li Sung's life. In the 9th month (Oct. 11—Nov. 9),²⁾ the Red Eyebrows entered Ch'ang-an through the Tung-tu Gate (1 A: 17 a; 11,41: 6 b—7 a, 11 b). It was the same gate through which Wang Mang had been attacked two years earlier.³⁾ The Lieutenant Chancellor of the Left, Ts'ao King, fought them and was killed (HS 72: 26 b). The Keng-shī Emperor fled on horseback through the Ch'u-ch'eng Gate⁴⁾ (11,41: 7 a). The promise to spare Li Sung was not kept. He died (15,45: 3 b), in all probability executed on the instigation of his implacable enemies, the surviving former chieftains. Nothing is known about the fate of Chao Meng, although it is evident that he also must have been killed. Ch'ang-an was in the hands of the Red Eyebrows, and their emperor, Liu P'en-tsi, was installed in the Ch'ang-lo Palace (11,41: 11 b).

The Keng-shī Emperor fled to Kao-ling, which had recently been evacuated by the Red Eyebrows (1 A: 17 a). He was arrested there by one of his former officials. The Red Eyebrows conveyed a message that if he surrendered within twenty days, he would be enfeoffed as king of Ch'ang-sha. The emperor dispatched his fanatically faithful adherent, Liu Kung, who conveniently enough was also the elder brother of Liu P'en-tsi, and accepted the terms. The Red Eyebrows sent Sie Lu to receive the capitulation (11,41: 7 a).

In the 10th month (Nov. 11—Dec. 8), the Keng-shī Emperor followed Sie Lu to Ch'ang-an, half-naked entered the Ch'ang-lo Palace where he had once resided, and surrendered the imperial seal to Liu P'en-tsi. The Red Eyebrows wished to kill him then and there, but Sie Lu and Liu Kung intervened. The latter threatened to commit suicide. The former emperor was thereupon enfeoffed as Marquis Who Fears Majesty and finally, on Liu Kung's earnest intercession, received the

¹⁾ This was another name for the Süan-p'ing Gate. Cf. map 11.

²⁾ The fall of Ch'ang-an must have occurred during the first days of this month, since an edict of Oct. 16 by Emperor Kuang-wu refers to the defeat of the Keng-shī Emperor (1 A: 17 a). Cf. *infra* p. 105.

³⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 131.

⁴⁾ The *Commentary* quotes San fu huang t'u to the effect that Wang Mang had changed the name of the Lo-ch'eng Gate to Kien-tsi Gate and that Ch'u-ch'eng was a popular name for it. This may be a misquotation of the *Commentary*. The Yüan edition of 1328 of the San fu huang t'u, reproduced by Lo Chen-yü (1866—1940), clearly distinguishes between the Lo-ch'eng Gate on the one hand and the Ch'u-ch'eng Gate on the other. It states that it was the latter which Wang Mang changed to Kien-tsi. (96. San fu huang t'u 1: 8 b). This is confirmed by SKC 19: 12 b—13 a, which also clearly distinguishes between the two gates. It adds that another name of the Lo [-ch'eng] Gate was Li-ch'eng and that Wang Mang had changed it to the Ho Gate. (This must be the reason why 104. Herrmann p. 21, map III, lists a Ho-ch'eng Gate and 97. Utsunomiya p. 150 reproduces a map which shows a Li-ch'eng Gate). One is therefore, in variance with Herrmann and Utsunomiya, forced to the conclusion that Ch'u-ch'eng (alias Kien-tsi) was the name of one gate, separate and distinct from the northernmost Lo-ch'eng (alias Li-ch'eng, Ho [-ch'eng]) Gate.

promised rank as king of Ch'ang-sha. Subsequently he lived in the entourage of Sie Lu, where Liu Kung tried to protect him against his enemies. This was in vain. The former chieftains had waited a long time for their final vengeance. Chang Ang and the others persuaded Sie Lu to have the former emperor killed. He was ordered to herd horses in the open country outside the city, and there was strangled. Liu Kung dug up his corpse by night and hid it. Later, it was buried in the Pa-ling prefecture (11,41: 7 a—7 b, 11 b). So ended the life of the man whom the chieftains had raised to the throne, but who later had turned against them.

After Ch'ang-an had been taken by the Red Eyebrows, Teng Yü was advised by his officers to attack it directly. He decided against this and advanced and captured Sün-yi¹⁾ (cf. map 10). The former emperor's Grand Administrator of Si-ho surrendered, and separately operating officers took possession of the Shang commandery. Teng Yü then proceeded to Ta-yao.²⁾ Finally he turned southeastwards and took Yün-yang,³⁾ 50 km NW of Ch'ang-an⁴⁾ (13,43: 6 b; 16,46: 4 a—5 a).

The former chieftains Wang K'uang, Chang Ang and Liao Chan, as well as Hu Yin who was not a chieftain himself, had joined the Red Eyebrows, but all except Liao Chan seem to have fallen out with their leaders. No details are known except that they surrendered to Tsung Kuang⁵⁾ before the end of 25. Wang K'uang and Hu Yin are mentioned by name. Chang Ang probably submitted on the same occasion, as henceforth he disappears from the sources.⁶⁾ Tsung Kuang set off to escort them to Lo-yang and *en route* had them all executed during an escape attempt (16,46: 5 a). This incident may well have been contrived.

Among the leaders of the two cliques which had struggled for power under the Keng-shi Emperor, few survived the death of their ruler. Li Sung and Chao Meng who had emerged as the foreground figures of the Nan-yang gentry were both

¹⁾ The Sün-yi prefecture during Han belonged to the Yu-fu-feng commandery and was situated NE of the present hien with the same name, Shen-si.

²⁾ The Ta-yao prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Pei-ti commandery and was situated SE of the present Ning hien, Kan-su.

³⁾ The Yün-yang prefecture during Han belonged to the Tso-p'ing-yi commandery and was situated 30 li SE of the present Ch'un-hua hien, Shen-si.

⁴⁾ During these manoeuvres, one of Teng Yü's officers revolted, marched northwestwards, and was defeated by Wei Ao. 13,43: 6 a—6 b places this event in the beginning of A. D. 26, which must be a mistake. Teng Yü's biography clearly dates the insubordination at the end of 25. It is also mentioned that because of this emergency Emperor Kuang-wu dispatched the Master of Writing, Tsung Kuang, with the Staff of Authority to the northwest (16,46: 5 a). Teng Yü entered Ch'ang-an in the 1st month of 26 (1 A: 19 a), and Tsung Kuang had by this time returned to the Great Plain (22,52: 4 b). Since the revolt of Teng Yü's officer precedes the entering of Ch'ang-an and Tsung Kuang's return eastwards, it can only have occurred at the end of A. D. 25, as correctly stated by Teng Yü's biography.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* note 4.

⁶⁾ Strangely enough, 16,46: 5 a mentions that Ch'eng Tan also capitulated. This is contradicted by the biography of the Keng-shi Emperor, which states that he had been executed (cf. *supra* p. 99). Although one may be inclined to accept the latter version, in which the history of the chieftains is given in its proper setting, the contradiction must remain unsolved.

dead. The chieftains Wang K'uang, Ch'eng Tan and Ch'en Mu had been killed. Their fate was probably shared by Chang Ang, while Wang Feng must have died earlier. Liao Chan stayed with the Red Eyebrows and fell in battle during the following year (14,44: 14 b). Only one of the actual chieftains survived the civil war. This was Chu Wei who on Nov. 4, A. D. 25, surrendered himself with the city of Lo-yang; and Lo-yang was well worth a pardon.¹⁾ It is suggestive that the only other two men who originally had been associated with the commoners, but seem themselves to have belonged to the gentry, found no difficulty in accomplishing a smooth transfer from the losing party to the winning one. They were Ma Wu, who had surrendered to Liu Siu at the end of 24,²⁾ and Wang Ch'ang, who was warmly received in Lo-yang during the summer of 26 (15,45: 5 b—6 a).

2. *The heirs of the Keng-shi Emperor*

Liu Siu.

At the end of A. D. 24, the Keng-shi Emperor had placed a large garrison in Lo-yang under the command of Chu Wei. Liu Siu, in turn, had instructed his general Feng Yi to defend the Meng Ford in order to prevent enemy attacks over the river. K'ou Sün had been appointed Acting Grand Administrator of Ho-nei and had made military preparations.³⁾ His capital was the Huai prefecture.⁴⁾

In the beginning of A. D. 25, Feng Yi wrote a letter to Li Yi, who was one of the defenders of Lo-yang, and advised him to surrender. Li Yi was in a difficult position. He had been one of the original rebels in the Nan-yang commandery and had closely cooperated with Liu Po-sheng. Later he had turned against him and together with the chieftain Chu Wei proffered the charges which had led to his execution.⁵⁾ He could not hope for clemency from Liu Siu, but at the same time must have realized that the fall of the Keng-shi Emperor was imminent. In this dilemma, Li Yi answered Feng Yi's letter and stated that he wished to make peace with Liu Siu. He ceased military operations, which enabled Feng Yi to attack the T'ien-ting pass⁶⁾ in the north, to cross the Yellow River, and attack Ch'eng-kao⁷⁾ and other prefectures further eastwards. The Grand Administrator of Ho-nan, Wu Po, attempted to reconquer his lost prefectures, but Feng Yi crossed the river again⁸⁾ and defeated and killed him at Shi-hiang.⁹⁾ Li Yi kept the gates of Lo-yang

¹⁾ Cf. *infra* pp. 105—106.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 86.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 87.

⁴⁾ The Huai prefecture during Han was the capital of the Ho-nei commandery and situated SW of the present Wu-chi hien, Ho-nan. For this and the following events cf. map 12.


⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 11, 23.

⁶⁾ Situated S of the present Tsin-ch'eng hien, Shan-si. It is shown in 90. Ting, map 23.

⁷⁾ The Ch'eng-kao prefecture during Han belonged to the Ho-nan commandery and was situated 2 li NW of the present Si-shui hien, Ho-nan.

⁸⁾ Lacking further evidence, I have assumed that the crossings took place at the Meng Ford.

⁹⁾ According to ch'i 19: 6 a, Shi-hiang was an agglomeration within the Lo-yang prefecture. Since Wu Po marched in the direction of Ch'eng-kao, it may be assumed that Shi-hiang was situated E of Lo-yang.




Map 12. Operations in the Lo-yang area I, A. D. 25.

closed and did not come to the assistance of Wu Po. Fengt Yi took this as a proof of Li Yi's sincerity and informed Liu Siu about the agreement. Liu Siu made Li Yi's letter known. As was certainly intended, this news reached Lo-yang's commander, Chu Wei, who had Li Yi murdered (15,45: 3 b; 17,47: 3 a—4 a).

Chu Wei made one major attempt to outmanoeuvre his enemies, himself marching against Feng Yi in order to engage his troops, while simultaneously Su Mao crossed the Yellow River north of the Kung prefecture¹⁾ and attacked Wen.²⁾ If this operation had proved successful, Feng Yi would have been outflanked and either defeated or forced to a hurried retreat. K'ou Sün rushed his army from Huai to Wen. The battle took place below this city and lasted one whole day. Feng Yi sent reinforcements, and Su Mao had to withdraw with heavy losses. K'ou Sün pursued him to Lo-yang before returning to Huai. Feng Yi with the main body of his troops had meanwhile crossed the river and encountered Chu Wei at P'ing-

¹⁾ The Kung prefecture during Han belonged to the Ho-nan commandery and was situated 30 li SW of the present hien with the same name, Ho-nan. SKC 5: 5 a states that Su Mao crossed the Yellow River through the Wu-she Ford, situated N of Kung. For this and the following events cf. map 13.

²⁾ The Wen prefecture during Han belonged to the Ho-nei commandery and was situated 30 li SW of the present hien with the same name, Ho-nan.



Map 13. Operations in the Lo-yang area II, A. D. 25.

yin.¹⁾ He also gained a complete victory, pursued Chu Wei to Lo-yang, marched triumphantly in a circle around the city, and returned (1 A: 14 a; 16,46: 18 b; 17,47: 4 a—4 b).

During this time, Liu Siu had been engaged in campaigns against the Yu-lai, Wu-fan, Ta-ts'iang, and Wu-hiao bandits on the northern part of the plain.²⁾ After these had been concluded, his followers insistently urged him to ascend the throne. Three times they invited him to take this step, and three times, in accordance with propriety, he refused to listen. A fourth time the request was repeated, and Liu Siu then accepted. An altar was built in the Ts'ien-ts'iu commune, 7 li W of Ho,³⁾ and on Aug. 5, A. D. 25, Liu Siu ascended the imperial throne. He chose «kien-wu», «Inauguration of Firmness», as his title of reign (nien hao), proclaimed a general amnesty, and changed the name of Ho to Kao-yi, the «Eminent City.»⁴⁾ Teng Yü was appointed Grand Minister over the Masses, Wu Han became Commander-in-chief, and Wang Liang Grand Minister of Works. All belonged to the group of Liu Siu's intimate followers (1 A: 14 a—16 b; ch' 20: 13 b).

As emperor, Liu Siu is known in history by his posthumous title, Kuang-wu, or sometimes by his temple name, the Epochal Founder (Shi-tsu). In this work he will henceforward be referred to as Kuang-wu.

¹⁾ The P'ing-yin prefecture during Han belonged to the Ho-nan commandery and was situated 1 li E of the present Meng-tsin hien, Ho-nan.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 79 ff.

³⁾ The Ho prefecture is shown on map 7.

⁴⁾ This was done very elegantly by removing the radical 163 from the element *kao* and writing it separately as the second part of the name.

On Sep. 14¹⁾, Emperor Kuang-wu arrived in Huai²⁾ to supervise in person the campaign against Lo-yang. He dispatched no less than twelve generals to surround the city and, in addition, stationed an army at Yung-yang (1 A: 16 b; 17,47: 11 b; 22,52: 9 b). The latter was undoubtedly a precautionary measure against Liu Mao, who dominated a large territory southeast of the Ho-nan commandery³⁾. It proved to be a wise step as Liu Mao soon attacked the Ao Granary, situated within the Yung-yang prefecture⁴⁾. He lost the battle, surrendered to Kuang-wu⁵⁾, and was enfeoffed as king of Chung-shan (1 A: 16 b; 14,44: 11 b; 19,49: 4 a).

In the 8th month (Sep. 12—Oct. 10), one of the defenders of Lo-yang, the king of Lin-k'iu, T'ien Li, surrendered (1 A: 17 a). The White Tiger Duke, Ch'en K'iao, also submitted at a time unknown (17,47: 19 a). No details are preserved in either case.

When Kuang-wu heard of the fall of Ch'ang-an, he issued an edict on Oct. 16 which said: «Keng-shī is crushed and defeated. He has abandoned the city and escaped. His wife and children are stripped of everything, adrift and scattered on the roads. We pity it extremely and now enfeoff Keng-shī as king of Huai-yang. If among officials and people there dare to be those who injure him, the crime will be identical with great refractoriness» (1 A: 17 a). Kuang-wu's attempt to offer protection to his former rival proved futile.

With the fall of the Keng-shī Emperor, the defenders of Lo-yang were in a hopeless situation, and their morale quickly disintegrated. An officer opened the Shang-tung Gate, and two of Kuang-wu's generals entered with their troops early one morning. A fierce battle took place below the Arsenal, but the attack seems to have been repulsed (22,52: 9 b). Chu Wei was now ready to seek terms of surrender. Emperor Kuang-wu selected as an intermediary one of his chief followers, Ts'en P'eng, who previously had been a subordinate of Chu Wei⁶⁾. The discussion took place with Chu Wei standing on the city wall of Lo-yang and Ts'en P'eng below it. The former had been one of the principal agents in the murder of Liu Po-sheng and later had opposed Liu Siu's mission to the north⁷⁾. He was understandably afraid of the consequences. Ts'en P'eng reported this to Kuang-wu, who promised complete pardon. On Oct. 30, Ts'en P'eng returned to Lo-yang and delivered this message. Five days later, on Nov. 4, Chu Wei submitted to the emperor with his hands tied behind his back. Kuang-wu untied the rope in person. During the night, Ts'en P'eng escorted Chu Wei back to Lo-yang. On the following day, Nov. 5, Chu Wei

¹⁾ 1 A: 16 b. says: «on the day *ki-hai*». The event is preceded by entries concerning the 7th month and followed by entries for the 8th month. It so happens that the 7th month had no day with the cyclical characters *ki-hai*. They must undoubtedly refer to the 3rd day of the 8th month.

²⁾ Cf. map 13.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 90 and map 9.

⁴⁾ Cf. *chī* 19: 7 b. Yung-yang is shown on map 13.

⁵⁾ 1 A: 16 b places Liu Mao's surrender before Kuang-wu arrived in Huai and stationed troops at Yung-yang. This is impossible, since 19,49: 4a clearly states that Liu Mao was defeated by the generals who were in charge of the defence of Yung-yang and who had been dispatched from Huai.

⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 35, note 4.

⁷⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 23, 37.

capitulated together with his army. He was enfeoffed as a marquis and appointed a general (1 A: 17 a; 17,47: 11 b—12 a).

Emperor Kuang-wu entered Lo-yang on Nov. 27, chose it as his capital and took up his residence in the Southern Palace (1 A: 17 a—17 b).

Up to this stage, the T'ien-tsing pass had been stubbornly defended by the Grand Administrator of Shang-tang¹). He now sent messengers to Lo-yang and surrendered. Pao Yung²), however, refused to believe that the Keng-shī Emperor was dead and continued to guard the T'ai-yüan commandery (28 A, 58 A: 10 a—13 a).

In southern China, Liu Sin was forced to abandon the Yü-chang commandery in present Kiang-si, which he had controlled since A. D. 24³). He came to Lo-yang and surrendered to Kuang-wu (14,44: 13 a).

Liu P'en-tsī.

The Red Eyebrows proved totally incapable of implementing a government. Their mode of existence had been to take by force what they needed and leave an area once it had been stripped of supplies. The fall of Ch'ang-an was to them not the conquest of the imperial capital with all its historical prestige, and the opportunity it offered of establishing a central administration. To them Ch'ang-an was simply a great and rich city to be looted. One does not have to rely for this on the description of the historian, which may be biased. The events, as we shall see later, speak for themselves. The Red Eyebrows continued to sack and terrorize the people, concurrently with naive and futile attempts to enact a court ceremonial. A banquet given on the day of the Winter Sacrifice⁴) (Jan. 23, A. D. 26) deteriorated into a riot⁵) (11,41: 11 b—12 a). All order broke down, and Ch'ang-an was in complete chaos. The HHS tells how harem ladies and musicians of the late Keng-shī Emperor still lived isolated in the Lateral Courts, how Liu P'en-tsī saw to it that they received food, and how «all» starved to death after the exodus of the Red Eyebrows (11,41: 12 a). The story is exaggerated, but serves to illustrate the confusion in the capital.

Liu Yung.

In the 11th month (Dec. 9, A. D. 25—Jan. 7, A. D. 26), Liu Yung proclaimed himself Son of Heaven (1 A: 17 b; 12,42: 3 b). Little is known about his high officials. He seems to have appointed his youngest brother Shao-kung as Grandee Secretary⁶) (12,42: 3 a), and in A. D. 26 made Su Mao⁷) his Commander-in-chief (12,42: 3 b).

¹) Cf. *supra* p. 102 and map 12.

²) Cf. *supra* pp. 60, 84.

³) Cf. *supra* pp. 60, 88 and map 9.

⁴) This was a sacrifice to the spirits performed on the third day designated with the cyclical character *sū* after the winter solstice. Cf. 72. Dubs, II, p. 101, note 32.2.

⁵) Cf. *infra* p. 252.

⁶) The title corresponds to Grand Minister of Works. Strangely enough, the HHS lists this appointment previous to Liu Yung's ascension to the throne.

⁷) Cf. *supra* pp. 91, 92, 103 and *infra* pp. 133—135.

*Kung-sun Shu.*¹⁾

Kung-sun Shu, who already had made himself king of Shu and Pa, was advised by his official Li Hiung to ascend the throne. The latter pointed out that there was a famine on the plain, while the area of Shu was fertile. Its products were known all over the empire, and it had more timber and bamboo than could be used. The land had fish, salt, copper, silver, and rivers suitable for navigation. Kung-sun Shu should expand eastwards and set himself up as Son of Heaven (13,43: 14 a—15 a).

In the 4th month (May 17—June 14) of A. D. 25, i. e. before the fall of the Keng-shi Emperor and before Liu P'en-tsi, Liu Siu and Liu Yung had been proclaimed emperors, Kung-sun Shu ascended the throne. He chose Ch'eng²⁾ as the name of the dynasty he hoped to found and selected white as his colour in contrast to the red of the Han dynasty. His title of reign (nien hao) was «lung-hing», «the Rise of the Dragon» (1 A: 14 b; 13,43: 15 a).

Kung-sun Shu selected Li Hiung as Grand Minister over the Masses and his own brothers Kuang and Hui as Commander-in-chief and Grand Minister of Works respectively³⁾ (13,43: 15 a).

The appointments made by Liu Yung and Kung-sun Shu form a notable exception from the usual practice. None of the emperors of the two Han dynasties, and as far as is known none of the pretenders during the civil war, ever appointed their brothers to the highest offices.

Kung-sun Shu was immediately successful in extending his territory. The aboriginal king of Yüehi, Jen Kuei⁴⁾, submitted to him (13,43: 15 a; 86,116: 19 a). Troops were also dispatched to garrison two important defiles through which enemy attacks could be expected. One general was stationed at the Po-shui pass⁵⁾

¹⁾ A special work exists which devotes considerable space to the time of Kung-sun Shu. This is the *Hua yang kuo chi*, written in 12 kuan and preserved in this form. It traces the history of the area of present Si-ch'uan, Yün-nan and Kuei-chow from earliest times to A. D. 347. The HYKC was composed by Ch'ang K'ü, himself a native of Si-ch'uan. He rose to the rank of Honorary Regular Attendant in the kingdom of Ch'eng or Shu (302—347) and in 347 advised its last ruler, Li Shi, to surrender to the general of the Eastern Tsin dynasty, Huan Wen (312—373).


The HYKC is often at variance with the HHS and is not a reliable source for the period under discussion. It was composed long after the time of Kung-sun Shu, so that no primary sources could have been available to Ch'ang K'ü. After the defeat and death of Kung-sun Shu, his archives were brought to Lo-yang (cf. *supra* pp. 76—77) where they were exploited by the authors of the TTK. This work was in turn the most important source for Fan Ye's HHS. The primary sources were later scattered and lost, especially in A. D. 191, 311 and 314 (cf. vol. I, p. 9). It is obvious, therefore, that Ch'ang K'ü had to base his history on local and often unreliable traditions, while the narrative of the HHS embodies sections which, via the TTK and other sources, are excerpts from the original documents.

²⁾ HYKC p. 36: 2 writes Ta-ch'eng.

³⁾ HYKC p. 37: 1 gives quite another version. It agrees that Li Hiung became Grand Minister over the Masses but says that Kung-sun Hui (not Kuang) became Grand Commandant (a title corresponding to Commander-in-chief) and that a certain Jen Man was appointed Grand Minister of Works.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 60, 90 and map 9.

⁵⁾ The Po-shui pass was situated within the Po-shui prefecture. This prefecture during Han belonged to the Kuang-han commandery and was situated NW of the present Chao-hua hien, Si-ch'uan.



Map 14. Military measures of Kung-sun Shu in A. D. 25.

which commanded the roads leading from the Land Within the Passes southwards through the mountain range into present Si-ch'uan¹). This garrison also offered protection against an approach from Nan-cheng, the capital of Liu Kia's kingdom Han-chung. The other general encamped at the Kiang (Han)pass²) to prevent enemy movements along the Yang-tsi (13,43: 15 a—15 b). HYKC (p. 22: 2) adds that Kung-sun Shu also conquered the Kien-wei commandery. This is not mentioned in the HHS, but it is clear from later events that the area must have been taken. In the north, some of the Po-ma-ti (»White Horses Ti«), an aboriginal

¹) Cf. map 14.

²) HS 28 Ac: 97 b states that the Yü-fu prefecture of the Pa commandery (situated NE of the present Feng-tsie hien, Si-ch'uan) had a Kiang pass. HHS ch'i 28 A: 8 a says that this same prefecture had a Han pass. SKC also distinguishes between two names: it quotes HS to the effect that the Yü-fu prefecture had a Kiang pass (33: 25 a). It mentions a Han pass as well (36: 2 a), which obviously was situated in the same area as the Kiang pass (the text states that the Liang province of Tsin times reached in the east to the Han pass, a spot which coincides with the site of the Kiang pass).

A complication arises because quite another Han pass existed further eastwards in present Hu-pei

tribe in the Wu-tu commandery¹⁾, submitted to Kung-sun Shu. Others preferred to join Wei Ao (86,116: 23 b).

The new emperor was not equally successful in the territories corresponding to present Yün-nan and Kuei-chou. In the Yi-chou commandery, the Grand Administrator refused to surrender to Kung-sun Shu and secretly sent a messenger to Kuang-wu (HHS 86,116: 14 a; HYKC pp. 27: 1, 98: 1). In the Tsang-ko commandery the various powerful clans of the aborigines also resisted Kung-sun Shu and dispatched messengers to Kuang-wu (HHS 86,116: 13 a; HYKC p. 30: 2).

3. Summary

Map 15 presents the situation at the end of A. D. 25 and should be compared with map 9. Though the Keng-shī Emperor was dead, some of his officials were still in control of their territories. In central Shan-si, Pao Yung had refused to surrender the T'ai-yüan commandery. South of the Ts'in-ling Range, the Han-chung kingdom along the Han River remained in the hands of Liu Kia. Three of the late emperor's Grand Administrators continued to govern their commanderies on the Great Plain, and this was probably the case also in the area south of the mouth of the Yang-tsi.

Emperor Kuang-wu's domain had been greatly enlarged during A. D. 25. Apart from the region previously under his control, he now possessed the major part of Shan-si and adjacent sections of Shen-si. He had expanded southwards over the Yellow River by taking Lo-yang with its surrounding territory, and another area further eastwards. Also, the Yi-chou and Tsang-ko commanderies in southwestern China had recognized Kuang-wu in the loosest possible sense, though for the time being this had no practical importance.²⁾

The Red Eyebrows occupied Ch'ang-an and the three capital commanderies.

No changes had taken place in the territories of Liu Yung, Chang Pu, Tung Hien, Li Hien and Ts'in Feng.

One year earlier, Kung-sun Shu had only possessed a minor, although fertile and populous, region around Ch'eng-tu. He had expanded in all directions during A. D. 25 and now controlled the entire area corresponding to present Si-ch'uan.

(W of the present Ch'ang-yang hien). Hui Tung believes that the pass in Hu-pei is the proper Han pass, while the pass in Si-ch'uan is the proper Kiang pass. He therefore suggests that the *Han* of the present text should be amended to *Kiang* (cf. 13,43: 14 b, 16 a, *Tsi kie*).

It is, of course, quite possible that a Han pass could exist in Si-ch'uan in spite of the pass with the same name in Hu-pei. The answer may be given by SKC 34: 1 a, which clearly states that three passes were situated close together in one and the same area. They were from W to E the Kiang pass, the Jo pass, and the Han pass. These three defiles were clearly connected and all situated within the Yü-fu prefecture. This would imply that the HS simply uses *Kiang* as a collective term for the three passes, while the HHS employs both *Han* and *Kiang* indifferently.

¹⁾ Cf. also 104. Herrmann, map 22-23.

²⁾ These areas are therefore not marked on the map.

His domain was rich, surrounded by mountains, inaccessible, and therefore easily defended.


In northwestern China, the map had been much altered during the past year. The warlords Wei Ao and Lu Fang had reasserted themselves in areas where the suzerainty of the Keng-shī Emperor had never been more than theoretical. Lu Fang again took possession of the Dependent State of An-ting, where the powerful families seem to have recognized his alleged descent from Emperor Wu. He was proclaimed Supreme General and King Who Pacifies Westwards (1 A: 17 b; 12,42: 10 b). Wei Ao assumed the title of Supreme General of the Western Provinces. At the end of A. D. 25, he defeated an officer who had revolted against Teng Yü¹), presumably not because he wished to assist the latter but simply to prevent the rebel from entering his own territory. Teng Yü was Emperor Kuang-wu's Grand Minister over the Masses, and had been granted considerable authority in the north-west. He appointed Wei Ao as General-in-chief of the Western Provinces and put him in charge of the provinces of Liang and Shuo-fang²) (1 A: 17 b; 13,43: 6 a—6 b). Wei Ao had therefore, in theory, become one of Emperor Kuang-wu's officials. In reality, he enjoyed an unchallenged independence, which is shown by the fact that he himself appointed six Generals-in-chief (13,43: 6 a). Compared with the situation of two years earlier (map 5), Wei Ao had been reduced to a smaller area, and had lost the whole of Kan-su west of the Yellow River to his rival Tou Jung. However, Wei Ao possessed a great reputation at this time, and many famous men flocked to him: such as the influential Ma Yüan (24,54: 2 a), the historian Pan Piao (40 A, 70 A: 1 a), the scholars Cheng Hing, Tu Lin, and Kin Tan, and many others (13,43: 6 a; 27,57: 5 b).

Tou Jung had meanwhile managed to get himself elected as overlord of the region comprising the Kan-su corridor and had adopted the title of Acting General-in-chief of the Five Commanderies West of the [Yellow] River³). Only the Grand Administrators of Wu-wei and Chang-ye refused to follow him and were accordingly replaced by persons loyal to him. Influenced by Wei Ao's theoretical recognition of Kuang-wu, Tou Jung also, in the loosest possible way, endorsed this emperor. This created the anomalous situation that Tou Jung technically became the subordinate of Wei Ao. His territory was situated within the area over which Wei Ao had been given authority by Teng Yü. Tou Jung and his allies even accepted official seals which according to the HHS had been «counterfeited» by Wei Ao. This is proved by a statement that they later ceased to use them. But for all practical purposes, Tou Jung and Wei Ao were independent warlords and utterly unwilling to cooperate with each other. Tou Jung seems to have kept good order in his territory. He beat off attacks by the Tibetans in the south and the Hiung-nu in

¹) Cf. *supra* p. 101, note 4.

²) Roughly corresponding to present Kan-su, the eastern part of Ning-hia along the Yellow River, and the western part of Ordos. In practice, Wei Ao's domain was restricted to the area shown on map 15.

³) I. e. the commanderies of Kin-ch'eng, Wu-wei, Chang-ye, Tsiu-ts'üan and Tun-huang.



Map 15. The political situation at the end of A.D. 25.

the north, and the people prospered through peace and trade (23,53: 2 a—3 a, 7 a; 34,64: 1 a—1 b).

In Korea, finally, the Grand Administrator of Lo-lang had been killed by a certain Wang T'iao, a native of his commandery¹). Wang T'iao styled himself a General-in-chief, took charge of the commandery and refused to submit to Kuang-wu (1 B: 2 a; 76,106: 5 a).

¹) Cf. *supra* p. 47, note 3.

CHAPTER IV. THE RED EYEBROWS¹⁾

A. D. 26, movements in the northwest.

Emperor Kuang-wu had long and weary years of civil war ahead of him, which were to last until Dec. 24, A. D. 36. The reasons for his victory will be analyzed later, although one is obvious from the description of the various campaigns: his very considerable military gifts. Kuang-wu's strategy was as simple as it was effective. From A. D. 26 to 29, he proceeded to conquer the Great Plain and the Shan-tung peninsula, taking care not to become embroiled with his formidable opponents Wei Ao and Kung-sun Shu. Only after this populous and economically dominant region of the empire had been brought under control, did he possess the resources to attack and defeat his powerful rivals in the west. Any earlier efforts in this direction might well have had disastrous results. Kuang-wu was helped by the inability of his enemies to cooperate while that course still was open to them and, in the case of the Red Eyebrows, by their almost incomprehensibly irrational manoeuvres.

It has been shown that the Red Eyebrows, in spite of their «Emperor» Liu P'en-tsī, remained a peasant army²⁾. They had descended on Ch'ang-an like a swarm of locusts, and never succeeded in establishing a government. No central administration ever functioned. Accordingly, the regular supply of provisions to the city ceased, and food was gradually getting scarce. It was clear to all intelligent people that time was running out for the Red Eyebrows in Ch'ang-an and that they would soon be forced to move on. One man who fully realized this hopeless situation was Liu Kung. Since the death of the Keng-shī Emperor, he had stayed in the

¹⁾ In the preceding chapters, it was possible to present events in their chronological order. It is not convenient to maintain this arrangement for the years of the civil war A. D. 26–36. This period is crowded with military actions in various parts of China. If these were presented chronologically on a broad basis, the thread could easily be lost and the reader smothered under an avalanche of facts. It is therefore proposed to describe in turn each of the important campaigns. These will be subdivided by years so that the parallel events of each may be ascertained without much difficulty.

Furthermore, I will not present all my detailed material for the civil war. This could be done but would result in lengthy descriptions of battles, sieges and conquests of cities. Since a special chapter will be devoted to military techniques, I have here restricted myself to a treatment of the important aspects of each campaign. Other factors which, although interesting in themselves, do not contribute to the understanding of the main course of development, have been by-passed. Only the campaigns against Wei Ao and Kung-sun Shu will be treated in detail, since in these cases the issues involved were considerably more complex. The activities of Lu Fang will not be taken up at all in this part of the work but discussed in the section on the Hiung-nu in vol. III.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 106.

entourage of his own younger brother P'en-tsi¹⁾. Wishing to disassociate his clan from the Red Eyebrows, he now advised him to abdicate. Consequently, on the first day of the New Year (Feb. 6, A. D. 26), which customarily was the occasion for great court ceremonies, Liu P'en-tsi tried to relinquish his throne. This was not accepted by the leaders of the Red Eyebrows (11,41: 12 a—12 b).

During the 1st month (Feb. 6—Mar. 7) of A. D. 26, some twenty odd days after Liu P'en-tsi's attempt to abdicate, the peasants had finally exhausted their supplies and evacuated Ch'ang-an. This places the exodus in the very beginning of March. Before their departure, the Red Eyebrows sacked and partially burned the city²⁾. Subsequently they looted the imperial graves (HS 99 C: 19 a; HHS 1 A: 19 a; 11,41: 12 b—13 a; 72,102: 6 b³⁾). Taking along the unwilling Liu P'en-tsi, they marched southwards until they reached the Southern Mountains, i. e. the foothills of the Ts'in-ling Range, and then turned westwards (11,41: 12 b⁴⁾).

Kuang-wu's Grand Minister over the Masses, Teng Yü, took immediate advantage of this opportunity. He left his quarters in Yün-yang and entered Ch'ang-an at the end of the 1st month. Encamping at the K'un-ming Pond⁵⁾, he rewarded his officers with a banquet, sacrificed in the temple of Emperor Kao, and sent the ancestral tablets of the «eleven» Former Han rulers⁶⁾ to Lo-yang (1 A: 19 a; 16,46: 5 a). Teng Yü's biography makes it perfectly clear that he waited until the Red Eyebrows had evacuated the city and that no military engagements between him and the latter took place (16,46: 5 a)⁷⁾.

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 100—101.

²⁾ 72,102: 6 b says that «nothing was left», which is a clear exaggeration.

³⁾ The *pen ki* (1 A: 19 a) states that the graves were pillaged immediately after the Red Eyebrows had left Ch'ang-an. This is obviously correct. The latter would hardly have evacuated the capital area without the rich booty available in the imperial graves. Liu P'en-tsi's biography (11,41: 13 a) has misplaced the event altogether. It says that the graves were looted after the Red Eyebrows had passed through the P'an-sü Valley but before the battle of Yü-yi (cf. *infra* p. 115—117 and map 16). This is patently wrong considering that the graves were situated outside Ch'ang-an and not 200 km further west between the P'an-sü Valley and Yü-yi.

⁴⁾ For this and the following events cf. map 16.

⁵⁾ Situated SW of Ch'ang-an, not far from the city. Cf. 72. Dubs, II, p. 63, note 15,10.

⁶⁾ This indicates that the Empress née Lü (187—180 B. C.) had not been included.

⁷⁾ 45. Tsien Po-tsan is strongly biased in favour of the «common people» and therefore attempts to whitewash the Red Eyebrows. He says of their looting that they were surrounded in Ch'ang-an by Kuang-wu, that they consequently could not obtain provisions from outside, that they had to make levies within the city, and that this was misinterpreted by the historian (p. 432). As it happens, Tsien Po-tsan's siege of Ch'ang-an is entirely imaginary. The sources are quite unequivocal, that from the moment the Red Eyebrows entered the city until they left it voluntarily, less than five months later, no siege took place at all. The nearest imperial troops, under Teng Yü, were in Yün-yang, and Kuang-wu was far away on the Great Plain.

Tsien also attempts to excuse the pillaging of the imperial graves by explaining it as an angry reaction against an attack by Teng Yü (p. 433). He has not observed that the chronology in HHS 11,41:13 a is confused. It is beyond doubt that the graves were plundered immediately after the evacuation of Ch'ang-an, when Teng Yü had not yet arrived (cf. *supra* note 3). In fact, no military engagements between Kuang-wu's troops and the Red Eyebrows took place before the autumn of A. D. 26. Therefore no «provocation» existed for the pillaging of the imperial graves, even

The Red Eyebrows had meanwhile proceeded westwards and defeated a general of the late Keng-shi Emperor at Mei¹⁾ (11, 41: 12 b). They then ascended the Lung Slope²⁾ (13, 43: 6 b). This utterly irrational manoeuvre defies explanation. Nothing would have prevented the Red Eyebrows at this stage from returning to the Great Plain. Their retreat was not yet cut off, and in the east they could have continued to live off the land. Perhaps they felt that their emperor should reside in Ch'ang-an and were therefore reluctant permanently to abandon the Land Within the Passes. If this is true, their exodus should be interpreted as a full scale foraging expedition. Such a venture was doomed from the outset, considering the sparse population, the poverty, and the geographical obstacles of the northwest. Possibly the leaders of the Red Eyebrows, whose experience was limited to the Shan-tung peninsula, parts of the Great Plain, and the immediate surroundings of Ch'ang-an, were simply perplexed and acted blindly.

Wei Ao could not tolerate any interference in his domain and dispatched an army against the Red Eyebrows. These had only been defeated twice before³⁾. It is symptomatic of their weakened state that they now lost two consecutive battles. The sources do not indicate where the first was fought, but the second took place between the cities of Wu-chi⁴⁾ and King-yang⁵⁾ (13, 43: 6 b). As a result, the Red Eyebrows were forced to turn back. During the whole expedition they had as usual marched very slowly, and it was not before the autumn that they reached the P'an-sü Valley⁶⁾. There they encountered heavy snowfalls, and many froze to death (11, 41: 12 b—13 a).

Teng Yü must have thought the time ripe for a final blow. He sent troops westwards which attacked the Red Eyebrows as they emerged from the P'an-sü Valley.

if this could be accepted as a sufficient motive. Tsien Po-tsan has been carried away by his preconceived idea that, since the Red Eyebrows were the 'people', they were necessarily more 'moral' than their adversaries.

¹⁾ The Mei prefecture during Han belonged to the Yu-fu-feng commandery and was situated NE of the present hien with the same name, Shen-si.

²⁾ The Lung Slope is a steep incline in eastern Kan-su (indicated on map 16) which reaches a height of more than 3000 m above sea level (cf. vol. I, p. 53, note 1). It was accessible through few passes and therefore relatively easy to defend. In Han times, the area between the Lung Slope and the upper reaches of the Yellow River was referred to as *Lung yü*, the land to the 'Right' (i. e. West) of Lung. This region was controlled by the warlord Wei Ao, and the Lung Slope formed his defence line against attacks from the east.


The sources do not tell on which route the Red Eyebrows ascended the Lung Slope. It is known, however, that they later returned through the P'an-sü Valley (cf. infra note 6). Due to lack of further evidence it has been assumed that they then retracted their steps, i. e. that they ascended and returned through the same valley.

³⁾ The first time was early in their career in the Tung-hai commandery (cf. vol. I, p. 140), and the second at She-k'üan (cf. supra p. 84) when only a minor contingent had been involved.

⁴⁾ The Wu-chi prefecture during Former Han belonged to the An-ting commandery and was situated NW of the present P'ing-liang hien, Kan-su.

⁵⁾ The King-yang prefecture during Former Han belonged to the An-ting commandery and was situated 40 li W of the present P'ing-liang hien, Kan-su.

⁶⁾ Situated NW of the present Lung hien, Shen-si. Cf. *Chung kuo ku kin ti ming ta ts'i tien*, p. 924: 4.



Map 16. Movements of the Red Eyebrows in A. D. 26.

The engagement took place at Yü-yi¹⁾ and unexpectedly resulted in the complete defeat of the imperial army. Teng Yü was compelled to make a hurried withdrawal. He evacuated Ch'ang-an and fell back on Yün-yang (11, 41: 13 a; 16, 46: 5 b)²⁾. In the 9th month (Oct. 1—29), the Red Eyebrows entered Ch'ang-an for the second time and chose the Kuei Palace³⁾ as their emperor's residence (11, 41: 13 a).

In the same month in which the Red Eyebrows returned to Ch'ang-an, they attacked Yen Ts'en in Tu-ling⁴⁾. They were victorious at first but subsequently defeated through a stratagem (1 A: 20 b; 11, 41: 13 a—13 b). Teng Yü had meanwhile attempted to take Ch'ang-an by surprise while a large contingent of the enemy was absent. He was able to penetrate into the city, where street fighting raged through one night. Ch'ang-an was relieved, however; Teng Yü lost and withdrew to Kao-ling (11, 41: 13 a; 16, 46: 5 b; 38, 68: 1 b).

Kuang-wu had for a while been discontent with Teng Yü's handling of the war, and an imperial order shows how well informed he was of the general situation. The order stated that the Red Eyebrows were without provisions and would automatically be forced to return eastwards. The emperor would then take care of them in person. In the meantime, Teng Yü was strictly forbidden to seek any further engagements. These instructions do not seem to have been obeyed (16, 46: 5 b). Consequently, in the 11th month (Nov. 29—Dec. 27), the emperor dispatched Feng Yi against the Red Eyebrows. He escorted him part of the way and gave detailed orders for the campaign (1 A: 21 a; 17, 47: 5 a).

Kuang-wu had accurately analyzed the depressed state of his enemies. The Red Eyebrows had lost four major battles during A. D. 26. Their expedition to the northwest had been disastrous. Provisions were so low by now that the peasants could only stay in Ch'ang-an for a limited time. Having returned to this city in the 9th month, they were forced to evacuate it once more, and for the last time, in

¹⁾ The Yü-yi prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Yu-fu-feng commandery and was situated W of the present Lung hien, Shen-si.

²⁾ In Yün-yang, Teng Yü was joined by a member of the imperial clan who had been prominent under the Keng-shi Emperor. This was Liu Kia. In A. D. 24, he had been enfeoffed as king of Han-chung, taken possession of this area (cf. *supra* pp. 53—54 and map 6), and chosen Nan-cheng as his capital. Liu Kia's old enemy, Yen Ts'en, who in A. D. 23 had been defeated by him at Kuan-kün (cf. *supra* p. 26), also entered Han-chung, where he seems to have been an independent rebel from A. D. 24 onwards (1 A: 11 b). In the 2nd month (Mar. 8—Apr. 5) of A. D. 26, he proclaimed himself a king (1 A: 19 b), defeated Liu Kia at Nan-cheng, and forced him to abandon his kingdom. Subsequently, Yen Ts'en himself was conquered by a general of the late Keng-shi Emperor. Liu Kia and Yen Ts'en both appeared in the Land Within the Passes, while Han-chung was taken by the troops of Kung-sun Shu (14,44: 14 a—14 b). Yen Ts'en encamped in the Tu-ling prefecture SE of Ch'ang-an (11,41: 13 a). Liu Kia operated north of the Wei River. He was there attacked by a separate contingent of the Red Eyebrows, led by the former chieftain of the Troops from P'ing-lin, Liao Chan (cf. *supra* p. 102). A battle was fought at Ku-k'ou (this prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Tso-p'ing-yi commandery and was situated 70 li NE of the present Li-ts'üan hien, Shen-si; cf. map 16) in which the Red Eyebrows were defeated and Liao Chan killed. Thereafter, Liu Kia went to Yün-yang and surrendered to Teng Yü. In A. D. 27, he arrived in Lo-yang and was well received by Emperor Kuang-wu (14,44: 14 b).

³⁾ Cf. map 11.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* note 2.

the 12th month (Dec. 28, A. D. 26—Jan. 26, A. D. 27) (11, 41: 13 b). This time, the Red Eyebrows marched eastwards and met Feng Yi's troops at Hua-yin. The two armies fought several undecisive battles in this area (17, 47: 5 a—5 b), although Feng Yi was gradually pushed back.

The emperor had taken steps to cut off all possible retreats of the Red Eyebrows. One army defended the Ki pass (22, 52: 4 b—5 a) in case the enemy would cross the Yellow River. Two others were encamped at Sin-an¹⁾ and Yi-yang²⁾. Kuang-wu expected the Red Eyebrows to withdraw through either the Han-ku or the Lu-hun pass, a prediction which was to prove correct. Depending on which route they chose, he ordered a rendezvous of the two contingents at either Sin-an or Yi-yang (11, 41: 13 b). It was no longer a question whether the Red Eyebrows would be defeated but only how much longer they could postpone this moment.

A. D. 27, surrender.

In the 1st month (Jan. 27—Feb. 24) of A. D. 27, the Red Eyebrows were in the area of the Hu prefecture³⁾. Teng Yü knew well that the recent failures had lowered his prestige. Disobeying the imperial orders, he therefore attempted to recuperate his fortunes by crossing the Wei River and attacking the Red Eyebrows at Hu. He was again defeated (11, 41: 13 b) and had to seek contact with Feng Yi. The latter suggested that the two armies should cooperate and simultaneously assault the Red Eyebrows from east and west. Teng Yü refused to wait and during the same 1st month made a headlong attack on the enemy at the Hui Creek⁴⁾. He was completely routed, and Feng Yi who tried to come to his aid became involved in the debacle. Teng Yü escaped with only 24 cavalymen. Feng Yi lost his horse, climbed up the side of the valley, and was able to return to his camp (1 A: 21 b; 11, 41: 13 b; 16, 46: 5 b; 17, 47: 5 b).

After Feng Yi had reassembled his scattered troops, he fought two successful battles with the Red Eyebrows in the beginning of the intercalary month (Feb. 25—Mar. 26). The first took place outside his camp and the other at the Yao Mountain⁵⁾. Great numbers of the Red Eyebrows, women as well as men, surrendered (1 A: 21 b; 11, 41: 13 b; 16, 46: 5 b—6 a; 17, 47: 6 a).

The remnants of the peasant army⁶⁾ withdrew. Up to this point, they seem to have hesitated which route to follow. At some unspecified time in A. D. 27, one

¹⁾ The Sin-an prefecture during Han belonged to the Hung-nung commandery and was situated E of the present Min-ch'i hien, Ho-nan.


²⁾ The Yi-yang prefecture during Han belonged to the Hung-nung commandery and was situated E of the present hien with the same name, Ho-nan.

³⁾ For this and the following events cf. map 17.

⁴⁾ Situated NE of the present Lo-ning hien, Ho-nan. Cf. Chung kuo ku kin ti ming ta ts'i tien, p. 298: 2.

⁵⁾ This mountain still has the name and is situated NW of the present Lo-ning hien, Ho-nan. It is shown on 90. Ting, map 29.

⁶⁾ HHK 4: 9 a and HHS 17,47: 6 a state that the Red Eyebrows still counted more than 100,000, but the figure cannot be checked.



Map 17. Movements of the Red Eyebrows in A. D. 27.

contingent actually advanced along the Yellow River, which implies that it went through the Han-ku pass. This group was defeated between Sin-ch'eng¹) and Min-ch'i²), and, having retreated, lost another engagement close to the latter place (TKK 8: 5 b; HHS 17, 47: 19 b). Nothing more is known about the movements of this contingent. In any event, there is no doubt that the main bulk of the Red Eyebrows marched on Yi-yang (1 A: 21 b; 17, 47: 6 a), i. e. penetrated the Lu-hun pass.

The emperor now took command in person and on Mar. 8 arrived in Yi-yang, where his various armies converged. He was met by Teng Yü who resigned as Grand Minister over the Masses (1 A: 21 b; 11, 41: 13 b; 16, 46: 5 b; 17, 47: 19 b).

On Mar. 13, Kuang-wu arrayed his soldiers, with the cavalry placed on both flanks and the Commander-in-chief, Wu Han, commanding the van. When the Red Eyebrows approached, they saw that they were opposed by superior troops. Although not mentioned in the records, it is probable that they were pursued by Feng Yi and therefore could not retreat. The long wanderings of the Red Eyebrows had come to a close. Their leaders dispatched the useful Liu Kung to discuss the terms of surrender, but the emperor was only willing to promise them their lives (1 A: 21 b; 11, 41: 13 b—14 a).

On Mar. 15, the leaders of the peasants capitulated. Emperor Kao's imperial seal, which had passed through the hands of Wang Mang, the Keng-shi Emperor

¹) The Sin-ch'eng prefecture during Han belonged to the Ho-nan commandery and was situated S of the present Lo-yang hien, Ho-nan.

²) The Min-ch'i prefecture during Han belonged to the Hung-nung commandery and is identical with the present Min-ch'i hien.

and Liu P'en-tsī, was surrendered to Kuang-wu. The Red Eyebrows were disarmed and their weapons piled up in a heap west of the city of Yi-yang. The emperor then ordered the prefecture to provide food to those who had submitted (1 A: 21 b; 11, 41: 4 a).

On Mar. 16, Kuang-wu inspected the Red Eyebrows, talked for a while to Liu P'en-tsī, and was in a jocular mood. He asked Fan Ch'ung whether he did not regret the surrender and whether they perhaps after all should fight it out? Subsequently, the various leaders were ordered to settle with their families in Lo-yang where they received houses and land (11, 41: 14 a—14 b). The reason must have been to keep them under surveillance close at hand. This proved a sensible measure. Already during the summer of A. D. 27, Fan Ch'ung and P'ang An prepared to revolt again. The plot became known in the 7th month (Aug. 21—Sep. 19), and they were executed (11, 41: 14 b; chī 18: 1 b). The charges can hardly have been trumped up, since otherwise all the former leaders of the Red Eyebrows would have been disposed of. In fact, Yang Yin was later enfeoffed as Marquis Within the Passes. He and Sü Sūan both died a natural death. Sie Lu was murdered by the fanatical Liu Kung in revenge for the death of the Keng-shī Emperor¹). Afterwards, Liu Kung gave himself up but was pardoned. Liu P'en-tsī continued to be pursued by ill fortune. He became sick and lost the sight of his eyes. Kuang-wu appointed him to a sinecure which he retained until his death (11, 41: 14 b—15 a).

¹) Cf. *supra* p. 101.

CHAPTER V. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EAST CHINA

1. *Campaigns on the northern plain*

A. D. 26, rebellions of «Goitre Yang» and P'eng Ch'ung.

Emperor Kuang-wu spent most of the winter 25—26 in his capital Lo-yang, rewarding his followers and arranging the state rituals (1 A: 17 b—18 b). At the same time, some of his generals were ordered to mop up those bands of commoners which still offered resistance north of the Yellow River¹). The T'an-hiang were conquered and pacified in February (1 A: 17 b; 18, 48: 3 a—3 b; 22, 52: 4 b), and the Wu-lou shared their fate later in the year (18, 48: 3 b). In September, the emperor in person defeated the Wu-hiao (1 A: 20 b; 22, 52: 3 b). His generals fought further successful battles against them, with the result that more than thirty of their leaders capitulated (SHS 2: 13 b; HHS 22, 52: 5 b). A part of this band was able to withdraw and to preserve its independence until A. D. 29. The Fu-p'ing bandits, whose sphere of activity lay far towards the east, were not attacked either this year or in A. D. 27. They controlled the area of the prefecture from which they had taken their name²) and in A. D. 26 seem to have been joined by remnants of the Huo-so³). As far as the bands of commoners were concerned, the situation had thus been greatly simplified by the end of the year. On the entire Great Plain, only two major and one minor units remained at large. These were the Wu-hiao and Fu-p'ing, as well as a group of the Ts'ing-tu which had not been engaged in any battle during A. D. 26.

The pacification of the bands of commoners was necessary, though a nuisance. While the military outcome was never in doubt, considerable numbers of troops were immobilized which more profitably could have been used in other parts of the empire. A notable progress had been made, however, and it seemed as if the northern plain would soon be brought under complete control. At this stage, Kuang-wu suffered a setback which could have been foreseen and perhaps prevented. Regional, centrifugal forces were still an important factor among the gentry and may have been underestimated by the court in Lo-yang.

The first report that all was not well came from Chen-ting, whose king was Liu Yang, also known as «Goitre Yang». In A. D. 24, he had raised troops in order to join the pretender Wang Lang but had been persuaded to change party in favour of Liu Siu (the future Emperor Kuang-wu). Liu Yang's sister had married into

¹) Cf. *supra* pp. 79 ff.

²) For this and the following events cf. map 18.

³) The main bulk of the Huo-so in A. D. 26 surrendered in Shan-tung to Emperor Kuang-wu's emissary Fu Lung (cf. *infra* p. 135).

the powerful Kuo clan of the kingdom, and her daughter, Kuo Sheng-t'ung, had been offered to Liu Siu as a pledge of their alliance¹⁾. The support of the king of Chen-ting had certainly contributed to the victory over Wang Lang, but there is no indication in the sources that Kuang-wu after his ascension to the throne showed any willingness to recognize this fact. The emperor was surrounded by his clique of early and intimate followers, who were interested in preserving their influence²⁾. Although not directly stated, this may have provided the driving force for Liu Yang's growing opposition to the court and so form a parallel to the well-authenticated background of P'eng Ch'ung's rebellion. Supported by his nearest relatives, Liu Yang began to assemble troops (21, 51: 9 a).

The news of these manoeuvres reached Lo-yang in the 1st month (Feb. 6—Mar. 7) of A. D. 26. Kuang-wu dispatched the general Teng Lung and another high-ranking officer, undoubtedly in command of some troops, under the transparent pretext of «summoning» Liu Yang. The latter countered this by closing the city gates of Chen-ting (1 A: 19 b; 21, 51: 9 a).

Two years earlier, the pretender Wang Lang had enjoyed the active support of large parts of the northern gentry. There was considerable danger that the same regional forces would now swing behind Liu Yang. It was important for Kuang-wu to counter this swiftly by appeasing the influential families. Although he controlled parts of Shan-si and Shen-si, his actual power rested on the possession of the wealthy and populous northern plain. If this were to slip through his fingers, all hopes for ultimate victory would fade. Kuang-wu's difficulties are highlighted by the fact that members of the northern gentry were by no means represented among his chief followers in any realistic proportion to the importance of their home area. In fact, only three of them came from this circle. They were P'ei T'ung and Liu Chi from Sin-tu and Keng Ch'un from Kü-lu, who together amounted to no more than 10 % of Kuang-wu's 31 chief followers at the time³⁾.

The emperor adopted the same policy he had used before. When Liu Yang had been on the verge of recognizing Wang Lang, Liu Chi of Sin-tu had been sent to him on a special mission. The latter, as the leader of an influential gentry clan in the north, was able to negotiate from a stronger position than an outsider from another part of the empire could have done.⁴⁾ This time, Kuang-wu selected Keng Ch'un from Kü-lu as his representative. Kü-lu bordered on Chen-ting in the east, and not only was Keng Ch'un's clan powerful in this commandery, but he himself was related to Liu Yang (21, 51: 9 b). Kuang-wu, who undoubtedly wished to establish a warning example, achieved with this a double purpose. It would be relatively easy for Keng Ch'un to arrange a meeting in such a way as to get Liu Yang in his power. It also could be impressed upon the northern gentry that here was a man from their own midst who whole-heartedly supported the emperor.

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 70.

²⁾ I will return to the complex question of cliques in a special chapter in vol. III.

³⁾ What is more, Liu Chi was killed in battle in the 3rd month (Apr. 6—May 5) of this year (1 A: 20 a; 21, 51: 7 a), which lowered the percentage to 6.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 70.

Keng Ch'un was dispatched with the Staff of Authority, openly to proclaim an amnesty in the northern provinces and to reward and soothe. Secretly he received orders to arrest Liu Yang. He made his way north with a small contingent of troops and met Teng Lung and his colleague in Yüan-shi. Together they arrived in Chen-ting without being stopped.

Liu Yang may have felt safe in the knowledge of having an army under his command. He pretended, however, to be ill and did not leave his palace. Keng Ch'un, who by virtue of the Staff of Authority acted with imperial powers, urged Liu Yang to pay him the customary visit. The king finally arrived at the inn and entered alone while his relatives surrounded the place with superior bodies of troops. Keng Ch'un greeted him respectfully and apparently succeeded in calming any suspicions. He then invited Liu Yang's relatives to enter as well. Once they had done this, the gates were closed, and all suffered immediate execution. The soldiers outside did not interfere (1 A: 19 b; 21, 51: 9 b).

Having reasserted imperial authority, Kuang-wu took immediate pains to court the good will of the northern gentry. This is not directly stated in the sources. The entire background to Liu Yang's rebellion, the attitude of the northern gentry, and the purpose of Kuang-wu's policy can only be reconstructed on the basis of a few significant facts which are not elaborated in the HHS. The main clues are provided by the two measures which Kuang-wu adopted after the unrest had been quelled. He did not persecute his opponents. The sons of the men who had been executed were not, as was customary, put to death. On the contrary, on June 22, A. D. 26, Kuang-wu enfeoffed Liu Yang's son Te¹) as the new king of Chen-ting. Another member of the Liu clan was permitted to inherit the marquise of his father, although this had been forfeited (1 A: 20 a; 21, 51: 9 b). Having manifested that he had no thoughts of revenge and that bygones were bygones, Kuang-wu took a further and even more drastic step. Now and later, the emperor leaned heavily on cliques in which members of the northern gentry were not represented. As far as can be ascertained from the sources, after A. D. 25 not one of the latter belonged to the Three Dukes or the Nine Ministers, i. e. held any of the highest offices in the central administration. During 25, a single northerner had occupied such a post: P'ei T'ung from Sin-tu, and he was an early follower of Kuang-wu. If the emperor wished to neutralize the northern regionalism in spite of a general policy which gave preference to men from other parts of the empire, some very specific measure was required. The northern gentry clans had so far been precluded from any direct access to the emperor in person. Under the force of circumstances, Kuang-wu was prepared to open such an avenue. On July 10, A. D. 26, he proclaimed Kuo Sheng-t'ung of the great gentry clan in Chen-ting as his empress, and her son K'iang was made the Heir-apparent (1 A: 20 a; 10 A: 4 a; 42, 72: 1 a). The brothers of the empress and the two sons of her paternal uncle were all enfeoffed as marquises (10 A: 4 a—4 b). It is clear that this temporarily mollified the gentry families in at least the central parts of the northern plain, since they kept the peace for fourteen years.

¹) 1 A: 10 a writes Te as 德, but 1 B: 9 a as 得.

While Kuang-wu had cleverly overcome a potentially dangerous situation, which probably could have been entirely prevented with more forethought, another separatist movement had gained momentum in the extreme north of the Great Plain. Its leader was P'eng Ch'ung.

Although P'eng Ch'ung in A. D. 23 had become the Keng-shi Emperor's Acting Grand Administrator of Yü-yang¹⁾, he had enjoyed almost complete independence. P'eng Ch'ung was not a native of the north but, like Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) and the Keng-shi Emperor, came from Nan-yang. He had no reason to align himself with the pretender Wang Lang and, when a choice became necessary in A. D. 24, preferred to join the party of Liu Siu. The gentry clans, however, from which his subordinates in the central commandery administration were recruited, represented regional forces and so generally came out in favour of Wang Lang. It was only through a stratagem that P'eng Ch'ung was able to implement his policy. The assistance he rendered proved valuable towards the final victory over Wang Lang²⁾. Liu Siu acknowledged this by enfeoffing him as marquis³⁾ and conferring on him the rank of a General-in-chief (12,42: 8 b). Towards the end of A. D. 24, a meeting took place between the two, but this was not auspicious. P'eng Ch'ung had expected additional rewards for his very substantial services, but these hopes were not realized⁴⁾. Kuang-wu added insult to injury after he had ascended the throne in A. D. 25. While two of P'eng Ch'ung's former subordinates were appointed as high ministers⁵⁾, he himself was passed by completely and merely remained Grand Administrator of Yü-yang (12,42: 8 b—9 a).

The situation was aggravated by a remarkably ill-advised assignment. Kuang-wu's Shepherd of the Yu province, within which the Yü-yang commandery was situated, was a certain Chu Fou who had received his office already in A. D. 24. He remained a favourite of the emperor all through the latter's reign although he seems to have had an objectionable character. Chu Fou was conceited and boastful, while P'eng Ch'ung was strong-minded and frustrated in his political ambitions. The two officials soon took a violent dislike to each other. P'eng Ch'ung began to disobey the orders of Chu Fou, and Chu Fou slandered P'eng Ch'ung at court (12,42: 9 a; 33,63: 1 b). Matters came to a head when Chu Fou secretly memorialized to the emperor that P'eng Ch'ung had treated his wife better than his mother, that he was corrupt, and that he was storing provisions and assembling troops (33,63: 1 b).

In the beginning of A. D. 26, the emperor summoned P'eng Ch'ung to the court. The latter had good reasons to fear an intrigue of his enemy and petitioned that they should both be summoned together. He also wrote to two of his former subordinates⁶⁾ in the hope of enlisting their help, and offering his version of the contro-

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 38—39.


²⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 71—72, 75.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 73.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 83.

⁵⁾ Wu Han became Commander-in-chief and Wang Liang Grand Minister of Works.

⁶⁾ The Commander-in-chief Wu Han and the Tiger's Teeth General-in-chief Ko Yen.



Map 18. Operations on the northern plain in A. D. 26.

versy. This was to no avail. The petition was refused, and P'eng Ch'ung's suspicions increased. His strong-willed wife encouraged him to disobey the summons. What is more suggestive, the officials of the central commandery administration also advised this course (12,42: 9 a). The very regional forces, which once had favoured Wang Lang and which P'eng Ch'ung himself then had opposed, were again at work. Meanwhile, P'eng Ch'ung had shifted ground. He now was a disappointed man and willing to place himself at the head of the local gentry clans who wished to break away from the new court in Lo-yang.

The emperor belatedly realized the new danger and dispatched two of P'eng Ch'ung's cousins to Yü-yang with special instructions, but the differences could no longer be bridged. P'eng Ch'ung detained his relatives, assembled troops and revolted in the 2nd month (Mar. 8—Apr. 5) of A. D. 26 (1 A: 19 b; 12,42:9 a).

The situation in the north had got thoroughly out of hand, and, strictly speaking, the emperor had only himself to blame. In fact, the HHS clearly tries to be fair to P'eng Ch'ung and puts much of the blame for the rebellion on Chu Fou¹).

P'eng Ch'ung sent out forces which surrounded Chu Fou in Ki, the capital of the Yu province. He also invaded the commanderies bordering on Yü-yang in the east (Yu-pei-p'ing) and west (Shang-ku). The Grand Administrator of Shang-ku was still the same Keng K'uang who during the Wang Lang crisis had given military assistance to the future Emperor Kuang-wu²). At that time, P'eng Ch'ung and Keng K'uang had collaborated. The former thought that his colleague now, like himself, might feel a grievance. He frequently sent messengers to win him over to his side, but Keng K'uang had them executed (1 A: 19 b; 12,42: 9 a). Some of P'eng Ch'ung's letters undoubtedly found their way into the imperial archives, where they later offered a valuable insight to the historian into the character and motive forces of their author. It is, by the way, not surprising that Keng K'uang remained faithful to Kuang-wu. Unlike P'eng Ch'ung, he had a son (Keng Yen) among the chief followers of the new emperor and so had secured the future prominence of his clan³).

Kuang-wu's first attempt to put down the rebellion proved abortive. In the 8th month (Sept. 1—30) of A. D. 26, he dispatched the general Teng Lung, who probably until this time had remained in Chen-ting⁴). He relieved Chu Fou in Ki, but subsequently they committed the blunder of operating separately. This enabled P'eng Ch'ung to inflict a crushing defeat on Teng Lung, who was forced to withdraw. Chu Fou again became trapped in Ki, and the siege was resumed (1 A: 20 b; 12,42: 9 a—9 b).

P'eng Ch'ung's position remained, for the time being, relatively strong. A serious attack could only come from the south, since Yü-yang in the north bordered on the territory of the nomads. It was, moreover, a wealthy commandery, with both salt and iron deposits. These commodities were highly coveted, and P'eng Ch'ung had previously bartered them for grain (12,42: 9 a). Emperor Kuang-wu was fully occupied in other parts of China and could for a while do little to master this new problem.

A. D. 27, prominence of P'eng Ch'ung.

In the 2nd month (Mar. 27—Apr. 24) of A. D. 27, the last of the Ts'ing-tu bandits were overpowered directly north of the Yellow River⁵) (1 A: 22 a; 18,48: 3 b). During the spring, the Wu-hiao suffered new defeats (22,52: 5 a). These were minor encounters which in no way averted attention from the events in Yü-yang.


¹) Cf. vol. I, p. 43.

²) Cf. *supra* p. 72.

³) Cf. the genealogy of the Keng clan in vol. I, p. 34.

⁴) Cf. *supra* pp. 122—123.

⁵) This group must have split off from another branch of the Ts'ing-tu which had moved westwards and in A. D. 26 had surrendered in Shen-si. Cf. *infra* p. 159.



Map 19. The political situation on the northern plain at the end of A. D. 27.

The year 27 proved very successful for P'eng Ch'ung. He enlarged the area under his control by conquering a number of unspecified prefectures in the adjoining Yu-pei-p'ing and Shang-ku commanderies. He also formed several alliances. The most important of these was with the Hiung-nu. Chang Pu cemented it by sending the Shan-yü a daughter and presents of silk. The latter, in turn, assisted him with troops of horsemen, led by Hiung-nu nobles. P'eng Ch'ung also made contacts and exchanged hostages with Chang Pu on the Shan-tung peninsula¹⁾ as well as with the Fu-p'ing bandits and those remnants of the Huo-so which cooperated with them²⁾ (12,42: 9 b; 89,119: 1 b).

Emperor Kuang-wu wished personally to lead an attack against P'eng Ch'ung but was persuaded to abandon this project after having received a lengthy memorial from the Grand Minister over the Masses. The latter pointed out that Yü-

¹⁾ Cf. *infra* p. 139.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 121 and map 19.

yang was relatively distant, that the taxes of the area were insignificant compared to the central region, and that more urgent matters required attention nearby (26,56: 1 b—2 b). Although the arguments of the memorial were not without justification, these had been based on the assumption that P'eng Ch'ung's rebellion would not spread. This proved to be mistaken, and the postponement of a major attack had exactly the result of encouraging further insubordination.

In the 11th month (Dec. 18, A. D. 27—Jan. 15, A. D. 28), the Grand Administrator of Cho, a certain Chang Feng, revolted. He arrested imperial messengers, raised troops, joined P'eng Ch'ung, and adopted the title of General-in-chief Who Has No Superior (1 A: 23 a; 20,50: 6 b; 33,63: 3 a). P'eng Ch'ung's domain now extended southwestwards into the heart of the northern plain¹⁾, and Chu Fou's situation in the still besieged Ki began to turn critical.

Chu Fou had confidently expected a campaign by Kuang-wu himself, and when this did not materialize he sent a desperate memorial to the throne. In it, he drew attention to the dangers of Chang Feng's rebellion, pointed out that the harvest had again fallen into the hands of P'eng Ch'ung, and urged the emperor to take the field himself. Kuang-wu's answer was non-committal. He predicted a schism among the rebels and stated that at present he did not have sufficient provisions for an attack (33,63: 3 a—3 b). Keng Yen, who knew the north, made recommendations for a general strategy which were adopted in principle (19,49: 4 b).

A. D. 28, victory and defeat of P'eng Ch'ung.

In the earlier part of A. D. 28, Wu Han inflicted on the Wu-hiao their last defeat north of the Yellow River. The battle took place at Lin-p'ing²⁾ (18,48: 4 b), probably before the emperor arrived in this city on May 31 (1 A: 24 a). The Wu-hiao evacuated the northern plain, withdrew southwards, and crossed the Yellow River. Kuang-wu ordered Wu Han to pursue them. He caught up with them at the Ki Mountain³⁾, and in the beginning of June won a new victory (1 A, 24 a; 18,48: 4 b⁴⁾). He then returned to the northern bank of the river and mopped up sporadic popular resistance. In the winter of this year, Wu Han marched against the Fu-p'ing bandits and the remnants of the Huo-so at P'ing-yüan⁵⁾, and encamped in that area (18,48: 4 b). No major battle took place until the following year.

Meanwhile, provisions were exhausted in the besieged Ki, and the fall of the city was imminent. Chu Fou managed to escape together with his wife and some troops after relief cavalry had arrived from Shang-ku. However, Chu Fou was


¹⁾ Cf. map 19.

²⁾ The Lin-p'ing prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Kü-lu commandery and was situated SE of the present Tsin hien, Ho-peï. For this and the following events cf. map 20.

³⁾ Situated 50 li E of the present P'u hien, Shan-tung. Cf. Chung kuo ku kin ti ming ta ts'i tien, p. 116: 1.

⁴⁾ The Wu-hiao subsequently joined the remnants of the late Liu Yung's party. Cf. *infra* p. 142.

⁵⁾ The P'ing-yüan prefecture during Han was the capital of the P'ing-yüan commandery and situated 20 li S of the present hien with the same name, Shan-tung.



Map 20. Operations on the northern plain in A. D. 28.

not even popular among his officers. They mutinied against him and tried to cut off his retreat. Chu Fou judged that the chances for escape were slim, killed his wife, and was able to save his life alone (33,63: 3 b). In the 3rd month (Apr. 14—May 12)¹⁾, P'eng Ch'ung took Ki and proclaimed himself King of Yen (1 A: 22 a; 12,42: 9 b; 33,63: 3 b). This was his last victory.

¹⁾ 1 A: 22 a lists the fall of Ki under A. D. 27, 3rd month, but this cannot be correct. Neither 12,42: 9 b nor 33,63: 3 b give any direct date. Both place the event after entries for A. D. 27, followed

In the 5th month (June 12—July 10), Emperor Kuang-wu dispatched troops to reconquer the Cho commandery, a swift campaign which was concluded before the month was over. Chang Feng was arrested by one of his subordinates and subsequently executed (1 a: 24 a; 20,50: 6 b). While imperial forces put down the last unrest in the Cho commandery (HHS 15,45: 6 b; 19,49: 4 b; SKC 11: 7 b—8 a), further troops began the offensive against P'eng Ch'ung himself. One army under Chai Tsun encamped at Liang-hiang¹⁾ and another at Yang-hiang²⁾ (19,49: 5 a 20,50: 7 a).

This offensive had been coordinated with an attack from Shang-ku. When Hiung-nu horsemen set out to strike at Chai Tsun, they were taken in the flank at Kün-tu³⁾ and badly defeated. Two of their high dignitaries fell in this battle (19,49: 5 a). At some unspecified time, one of Chai Tsun's subordinates also gained a victory at Lu⁴⁾ (20,50: 7 a). It was clear that the end of P'eng Ch'ung's rebellion was imminent.

A sequel to Chu Fou's unfortunate role in the north took place in Lo-yang at the end of A. D. 28. He was impeached by the newly appointed Prefect of the Masters of Writing, Hou Pa⁵⁾, who stated in a memorial that Chu Fou was responsible for the disorder in the Yu province and blamed him for not choosing death. He urged his execution. The emperor refused to take any notice and, in fact, promoted Chu Fou to the important office of Bearer of the Gilded Mace (33,63: 3 b—4 a).

by entries for A. D. 29 and 30 respectively. Thus only the pen ki commits itself to the 3rd month of 27.

The clue to the problem is provided by Chu Fou's memorial (cf. *supra* p. 128). It was written during the siege as a plea for help, and makes specific reference to Chang Feng's rebellion in the Cho commandery. Chang Feng rose in the 11th month of A. D. 27, which implies that the memorial cannot have been sent before the end of that year. In other words, the siege was still going on at the end of A. D. 27, and Ki therefore could not have surrendered as early as the 3rd month of the same year. In all probability, the entry in the pen ki is simply misplaced by one whole year, i. e. the city fell in the 3rd month of A. D. 28.

The correction of this date can be confirmed through another source. After his escape, Chu Fou was impeached by the Prefect of the Masters of Writing, Hou Pa (cf. *infra* p. 130). According to Hou Pa's biography, he received this rank in A. D. 28 while the emperor was in Shou-ch'un (26,56: 6 b). This date is clearly correct, since the pen ki confirms Kuang-wu's arrival at Shou-ch'un on Sept. 17, A. D. 28 (1 A: 24 b). It is hardly probable that Hou Pa would have memorialized about matters which were almost two years old, as suggested by the T'ung kien k'ao yi (cf. HHS 33,63: 3 b, *T'ei kie*). Nor can Ts'ien Ta-chao be correct in his speculation that Hou Pa may have become Prefect of the Masters of Writing earlier than A. D. 28 (cf. HHS 26,56, *Kiao pu*). Once it is realized that Ki fell one year later than indicated by the pen ki, all events fall into logical sequence.

¹⁾ The Liang-hiang prefecture during Han belonged to the Cho commandery and was situated E of the present Fang-shan hien, Ho-pei.

²⁾ The Yang-hiang prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Cho commandery and was situated NW of the present Ku-an hien Ho-pei.

³⁾ The Kün-tu prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Shang-ku commandery and was situated 17 li W of the present Ch'ang-p'ing hien, Ho-pei.

⁴⁾ The Lu prefecture during Han belonged to the Yü-yang commandery and was situated 8 li E of the present T'ung hien, Ho-pei.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 129, note 1.

A. D. 29, death of P'eng Ch'ung.

P'eng Ch'ung's time ran out in the 2nd month (Mar. 4—Apr. 2) of A. D. 29, due not to a final imperial victory but to internal collapse. One day, after P'eng Ch'ung had withdrawn to his rooms and was resting on a bed, three of his slaves¹⁾, Tsi-mi and two others whose names are not recorded, entered, overpowered and tied him. They issued an order in P'eng Ch'ung's name that all other slaves should be fettered, that no one should enter his chamber, and that all officials should retire. Then they called for his wife. When she came, Tsi-mi and another slave forced her to take them to the treasury, which they looted. The third slave was left behind to watch P'eng Ch'ung. The latter tried to move him to pity and asked him to unfasten the ropes. In exchange, he promised the young slave his daughter Chu (•Pearl•) and valuable gifts. The boy seems to have been tempted, but when he glanced outside the door and discovered that Tsi-mi had been listening, he lost his nerve. The slaves now saddled six horses and forced P'eng Ch'ung's wife to sew two bags of silk. When it had grown dark, they untied P'eng Ch'ung's hands and made him write a document permitting them to leave the city. They cut off the heads of P'eng Ch'ung and his wife and placed them in the silk bags, escaped, and made their way to Lo-yang (1 A: 25 a; 12,42: 9 b—10 a). Undoubtedly, in accordance with the usual practice, the slaves were thoroughly questioned, and a detailed report was prepared about the case. The affair became a *cause célèbre* at the court. In an earlier proclamation, the emperor had promised the rank of marquis to anyone who would put P'eng Ch'ung to death (TKK 23: 4 b). On the other hand, it was a hair-raising thought that a slave should be rewarded for having killed his master. Finally, it was decided to grant Tsi-mi the title of a Marquis Who Is Not Righteous (TKK 23: 5 a; HHS 12,42: 10 a).

The last resistance in Yü-yang petered out. To be sure, P'eng Ch'ung's son Wu was proclaimed king, but he was soon murdered by one of his officials who subsequently surrendered (12,42: 10 b).

In the same month (2nd) in which P'eng Ch'ung had been killed, Wu Han was attacked at night in his camp at P'ing-yüan by the Fu-p'ing and Huo-so bandits. He gained a major victory, and most of the enemy surrendered (1 A: 25 a; 18,48: 4 b; 19,49: 5 a). The last of the Fu-p'ing withdrew to the prefecture of the same name and surrendered there later in the year (26,56: 2 b—3 a). Wu Han turned northwards and took possession of the Po-hai commandery, situated along the sea²⁾ (18,48: 5 a). These operations concluded the conquest of the northern plain.

2. Campaigns on the southern plain and the Shan-tung peninsula

A. D. 26, first campaign against Liu Yung.

While the northern gentry's attitude, and its part in the unrest, can be reconstructed, at least in general outline, this is not possible for the parallel events south

¹⁾ The text says *ts'ang t'ou*: 'green-heads'. According to 109. Wilbur, p. 230, 'the green turban became a sort of insignia for more important male slaves, both government and private . . .'

²⁾ Cf. map 20.

of the Yellow River. There, the documents throw light only on the activities of the main protagonists. It cannot be doubted that these again represented, or took advantage of, the centrifugal forces of regionalism¹), but the meagreness of the sources does not permit any analysis in depth.

It is clear that the southern plain had suffered greatly from the direct and indirect consequences of the change of the course of the Yellow River. Among the various areas, one in particular had been affected earlier and more directly than the others: the Tung commandery, situated south of the break²). In A. D. 2, the number of households there had been 401,297 (HS 28 A a: 75 a). This total dwindled during the following decades, since the dikes of the Yellow River were not repaired until A. D. 70. The early decrease was undoubtedly due to loss of life through direct devastations, while famine later continued to decimate the population and forced many to emigrate. Because of these factors, the number of households amounted in A. D. 140 to no more than 136,088 (HHS chi 21: 4 b). By a fortunate chance, the HHS quite incidentally refers to the situation in Tung just after Wang Mang's death, which clarifies the conditions of that time. It states that this commandery then numbered 300,000 odd households (12,42: 7 a). In other words, the population had already decreased since A. D. 2 by about half a million inhabitants³). Migration must have been in full process, and it is not surprising that banditry was rife. To cope with this, in A. D. 26 Kuang-wu appointed as Grand Administrator of Tung the same Keng Ch'un who earlier in the year had proved his ability during the abortive rebellion in Chen-ting⁴). After several months in office, Keng Ch'un had put down the unrest (21,51: 9 b), although the pacification was only temporary. In this year, banditry was also quelled in the Ch'en-liu commandery (18,48: 11 a), which bordered on Tung in the southeast and had been indirectly affected by the flood.

Problems created by the change of the course of the Yellow River continued to plague Emperor Kuang-wu⁵), but from the military point of view they were at present overshadowed by another exigency. This was the hostile concentration of regional powers led by Liu Yung, Tung Hien and Chang Pu. Liu Yung had come to the Keng-shi Emperor's court in Lo-yang in A. D. 23 and had been installed as king of Liang. His capital was the Sui-yang prefecture. In A. D. 24, he had embarked on a policy of his own and greatly enlarged the area under his control. At the end of A. D. 25, he had proclaimed himself Son of Heaven⁶). Chang Pu had taken possession of the Lang-ya commandery in A. D. 23 and in the following year conquered the major part of present Shan-tung. Although he had at first

¹) E. g. Liu Yung summoned the «Braves and Stalwarts» (hao kie) and gave them offices and titles (12,42:3 a). The term designated powerful members of the local gentry. One of these is mentioned by name: Chou Kien from the P'ei commandery (12,42: 3 a).

²) Cf. vol. I, p. 153.

³) Taking the number of members/household as circa 5. Cf. 64. Bielenstein, p. 129.

⁴) Cf. *supra* p. 122—123.

⁵) Cf. *infra* pp. 176—177.

⁶) Cf. *supra* pp. 42, 59, 106 and map 15.

recognized the Keng-shī Emperor and later Liu Yung, accepting the distinctions which were offered, he was in practice an independent warlord.¹⁾ Tung Hien had also in A. D. 24 received rank from the Keng-shī Emperor, but this did not prevent him from carving out a domain of his own. It comprised the coastal region from Shan-tung to the Yang-tsi River.²⁾ A fourth warlord should be mentioned here, even if he followed an entirely different course: Li Hien who in A. D. 23 had proclaimed himself king of Huai-nan. He controlled the Lu-kiang and probably also the Kiu-kiang commanderies, situated in present An-hui between the Huai and Yang-tsi Rivers³⁾. Li Hien had aspirations to the throne which automatically excluded any alliance between him and Liu Yung. Tung Hien and Chang Pu, on the other hand, seem to have been content with the power they had achieved. They were no rivals of Liu Yung and, in fact, were prepared to support him as long as this did not threaten their own regional power. Together they would have presented a formidable military bloc. It was fortunate for Kuang-wu that the same centrifugal forces which he had to fight also applied to his rival Liu Yung.

Apart from Kuang-wu himself and Kung-sun Shu in the west, Liu Yung was in A. D. 26 the only other pretender. It is significant that Kuang-wu launched an attack against the latter as soon as he was able to do so. His general strategy quite clearly was to sweep the Great Plain of his enemies before he turned westwards, and among these enemies Liu Yung was potentially the most dangerous. It was an added peril that Liu Yung also belonged to the former imperial clan and so could pose as the restorer of the fallen dynasty.

The first military encounter between troops of Kuang-wu and Liu Yung had taken place in A. D. 25 and been on a minor scale (21,51: 9 a). On Nov. 5 of this year, Lo-yang fell. As soon as Kuang-wu had obtained this first firm foothold on the southern shore of the Yellow River, he must have pushed his military preparations to the utmost, because as early as the 3rd month (Apr. 6—May 5) of A. D. 26 he started a major offensive against Liu Yung. The army was placed under the command of the General-in-chief Ko Yen (1 A: 20 a; 12,42: 3 b).

The campaign was rapid but not conclusive⁴⁾. Ko Yen conquered the Ao Granary and the Suan-tsao⁵⁾, Feng-k'iu⁶⁾, and Siang-yi⁷⁾ prefectures (SHS 2: 9 a; HHS 18,48: 9 a). By the 4th month (May 6—June 3) he stood outside Liu Yung's capital Sui-yang and laid siege to this city (1 A: 20 a; 12,42: 3 b; 18,48: 9 a).

During the same month, Ko Yen received a setback. His subordinate officer

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 29, 58—59 and maps 5, 15.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 59 and map 15.


³⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 28—29 and map 15.

⁴⁾ For this and the following events cf. map 21.

⁵⁾ The Suan-tsao prefecture during Han belonged to the Ch'en-liu commandery and was situated 15 li N of the present Yen-tsin hien, Ho-nan.

⁶⁾ The Feng-k'iu prefecture during Han belonged to the Ch'en-liu commandery and is identical with the present hien with the same name, Ho-nan.

⁷⁾ The Siang-yi prefecture during Han belonged to the Ch'en-liu commandery and was situated 1 li W of the present Sui hien, Ho-nan.



Map 21. Operations on the southern plain in A. D. 26.

Su Mao rebelled, killed Kuang-wu's Grand Administrator of Huai-yang¹), took possession of Kuang-lo²), and declared himself a subject of Liu Yung (1 A: 20 a; 12,42: 3 b). Su Mao originally had been a general of the Keng-shi Emperor and one of the defenders of Lo-yang³). When this city fell, he had entered the service of Kuang-wu. His rebellion could therefore be explained as the protest of an officer who in his heart had remained loyal to the late Keng-shi Emperor and who harboured a grudge against Kuang-wu. Although such considerations may have carried some weight, there exists another more probable and more earthy explanation. It so happens that Su Mao was a native of Ch'en-l'iu, situated on the plain south of the Yellow River, and bordering directly on Liu Yung's kingdom in the west. This meant that its gentry clans most likely had sympathies with Liu Yung's cause, which in turn may have prompted Su Mao to make his choice.

¹) Huai-yang was only later in this year pacified by an imperial army. The presence of the Grand Administrator — his name was P'an Kien (1 A: 20 a) — may therefore reflect an early and unsuccessful attempt at gaining control over the area without an open fight. Alternatively, P'an Kien may simply have been attached to Ko Yen's army as a Grand Administrator designate. It should also be observed that a Grand Administrator of the late Keng-shi Emperor, Pao SI, still maintained himself in the commandery (17,47: 19 a), although he must have come to terms with Liu Yung when the latter conquered Huai-yang in A. D. 24 (cf. *supra* p. 59).

²) This was a smaller unit than a prefecture, which according to the *Commentary* (1 A: 22 b) still existed in T'ang times and was then situated within the Yü-ch'eng prefecture.

The Yü-ch'eng prefecture of T'ang times was situated 3 li SW of the present hien with the same name, Ho-nan.

³) Cf. *supra* pp. 91—92, 103.

In other words, his regional loyalties came to override all other considerations¹). Liu Yung immediately made political propaganda out of this by appointing him Commander-in-chief and enfeoffing him as king of Huai-yang (12,42: 3 b). The kingdom was a fief in name only, since it was soon conquered by one of Kuang-wu's generals²).

In spite of Su Mao's rebellion, Ko Yen proceeded with the siege of Sui-yang. In the 8th month (Sept. 1—30), his troops scaled the city walls on ladders by night. Liu Yung slipped out through the eastern gate³) and escaped to Yü⁴), perhaps to seek help from Su Mao in Kuang-lo. The populace in Yü killed his mother, wife and children. He fled again with a handful of guards (1 A: 20 b; 12,42: 3 b; 18,48: 9 a), while the Liang kingdom fell to the imperial forces. During the remaining part of the year, Ko Yen continued to defeat Liu Yung's officers. All organized defence seemed to collapse, and the Lu, P'ei and Ch'u commanderies were conquered. Su Mao, who had attempted to relieve Liu Yung, returned to Kuang-lo, where he persisted in putting up a fight. The city of Hu-ling⁵) was held by two of Liu Yung's generals: Chou Kien and Kiao K'iang (1 A: 21 a; 12,42: 3 b; 18,48: 9 a—9 b). These were the only cases of obstinate resistance⁶). Victory had been won almost too easily.

In the 11th month (Nov. 29—Dec. 27) of A. D. 28, at a time when Liu Yung was reduced to a mere fugitive, Kuang-wu coupled his military offensive with a diplomatic *démarche*. He dispatched the Grand Palace Grandee Fu Lung with the Staff of Authority in order to assert imperial authority in the Ts'ing and Sū provinces. These areas comprised the Shan-tung peninsula and the coastal stretch from there to the Yang-tsi, that is the domains controlled by Chang Pu and Tung Hien. Fu Lung sent out a proclamation which enumerated the victories of the emperor and did not fail to mention the fall of Sui-yang and the flight of Liu Yung. This had immediate results. Not only did the major part of the Huo-so bandits surrender⁷), but Chang Pu himself was ready to seek a settlement. He instructed a messenger to follow Fu Lung to Lo-yang where, as a sign of his master's submis-

¹) Su Mao may also have been antagonized by the behaviour of the imperial forces in his home commandery, where they recently had conquered three prefectures (Suan-tsao, Feng-k'iu, Siang-yi).

It will be seen later (cf. *infra* pp. 144, 153—154) that two other insurrections show striking parallels with the rebellion of Su Mao.

²) Cf. *infra* p. 152.


³) According to TTK 9: 6 a, Liu Yung fled through the Fish Gate. HHS chi 20: 11 b confirms that Sui-yang had a gate with this name.

⁴) The Yü prefecture during Han belonged to the Liang kingdom and was situated 3 li SW of the present Yü-ch'eng hien, Ho-nan.

⁵) The Hu-ling prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Shan-yang commandery and was situated 60 li SE of the present Yü-t'ai hien, Shan-tung.

⁶) It is worth observing that all three men who refused to surrender were natives of the southern plain and that at least two of them are directly stated to have wielded local power: Chou Kien in P'ei (cf. *supra* p. 132, note 1) and Kiao K'iang in Shan-yang (cf. *infra* p. 144).

⁷) Remnants of this band withdrew, crossed the Yellow River and joined the Fu-p'ing bandits. Cf. *supra* p. 121.



Map 22. The political situation on the southern plain and the Shan-tung peninsula at the end of A. D. 26.

sion, he presented a memorial and a »Fu Fish«¹⁾ (26,56: 4 b—5 a). Tung Hien, who had lost the Lin-huai commandery to the imperial forces (18,48: 9 b)²⁾, was not approached on this occasion.

Map 22 shows the situation on the southern plain and the Shan-tung peninsula at the end of A. D. 26. It should be compared with map 15. Kuang-wu had every reason to be pleased with his progress. Practically nothing remained of Liu Yung's former territory. Only Kuang-lo and Hu-ling were still defended. Tung Hien's

¹⁾ This may actually have been a kind of abalone or, in this special case, the shell of it.

²⁾ Cf. map 22.

domain had been drastically reduced, and Chang Pu seemed ready to come to terms. Li Hien was in unchallenged possession of his territory, but then he never posed any serious military problem. One area, the Tung-p'ing commandery, was still governed by a Grand Administrator of the late Keng-shi Emperor. He did not surrender until he was forced to do so in A. D. 28¹⁾ (21,51: 9 b—10 a). All other parts of the southern plain were in the hands of the imperial troops²⁾, and complete pacification did not seem far off. The calm, however, was deceptive.

A. D. 27, second campaign against Liu Yung.

Emperor Kuang-wu was anxious to gain full control over the Shan-tung peninsula by taking advantage of Chang Pu's present weakness. Fu Lung, whose first mission had been eminently successful, was promoted to Imperial Household Grandee and again with the Staff of Authority dispatched to Chang Pu. He was accompanied by the newly appointed Shepherd of the Ts'ing province and the Grand Administrators and Chief Commandants of the various commanderies who were ready to take up their offices. Fu Lung himself was empowered to appoint officials of the rank of Prefect and below. Upon his arrival, he installed Chang Pu as Grand Administrator of Tung-lai (12,42: 6 a; 26,56: 5 a)³⁾. This was quite a downcome for the latter, who could not even assume that he would be tolerated in this office for any length of time.

At this point, all calculations were suddenly overthrown. The inhabitants of Sui-yang again revolted, and Liu Yung was able to return to his former capital (18,48: 9 b). He knew, of course, of Chang Pu's negotiations. In order to put a stop to them, he hurriedly dispatched a messenger and offered him the title of king of Ts'i. It can be assumed that Chang Pu's proposed submission to Emperor Kuang-wu had been a direct result of Liu Yung's defeat, and clearly it opened no attractive vistas to him. Whether or not the title of king was alluring, he now saw the chance of reverting to his former role as independent warlord. Unfortunately for Fu Lung, his instructions did not cover such an emergency. He tried to neutralize Liu Yung's messenger but was in no bargaining position and could only make the relatively insignificant counter-offer of a marquisate. Chang Pu knew that he had the initiative and even invited Fu Lung to join his party. The latter refused

¹⁾ Cf. *infra* p. 140.

²⁾ It is possible that in this year the coastal area south of the mouth of the Yang-tsi, comprising the K'uai-ki commandery (cf. map 22), peacefully submitted to Kuang-wu. The Keng-shi Emperor had appointed Jen Yen as a Chief Commandant in this commandery (cf. *supra* p. 45, note 1). Early in Kuang-wu's reign, Jen Yen in a memorial requested permission to resign (76,106: 4 a). He may have done this under the impact of Ko Yen's victories. A memorial always implied the recognition of the receiver as the legitimate ruler of the empire. It may be assumed that Jen Yen's attitude was shared by the other officials in K'uai-ki.

³⁾ Fu Lung's biography lists all events until his death under A. D. 26 (26,56: 5 a—5 b). Other sources make it perfectly clear that Chang Pu received his rank as Grand Administrator in A. D. 27 (12,42: 6 a) and that Fu Lung died in the 2nd month of this year (1 A: 22 a). In other words, Fu Lung returned from his first mission at the end of A. D. 26, was promoted during the winter 26—27, and returned to Shan-tung in the beginning of 27.

this and hurriedly sent a final report to the emperor. Then he waited for the next move of his opponent, about which he could have little doubt (12,42: 6 a; 26,56: 5 a—5 b).

In the 2nd month (Mar. 27—Apr. 24) of A. D. 27, Chang Pu accepted Liu Yung's rank and executed Fu Lung. Tung Hien also acquired a title as king of Hai-si¹⁾ (1 A: 22 a; 12,42: 3 b, 6 a; 26,56: 5 b). This does not mean that any direct cooperation was inaugurated. Now as before, Chang Pu and Tung Hien remained aloof, and Liu Yung faced the imperial troops alone. He did not have much time to prepare for their attack.

In the 4th month (May 25—June 22), Emperor Kuang-wu dispatched a new and larger army against Liu Yung. The Commander-in-chief Wu Han himself was in charge, and Ko Yen served under him. Wu Han surrounded Su Mao in Kuang-lo, while Ko Yen began the second siege of Sui-yang, almost exactly one year after the first. An early attempt by Chou Kien to relieve Kuang-lo proved temporarily successful; Wu Han was defeated and wounded during the battle, and had to seek protection within his camp²⁾. The following morning, a new engagement took place, and Wu Han now routed the enemy. His troops actually penetrated into Kuang-lo, although they were unable to hold it. Su Mao and Chou Kien fled to Hu-ling. This enabled Wu Han to leave the siege of Kuang-lo to one of his generals, while he himself joined Ko Yen outside Sui-yang (1 A: 22 b; 12,42: 3 b; 18,48: 3 b—4 b, 9 b).

In the autumn of A. D. 27, food supplies were exhausted in Sui-yang. Liu Yung made a sally and escaped but was soon killed by one of his officers who wished to surrender³⁾. Subsequently, both Sui-yang and Kuang-lo capitulated (1 A: 23 a; 12,42: 3 b; 18,48: 4 b, 9 b). This meant that, before the end of the autumn, Emperor Kuang-wu had regained the position on the southern plain which he had lost at the beginning of the year.

Su Mao, Chou Kien and Kiao K'iang were as little prepared to give up the fight as they had been at the end of A. D. 26. The two former hurried to Ch'ui-hui⁴⁾ and there proclaimed Liu Yung's son Yü king of Liang (1 A: 23 a; 12,42: 4 a). It is interesting that no attempt was made to claim for him the imperial dignity

¹⁾ The Hai-si prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Tung-hai commandery and was situated 120 li S of the present Tung-hai hien, Kiang-su. The geographical treatise of the HS wrongly writes Hai-k'ü (HS 28 Ac: 10 b). It should not be confused with the Hai-k'ü prefecture in the Lang-ya commandery (cf. vol. I, p. 54, note 3). The commentators have extensively discussed this question (HS 28 Ac: 4 a, 10 b—11 a; HHS 1 A: 22 a; 11,41: 8 b; ch'i 21: 18 b, 22 a), and the majority agrees that the Hai-k'ü prefecture of Tung-hai is a mistake for Hai-si. This must be correct, considering that Liu Yung would have chosen a title for Tung Hien from the latter's own domain. He could not have made him the king of an area which was situated in Lang-ya and controlled by Chang Pu. During Later Han, the Hai-si prefecture of the Tung-hai commandery was transferred to the Kuang-ling commandery, and the HHS (ch'i 21: 22 a) gives there the name correctly as Hai-si.

²⁾ Cf. also vol. I, p. 53.

³⁾ 1 A: 23 A states that Ko Yen took Sui-yang and captured Liu Yung. This is an ellipsis.

⁴⁾ According to HHS ch'i 20: 11 a, Ch'ui-hui was an agglomeration within the Shan-sang prefecture. This prefecture during Former Han belonged to the P'ei commandery and was situated 37 li N of the present Meng-ch'eng hien, An-hui. Cf. also map 23.

assumed by his father. All points to the fact that he was nothing but a tool of his generals, and their military and political potential was now far too minute for any exhibitions of grandeur.

It is also indicative that Chang Pu, under the influence of Wang Hung¹⁾, changed his mind and refused to recognize Liu Yü (12,42:6 a-6 b). This altered nothing in practice, since he had never lifted a finger in support of Liu Yung, whom he had recognized. During the entire year of A. D. 27, Chang Pu had not taken part in any hostilities; and, although he had concluded an alliance with P'eng Ch'ung in the north²⁾, this again had been a commitment in name only. Tung Hien also had enjoyed a peaceful year in his domain and watched Liu Yung's fall from a distance. He is nowhere said to have recognized Liu Yü, and nothing indicates that he did so.

Emperor Kuang-wu had rid himself of one rival in A. D. 27, but during the same year another pretender stepped forward to demand recognition as the Son of Heaven. This was Li Hien, formerly self-styled king of Huai-nan. He appointed the customary high officials, such as the Three Dukes and the Nine Ministers, and assembled an army (1 A:23 a; 12,42: 7 b). Up to this point, Kuang-wu quite clearly had considered Li Hien as nothing but a minor issue which had to wait for its turn in the all-over strategy. It is typical, therefore, for the great weight he attached to the rise of any new rival that Li Hien's claim immediately unleashed an imperial attack during the following year.

A. D. 28, operations against Chang Pu, Liu Yü, Tung Hien and Li Hien.

At the beginning of A. D. 28, Chang Pu still retained a strong position. He had not yet fought any battles with imperial troops, and his local support had not faltered. It is specifically stated that the »Braves and Stalwarts» of the T'ai-shan commandery,³⁾ i. e. powerful members of the local gentry, rendered him active assistance (18,48: 11 b).

In the spring of this year, Kuang-wu ordered an offensive which clearly must have served the purpose of driving a wedge between Chang Pu and Liu Yü in order to prevent any last minute cooperation between their forces. Imperial troops, in a swift thrust, conquered the Fei-ch'eng⁴⁾ and Wen-yang⁵⁾ prefectures, continued in a south-southwesterly direction, and took the Nie-sang commune⁶⁾ (22,52: 5 a).

¹⁾ For Wang Hung cf. supra pp. 58, 59. After the death of the Keng-shī Emperor, he had remained with Chang Pu.

²⁾ Cf. supra p. 127.

³⁾ For this and the following events cf. map 23.

⁴⁾ The Fei-ch'eng prefecture during Former Han belonged to the T'ai-shan commandery and is identical with the present hien of the same name, Shan-tung.

⁵⁾ The Wen-yang prefecture during Han belonged to the Lu kingdom and was situated NE of the present Ning-yang hien, Shan-tung. In contrast to the present text, the geographical treatises of the HS and HHS write *wen* with radical 85.

⁶⁾ According to Fang yü ki yao, the Nie-sang commune was situated SW of the present P'ei hien, Kiang-su. Cf. Chung kuo ku kin ti ming ta ts'i tien, p. 1387: 3.

They had sliced through the western part of T'ai-shan, the very commandery in which Chang Pu only recently had been acclaimed. The emperor immediately appointed a Grand Administrator for T'ai-shan, who in a battle at Ying¹⁾ disastrously defeated the forces of Chang Pu. Subsequently, he pacified his commandery (18,48: 11 b). Keng Ch'un, Grand Administrator of Tung since A. D. 26²⁾, was also ordered to take the field. The late Keng-shī Emperor's Administrator of Tung-p'ing surrendered to him³⁾; he captured the Tsi-nan commandery, and assisted in the pacification of T'ai-shan (21,51: 9 b-10 a).

Further south, the imperial troops had meanwhile continued their vigorous attacks against Liu Yü's generals. Ko Yen seems to have spent the winter of A. D. 27 — 28 in Sui-yang, Wu Han having been transferred to another theatre. In the spring of A. D. 28, he attacked and defeated Su Mao and Chou Kien at K'i⁴⁾. He then marched straight north to Liu⁵⁾, where the first encounter between imperial forces and Tung Hien's troops took place. Ko Yen was again victorious. Next, he temporarily conquered Si-fang⁶⁾, doubled back, and attacked P'eng-ch'eng⁷⁾. This city had been taken by Su Mao and Chou Kien, who also had moved north. They were again defeated, but succeeded in escaping (18,48: 9 b).

During all this time, Liu Yü had remained passively in the Ch'ui-hui agglomeration, where he now once more was joined by Chou Kien. On Aug. 17, Emperor Kuang-wu personally arrived in Ts'iao⁸⁾ to supervise the campaigns on the southern plain. He dispatched troops against Liu Yü and Chou Kien which surrounded Ch'ui-hui (1 A: 24 a-24 b; 12,42: 4 a; 20,50: 4 a). The siege was to last into the following year.

As a result of the recent imperial victories, one of Tung Hien's officers thought the time ripe for changing his allegiance. In the 7th month (Aug. 10 — Sept. 7),

¹⁾ The Ying prefecture during Han belonged to the T'ai-shan commandery and was situated 40 li NW of the present Lai-wu hien, Shan-tung.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 132.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 137.

⁴⁾ The K'i prefecture during Han belonged to the P'ei commandery and was situated S of the present Su hien, An-hui.

⁵⁾ The Liu prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Ch'u kingdom and was situated SE of the present P'ei hien, Kiang-su.


⁶⁾ Si-fang was not a prefecture but a smaller unit. It was the stronghold of Kiao K'iang, who originally had risen in this area and later had become one of Liu Yung's generals.

According to Wang Sien-k'ien, Si-fang was situated within the area of the Fang city which during the Ch'un-ts'iu period had belonged to the feudal state of Sung. The character *si* 'West' was added later. In Later Han times, the Fang-tung (i. e. 'East of Fang') prefecture was established east of it. Cf. 12,42: 3 a, *T'ei kie*. This implies that Si-fang was situated west of Fang-tung.

The Fang-tung prefecture belonged to the Shan-yang commandery and was situated SW of the present Kin-hiang hien, Shan-tung.

⁷⁾ The P'eng-ch'eng prefecture during Former Han was the capital of the Ch'u kingdom and is identical with the present T'ung-shan hien, Kiang-su.

⁸⁾ The Ts'iao prefecture during Han belonged to the P'ei commandery and is identical with the present Po hien, An-hui.



Map 23. Operations on the southern plain and the Shan-tung peninsula in A.D. 28.

he took possession of the Lan-ling prefecture¹⁾ and offered his submission. His former master arrived hurriedly from T'an²⁾ and surrounded the city. Ko Yen

¹⁾ The Lan-ling prefecture during Han belonged to the Tung-hai commandery and was situated 50 li E of the present Yi hien, Shan-tung.

²⁾ The T'an prefecture during Han belonged to the Tung-hai commandery and was situated 30 li SW of the present T'an-ch'eng hien, Shan-tung.

wished to relieve it, but the emperor gave strict orders for an attack on T'an itself, which at present was emptied of enemy troops. Disobeying this command, Ko Yen marched straight on Lan-ling, broke the siege, and entered the town, only to be surrounded in turn by Tung Hien on the following morning. He made a successful sally and withdrew, but Lan-ling fell to Tung Hien who executed his disobedient officer. A belated attack by Ko Yen on T'an was a failure, and all further battles which he fought with Tung Hien at the end of the year were undecisive (1 A:24 b; 18,48: 9 b-10 a). The latter's strength was far from broken.

Emperor Kuang-wu had meanwhile continued southwards and on Sept. 17 arrived in Shou-ch'un¹). From there, he dispatched four generals to mobilize troops in K'uai-ki, Tan-yang, Kiu-kiang, and Liu-an, i. e. in the central and southern parts of present An-hui, in southern Kiang-su, and in Che-kiang. They then attacked the pretender Li Hien, and in the 9th month (Oct. 10 — Nov. 11) surrounded him in Shu²). The emperor had given strict instructions to avoid any open engagements, and Li Hien's invitations to battle were therefore not accepted (1 A: 24 b; 22,52: 6 b-7 a, 8 a). The plan was clearly to starve him out, and so the imperial troops settled down to a prolonged siege which continued until A. D. 30.

Map 24 presents the situation at the end of A. D. 28 and should be compared with map 22. Almost the entire southern plain was now under the control of Emperor Kuang-wu. Only Ch'ui-hui was still held by Liu Yü and Chou Kien, while the pretender Li Hien had been reduced to the city of Shu. Chang Pu's territory had decreased through losses in the west. On the eve of his defeat, Tung Hien still managed to keep his domain intact.

A. D. 29, campaigns against Tung Hien and Chang Pu.


During A. D. 28, Su Mao had lost most of his army in two major defeats. It is clear from the events which followed that in this emergency he made contact with the Wu-hiao bandits who meanwhile had appeared south of the Yellow River³). With these under his command, in addition to some cavalry, he attempted in the 2nd month (Mar.4 — Apr.2)⁴) to relieve his confederates Liu Yü and Chou Kien in Ch'ui-hui. The imperial troops which surrounded it were led by the generals Ma Wu and Wang Pa, the former of whom lost his stores to Su Mao's cavalry. During the ensuing encounter, Chou Kien made a sally from Ch'ui-hui and attacked Ma Wu from the rear. This decided the first phase of the battle, and Ma Wu's troops turned and fled. Wang Pa did not participate in the fighting but held his soldiers back until the enemy incautiously had proceeded too far in pursuit of Ma Wu.

¹) The Shou-ch'un prefecture during Han belonged to the Kiu-kiang commandery and is identical with the present Shou hien, An-hui.

²) The Shu prefecture during Han was the capital of the Lu-kiang commandery and situated W of the present Lu-kiang hien, An-hui.

³) They had been defeated north of the Yellow River at the beginning of A. D. 28 and subsequently moved southwards. Cf. *supra* p. 128.

⁴) I follow here the *pen ki* (1 A: 25 a), which is very explicit. 12,42: 4 a and 20, 50: 4 a—4 b place the event at the end of A. D. 28.



Map 24. The political situation on the southern plain and the Shan-tung peninsula at the end of A. D. 28.

At this stage, he in turn attacked the rear of Su Mao and Chou Kien and turned their victory into defeat. On the following morning, troops having been reassembled on both sides, the imperial forces were again challenged to battle but refused this firmly¹⁾. Su Mao and Chou Kien finally withdrew at nightfall, only to discover that the latter's nephew had deserted and closed the gates of Ch'ui-hui. This was the last united effort of the remnants of the late Liu Yung's party. Chou Kien died during his escape. Su Mao fled to Tung Hien. Liu Yü joined Kiao K'iang, who had taken fresh possession of Si-fang (1 A: 25 a; 12,42: 4 a; 20,50: 4 a-4 b). During

¹⁾ Cf. also vol. I, p. 53.

the spring, Si-fang was once more conquered by imperial forces. Kiao K'iang and Liu Yü escaped again and also joined Tung Hien (12,42: 4 a; 22,52: 6 a).

By the spring of A. D. 29, the situation had thus been simplified to the extent that only Chang Pu and Tung Hien preserved a precarious independence. Since the imperial General-in-chief Ko Yen now stood on the confines of Tung Hien's territory¹⁾, it must have seemed as if final victory over at least one of the warlords was within reach. This victory was delayed, however, through the rebellion of another subordinate of Ko Yen. P'ang Meng²⁾, stationed in Ch'u's capital P'eng-ch'eng, killed the Grand Administrator of this commandery and in the 3rd month (Apr. 3 — May 2) of A. D. 29 threw in his lot with Tung Hien (1 A: 25 a; 39,69: 3 a).

The HHS gives as a reason for the revolt that P'ang Meng and Ko Yen were jealous of each other, and that the former believed he had been slandered at the court (12,42: 4 b). These facts may well have played a role but, just as in the case of Su Mao³⁾, another possible explanation emerges. True, in each instance former officers of the Keng-shi Emperor rebelled against Ko Yen, who may have been hard to get along with. It is also true, however, that both Su Mao and P'ang Meng were natives of the southern plain. During the campaigns of A. D. 28, P'ang Meng had participated in Ko Yen's attack on Si-fang⁴⁾ (18,48: 9 b). This place was situated in Shan-yang, and Shan-yang was the home commandery of P'ang Meng. As will be seen later, the imperial forces were far from impeccable in their conduct, and while high officers may not have intervened against looting in general, they may have tended to resent this if it involved their own home areas. Shan-yang was, furthermore, situated directly northeast of the Liang kingdom in which Liu Yung had risen, and it had become an integral part of his state as early as A. D. 24⁵⁾. The support which Liu Yung enjoyed in this commandery is exemplified by the career of Kiao K'iang, who had rebelled in Si-fang and become one of his chief assistants⁶⁾. In a direct parallel to Su Mao, P'ang Meng's mutiny took place after he had taken part in an imperial campaign in his home commandery. Having watched the conduct of the troops and established contacts with the local gentry, he too was probably swayed by regional loyalties⁷⁾. He may have thought that even at this late stage his defection would secure the victory of Tung Hien, although it is equally possible that his was the irrational action of a man overpoweringly moved by local sympathies and ties.

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 142.

²⁾ P'ang Meng originally had been a fugitive and a member of the Troops from the Lower [Yang-tai-] kiang. The Keng-shi Emperor later made him the Shepherd of the Ki province. During the Wang Lang crisis, he served in Sie Kung's army (cf. *supra* p. 74). After Kuang-wu had ascended the throne, he appointed P'ang Meng first as Palace Attendant and subsequently as a general (12,42: 4 a—4 b).

³⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 133—135.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 140.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 59.

⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 135, note 6, p. 140, note 6.

⁷⁾ A third insurrection will be discussed (cf. *infra* pp. 153—154), which belongs to the same category and about which the sources are particularly informative.

Immediately after his rebellion, P'ang Meng surprisingly attacked and defeated Ko Yen¹⁾. The latter fled, crossed the Si River, destroyed the bridge and all boats and oars, and so made his escape (12,42: 4 a 18,48: 10 a)²⁾. P'ang Meng followed him, went over the same river by some means or other, and encamped north of the T'ao district³⁾. This area had during Former Han belonged to the Tung-p'ing kingdom, and consequently P'ang Meng assumed the title of king of Tung-p'ing (12,42: 4 a, 22,52: 11 a).

Emperor Kuang-wu must have attached great importance to this turn of events, since he took command in person and ordered his generals to meet him in Sui-yang. Having passed through this city, he arrived during the 6th month (July 1 — 29) in Meng⁴⁾. He received the information there that in the same month Tung Hien had dispatched Su Mao and Kiao K'iang to assist P'ang Meng, and that these two were now in the process of laying siege to the T'ao district. In this emergency, Kuang-wu seems to have changed the rendezvous of his armies to Jen-ch'eng⁵⁾. He left all heavy equipment behind and, hurrying day and night, arrived in this prefecture, where he was joined by at least seven generals including Ko Yen. Having rested his troops, the emperor advanced on the T'ao district and gained a major victory. P'ang Meng, Su Mao, and Kiao K'iang fled by night and rejoined Tung Hien (1 A: 25 b; 12,42: 4 b-5 a; 15,45: 6 b; 18,48: 10 a-10 b; 21,51: 4 a; 22,52: 5 a, 11 a).

In the 7th month (July 30 — Aug. 28), the emperor continued his offensive and arrived at Hu-ling and P'i⁶⁾. He had, undoubtedly, decided to outmanoeuvre the enemy by swerving northwards rather than risking a frontal attack on his positions at Ch'ang-lu⁷⁾ and Kien-yang⁸⁾. With their troops augmented by the Wu-hiao bandits, all the leaders of southern regionalism, Tung Hien, Liu Yü, Su Mao, Kiao K'iang and P'ang Meng, were there assembled for the last time. The

¹⁾ For this and the following events cf. map 25.

²⁾ TTK 9: 6 b and SHS 2: 9 a both state that Ko Yen defeated P'ang Meng and was rewarded by an edict. This is flatly contradicted by the above-mentioned sources. It is conceivable that Ko Yen in a memorial presented his defeat as a victory, that the emperor at first was deceived by this, and that the various documents of the case later confused some of the historians.

³⁾ 12,42: 4 b—5 a mentions that the T'ao district was situated at a distance of 60 li from the Jen-ch'eng prefecture. The *Commentary* states that the T'ao district was located NW of the Kung-k'iu prefecture of T'ang times (12,42: 4 a). This Kung-k'iu, in turn, lay NE of the Han prefecture of Jen-ch'eng. It must be correct, therefore, to assume that the T'ao district was situated 60 li N of Jen-ch'eng.


⁴⁾ The Meng prefecture during Han belonged to the Liang kingdom and was situated 22 li NE of the present Shang-k'iu hien, Ho-nan.

⁵⁾ The Jen-ch'eng prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Tung-p'ing kingdom and is identical with the present Tsi-ning hien, Shan-tung.

⁶⁾ The P'i prefecture during Han belonged to the Lu kingdom and is identical with the present T'eng hien, Shan-tung.

⁷⁾ The Ch'ang-lu prefecture during Han belonged to the Tung-hai commandery and was situated 60 li SE of the present T'eng hien, Shan-tung.

⁸⁾ The Kien-yang prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Tung-hai commandery and was situated W of the present Yi hien, Shan-tung.



Map 25. Operations on the southern plain in A. D. 29.

emperor did not move from P'i before the supplies of his opponents were exhausted. Then he attacked and twice within three days defeated them at Ch'ang-lu (1 A: 25 b-26 a; 12,42: 5 a; 18,48: 10 b).

This was the final attempt at a coordinated defence against the imperial forces. Kiao K'iang surrendered. Su Mao escaped to Chang Pu in the north. Tung Hien, Liu Yü and P'ang Meng withdrew to T'an (12,42: 5 a-5 b).

On Sept. 3, the emperor arrived outside T'an and gave orders for the siege. He led in person a separate contingent, took P'eng-ch'eng and Hia-p'i¹), and then again proceeded to T'an. The city fell before the end of the 8th month (i. e. before Sept. 26). The unfortunate Liu Yü no longer knew where to turn, but was saved a decision by one of the leaders of the Wu-hiao bandits²), who decapitated him and surrendered. Tung Hien and P'ang Meng fled to K'ü³), which city was promptly surrounded by imperial troops (1 A:26 a; 12,42: 5 b; 15,45: 6 b; 18,48: 5 a). With

¹) The Hia-p'i prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Tung-hai commandery and was situated 3 li E of the present P'i hien, Kiang-su.

²) 12,42: 5 b records that he was killed by a certain Kao Hü. TTK 23: 8 a states that this man was a leader of the Wu-hiao.

³) The K'ü prefecture during Han belonged to the Tung-hai commandery and is identical with the present Tung-hai hien, Kiang-su.

this, the campaign against Tung Hien was virtually concluded. The emperor could withdraw part of his forces and throw them into the final assault on Chang Pu.

All through the year A. D. 29, and parallel with the attacks on Tung Hien, an imperial army had been on the offensive against Chang Pu. This had been initiated after the northern plain was finally pacified. The last major battle had been fought there by the Commander-in-chief Wu Han at P'ing-yüan during the 2nd month (Mar. 4 — Apr. 2) of A. D. 29¹⁾. His subordinate, the General-in-chief Keng Yen who had previously drawn up the strategical plan²⁾, now was placed in command of a newly assembled army and ordered to invade the territory of Chang Pu³⁾. Before the end of the 2nd month, he had begun his advance by crossing the Yellow River at Ch'ao-yang⁴⁾ (1 A: 25 a; 18,48: 11 b; 19,49: 5 a).

Chang Pu had placed three armies at Chu-o⁵⁾, Li-hia⁶⁾, and Chung-ch'eng⁷⁾ respectively, which threatened Keng Yen's flank. His offensive would be effectively halted until he had eliminated the danger in the south. Keng Yen therefore attacked Chu-o and took it within half a day. As a result of this victory, the troops at Chung-ch'eng abandoned their positions and fled. Chang Pu's commander now held only Li-hia and, in order to widen his base, dispatched forces to encamp in Kü-li⁸⁾. Keng Yen outmanoeuvred the enemy through a ruse, disastrously defeated him outside Kü-li⁹⁾, and subsequently took possession of the entire Tsi-nan commandery (12,42: 6 b; 19, 49: 6 a—6 b).

In the 10th month (Oct. 27—Nov. 24), Keng Yen again advanced eastwards. Chang Pu's capital was the Kü prefecture,¹⁰⁾ and, for its protection, he had stationed

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 131.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 128.

³⁾ For this and the following events cf. map 26.

⁴⁾ The Ch'ao-yang prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Tsi-nan commandery and was situated NW of the present Chang-k'iu hien, Shan-tung.

⁵⁾ The Chu-o prefecture during Han belonged to the P'ing-yüan commandery and was situated 30 li NE of the present Ch'ang-ts'ing hien, Shan-tung.


⁶⁾ Li-hia was a smaller unit than a prefectural city. It was situated below the Li Mountain and W of the Han prefecture of Li-ch'eng (cf. *Chung kuo ku kin ti ming ta ts'i tien*, p. 1220: 4 ff.). The latter belonged to the Tsi-nan commandery and is identical with the present hien with the same name, Shan-tung.

⁷⁾ Chung-ch'eng was a smaller unit than a prefectural city and, according to Shen K'in-han, situated 100 odd li SE of the present Yü-ch'eng hien, Shan-tung. Cf. 19,49: 5 b, *Tsi kie* (repeated by *Chung kuo ku kin ti ming ta ts'i tien*, p. 1303: 3).

⁸⁾ Kü-li, according to *ch'i* 22: 2 b, was an agglomeration within the Li-ch'eng prefecture. Shen K'in-han states that it was situated 70 li E of the present Li-ch'eng hien. Cf. 19,49: 6 a, *Tsi kie*.

⁹⁾ According to 12,42: 6 b, Keng Yen won this victory in the winter of A. D. 29. Winter began in the 10th month, but at that time Keng Yen already had continued his offensive eastwards. It seems plausible that the text is mistaken and that the battle took place earlier during the year. In fact, the character «winter» is probably misplaced and simply should be moved one sentence down.

¹⁰⁾ The Kü prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Tsi-ch'uan kingdom and was situated SE of the present Shou-kuang hien, Shan-tung.



Map 26. Operations in Shan-tung, A. D. 29.

two armies at Lin-tsi¹⁾ and Si-an.²⁾ Keng Yen arrived at Hua-chung³⁾, situated between the two. He realized that the city of Lin-tsi, although large and famous, was an easier target than the smaller but well-fortified and garrisoned Si-an. Using another ruse, he struck against the former and within half a day had it in his possession. The enemy at Si-an withdrew to Kū (1 A: 26 a; 12,42: 6 b; 19,49: 6 b—7 a).

¹⁾ The Lin-tsi prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Ts'i commandery and was situated 8 li N of the present hien with the same name, Shan-tung.

²⁾ The Si-an prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Ts'i commandery and was situated 30 li W of the present Lin-tsi hien, Shan-tung.

³⁾ Hua-chung was a smaller unit than a prefectural city. According to Shen K'in-han, it was situated 20 li NW of the present Lin-tsi hien, Shan-tung. Cf. 19,49: 6 b, *T'si kie*.

Instead of proceeding further towards K'ü, Keng Yen stayed in Lin-tsai and awaited Chang Pu's counterattack. The latter soon appeared at the head of a large army¹⁾ east of the city. Keng Yen met him in the open field. The fighting was not decisive and started afresh on the following morning. It lasted until the evening and through still another stratagem turned into an overwhelming victory for the imperial forces (1 A: 26 a; 12,42: 6 b; 19,49: 7 a—8 a).

A few days later, Kuang-wu arrived with reinforcements. Since Tung Hien to all intents and purposes was defeated, the emperor had left T'an and via Lu hurried to Lin-tsai. He rewarded the troops and subsequently proceeded to the K'ü prefecture (1 A: 26 a; 12,42: 6 b; 19,49: 8 a—8 b).

Chang Pu had meanwhile fled to P'ing-shou²⁾, where he was met by Su Mao and the remnants of his army³⁾. Both men were separately approached by imperial messengers who promised the rank of marquis to each if he would kill the other. Chang Pu moved the faster. He decapitated Su Mao and surrendered together with his three brothers. Wang Hung also capitulated⁴⁾. All this took place before the end of the 10th month. The last of the Wu-hiao bandits soon submitted to Keng Yen, and with this the pacification of the whole of Shan-tung was completed (1 A: 26 a; 12,42: 6 b; 19,49: 8 b).

Chang Pu received his pledged marquisate, and was ordered to live with his family in Lo-yang (12,42: 6 b). He remained there until the summer of A. D. 32, when his ambitions drove him into a last and fatal adventure⁵⁾.

A. D. 30, death of Li Hien and Tung Hien.

A. D. 30 saw the end of the Kuang-wu's last rivals on the plain. Li Hien had been besieged in Shu since the end of A. D. 29⁶⁾. By the 1st month (Feb. 22—Mar. 22) of A. D. 30, the city had been brought to the point of starvation, and was easily taken by storm. The pen ki and another source state that Li Hien was seized and beheaded (1 B: 1 a; 22,52: 7 a). His own biography gives a more detailed version: he fled but was decapitated by one of his subordinates. His wife and children were executed (12,42: 7 b). Some of Li Hien's followers assembled a band and created some further disturbances, but they were soon persuaded to surrender (12,42: 7 b—8 a).

Tung Hien's provisions in K'ü were also exhausted. In the 2nd month (Mar. 23—Apr. 21), Wu Han conquered the city and, according to his biography and the pen ki, seized and beheaded Tung Hien and P'ang Meng (1 B: 1 a—1 b; 18,48: 5 a). This again is an ellipsis. Tung and P'ang in fact managed to escape and capture

¹⁾ 19,49: 7 b states that this army included remnants of the Ta-t'ung bandits. Most of them had been absorbed by the Red Eyebrows in A. D. 24. Cf. *supra* p. 84.

²⁾ The P'ing-shou prefecture during Han belonged to the Pei-hai commandery and was situated 30 li SW of the present Wei hien, Shan-tung.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 146.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 58, 59, 139.

⁵⁾ Cf. *infra* p. 177.

⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 142.

the city of Kan-yü¹⁾ by surprise, though they were soon forced to abandon the place and flee into the marshes. Meanwhile, Wu Han arrested their wives and children. Tung Hien and P'ang Meng are stated to have taken a moving leave of their followers and then to have followed unfrequented paths westwards in order to surrender. One of Wu Han's officers caught up with them in Fang-yü²⁾, where he decapitated Tung Hien. P'ang Meng was killed by a native of the same prefecture. Both heads were sent to Lo-yang (12,42: 5 b; 18,48: 11 b—12 a).

The entire Great Plain had finally been pacified, although a crisis in A. D. 32 was temporarily to create a new and serious threat³⁾.

3. Campaigns in southern Ho-nan and northwestern Hu-pei

A. D. 26, the first campaign.

The foothills of the Ts'in-ling-shan and the Huai-shan enclose a basin whose watercourses are tributaries of the Han River. This basin is connected by corridors with the Great Plain in the west and the Hu-pei plain in the south. In Han times it formed the Nan-yang commandery. Directly south of this area was the Nan commandery, situated between the Han and Yang-ts'i Rivers.

Nan and the southern part of Nan-yang had been dominated by the warlords Ts'in Feng and his ally T'ien Jung since A. D. 23⁴⁾. The major part of Nan-yang, on the other hand, had, after the fall of the Keng-shi Emperor, become a no man's land where some of his former officers had taken possession of various prefectural cities (17,47: 12 b) but where no person of stature had risen in challenge against Kuang-wu. The latter, like the Keng-shi Emperor, was a native of Nan-yang, and the ambitious gentry clans of this commandery had early made their choice. Those who had favoured Kuang-wu were now in an enviable position, while the others were in the process of reassessing the situation and shifting their allegiance to him. Nan-yang was therefore the one region in which, from Kuang-wu's point of view, no serious separatist movement was to be expected; and its pacification seemed to pose no special problem. But even here events did not proceed quite according to calculation.

Emperor Kuang-wu had entered Lo-yang on Nov. 27, A. D. 25. During the following year he initiated campaigns on the northern and southern plains; against the Red Eyebrows in the west; and, as presently will be seen, in Nan-yang in the south. Simultaneously he had to devote attention to the immediate vicinity of Lo-yang, which was far from untroubled. A certain Chang Man was in control of the Man-chung agglomeration⁵⁾ in the hills directly south of the capital. He was

¹⁾ This prefecture is shown on map 25.

²⁾ The Fang-yü prefecture during Han belonged to the Shan-yang commandery and was situated N of the present Yü-t'ai hien, Shan-tung. It is shown on map 25.

³⁾ Cf. *infra* pp. 176 ff.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 26—28 and maps 3, 5.

⁵⁾ According to *chi* 19: 11 a and 20,50: 6 a, the Man-chung agglomeration was situated within the Sin-ch'eng prefecture. The latter during Han belonged to the Ho-nan commandery (during Former Han *ch'eng* was written without radical 32) and was situated S of the present Lo-yang hien, Ho-nan.

attacked and surrounded by an imperial army in the 2nd month (Mar. 8—Apr. 5) of A. D. 26¹⁾. The sources state that the remnants of the Yen-sin²⁾ and Po-hua³⁾ bandits came to his aid but that they were defeated at Huo-yang⁴⁾ and forced to surrender by the general in charge of the siege at Man-chung. The latter place fell in the 1st month (Jan. 27—Feb. 24) of A. D. 27, and Chang Man was executed together with his wife and children (1 A: 19 b, 21 b; 20,50: 6 a—6 b). In the autumn of A. D. 26, imperial troops also defeated the bandits of the Kin-men Mountain and the Po-ma Creek⁵⁾ (18,48: 11 b).

Meanwhile operations in Nan-yang were also in progress. The General-in-chief Ts'en P'eng, who had received his orders almost immediately after the emperor's arrival at Lo-yang, started a campaign early in 26, captured one city after another⁶⁾, and finally in the autumn conquered the Hing agglomeration⁷⁾, where a minor rebel had been active (1 A: 17 b; 17,47: 12 b).

In the 3rd month (Apr. 6—May 5) of A. D. 26, the emperor dispatched another army southwards. It was commanded by Kia Fu⁸⁾, who surrounded the late Keng-shi

¹⁾ For this and the following events cf. map 27.

²⁾ No place called Yen-sin is recorded in either HS or HHS. It will be remembered, however, that Liu Mao in A. D. 23 had adopted the title of a General Who Detests the Sin [Dynasty] (yen sin tsiang kün). He had surrendered to Kuang-wu at the end of A. D. 25 (cf. supra pp. 29, 105). It is probable that remnants of his party had continued to operate separately and were referred to as the 'Yen-sin bandits'.

³⁾ Po-hua may have been the name of a place, but it is not certain where this was situated. Shen K'in-han's speculation is not entirely convincing. Cf. 20,50: 6 a, *Commentary* and *Tsi kie*.

⁴⁾ Thanks to SKC 21: 3 a—3 b it is possible to establish that Huo-yang was an agglomeration within the Liang prefecture. The latter during Han belonged to the Ho-nan commandery and was situated 40 li W of the present Lin-ju hien, Ho-nan.

⁵⁾ According to the present source, the battle took place in the Ho-nei commandery, i. e. north of the Yellow River. This is a mistake. ChI 19: 19 b states that the Yi-yang prefecture in the Hung-nung commandery had a Kin-men Mountain. Furthermore, SKC 15: 5 b remarks that the Po-ma Creek originated in the mountains of the same Yi-yang prefecture. It adds that this was the locality where the bandits were defeated.

⁶⁾ 17,47: 12 b mentions two prefectures:

Ch'ou in the Nan-yang commandery, situated 55 li SE of the present Lu-shan hien, Ho-nan.

She in the Nan-yang commandery, situated 30 li S of the present hien with the same name, Ho-nan. (For the pronunciation of She cf. 1 B: 13 b, *Commentary*.)

SHS 2: 7 a lists in addition seven prefectures:

Ch'eng-an in the Ying-ch'uan commandery, situated 30 li SE of the present Lin-ju hien, Ho-nan (SHS in contrast to HS writes *ch'eng* with radical 32).

Wu-yang in the Ying-ch'uan commandery, situated SW of the present hien with the same name, Ho-nan.


Che-yang in the Nan-yang commandery, situated 6 li E of the present Fang-ch'eng hien, Ho-nan.

K'un-yang, P'ing-shi, Ki-yang and Hu-yang.

It is not stated in which order these prefectures were taken but, if followed on a map, the general course of Ts'en P'eng's operations is quite clear.

⁷⁾ According to ChI 22:24 b, Hing was an agglomeration within the Fu-yang prefecture. The latter during Han belonged to the Nan-yang commandery and was situated E of the present T'ung-po hien, Ho-nan.

⁸⁾ The campaign began with a defeat. Several men, whose background is not known, had assembled troops in Ying-ch'uan (16,46: 19 a). The capital of this commandery, Yang-ti, and the Mi prefecture



Map 27. Operations in the Nan-yang area, A. D. 26.

Emperor's king of Yen¹⁾ in his city. The latter capitulated after about one month. Kia Fu thereupon took Chao-ling²⁾, pacified Huai-yang³⁾, and in the autumn conquered the Sin-si prefecture in the south. The campaign was probably synchronized with Ko Yen's attack on Liu Yung⁴⁾, and served as a wedge to prevent any spread of hostilities from the southern plain into the Nan-yang basin (1 A: 19 b—20 a; 17,47: 19 a—19 b).

were in their possession. One of Kia Fu's subordinates attacked Mi but was killed in battle (1 A: 20 a; 21,51: 7 a). The area was pacified later during the year by a newly appointed Grand Administrator (16,46: 19 a). A separate imperial force took Yang-ti during the earlier part of A. D. 26 (17,47: 5 a). Cf. map 27.

¹⁾ Cf. supra p. 54 (Yin Tsun).

²⁾ The Chao-ling prefecture during Han belonged to the Ju-nan commandery and was situated 35 li E of the present Yen-ch'eng hien, Ho-nan. 17,47: 19 a—19 b mentions the conquest of this prefecture after the pacification of Huai-yang, but, if one follows the operations on a map, it seems probable that the sequence of events should be reversed.

³⁾ The Grand Administrator Pao Si surrendered. Cf. also supra p. 134, note 1.

⁴⁾ Cf. supra pp. 133 ff.

A third force, which set out at some unspecified date early in A. D. 26, was led by the Commander-in-chief Wu Han. He captured Wan, the capital of Nan-yang, and the Nie-yang¹⁾, Li²⁾, Jang, and Sin-ye prefectures (17,47: 12 b; 18,48: 3 a)³⁾.

Ts'en P'eng's and Wu Han's recent conquests had deprived the warlord Ts'in Feng of three prefectural cities⁴⁾ which he had controlled since A. D. 23. He now started a counteroffensive, but was defeated by Wu Han outside Sin-ye⁵⁾ (18,48: 3 b). It may have seemed as though with this victory the campaign in Nan-yang was nearing its end, but two rebellions upset the balance of power.

A certain Tung Hin who was a native of the Che district⁶⁾ revolted, killed Kuang-wu's Grand Administrator of Nan-yang, and took possession of the Wan prefecture. Two imperial generals, operating separately, stormed the city by night, whereupon Tung Hin withdrew to the Che district (22,52: 9 b). The outbreak of this rebellion is not clearly dated but must have occurred in the latter part of A. D. 26⁷⁾. Tung Hin remained a very minor figure, and in himself would have posed no problem, but it so happened that, more or less simultaneously, another and more serious insurrection took place. In the 8th month (Sept. 1—30), the imperial general Teng Feng made a surprise attack on Wu Han, defeated him, took his equipment, and conquered the Yü-yang prefecture (1 A: 20 b; 17,47: 12 b; 22,52: 10 a). This rebellion, just as the preceding ones of Su Mao⁸⁾ and P'ang Meng⁹⁾, affords still another insight into the strong ties of regionalism and the clash of loyalties which these could involve. The sources state that Teng Feng returned to visit Sin-ye, which was his home prefecture. More probably, he had served under Wu Han, and during the course of his campaign arrived at Sin-ye. This would mean that, like Su Mao and P'ang Meng, he had participated in operations in his home commandery. The HHS here adds an important remark: wherever Wu Han's troops passed, they raided and looted. When Teng Feng came to Sin-ye and discovered that even his own district and hamlet had been plundered, he was infuriated to the point where he attacked Wu Han (17,47: 12 b). It is most significant in this connection that Teng Feng was the paternal nephew of none other than Teng Ch'en, the brother-in-law of Emperor Kuang-wu himself (17,47: 13 a). He belonged therefore to the party which, according to all indications, would emerge victorious, and

¹⁾ The Nie-yang prefecture during Han belonged to the Nan-yang commandery and was situated S of the present Chen-p'ing hien, Ho-nan.

²⁾ The Li prefecture during Han belonged to the Nan-yang commandery and was situated 10 li NE of the present Nei-hiang hien, Ho-nan.

³⁾ Again it is not known in which order the cities were taken, although the general outline of the campaign emerges from the map.

⁴⁾ Hu-yang, Sin-ye and Jang. Cf. map 3.

⁵⁾ The battle was at the Huang-yu River. According to chf 22: 13 a, the Sin-ye prefecture had a Huang-yu agglomeration. SKC 31: 15 b remarks that the Huang-yu River passes through the Huang-yu agglomeration.

⁶⁾ SKC 31: 14 a—14 b indicates that the Che district was situated within the Che-yang prefecture.

⁷⁾ I. e. after Wu Han had taken Wan and proceeded southwards.

⁸⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 133—135.

⁹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 144.

so had nothing to gain from an insurrection. Yet he rebelled, in spite of all rational arguments to the contrary. The regional, centrifugal forces had once more dragged in a man whose own future depended on his resisting them.

As Wu Han had been recalled soon after Teng Feng's revolt¹⁾, the imperial forces in Nan-yang now consisted only of Ts'en P'eng's army at Hing, and the defenders of Wan. In the 11th month (Nov. 29—Dec. 27), Ts'en P'eng was promoted, and received reinforcements with which he attacked Tung Hin in the Che district. He was not successful, since Teng Feng also appeared on the scene. Later, he was again defeated by Teng Feng at Yü-yang (1 A: 20 b; 15,45: 6 b; 17,47: 12 b—13 a; 22,52: 1 b).

A. D. 27, campaign against Teng Feng and Ts'in Feng.

In the 3rd month (Apr. 25—May 24) of A. D. 27, Kuang-wu took command in person. He was met by Ts'en P'eng, who at She routed an officer of Tung Hin. The emperor proceeded to Che-yang. Teng Feng gave up an attempt to resist him there and withdrew. Tung Hin, however, capitulated, and the city of Wan was relieved (SHS 2: 7 a; HHS 1 A: 22 a; 17,47: 13 a; 22,52: 10 a).

In the 4th month (May 25—June 22), the emperor advanced and in a battle directly south of Wan²⁾ defeated Teng Feng, who surrendered (1 A: 22 a—22 b; 17,47: 13 a; 22,52: 1 b). Kuang-wu wished to spare him, since he was aware of the provocation which lay behind his rebellion. He was persuaded to change his mind, and Teng Feng was decapitated (17,47: 13 a). The major part of Nan-yang was soon pacified (18,48: 12 b; 20,50: 6 b; 22,52: 1 b). It seemed again as if the operations in this commandery had been successfully concluded, and the emperor returned to Lo-yang on July 16 (1 A: 22 b). Once more, such optimism proved premature, although the imperial troops this time suffered no further setbacks.

In the middle of A. D. 27, the adventurous and ubiquitous Yen Ts'en, who retained a considerable nuisance value, reappeared in Nan-yang³⁾. His movements had carried him in a complete circle back to the point where he had started. In the 6th month (July 23—Aug. 20), he fought a battle at Jang but was overwhelmed by imperial forces⁴⁾. Having escaped to Tung-yang⁵⁾ (1 A: 22 b; 19,49: 4 b), Yen


¹⁾ At the end of the 8th month, he served on the northern plain (1 A: 10 b; 22,52: 3 b).

²⁾ It took place at the Siao-ch'ang-an agglomeration, situated halfway between Wan and Yü-yang. Cf. vol. I, map 4.

³⁾ Yen Ts'en was a native of Nan-yang and had risen in this commandery in A. D. 23 (cf. *supra* p. 26). He withdrew to Han-chung, where in A. D. 26 he proclaimed himself king. During the same year he entered the Land Within the Passes (cf. *supra* p. 117, note 2). He was defeated there by imperial troops in the 4th month (May 25—June 22) of A. D. 27, withdrew through the Wu pass, attacked the Si prefecture, was again defeated, and lost some of his troops (1 A: 22 b; 17,47: 6 b). (17,47: 6 b reverses the events. It is clear, however, that Yen Ts'en must have penetrated the Wu pass before attacking Si.)

⁴⁾ He had received support from a native of this prefecture who surrendered after the defeat. For this and the events to and including A. D. 29 cf. map 28.

⁵⁾ Tung-yang was an agglomeration within the Yü-yang prefecture. Cf. *ch'i* 22: 15 b.



Map 28. Operations in Nan-yang and Nan, A. D. 27—29.

Ts'en united his troops with those of an officer of the warlord Ts'in Feng, only to suffer another disastrous defeat (1 A: 24 a; 22,52: 1 b). The imperial army captured at Tung-yang garments and official seals and ribbons from Emperor Wu's ancestral temple in Mao-ling, which Yen Ts'en had previously looted (TKK 9: 4 a). He managed to escape again, officially joined Ts'in Feng's party, and received one of his daughters in marriage (13,43: 16 a; 16,46: 5 b; 22,52: 1 b).

The defeat at Tung-yang was a turning point also in the fortunes of Ts'in Feng. So far he had not been seriously challenged in the domain which he had held for nearly five years; but, once the offensive began, his collapse was rapid. The imperial

forces advanced, conquered the Huang-yu agglomeration¹), and took up positions at the Teng prefecture (17,47: 13 a; 22,52: 1 b).

Ts'in Feng offered a stubborn defence at the Han River and prevented Kuang-wu's General-in-chief Ts'en P'eng from crossing it. The latter finally spread the news that he would carry his troops over the river at Shan-tu²). As soon as Ts'in Feng had hurried to this place, Ts'en P'eng crossed where he was and defeated the remaining enemy forces at the O-t'ou Mountain³). Thereupon he marched on the Li-k'iu district. Ts'in Feng hastened back to defend his stronghold. A major battle was fought outside Li-k'iu in the 7th month (Aug. 21—Sept. 19) in which Ts'en P'eng was again victorious. After this, disintegration spread quickly among Ts'in Feng's followers. His Chancellor deserted to the imperial forces. He himself was surrounded in Li-k'iu, which he was not to leave again as a free man (1 A: 22 b; 17,47: 13 a—13 b).

A. D. 28, status quo.

During the whole of A. D. 28, Yen Ts'en and other officers of Ts'in Feng continued minor operations in southern Nan-yang, but without success (1 A: 24 a; 16,46: 5 b—6 a; 22,52: 1 b). Meanwhile, even Ts'in Feng's long-standing ally, T'ien Jung, had begun to harbour second thoughts. He seems already to have come to a decision by the latter part of A. D. 27, after Li-k'iu had been surrounded, although his plans were not immediately carried out. In the spring of A. D. 28, he ordered his brother-in-law Sin Ch'en⁴) to protect Yi-ling, went himself to a place outside Li-k'iu, and fixed a date for the surrender. Sin Ch'en, however, looted his treasury, hurried on unfrequented paths to Li-k'iu, and capitulated ahead of T'ien Jung. He then wrote a letter advising him to follow his example. T'ien Jung, of course, feared a trap and so changed his mind. Suffering defeat at the hands of the imperial troops, he again withdrew to Yi-ling (17,47: 13 b—14 a).

The siege of Li-k'iu dragged on throughout the rest of the year. In the 12th month, on Jan. 23, A. D. 29, Kuang-wu in person arrived outside the city. He invited Ts'in Feng to surrender, but received only curses by way of answer (1 A: 24 b; 17,47: 14 a; 22,52: 1 b—2 a). The emperor returned to Lo-yang (1 A: 25 a).

A. D. 29, defeat of Ts'in Feng and T'ien Jung. Surrender of the south.

In the 3rd month (Apr. 3—May 2) of A. D. 29, the imperial General-in-chief Ts'en P'eng set out to break T'ien Jung's last resistance. Routing him at the Tsin

¹) Cf. *supra* p. 153, note 5.

²) The Shan-tu prefecture during Han belonged to the Nan-yang commandery and was situated NW of the present Siang-yang hien, Hu-peï.

³) Shen K'in-han states that the O-t'ou Mountain is situated 9 li W of the present Siang-yang hien, Hu-peï.

⁴) According to 13,43: 16 a, T'ien Jung had earlier married a daughter of Ts'in Feng (cf. *supra* p. 28). If that entry is correct, she probably had died.

district¹⁾ (1 A: 25 a), he overran the Yi-ling prefecture and pursued the enemy to Ts'ikuei²⁾. T'ien Jung fled with a handful of horsemen to Kung-sun Shu in S'ich'uan. His wife and children and all his soldiers were captured (13, 43: 16 a; 17, 47: 14 a).

In the 6th month (July 1—29), Ts'in Feng finally capitulated in Li-k'iu together with his mother, wife and seven children. He was transported to Lo-yang in a prison cart and there decapitated (1 A: 25 b; 22, 52: 2 a). Yen Ts'en once again managed to save himself; continuing his perambulations, he entered S'ich'uan and also joined Kung-sun Shu (13, 43: 15 b—16 a). His last adherents in southern Nan-yang were pacified (22, 52: 2 a).

The imperial victories had a profound impact on the administrators in central and southern China. An-hui and Che-kiang were already under Kuang-wu's control³⁾, but in Han times they were both fairly isolated from other parts of the south. The two commanderies in Yün-nan and Kuei-chou had, through occasional messengers, been in contact with Kuang-wu⁴⁾. But the remaining areas, including central Hu-pei, Hu-nan, Kiang-si, Kuang-tung, Kuang-si and Indo-China, had in practice enjoyed a tranquil independence ever since the fall of Wang Mang. The recent campaigns had broken down the barrier which Li Hien, Ts'in Feng and T'ien Jung had formed between the south and Kuang-wu's rising might in the north⁵⁾, and now in A. D. 29, for the first time since the outbreak of the civil war, direct pressure was brought to bear on the southern administrators. It is indicative of the rapidly changing balance of power, as well as of their own insignificance in the general scheme of things, that these officials found little difficulty in adjusting themselves to the new situation.

As soon as Ts'en P'eng had defeated T'ien Jung and begun preparations for a campaign against Kung-sun Shu, he wrote a letter to the Shepherd of the Kiao province.⁶⁾ This man not only happened to be an old friend of his but was also married to a sister of Kuang-wu's concubine and future second Empress née Yin. His sympathies therefore could be counted on. Simultaneously, Ts'en P'eng sent a Lieutenant General with a call-to-arms to the areas south of the Yang-ts'i (TKK 15: 7 b; HHS 17, 47: 14 b). In order to put teeth into this diplomatic *démarche*, the emperor separately dispatched an officer⁷⁾ who invaded the Kiang-hia command-

¹⁾ Ts'in was a district within the Kiang-ling prefecture (ch'f 22: 18 b). According to the commentators (1 A: 25 a, *T'ei kie*), it was situated 3 li E of the present Kiang-ling hien. Cf. map 28.

The Kiang-ling prefecture during Han was the capital of the Nan commandery and is identical with the present hien with the same name, Hu-pei.

²⁾ The Ts'ikuei prefecture during Han belonged to the Nan commandery and is identical with the present hien with the same name, Hu-pei. Cf. map 28.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 137, note 2, p. 142. The parts of An-hui south of the Yang-ts'i comprised in Han times the Tan-yang commandery. It had with certainty an imperial Grand Administrator by A. D. 30 (21, 51: 4 a).

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 109.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 48.

⁶⁾ The text has «Kiao-ch'ia», but the correct name of the province was Kiao.

⁷⁾ The Ki ku ko and Palace editions mistakenly record the operation of this officer under kien-wu 3rd year (A. D. 27) instead of the 5th year (A. D. 29). The Shao-hing edition writes «5th year» (lie chuan 8: 20 a), which obviously is correct from all internal evidence.

ery and conquered Chung-wu¹) (18,48: 12 b). Under this combined onset, the various administrators followed the example of the Shepherd of Kiao, and through messengers surrendered to Kuang-wu²) (1 A: 26 b; 17,47: 14 b; 76,106: 4 a—4 b). It is not surprising that the south plays so minor a role during the civil war, nor that its reintegration into the empire should have been so smoothly effected. Southern China was a colonial area in which the regional forces were represented by the aborigines, while the Chinese there were too weak in numbers and resources to indulge in any serious separatist movements.

To complete the picture, it may be added that one year later, in the autumn of A. D. 30, the emperor also regained control over Lo-lang in Korea. Since the death of the Keng-shī Emperor this commandery had been in the hands of a certain Wang T'iao³). When Kuang-wu sent a Grand Administrator designate to take possession of Lo-lang, Wang T'iao was killed by his subordinates, who then welcomed the imperial appointee (1 B: 2 a; 76,106: 5 a).

By A. D. 30, the most hazardous phase of the civil war had ended. East China was wholly pacified, and the south had voluntarily submitted. Kuang-wu, without apprehensions of attacks from the rear, could begin the subjugation of the west. Wei Ao and Kung-sun Shu had failed to intervene in the war when intervention might still have influenced its outcome. Confronted with the massive resources of the emperor, and still averse to anything more than lukewarm cooperation, they were no longer able to stave off their ultimate defeat.

¹) Situated SE of the present Sin-yang hien, Hu-pei. Cf. map 28. He also took a district and a hamlet whose emplacement is no longer known.

²) Mentioned by name are the administrators of Kiang-hia, Wu-ling, Ch'ang-sha, Kuei-yang, Ling-ling, Ts'ang-wu, and Kiao-chī (17,47: 14 b). It may be assumed that the five additional commanderies within the Kiao province were included in the surrender of its Shepherd. This only leaves Yü-chang unaccounted for, which comprised the present Kiang-si. This commandery must also have submitted either now or soon afterwards, as Kuang-wu appointed a Grand Administrator of Yü-chang not later than A. D. 31 (Cf. 28 A, 58 A: 14 a—14 b, *Commentary*).

³) Cf. *supra* p. 47, note 3, p. 112, and map 15.

CHAPTER VI. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN WEST CHINA

1. *Campaigns in the northwest against Wei Ao*

A. D. 26—29, the diplomatic phase.

Kuang-wu's foothold in the northwest at the beginning of A. D. 26 consisted of parts of Shan-si and Shen-si on the mountainous plateau adjoining the Great Plain. Ch'ang-an and the old capital area on both sides of the Wei River were in the hands of the Red Eyebrows. The Hung-nung commandery, situated between the domain of the latter and Kuang-wu's recently conquered capital Lo-yang, belonged as yet to no one¹⁾. The Red Eyebrows did not attempt to hold this territory, and Kuang-wu's troops encountered there only men who in the sources are summarily described as 'bandits'. They may have belonged to the gentry and had taken a number of cities, which, quite possibly, were the capitals of their home prefectures²⁾. Imperial forces were engaged against them from the 2nd (Mar. 8—Apr. 5) to the 11th month (Nov. 29—Dec. 27) of this year. Though these operations were not without their setbacks, a successful conclusion to the campaign was never in doubt (TKK 9: 3 b; HHS 1 A: 19 b, 20 b, 21 a; 17,47: 5 a; 20,50: 6 a; 22,52: 3 b—4 a).

However, one of the battles fought in Hung-nung during the latter half of A. D. 26 was not against the local bandits. It involved remnants of the groups of commoners who had been active on the Great Plain³⁾. While popular unrest had for the most part been suppressed there during that year, scattered detachments from originally independent bands had merged, and moved into Hung-nung⁴⁾. They were defeated (18,48: 3 b) and probably pushed further inland. It is plausible that a unit which subsequently appeared in the Shang commandery⁵⁾ was made up of these same commoners⁶⁾. No cooperation with the Red Eyebrows can have taken place since it would have involved the recognition of their Emperor Liu P'en-tsi. As a matter of fact, members of this independent band proclaimed a Son of Heaven of their own in the 11th month (Nov. 29—Dec. 27) of A. D. 26, though nothing is known of this man except his name: Sun Teng. He was promptly killed by a subordinate who, together with the rest of the band, surrendered to imperial forces (1 A: 20 b—21 a).

¹⁾ Cf. map 15.


²⁾ The sources mention five men by name, as well as the prefectures which they controlled.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 79 ff.

⁴⁾ Directly mentioned are the T'ung-ma and Wu-fan.

⁵⁾ Situated in northeastern Shen-si along the Yellow River.

⁶⁾ This time the T'ung-ma, Ts'ing-tu and Yu-lai are mentioned.



Map 29. Prefectural cities in the Land Within the Passes held by gentry clans, A. D. 27.

Hung-nung was once more in turmoil at the beginning of A. D. 27, when the Red Eyebrows marched through the commandery in their attempted break away to the Great Plain¹⁾; but peace was restored after their surrender on Mar. 15, A. D. 27. In the three capital commanderies²⁾, on the other hand, the exodus of the Red Eyebrows left a void which could not immediately be filled by Kuang-wu's armies. Twelve men are mentioned by name who took possession of various cities, assembled troops, and adopted titles³⁾. It cannot be doubted that the majority of these were members of the local gentry⁴⁾ and that the prefectures they captured were those of which they were natives⁵⁾. Even Ch'ang-an was included among them (17,47: 6 a—6 b).

The imperial General-in-chief Feng Yi, who had successfully combatted the Red Eyebrows, remained in the Land Within the Passes to take up the fight. He was assisted by the new Grand Administrator of Yu-fu-feng. Together they attacked the various »Braves and Stalwarts«, executed those who did not surrender volun-

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 118—119.

²⁾ I. e. King-chao-yin, Yu-fu-feng, and Tso-p'ing-yi.

³⁾ Cf. map 29. The emplacement of these prefectures is already given in various notes, except for the following two:

The Ch'en-ts'ang prefecture during Han belonged to the Yu-fu-feng commandery and was situated E of the present Pao-ki hien, Shen-si.

The Hu prefecture during Han belonged to the Yu-fu-feng commandery and was situated N of the present hien with the same name, Shen-si.

⁴⁾ Two independent sources (13,43: 15 b; 17,47: 6 b) refer to the men in question as »Braves and Stalwarts«, i. e. powerful members of the gentry.

In one case it is possible to go one step further: the Huai-li prefecture was held by a certain Ju Chang. It so happens that, according to HS 99 C: 26 a (99. Dubs, III, p. 461), members of the powerful clans in the Ch'ang-an area assembled bands in A. D. 23. One of these was Ju Ch'en from Huai-li (cf. also vol. I, p. 130). Clearly, Ju Chang and Ju Ch'en belonged to the same gentry clan.

⁵⁾ An exception is Yen Ts'en who conquered Lan-t'ien in A. D. 27 (i. e. after he had occupied the Tu-ling prefecture. Cf. *supra* p. 117, note 2).

tarily, and sent the others to Lo-yang. Only three of the twelve escaped total defeat and managed to join Kung-sun Shu in Si-ch'uan. One of these was Lü Wei in Ch'en-ts'ang¹). Kung-sun Shu speedily dispatched troops to assist him, but these were defeated in a number of engagements with the imperial army and forced to withdraw. Lü Wei gave up his city and also fled (1 A: 24 b; 13,43: 6 b—7 a, 15 b; 17,47: 6 b—7 a). The chronology of these events is somewhat doubtful²). So much is clear, that the three capital commanderies were under Kuang-wu's control not later than A. D. 28. This concluded one phase of the operations. It was followed by a period of intensive diplomatic activity, involving the warlords Wei Ao and Tou Jung.

Wei Ao has been mentioned frequently in this work. He had been an official of Wang Mang³), had risen against him in A. D. 23 and conquered almost the whole of present Kan-su⁴). During the following year, he joined the Keng-shī Emperor, but in A. D. 25 he again rebelled. In the meantime Tou Jung had entrenched himself in the Kan-su corridor⁵). This meant that, from the end of A. D. 25 onwards, he and Wei Ao divided Kan-su between them: the former holding the area to the west, and the latter that to the east, of the Yellow River.

Tou Jung's policy was transparent. He belonged to one of the greatest gentry clans of Han times and was mainly interested in conserving its high position. In A. D. 24, he had deliberately intrigued for an appointment in the far northwest, as this would allow him to remain uncommitted as long as none of the contestants in the civil war emerged as the ultimate victor. It seems probable that Tou Jung's plans did not exclude the possibility of a prolonged period of independence, provided the political chaos continued. At the same time, he was prepared and eager to join any man who would restore order in the empire and so give his clan a chance to regain its share of power. Tou Jung was not a native of the Kan-su corridor, whose primitive conditions could hold little attraction for an educated and cultured man.

Wei Ao's ambitions were of a different sort, and, in a sense, much more complex. He belonged to a gentry clan of T'ien-shui, a commandery which always remained his fastness. It has been seen how, with the death of Wang Mang, and even more so with the fall of the Keng-shī Emperor, various parts of the empire broke away and achieved independence once the centripetal forces had ceased to act. Wei Ao represented and headed one of these regional parties. He became an autonomist, valuing his own freedom of action more highly than no matter how distinguished a subordinate career under any of the pretenders. If he seemed constantly to waver between political alternatives, this was only his way of avoiding irrevocable com-

¹) 13,43: 6 b, 15 b states clearly that he was a native of this prefecture and that he belonged to the gentry.

²) 1 A: 24 b and 17,47: 7a place the battles in A. D. 28. 13,43: 6 b—7 a, 15 b lists them under A. D. 27.

³) Cf. vol. I, p. 118.

⁴) Cf. *supra* pp. 24—25, 48, and map 5.

⁵) Cf. *supra* pp. 60—61, 110—112, and map 15.

mitments. He made a final choice only when this step was at last forced upon him — and when it was too late. In the true sense of the word, Wei Ao was a separatist.

This may not always have been so. When Wei Ao rose in A. D. 23, he summoned a certain Fang Wang and made him his official. Influenced by this man, who was evidently much respected in the northwest, Wei Ao proclaimed his support of the Han dynasty, built a temple, and sacrificed to the Emperors Kao (206—195), Wen (179—157), and Wu (140—87). He and his followers took a solemn oath in which they promised loyalty to the imperial Liu clan and subsequently confirmed their allegiance in the great proclamation of Aug. 6, A. D. 23¹⁾. All this does not necessarily mean that Wei Ao, at this stage, was in favour of the Keng-shī Emperor. Much points to the fact that he and Fang Wang generally welcomed the restoration of the Han dynasty, but that within this framework they wished to preserve their own freedom of initiative. This duality is exemplified by the title of reign which Wei Ao adopted: «han-fu», «the Return of Han» (13,43: 2 a). Although hailing the revival of the dynasty, it was not the title of reign selected by the Keng-shī Emperor, quite apart from the fact that the choice of a nien hao was in any case an imperial prerogative.

When the Keng-shī Emperor dispatched messengers in A. D. 24 and summoned Wei Ao to Ch'ang-an, the latter accepted the invitation despite the protests of Fang Wang²⁾. Wei Ao never seems to have become a confident supporter of the emperor, yet the fact remains that, in spite of a pronounced disagreement within his own ranks, he left his regional stronghold and went to the capital. It seems fairly certain that Wei Ao at this time was willing to give up separatism for centralism, even though he remained torn between the two. When his uncles wished to rebel and return to the T'ien-shui commandery, he was clearly aware of the plot, since he denounced it. He was therefore still, on balance, prepared to uphold the court, though the wish to liquidate his rivals for local power may also have been a motive. Later he received the distinguished rank of Grandee Secretary, which strengthened the influence of his party³⁾. Wei Ao's disillusionment grew as he noted the progressive disintegration of the Keng-shī emperor's prestige. In A. D. 25, he went so far as to advocate the latter's abdication and was soon taking part in a plot against the sovereign. After its failure, Wei Ao barely saved his life, escaping to T'ien-shui where he resumed the role of independent warlord⁴⁾.

This experience must have coloured Wei Ao's entire later outlook. He had made an attempt, half-hearted though it may have been, to surrender his local power in exchange for official position and influence under the restored dynasty, but had almost been drawn into the maelstrom of the fall of the Keng-shī Emperor. Safely back in T'ien-shui, he must have been firmly resolved to prevent any repetition of his recent predicament; and during the following year this determination hardened into obstinacy.

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 123 ff.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 58.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 86—87.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 97—99.

Wei Ao's entire thinking was defensive. The Lung Slope¹⁾ formed his frontier towards the east, and he guarded it jealously against encroachments. When at the end of A. D. 25 a mutinous imperial officer entered his territory, he promptly defeated him²⁾, and in the next year forced back the Red Eyebrows³⁾. Nevertheless, he made no attempt to invade the Land Within the Passes when the Red Eyebrows evacuated it in A. D. 27, and when it might have been his for the taking. As long as Wei Ao remained unchallenged in his possession of T'ien-shui, he was not overly concerned with the events in the Ch'ang-an area and, in fact, was quite willing to cooperate with the imperial forces. He proved this by assisting in the attack on Lü Wei⁴⁾ (13,43: 6 b—7 a). In theory, Wei Ao was indeed an official of Kuang-wu, since at the end of A. D. 25 he had accepted appointment as General-in-chief of the Western Provinces with sole authority in the provinces of Liang and Shuo-fang.⁵⁾ He must have been anxious to establish cordial relations in the hope that this would guarantee his actual autonomy.

Towards the west, the Yellow River separated Wei Ao's territory from Tou Jung's⁶⁾. No actual hostilities took place between these warlords for the first few years. Tou Jung was technically a subordinate of Wei Ao as, on the one hand, his area was situated within the Liang province and, on the other, he and his associates had accepted official seals from Wei Ao⁷⁾. In the most abstract sense, both were therefore officials of Kuang-wu. The true state of affairs was lost on neither the emperor nor the two warlords. Wei Ao and Tou Jung continued for a while to observe a guarded truce, the situation being complicated by the fact that they belonged to, or supported, different cliques which bitterly opposed each other⁸⁾.

Wei Ao had early extended his domain. Apart from T'ien-shui, he controlled the An-ting commandery in the north. He had also expanded towards the south and southwest. Some of the Po-ma-ti, an aboriginal tribe in the Wu-tu commandery, had joined him, while others supported Kung-sun Shu in Sī-ch'uan⁹⁾ (86,116: 23 a). Wei Ao also came to terms with the Tibetans, who since the death of Wang Mang had looted the Kin-ch'eng¹⁰⁾ and Lung-si commanderies. Being unable to defeat them, he entered into an alliance which gave him at least partial control of Lung-si and, to a lesser degree, of Kin-ch'eng (15,45: 11 b; 23,63: 6 b; 87,117: 6 b). However, as said before, Wei Ao maintained a rigidly defensive attitude towards the east and did not attempt to extend his territory beyond the Lung Slope. This relieved Kuang-wu from all immediate anxiety in the northwest at a time when

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 115, note 2. It is shown on maps 16, 29 etc.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 101, note 4.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 115.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 161.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 110.

⁶⁾ Cf. map 15.

⁷⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 110.

⁸⁾ Cf. further the chapter on cliques in vol. III.

⁹⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 108—109.

¹⁰⁾ At first, Tou Jung had controlled Kin-ch'eng (cf. *supra* p. 110, note 3), but the Tibetans killed its Grand Administrator and took over the commandery.

a determinate offensive against him might well have proved disastrous. Wei Ao remained inactive, content with his achievements, and held a brilliant court in his domain¹⁾.

It is necessary to examine closely the diplomatic manoeuvres in which Wei Ao, Tou Jung, Kung-sun Shu, and Kuang-wu were involved during the years A. D. 26—30. Among the men who played a role, Ma Yüan was the most important. He was a native of the northwest, the home of his family being in the Mao-ling prefecture²⁾ of the Yu-fu-feng commandery. His ancestors had already held official positions in Chou times (24,54: 1 a), and during the Han dynasty the clan had successfully preserved its influence. Ma Yüan thus belonged to one of the great gentry families of the period³⁾. His surviving elder brother submitted to Emperor Kuang-wu at an early stage. Ma Yüan himself stayed behind and joined Wei Ao, on whom he seems to have exerted a considerable influence. He received from him the rank of general (24,54: 2 a).

It was probably in the year A. D. 26 that Wei Ao sent Ma Yüan on an important diplomatic mission to Kung-sun Shu in Si-ch'uan⁴⁾. If this date is correct, Wei Ao negotiated with Kung-sun Shu after he had accepted official rank from Emperor Kuang-wu. Ma Yüan was an obvious choice for the embassy, since he and Kung-sun Shu were natives of the same prefecture and had been friends. Ma Yüan may, in fact, have been the driving force behind the whole approach, his object being to obtain a clear view of the various political alternatives⁵⁾. He was disappointed with his reception in Si-ch'uan. Kung-sun Shu did not treat him as an old acquaintance but insisted instead that imperial etiquette be observed. Although Ma Yüan was offered a marquissate and the rank of a General-in-chief, it was quite obvious that he would not be granted any special privileges. The report which he delivered after his return was therefore biased against Kung-sun Shu (24,54: 2 b—3 a)⁶⁾, and this may have reconfirmed Wei Ao's resolve to avoid any definite alignments. When Kung-sun Shu invited the latter to accept the rank of king and the office of Grand Minister of Works in exchange for his own recognition as Son of Heaven, the messengers were summarily executed. Wei Ao repeatedly defeated troops which attacked him from Si-ch'uan, after which Kung-sun Shu desisted from further offensives to the north (13,43: 7 b). About this time, Wei Ao discussed with his officials whether he himself should assume the rank of a king. The scholar Cheng Hing remonstrated against the suggestion, whereupon Wei Ao abandoned it (36,66: 1 b—2 b).

Kuang-wu was meanwhile well aware of the fact that Wei Ao, his acceptance of an imperial title notwithstanding, was still quite uncommitted. In A. D. 26,

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 110.

²⁾ It is shown in vol. I, map 2.

³⁾ Cf. further the chapter on cliques in vol. III.

⁴⁾ The embassy is not dated. Wei Ao had returned to T'ien-shui in the latter half of A. D. 25. It must have taken him some time to put his domain in order and to attract such men as Ma Yüan to his court. A. D. 26 seems, therefore, a plausible date for the approach.

⁵⁾ I will return to this question in the chapter on cliques in vol. III.

⁶⁾ Cf. also vol. I, p. 52.

he debated the situation with Lai Hi, a relative by marriage and his confidant. Lai Hi had not only known Wei Ao in Ch'ang-an but was also a friend of Ma Yüan. He requested permission to visit Wei Ao, thinking that this might result in his surrender. In the following year (A. D. 27), Lai Hi carried out his plan but achieved little. Wei Ao made various excuses and stayed where he was, though he went as far as to submit a memorial which, in theory, signified his recognition of Kuang-wu. The emperor answered with extreme politeness (1 A: 23 a; 13,43: 6 b, 7 b—8 a; 15,45: 9 b). This was the beginning of a lively personal correspondence between the two.

In spite of the direct contact, politically nothing was changed. Wei Ao wished to preserve his independence. Kuang-wu hoped to win him over, or, if this proved impossible, at least to neutralize him for the time being and so prevent the outbreak of open hostilities. Both played the diplomatic game to the limit. The, on the surface, exuberantly friendly relations grew somewhat cooler when the emperor in A. D. 27 instructed Wei Ao to attack Kung-sun Shu. This must have been deeply perturbing to Wei Ao, as he dispatched his own Chief Clerk with a memorial to the court. Wei Ao pleaded his cause by asserting that the northwest was weakened, that Lu Fang stood at the border¹⁾, and that it would therefore be unwise to strike at Kung-sun Shu. Although this reasoning may have been strategically sound, it also disclosed that he had no intention of fighting the emperor's battles. Kuang-wu cautiously refused to make an issue of the matter, but in future treated Wei Ao less effusively and applied the regular etiquette of a ruler and subject (13,43: 7 b).

In the winter of A. D. 28, Wei Ao again sent a memorial to the court. This time he chose Ma Yüan as his emissary, who, upon arrival, was received in audience. Kuang-wu remarked laughingly that Ma Yüan travelled to and fro between two emperors, these being Kung-sun Shu and himself. Here, Ma Yüan gave a most revealing answer. He said: »In present times, it is not only the sovereign who selects his subjects. The subjects also select their sovereign». Kung-sun Shu and he being natives of the same prefecture and childhood friends, Ma Yüan had gone first to him. The elaborate precautions taken at his reception had annoyed him. Ma Yüan contrasted this with his present audience and half jokingly asked how the emperor could be sure that he had not come to murder him. He then asserted his conviction that Kuang-wu was the true heir to the empire (24,54: 3 a). This ruthlessly frank statement could not have been made so easily by a lesser person. Only a man with Ma Yüan's great regional following²⁾ could have permitted himself the liberty of summing up the situation with such accurate bluntness. He had been rebuffed by Kung-sun Shu, had watched the rise of Kuang-wu, and had probably begun to doubt Wei Ao's chances of preserving his independence. He consequently proposed to change party in favour of the emperor, and knew exactly how much this was worth. It was, just as he had intimated, a case of a powerful subject choosing his sovereign. Kuang-wu, for his part, realized that with Ma

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 25—26.

²⁾ Cf. the chapter on cliques in vol. III.

Yüan's active assistance a major obstacle to the annihilation of Wei Ao's power would be removed. He was anxious not to antagonize Ma Yüan. Both men could afford to face the truth without evasion.

Ma Yüan remained in the entourage of the emperor until the following year (A. D. 29) and was made an Expectant Appointee (24,54: 3 a). The last resistance in East China was in the process of being broken down, and Kuang-wu's attitude towards Wei Ao began to harden. In A. D. 29, he sent Lai Hi with the Staff of Authority and an imperial letter to escort Ma Yüan on his return to the northwest. Demanding proof of Wei Ao's good faith, he requested him to send a son to the capital. Wei Ao discussed the situation with Ma Yüan, who seems to have posed as his supporter, although he was now working secretly for Kuang-wu. The report was not to Wei Ao's liking. Nevertheless he allowed himself to be persuaded, and permitted Ma Yüan and Lai Hi to convey his son Sün to the court. Subsequently, Ma Yüan stayed with Kuang-wu's party. Wei Sün was well treated, appointed as a Colonel of Hu Cavalry, and enfeoffed as Marquis Who Chisels Away the Tibetans (1 A: 26 b; 13,43: 8 a; 15,45: 9 b; 24,54: 3 a—3 b). This did not change the fact that he was a hostage.

The warlord had complied with the emperor's demand, yet his acquiescence remained entirely passive. He wished to prevent interference in his domain at whatever cost, even that of placing a son in Kuang-wu's power. Wei Ao was firmly resolved to take no orders from the court. There were those, indeed, among his followers who belatedly began to advocate a more active course. Two of Wei Ao's Generals-in-chief¹⁾ suggested that he should advance and conquer the Land Within the Passes (13,43: 8 a—8 b). The text adds that he agreed, which may be a private guess of the historian and a wrong one at that. Facts show that Wei Ao did not adopt this plan. He stubbornly avoided being drawn out of his own territory and remained strictly on the defensive. Neither did he take any notice of the many letters he received from Ma Yüan (24,54: 3 b).

In this dilemma, the emperor began to shift his position and apply diplomatic pressure in another quarter. Kan-su west of the Yellow River was still under the control of Tou Jung. He and Wei Ao had managed to coexist, although each seems to have been suspicious of the other. If Tou Jung could be made to collaborate with Kuang-wu, Wei Ao would be squeezed from two sides. The emperor therefore dispatched a messenger with a letter to Tou Jung in the summer of A. D. 29. It was no coincidence that this envoy should have met Tou Jung's Chief Clerk travelling in the opposite direction with a memorial and presents to the court. The same reasons which now permitted the emperor to take a resolute stand in the northwest applied equally to Tou Jung. The civil war in East China was coming to an end, with Kuang-wu emerging as the probable victor, and the time had come for Tou Jung to re-assess the situation. He held a conference with his officials and with members of the local gentry, at which it was decided to recognize the restored dynasty. Consequently, Tou Jung dispatched his Chief Clerk in the 4th month (May 3—31) of A. D. 29, accompanied by the private envoys of some

¹⁾ Wang Yüan and Wang Tsie.

of his powerful officials. When the imperial messenger met these men, he turned back and escorted them to Lo-yang. Kuang-wu gave a banquet and then ordered the emissaries to deliver a letter to Tou Jung. In this he confirmed Tou's self-assumed title as Acting General-in-chief of the Five Commanderies West of the [Yellow] River, appointed him Shepherd of the Liang province, and presented him with 200 catties of real gold. At least one of Tou's subordinates received the rank of general. Tou Jung's new position as Shepherd of Liang was a direct insult to Wei Ao, who had previously held this rank¹⁾. It is also interesting to note that the emperor's letter went straight to the crucial point, without beating about the bush. Apart from Kuang-wu and his remaining rivals, Tou Jung and Ma Yüan were the most influential men in the realm, and their personal power eclipsed that of any single individual in Kuang-wu's intimate entourage. Just as Ma Yüan and the emperor had been able to dispense with all pretence, the letter to Tou Jung stated with complete frankness: «At present, the Yi province has Kung-sun Tsi-yang²⁾, and T'ien-shui has the General Wei [Ao]. Just now, Shu and Han³⁾ attack each other, and the weight of balance rests with you, General».

As soon as Tou Jung had received this missive, he once more sent his Chief Clerk to Lo-yang. He reminded Kuang-wu that he was a distaff relative of the imperial house⁴⁾ and the scion of a family of high officials, but also pledged his full support. In proof of this, he promised to send a younger brother as a hostage to the capital⁵⁾ (1 A: 25 a; 23,53: 3 b—4 b; 34,64: 1 b).

A. D. 30, the first campaign.

In the beginning of A. D. 30, the period of diplomacy in the northwest reached its climax and end. Kuang-wu was still willing to acknowledge the *de facto* independence of Wei Ao, as long as the latter remained inactive. He continued to keep in contact with him through a brisk exchange of letters (13,43: 8 b—9 a). At the same time it became increasingly obvious that the lull could not last much longer. The emperor had pacified the east, and his pressure on Wei Ao was therefore bound to increase. The scholars and prominent men who had flocked around Wei Ao correctly assessed the altering situation and prudently changed sides while opportunity still offered. Ma Yüan had read the signs already in A. D. 28. Tu Lin used the death of his younger brother as a pretext and departed in A. D. 30⁶⁾. He was immediately summoned by Kuang-wu and appointed to office (27,57: 5 b—6 a). Cheng Hing absented himself with his whole family in A. D. 30 and, on Tu Lin's recommendation, also received official rank from Emperor Kuang-wu (36,66: 2 b—3 a). The historian Pan Piao too made ready to leave. Wei Ao

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 110.

²⁾ Tsi-yang was the style of Kung-sun Shu.

³⁾ I. e. the area of Si-ch'uan and the Han empire.

⁴⁾ Emperor Wen's (179—157) empress had belonged to the Tou clan. Moreover, she was the ancestress of Kuang-wu.

⁵⁾ The outbreak of hostilities prevented him from reaching Lo-yang (23,53: 4 b).

⁶⁾ Cf. also vol. I, p. 57.

questioned Pan on the one point which continued to excite his imagination and colour his political outlook. He asked whether the existing conditions corresponded to the period of the Warring States, and so would last for many generations, or whether the country would again be unified under one emperor. Pan Piao replied that the Chou dynasty had been a feudal era in which the nobles had grown in strength, while the kings of Chou had become weak. This had quite naturally led to the period of the Warring States. The Han, however, were the heirs of the Ts'in dynasty and had instituted a centralized government based on commanderies and prefectures. In this system, no subject could maintain power for long. It was true that Wang Mang had stolen the throne, but «the danger originated at the top, and the harm did not reach to the bottom». The people continued to long for the Han dynasty. When the civil war broke out, the various rebels declared themselves for the Liu clan without first having conferred with each other. Those who at present maintained their independence, in contrast to the nobles of the Warring States, had no hereditary right to their domains. Pan Piao concluded that the people, in truth, favoured the Han dynasty. Wei Ao agreed with some of these arguments but insisted that the Han House would not be restored. He believed that it was no argument to quote stupid people who were used to the Liu clan and could not imagine a change. Later Pan Piao composed the «Discussion of the Mandate of Kings» (Wang ming lun), in which he stated that the Han dynasty had its authority from Heaven. This must have been intended as a disavowal of his former connections with Wei Ao. The latter refused to be impressed, and Pan Piao departed. He joined Tou Jung west of the Yellow River and was made an Attendant Official by him (HHK 5: 13 b—17 a; HHS 40 A, 70 A: 1 a—2 a).¹⁾

In the 3rd month (Apr. 22—May 20) of A. D. 30, Kung-sun Shu's troops moved down the Yang-tsi and invaded the Nan commandery in present northwestern Hu-pei. This, at last, brought about a clarification. An imperial edict ordered Wei Ao to attack Kung-sun Shu from the north, a command which either had to be obeyed or defied. Wei Ao once more tried to make excuses, and pointed out that the roads along the precipices were in bad repair (13,43: 9 a). The emperor refused to be deceived. He instructed seven of his generals to assemble with their armies in Ch'ang-an in order to advance against Kung-sun Shu by way of T'ien-shui (15,45: 6 b; 18,48: 10 b; 20,50: 7 a). On May 28, Kuang-wu himself arrived

¹⁾ Pan Piao's biography was most likely written by his son Pan Ku (cf. vol. I, p. 10). It may therefore be expected to present him in the best possible light, i. e. as a staunch spokesman of the Han dynasty. As a matter of fact, this is exactly what Pan Piao by this time had become. He proved it in action by leaving Wei Ao.

Pan Piao must have had his doubts at the outbreak of the civil war, since otherwise he would hardly have spent years at Wei Ao's court. Gradually he came to realize that Kuang-wu would be victorious, and so made ready to change party. Safeguarding himself against any further repercussions, he argued with Wei Ao in favour of the Han dynasty, and, to make doubly sure, wrote the «Wang ming lun». All points to the fact that the biography does not need to vindicate him by direct misrepresentation of events. Bias is expressed rather through the exclusion and inclusion of material: by quietly passing over Pan Piao's early relations with Wei Ao, and by giving emphasis and space to the reasons for his departure.

at Ch'ang-an (1 B: 1 b; 13,43: 9 a). This was the first time since the outbreak of the civil war that he entered the Land Within the Passes. It is significant that East China was now pacified. Kuang-wu had learned from the Keng-shi Emperor's mistake, and carefully avoided visiting Ch'ang-an until he was sure that he would not be trapped there like his predecessor.

Even in the present inflammable situation, the emperor still tried to find a peaceful solution. He again dispatched Lai Hi with a letter which told Wei Ao that the attack on Kung-sun Shu was planned to go through his territory, and made it clear that Wei was expected actively to participate in the offensive (13,43: 9 a; 15,45: 9 b). Wei Ao had, of course, been correct in saying that the proposed route into Si-ch'uan was unsuitable for large scale troop movements. Kuang-wu must also have known this, as the imperial forces at no time made any serious assault from this direction. Although it was officially given out that the military concentration at Ch'ang-an was directed against Kung-sun Shu, this was obviously a pretext and a veiled threat against Wei Ao himself. Once the armies had entered his domain, they would enforce imperial authority and Wei's independence would vanish. In this situation Wei Ao found it difficult to reach a decision, and kept the imperial envoy waiting. Lai Hi finally lost patience, and demanded an immediate answer. Wei Ao did not relish such language, and rose and left, after which his soldiers began to act menacingly. Lai Hi ascended his chariot and drove away. There was at first some confusion as to whether or not he should be pursued and killed, and this enabled him to make good his escape (13,43: 9 a; 15,45: 9 b—10 a).

Kuang-wu held a final council with his generals in Ch'ang-an. He was inclined to postpone the attack on Wei Ao and meanwhile to sow discord among Wei's followers by offering them rewards if they surrendered. One of the high officers argued against this, and his advice was accepted by the emperor (20,50: 7 a).

Tou Jung, who for his part had reprimanded Wei Ao by letter, remained in direct touch with Kuang-wu. His troops stood ready, and he now requested a time-table for the offensive. The emperor provided the necessary information and gave flattering signs of his pleasure. He presented Tou Jung with a Chart of the Distaff Relatives¹⁾, Si-ma Ts'ien's chapters on the Hereditary Houses of the Distaff Relatives²⁾ and of the Five Family Branches³⁾, and his biography of the Marquis of Wei-k'i⁴⁾ (23,53: 4 b—6 b).

In the 5th month (June 20—July 18), the imperial armies advanced⁵⁾. The van won a minor victory, but soon after the main body of troops was badly defeated at the Lung Slope (1 B: 1 b; 13,43: 9 a; 17,47: 8 a; 20,50: 7 b; 22,52: 11 a).

¹⁾ Or drawings?


²⁾ SK 49. It includes a section on the Empress née Tou and her family.

³⁾ SK 59. The Five Family Branches refer to the thirteen sons of Emperor King (and their heirs) who were born by five different mothers.

Emperor King was the son of the Empress née Tou so that all men listed in SK 59 were her descendants.

⁴⁾ SK 107. This was Tou Ying, the grandson of the paternal uncle of the Empress née Tou.

⁵⁾ For this and the following events until the 1st month of A. D. 32, cf. map 30.



Map 30. Operations against Wei Ao, A. D. 30—32.

This unexpected reverse overthrew the original strategical plan, which now hurriedly had to be revised. Accordingly, the forces were divided into four groups and ordered to encamp in the cities of K'ien, Ts'i, Sün-yi and Ch'ang-an (17,47: 8 a; 18,48: 5 a; 19,49: 8 b; 20,50: 7 b). The K'ien contingent was intended to seal off the P'an-sü Valley, while the other three formed a reserve and second line of defence. These military measures were coupled with an amnesty to the officials and people in Wei Ao's territory (1 B: 1 b) who were prepared to surrender.

Wei Ao now took the offensive, and it is characteristic of the man that this step had in the end to be forced upon him. He dispatched two armies to occupy the capital commanderies¹⁾, but the attempt was not successful. One of his generals ran into the enemy positions at K'ien and was beaten back. The other tried to occupy Sün-yi before it had been reached by the imperial troops; but the latter arrived there first, hid in the city, and overpowered the approaching enemy in an unexpected sally²⁾. This had repercussions in the Pei-ti commandery, where Wei Ao had earlier been acclaimed by some of the local gentry. The Braves and Stalwarts surrendered, and this enabled the imperial forces at Sün-yi to advance

¹⁾ King-chao-yin, Yu-fu-feng, and Tso-p'ing-vi.

²⁾ HHK 6: 4 a—4 b places this event in A. D. 31. All sources in the HHS agree, however, unanimously on A. D. 30.

to Yi-k'ü¹⁾ (1 B: 2 b—3 a; 13,43: 9 a; 17,47: 8 a—9 a). Kuang-wu also began to win recognition in the An-ting commandery, directly north of Wei Ao's stronghold (17,47: 9 a). Although Pei-ti and An-ting were outlying areas which had been of subsidiary importance for Wei Ao in times of peace, their loss constituted a very real danger to his northern flank.

Tou Jung meanwhile had invaded Kin-ch'eng and defeated the Tibetans who controlled this commandery. He deployed his soldiers along the left bank of the Yellow River and awaited the imperial army. When the offensive broke down, Tou Jung again withdrew to his own territory. Kuang-wu agreed to this, as he was forced to, and continued to show Tou Jung the most flattering deference. He ordered the repair of his father's grave and the performance of a sacrifice in the form of a *suevotaurilia* (t'ai-lao), an exceptional honour. Imperial messengers continued to deliver valuable gifts (23,53: 6 b—7 a).

Wei Ao made one last effort to extricate himself from his difficulties. It is clear from indirect evidence that he must have tried to come to terms with Tou Jung, but, in spite of the recent imperial defeat, the latter was plainly still convinced of Kuang-wu's ultimate success. Wei Ao's messenger was put to death. The members of Tou Jung's party also returned to Wei Ao the seals and ribbons which they had previously accepted²⁾ (23,53: 7 a). At the same time, Wei Ao had renewed his contacts with the court and submitted an apologetic memorial. The high officials advised the emperor to disregard it and to have the hostage Wei Sün executed. Kuang-wu refused to do so. His hopes of reaching a peaceful settlement almost matched Wei Ao's tenacious faith in the possibility of his continued independence. Lai Hi was sent on a final diplomatic mission to the city of K'ien, where he seems to have met an envoy of Wei Ao. He delivered an imperial message which amounted to an ultimatum: Wei Sün's younger brother must go as a hostage to the court. Wei Ao refused to comply (13,43: 9 a—9 b). The breakdown of these last negotiations, which had taken place in the shadow of actual war, at long last convinced Kuang-wu of their futility. It also persuaded Wei Ao that in the future military contest, which he had tried to avoid by every means at his disposal, he was the weaker of the belligerents. In this emergency, he sent messengers to Kung-sun Shu and recognized him as emperor (13,43: 9 b).

It may seem surprising that the same man who had jealously guarded his freedom for all these years, was now willing to take such a step. It followed, nevertheless, quite logically from the premises on which all his previous conduct had been based. Wei Ao preferred to have no master but himself. He deliberately closed his eyes to the realities of Kuang-wu's rising power and tried to persuade himself that the Han dynasty would never be restored. He knew that surrender to Kuang-wu would inevitably mean the loss of his independence. Kung-sun Shu, on the other hand, had not brought pressure to bear on him recently, and

¹⁾ The Yi-k'ü prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Pei-ti commandery and was situated NW of the present Ning hien, Kan-su.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 110.

would be a valuable ally rather than an interfering sovereign. Their territories were divided by a high mountain range through which friendly troops could pass, but whose narrow defiles were easily defended against hostile armies. Wei Ao must have cherished the obstinate conviction that with Kung-sun Shu's help he could hold off the imperial armies, and that the country would in the end remain divided in two states: Kuang-wu's empire in the east, and that of Kung-sun Shu in Si-ch'uan. He himself would have preferred to be involved with neither; but if a choice became necessary, he would rather see his own domain as a half-autonomous appendix of the state of Kung-sun Shu than as a subordinate part of Kuang-wu's empire.

A. D. 31, counteroffensive.

In the 3rd month (Apr. 11—May 10) of A. D. 31, Kung-sun Shu enfeoffed Wei Ao as King Who Is the Pacifier of the North, and dispatched troops to his assistance (1 B: 4 a; 13,43: 9 b). No military operations took place until the 8th month (Sept. 6—Oct. 4), when Wei Ao made a major attempt to relieve the pressure which was being directed against him. He ordered a general to invade An-ting, in the hope of wresting this commandery from the imperial forces and so again securing his northern flank. The offensive petered out after an unsuccessful battle at Ch'ao-na¹) (15,45: 6 b—7 a). Simultaneously, Wei Ao himself attacked Yin-p'an²), while a third contingent tried anew to conquer the city of K'ien. Although these forces do not seem to have been actually defeated, they failed to achieve their objectives and withdrew (1 B: 4 b; 13,43: 9 b—10 a).

The emperor had been about to take command in person, and had informed Tou Jung when the coordinated attack should start. However, bad weather made the roads impassable and, since Wei Ao by this time was in retreat, the operation was called off. When Tou Jung received orders to discontinue his advance, he presented a memorial to the throne. It pointed out that, because of the absence of imperial activity, the local gentry was again swinging over to Wei Ao; that Kung-sun Shu's troops were in the northwest; and that a major assault should no longer be postponed (23,53: 7 a—7 b). These arguments may have convinced the emperor, or, equally well, they may merely have confirmed a decision at which he had already arrived. So much is clear, that preparations were made for a determined offensive in the following year.

Kuang-wu accompanied his military dispositions with the psychological warfare he had previously advocated³). Lai Hi was ordered to approach Wei Ao's General-in-chief Wang Tsun by letter, inviting him to surrender. Wang Tsun agreed and, together with his family, arrived in Lo-yang. He was made a Grand

¹) The Ch'ao-na prefecture during Han belonged to the An-ting commandery and was situated NW of the present P'ing-liang hien, Kan-su. Cf. map 30.

²) The Yin-p'an prefecture during Han belonged to the An-ting commandery and was situated NW of the present Ch'ang-wu hien, Shen-si. In contrast to HS 28 Ba: 22 a and HHS 13,43: 9 b, HHS ch'i 23 A: 35 b writes *p'an* with radical 108 instead of 75. Cf. map 30.

³) Cf. *supra* p. 169.

Palace Grandee and and enfeoffed as marquis, a hint to others that it would be worth their while as well to change allegiance (13,43: 10 a). Ma Yüan, who received permission to try the same method, approached various of Wei Ao's officers, and also the leaders of the Tibetans, but was less successful (24,54: 4 a—5 b).

A. D. 32, the second campaign and the rebellion on the southern plain.

The imperial offensive began with a surprise attack by Lai Hi in the 1st month (Feb. 1—29) of A. D. 32. He penetrated the P'an-sü Valley, advanced to Lüe-yang¹⁾, killed Wei Ao's commander, and took the city. It was immediately surrounded by Wei Ao whose valiant assaults were equalled by the dogged resistance of Lai Hi and his soldiers. When the supply of arrows of the defenders was exhausted, they broke down houses in the city and from the wood made new ones (1 B: 5 a; 13,43: 10 a; 15,45: 10 b). Kung-sun Shu dispatched auxiliary troops to help Wei Ao in his siege of Lüe-yang (13,43: 10 b), but Lai Hi continued to resist all attacks. He achieved what must have been the underlying purpose of the operation: namely to draw upon himself as many enemy forces as possible in order to prevent a concentrated defence against the coming main imperial thrust.

Wei Ao foresaw that major troop movements were in the offing and placed three armies in strategic positions²⁾: one at the mouth of the P'an-sü Valley; another at the Ki-t'ou Mountain;³⁾ and a third at the Wa commune⁴⁾. By these measures he tried to protect his vulnerable northern flank, and at the same time closed the very important pass through the Lung Slope. A fourth unit seems to have served as a mobile reserve to be engaged where needed (13,43: 10 a—10 b).

The imperial army began its march from Ch'ang-an in the intercalated month (July 27—Aug. 24), with Kuang-wu himself in command (1 B: 5 a). When he reached the city of Ts'i, some of the generals showed hesitation. The emperor summoned Ma Yüan, who arrived by night and was immediately questioned about conditions in the northwest. He reported that the enemy was weak. He also, in the presence of Kuang-wu, made a topographical map out of rice, showing valleys and mountains, and with his finger outlined the roads and paths by which the army should advance (24,54: 5 b—6 a)⁵⁾. The offensive was continued, and, divided into several contingents, the troops ascended the Lung Slope. Wei Ao's

¹⁾ The Lüe-yang prefecture during Former Han belonged to the T'ien-shui commandery and was situated 90 li NE of the present Ts'in-an hien, Kan-su. Cf. map 30.

²⁾ For this and the following events cf. map 31.

³⁾ Wang Sien-k'ien is undoubtedly correct in placing the Ki-t'ou 雞頭 Mountain W of the present P'ing-liang hien, Kan-su. Cf. 13,43: 10 b, *Ts'i kie*. HS 28 Ba: 20 b mentions a Kien-t'ou 開頭 Mountain, which according to Wang Sien-k'ien is a variant of Ki-t'ou. 90. Ting, map 21 shows a Ki-t'ou 筭頭 Mountain, which must be a third version of the name. Chung kuo ku kin ti ming ta ts'i tien, p. 1335: 4 correctly mentions a Ki-t'ou Mountain W of P'ing-liang but is wide of the mark by placing Wei Ao's army at another mountain with the same name W of the Ch'eng hien in southern Kan-su.

⁴⁾ According to chü 23 B: 35 b, the Wa commune was situated within the Wu-chü prefecture. The latter during Han belonged to the An-ting commandery and was situated NW of the present P'ing-liang hien, Kan-su.

⁵⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 50.

former General-in-chief Wang Tsun¹⁾) accompanied one of the detachments, undoubtedly because he knew the terrain. To give him the necessary prestige, the emperor granted him the Staff of Authority (13,43: 10 b).

When Kuang-wu arrived at Kao-p'ing²⁾, he met a large force under Tou Jung³⁾, consisting of footsoldiers and cavalry, and including Tibetans and Siao-yüe-chi. Tou Jung also brought with him a great amount of provisions, carried, it is said, on more than 5,000 carts. He was received in solemn audience and treated with the utmost politeness (1 B: 5 a; 23,53: 7 b; 34,64: 1 b).

The combined armies advanced southwards. No mention is made of any resistance. The offensive had succeeded on that same north flank which, ever since the loss of An-ting, had been Wei Ao's weakest point. Lüe-yang was relieved, and its defender Lai Hi rewarded (15,45: 11 a). All organized enemy operations ceased. Kuang-wu intensified the psychological pressure which, in this situation, brought instantaneous results. Wei Ao's general Niu Han received a letter from Wang Tsun, inviting him to surrender, just as his friend and correspondent had already done. Niu Han accepted the proffered advice and, in reward, was also made a Grand Palace Grandee. Thirteen other generals followed his example (13,43: 10 b—11 a). One of these was Kao Tsün, who had been persuaded to capitulate by Ma Yüan. He was made Marquis Within the Passes and a general, placed under Wu Han's command, and from then on took part in the campaigns against his former master (16,46: 20 b). One prefectural city after the other submitted (13,43: 11 a).

In spite of these defeats and desertions to the imperial side, Wei Ao and a handful of his officers continued to offer resistance. Two generals occupied the Shang-kuei prefecture⁴⁾. Wei Ao went south and defended himself in Si⁵⁾. The General-in-chief Wang Yüan was on his way to seek help from Kung-sun Shu (1 B: 5 a; 13,43: 11 b, 19 a). Kuang-wu still hoped for Wei Ao's surrender, and informed him that if he now submitted his son would be spared. It is interesting, though not entirely surprising, to learn that Wei Sün had not yet been killed. A live hostage was useful in the diplomatic game, but no benefit could be gained from a dead one; and the emperor's reluctance to give up the pawn in his hand is therefore understandable. When Wei Ao still refused to capitulate, his son was finally executed (13,43: 11 b).

Kuang-wu advanced to Shang-kuei and ordered two of his generals to surround it. Simultaneously, the Commander-in-chief Wu Han was sent to lay siege to the city of Si (1 B: 5 a; 13,43: 11 b; 17,47: 15 a; 18,48: 5 a). The situation in the

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 172—173.

²⁾ The Kao-p'ing prefecture during Han belonged to the An-ting commandery and is identical with the present Ku-yüan hien, Kan-su.

³⁾ According to 23,53: 7 b, the meeting took place in the Ti-yi city of the Kao-p'ing prefecture. Ch'i 23 A: 35 a confirms that this place was situated within the Kao-p'ing prefecture.

⁴⁾ The Shang-kuei prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Lung-si commandery and was situated SW of the present T'ien-shui hien, Kan-su.

⁵⁾ The Si prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Lung-si commandery and was situated 120 li SW of the present T'ien-shui hien, Kan-su.

northwest seemed firmly under control. With the conquest of the two remaining prefectures, so it appeared, the war would be over. Tou Jung's forces could now be dispensed with, and were ordered to return westwards. Before their departure, Kuang-wu showered new honours on Tou Jung and his followers (23,53: 7 b—8 a).

At this point the emperor encountered what can only be described as bad luck: rebellions broke out in the east, creating a panic in the capital. Two choices were open to Kuang-wu. He could either send some troops to the plain, while himself remaining in the northwest to finish the campaign against Wei Ao, or hurry back to Lo-yang. The fact that he decided on the latter course may have been dictated by his knowledge of recent history. The revolts might well be the beginning of a new major unrest in the east, and in no circumstances did he wish to be trapped in the Land Within the Passes like the Keng-shī Emperor. Kuang-wu therefore left his positions outside Shang-kuei, proceeded to K'ien, and rewarded the imperial troops which were still stationed there (20,50: 7 b). He then returned by forced marches to Lo-yang, where he arrived on Oct. 23 (1 B: 5 a—5 b).

The rebellions were confined to two distinct areas, and were probably quite unconnected. One was of little importance: the mutiny of the military garrison in the Ho-tung commandery (1 B: 5 a). Nothing is known about the events which followed, indicating that the insurrection must have been put down without undue difficulty. The situation was much worse on the plain directly south of the Yellow River, on both sides of its new southern branch¹). The texts record that in Ying-ch'uan bandits rose in flocks and looted the various prefectures (1 B: 5 a; 16,46: 20 a; 31,61: 1 b; 33,63: 7 b). Apart from this general statement, it is specifically mentioned that the Kia prefecture²) was overrun. The Prefect and his officials defended themselves until their supply of arrows was exhausted and then abandoned the city (33,63: 7 b—8 a). Further to the east, bandits were active in the Tung and Tsi-yin commanderies (21,51: 10 a). Special mention is made of Sang-chung³) (38,68: 1 b). The unrest had also spilled over into the Ho-nan commandery, where bandits controlled the Yung-yang and Chung-mou⁴) prefectures (20,50: 4 b).

Emperor Kuang-wu stayed in the capital for only five days. On Oct. 28, he set out in person to deal with the emergency (1 B: 5 b). When he arrived at the Liang-k'ü district⁵), he held an investigation (HHS 33,63: 8 a; SKC 21: 5 a), and sent out various officers who gradually pacified the troubled areas (1 B: 5 b;

¹) Cf. map 31.

²) The Kia prefecture during Former Han belonged to the Ying-ch'uan commandery and is identical with the present hien with the same name, Ho-nan.

³) Sang-chung was a smaller unit than a prefectural city and situated within the P'u-yang prefecture of the Tung commandery. Cf. chī 21: 5 a.

⁴) The Chung-mou prefecture during Han belonged to the Ho-nan commandery and was situated 60 li E of the present hien with the same name, Ho-nan.

⁵) It is clear from SKC 21: 4 a—4 b that the Liang-k'ü district was situated not far from the Chou-ch'eng-hiu prefecture. The latter during Former Han belonged to the Ying-ch'uan commandery and was situated 26 li E of the present Lin-ju hien, Ho-nan.

16,46: 20 b; 20,50: 4 b; 21,51: 10 a—10 b; 31,61: 1 b; 33,63: 8a; 38,68: 1 b—2 a). On Nov. 15, Kuang-wu was back in Lo-yang (1 B: 5b).

The disturbances on the southern plain were the occasion of a dangerous exploit, though the connection is not explicitly mentioned in the sources. Ever since his surrender, Chang Pu had lived in Lo-yang¹), presumably chafing at his unwonted inactivity. Surveillance must have slackened during the general panic in the capital and this gave him a chance to slip out of the city. With his wife, children and two younger brothers, he gained the Lin-huai commandery and boarded a ship, intending to return to the Shan-tung peninsula. It would have been an appalling setback for the emperor, had Chang been able to resume his independence. However, the Grand Administrator of Lang-ya caught up with Chang Pu's party in the 9th month (Oct. 23—Nov. 21), and all were executed (1 B: 5b; 12,42: 6 b—7 a; 18,48: 12 a).

The cause of the troubles on the southern plain, the third outbreak in this area²), is clearly shown by map 31. The unrest was concentrated in a broad belt below and on both sides of the place where the Yellow River broke its dikes in the time of Emperor P'ing (A. D. 1—6). Some regions had been directly affected by the flood and the ensuing famine; others were indirectly afflicted by the influx of refugees who migrated to them. Food supplies were not sufficient for the augmented population, and famine spread in ever-widening circles. This left the peasants no recourse but banditry or emigration. All the commanderies involved in the uprising of A. D. 32 lost heavily in population through the change of the course of the Yellow River. The suffering of the masses had made them a hot bed of discontent³).

These events in the east gave Wei Ao a respite. It seems evident that Kuang-wu had left behind only sufficient troops for the siege of Si and Shang-kuei. Some of them had previously served under Wei Ao, and had only been integrated into the imperial forces a few months before. In spite of this, Kuang-wu remained optimistic. He even wrote to one of his commanders, ordering him to attack Kung-sun Shu in Si-ch'uan once the two cities had fallen (17,47: 15 a). In Si and Shang-kuei, conditions were becoming desperate (13,43: 11 b.)

In the 11th month (Dec. 21, A. D. 32—Jan. 19, A. D. 33), Wei Ao was suddenly saved. His General-in-chief Wang Yüan, who had gone to Kung-sun

¹) Cf. *supra* p. 149.

²) Chai Yi rebelled in Tung during A. D. 7 (cf. vol. I, p. 153). In A. D. 26, banditry was put down in Tung, Ch'en-liu, and Ying-ch'uan (cf. *supra* p. 132, and 151, note 8).

³) It might be asked why the unrest did not spread spontaneously to those other parts of the southern plain and the Shan-tung peninsula which had also lost great numbers of people and where conditions were similar. The answers, I think, are two. On the Shan-tung peninsula, pressure had eased through the evacuation of the Red Eyebrows in the early twenties. In addition, this region and the lower reaches of the southern plain had been thoroughly pacified by imperial campaigns until A. D. 30. The area under discussion, on the other hand, had not only suffered immediately and more directly through the change of the course of the Yellow River, but had also been relatively little or not at all affected by the civil war. It is therefore not surprising that disturbances began earlier and lasted longer. Only after the rebellion of A. D. 32 was the energy of this region exhausted.

Shu for help, returned at the head of an army. He contrived to give the appearance of leading much larger forces than he actually had, broke the siege of Si, and later, together with Wei Ao, withdrew to Ki¹⁾ (1 B: 5 b; 13,43: 11 b; 17,47: 15 a). Wu Han followed him there and surrounded the city (16,46: 20 b), but this time the defenders were in a stronger position than the besiegers. The emperor instructed Wu Han to demobilize his soldiers before the provisions were exhausted, rather than court desertions which would be generally demoralizing. However, Wu Han and the other commanders wished to keep the troops together for a concerted attack on Wei Ao. This proved impossible. Supplies dwindled, and soldiers ran away; and soon nothing could save the imperial armies but hurried retreat. They abandoned the siege of Shang-kuei and Ki, burned their stores, and began the withdrawal. Kao Tsün, who earlier in the year had submitted and served under Wu Han, once more revolted and rejoined Wei Ao. Only the imperial garrison in K'ien remained at its post. The remnants of all the other forces returned to Ch'ang-an before the end of the 11th month (i. e. before Jan. 19, A. D. 33). The people of the An-ting, Pei-ti, T'ien-shui and Lung-si commanderies all rose again and followed Wei Ao (1 B: 5 b; 13,43: 12 a; 16,46: 10 a; 17,47: 15 a; 18,48: 5 a; 20,50: 7 b). After one year of strenuous and, in some cases, heroic efforts, the emperor was back where he had started.

A. D. 33—34, the third campaign.


If victory had slipped through Kuang-wu's fingers in this campaign through extremely bad luck, fate restored the balance by the equally unexpected death of Wei Ao. He fell ill in the 1st month (Feb. 18—Mar. 19) of A. D. 33, left the city of Ki where food had become scarce, and died in a fit of anger²⁾. His General-in-chief Wang Yüan and others proclaimed Wei Ao's son Ch'un as king and chose Ki as the capital. Kung-sun Shu sent further troops to their assistance (1 B: 5 b; 13,43: 12 a; 17,47: 9 a—9 b).

It soon became evident that death had removed the one man who could hold together the various unruly forces of the northwest. With its focus removed, the separatist movement disintegrated. Kao Tsün took possession of the Kao-p'ing prefecture and achieved quasi-independence (16,46: 20 b). Other officers operated separately in the various commanderies, and this later enabled the imperial armies to defeat them one by one.

In A. D. 33, Kuang-wu set in motion his third great offensive in the northwest. Lai Hi, who had reaped honours in the previous campaign, was given command over three Generals-in-chief and two Generals. Ma Yüan was also placed at his disposal. The army seems to have been divided into several contingents which entered the T'ien-shui, An-ting and Pei-ti commanderies. They gradually defeated the troops of Kung-sun Shu and wiped out local resistance (1 B: 6 a; 15,45: 11 a;

¹⁾ The Ki prefecture during Former Han belonged to the T'ien-shui commandery and is identical with the present Fu-k'iang hien, Kan-su.

²⁾ TTK 23: 6 a adds that his stomach became swollen.



Map 32. Operations in the northwest, A. D. 33-34.

17,47: 9 b; 19,49:8 b; 24,54: 6 a). Kao Tsün was surrounded in Kao-p'ing, an operation in which some of Tou Jung's forces took part (16,46: 20 b)¹). Other troops conquered Lüe-yang²), Kie-ts'üan³), and Ts'ing-shui⁴) (18,48: 10 b). At the end of A. D. 33, a joint attack was made on the city of Ki but was unsuccessful (17,47: 9 b). From this point onwards, the sources are silent for more than half a year. It is probable that Lai Hi and his officers were occupied by minor mopping-up operations.

On Sept. 27, A. D. 34, Kuang-wu himself arrived in Ch'ang-an and proceeded from there to K'ien (1 B: 6 b). He dispatched one of his dignitaries, who went to Kao-p'ing and brought about the surrender of Kao Tsün (16,46: 20 b-21 a)⁵).

¹) For this and the following events cf. map 32.

²) It is not clear by which route they approached this city.

³) The Kie-ts'üan prefecture during Former Han belonged to the T'ien-shui commandery and was situated NE of the present Ts'in-an hien, Kan-su.

⁴) The Ts'ing-shui prefecture during Former Han belonged to the T'ien-shui commandery and was situated 50 li W of the present hien with the same name, Kan-su.

⁵) Cf. also vol. I, pp. 52-53.

The emperor did not return to Lo-yang before Nov. 17, but no details of his movements are preserved.

In the 10th month (Nov. 1—29) of A. D. 34, the imperial forces launched their final assault. Wei Ch'un and his officers had withdrawn to Lo-men¹⁾ where all surrendered except Wang Yüan, who escaped to Kung-sun Shu. Wei Ch'un and some of his officers were ordered to live in the Hung-nung commandery, while other officials and members of the Wei clan were settled on the Great Plain, east of Lo-yang (1 B: 6 b; 13,43: 12 a; 15,45: 11 a—11 b; 17,47: 9 b)²⁾.

At the end of A. D. 34, Lai Hi also inflicted a defeat on the Tibetans at Wu-k'i³⁾ and subsequently conquered Siang-wu⁴⁾, held by a «bandit» whose affiliation is unknown (1 B: 6 b; 15,45: 11 b; 87,117: 7 a). Troops had already in A. D. 33 invaded Wu-tu and taken the Ho-ch'i prefecture⁵⁾ (22,52: 7 a). In the following years, the commandery was gradually brought under control, and the Po-ma-ti⁶⁾ submitted⁷⁾ (86,116: 23 b).

The war in the northwest had, at last, come to an end. It is not surprising that separatist feelings died down only very gradually among the gentry. This must have been the reason why the emperor appointed a certain Fan Ye as Grand Administrator of T'ien-shui (77,107: 3 b), a man who is listed in the HHS as one of the cruel (or harsh) officials⁸⁾. As pointed out by Hulsewé⁹⁾, these officials «used the utmost rigour of the law to maintain order within their area». «It is noteworthy that the 'cruelties' of these officials mostly concern prominent persons and but rarely the common people . . . they made it their special duty to curb the power of the locally prominent» and so acted as «useful instruments of the central government». Fan Ye stayed in T'ien-shui until his death fourteen years later (77,107: 4 a), which indicates the tenacious persistence of seditious feeling¹⁰⁾.

Kuang-wu no longer needed to worry about the northwest, and could now concentrate his final efforts on Kung-sun Shu.

¹⁾ According to ch'i 23 A: 30 a (which gives an alternative writing for *lo*), Lo-men was an agglomeration within the Ki prefecture. It seems to have been situated 40 li W of the present Fu-k'iang hien, Kan-su. Cf. 13,43: 12 a, *T'ei kie*.

²⁾ In A. D. 42, Wei Ch'un made an escape attempt but was captured and executed (13,43: 12 b).

³⁾ According to ch'i 23 A: 28 a (it writes *ki* with radical 172 instead of *k'i* with radical 150), Wu-k'i was an agglomeration within the Siang-wu prefecture. Shen K'in-han and Wang Sien-k'ien agree that this agglomeration was situated E of the present Lung-si hien, Kan-su. Cf. 1 B: 6 b and 15,45: 11 b, *T'ei kie*.

⁴⁾ The Siang-wu prefecture during Han belonged to the Lung-si commandery and was situated SW of the present Lung-si hien, Kan-su.

⁵⁾ Situated 15 li W of the present Hui hien, Kan-su.

⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 163.

⁷⁾ When Wei Mao, a relative of Wei Ao, revolted in Wu-tu at some unknown time after the end of the civil war, the Po-ma-ti assisted the imperial officials in defeating him, and he was killed (31,61: 6 a; 86,116: 23 b).

⁸⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 28, V: 4.

⁹⁾ 105. Hulsewé, pp. 89—90.

¹⁰⁾ A direct parallel to this is the fact that Kuang-wu in the thirties appointed the «cruel official» Li Chang (cf. vol. I, p. 28, V: 5) as Grand Administrator of Lang-ya (77,107: 4 a—4 b). This was the home commandery of Chang Pu, where he had enjoyed a great following.

2. Campaigns in the west against Kung-sun Shu

A. D. 26—29, the diplomatic phase.

Kung-sun Shu could have been the most dangerous of Kuang-wu's rivals. However, he was also the most isolated among them. The area corresponding to present Si-ch'uan included a rich and fertile part of the country. It was surrounded by high mountain ranges and accessible only through the deep gorges of river valleys or by hazardous paths along the cliffs. The alluvial plain of the Min River formed the economic base for the wealth of the Ch'eng-tu region, and this was far remote from the disturbances of the civil war. The tremendous distances and topographical obstacles of Si-ch'uan made invasion a very difficult task, nor did they encourage operations in the opposite direction. Kung-sun Shu was lulled into a false sense of security, and so missed the opportunity of forcing Kuang-wu to disperse, and perhaps exhaust, his resources against an additional enemy. The latter, for his part, carefully avoided becoming embroiled with Kung-sun Shu until the last of his other enemies had been annihilated. The result was that, for a number of years, China was divided into two empires which contemplated each other with guarded distrust.

Kung-sun Shu's career both before and under Wang Mang had been normal for a man of his background, and by no means spectacular. It was the outbreak of the civil war which provided the opportunity for his rise. He was then the administrator of Shu, and through a clever manoeuvre in A. D. 23 he not only gained official and popular support in his commandery but also won possession of an army. Although he claimed to have received confirmation of his rank, as well as promotion, from the Keng-shi Emperor, he had no intention of tolerating any outside interference¹⁾. In A. D. 24, he proclaimed himself king of Shu and Pa, and chose Ch'eng-tu as his capital²⁾. An attempt by the Keng-shi Emperor to take control of the Yi province was rebuffed³⁾. In the 4th month (May 17—June 14) of A. D. 25, Kung-sun Shu ascended the throne as Son of Heaven. He garrisoned the Po-shui and Kiang (Han) passes to protect himself against attacks from the north and east, and conquered the Kien-wei commandery in the south.⁴⁾ The aborigine Jen Kuei, who in A. D. 24 had captured the Yüehi commandery and made himself a king, submitted⁵⁾.

From a small beginning in A. D. 23⁶⁾, Kung-sun Shu had gained control of the whole of present Si-ch'uan by the end of A. D. 25⁷⁾. In the following year he also conquered Han-chung,⁸⁾ thereby acquiring the part of present Shen-si that lies

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 29—31.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 60.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 86.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 107—109.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 60, map 9, and p. 107.

⁶⁾ Cf. map 5.

⁷⁾ Cf. map 15.

⁸⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 117, note 2, and map 6.

south of the Ts'in-ling Range. He now dominated a vast territory, though its size gives a false impression of its strength. With the exception of the Ch'eng-tu region, it was sparsely inhabited.¹⁾ By the end of A. D. 26, the total population under his authority numbered only 4 million; while Kuang-wu's domain, at that time not more than twice as large as Kung-sun Shu's, contained no less than 31 million. This meant that Kung-sun Shu was master of about 7 % of China's manpower, against Kuang-wu's 54 %. The proportion was unfavourable for the former and became increasingly so as time went on, yet certain other factors were to his advantage. Kuang-wu was engaged in battles on many different fronts simultaneously. Kung-sun Shu enjoyed peace behind his barrier of mountains. Without being forced or hurried, he could take his time in assessing a situation, and then act accordingly. His problem was whether to adopt a defensive or offensive policy, a choice which was probably among the most decisive of the civil war. Neither should one underestimate the psychological impact of Kung-sun Shu's very existence as emperor for no less than eleven and a half years. For a while, even Kuang-wu found it opportune to recognize this fact. All extant sources are centred around the restorer of the Han dynasty who achieved the Mandate of Heaven by defeating his enemies, and it is easy to forget that Kung-sun Shu held a court which outshone all rivals and may even have been more splendid than that of Kuang-wu²⁾, whom he considered an impostor.

Kung-sun Shu was not a native of Sī-ch'uan but came from the northwest³⁾. It was only a historical accident that he found himself in the Shu commandery at the outbreak of the civil war. He must have been able to exploit the regionalist sentiments there, since he met with no local resistance. At the same time, he neither became the figurehead of, nor identified himself with, a separatist movement. He did not, for instance, give exclusive preference to local men in filling the highest offices, but, among others, favoured his own family to an unprecedented degree. The Commander-in-chief, who controlled the army, was for the first few years one of his brothers. The Grand Minister of Works, according to HHS, was another brother⁴⁾, and the Commandant of the Palace Guards a paternal cousin (chī 10: 6 b)⁵⁾. On the other hand, and in contrast to the usual practice of the time, Kung-sun Shu seems to have been unwilling to grant authority to prominent men from his own home area. When Ma Yüan, who was a native of his home prefecture, approached him around A. D. 26, he was treated courteously but coldly. Kung-sun Shu intimated that he would be welcome to enter the official ranks, but also that his influence would be limited⁶⁾.

Ma Yüan was a powerful man, and to antagonize him proved a bad mistake. In similar situations Kuang-wu showed more finesse. It is not improbable that

¹⁾ Cf. 64. Bielenstein, plate II.

²⁾ Cf. *infra* p. 198.

³⁾ His home was in the Mao-ling prefecture of the Yu-fu-feng commandery.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 107.

⁵⁾ He is stated to have held this office in A. D. 36 but may have been appointed to it much earlier.

⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 164.

Ma Yüan at first tried to bring about an understanding between Kung-sun Shu and Wei Ao, and that he gave up the idea after his cool reception in Ch'eng-tu. The consequences were soon apparent. In A. D. 27, Wei Ao refused to recognize Kung-sun Shu as emperor, and Ma Yüan most likely counted for something in this decision¹).

Kung-sun Shu was eager to obtain a foothold in the northwest. When diplomacy had failed, he dispatched troops, but these had to cope with great distances and the rugged terrain of the Ts'in-ling Mountains before they could make contact with the enemy. Some of his forces were defeated by Wei Ao and others by an imperial army²). Consequently, further attempts to expand in this direction were abandoned.

Kung-sun Shu refused to relinquish the idea of the universality of his claim to the throne. Although he desisted, for the time being, from any major offensive, he assembled and trained great bodies of troops and stored up provisions. Official seals were prepared for the Shepherds and Grand Administrators of the empire (13,43: 15), and proclamations were sent to various parts of the country to influence the people (13,43: 16 b). Kuang-wu was obviously alarmed about this but, as in the case of Wei Ao, tried to avoid an open clash before he was prepared. Apart from minor contacts in the northwest, no military encounters had occurred between the two emperors because, so far, a common border between their territories hardly existed. Kuang-wu was not inclined for the moment to make an issue of Kung-sun Shu's existence. On the contrary, he tried to court his antagonist, and frequently addressed letters to him. As late as A. D. 30, one of these was inscribed to the «Emperor Kung-sun» (13,43: 17 a). Kuang-wu received no answer to his missive which would seem to imply that, although he was willing enough to recognize Kung-sun Shu as a rival emperor, for the moment at any rate, Kung-sun was not prepared to return the compliment³).

Whether or not these diplomatic exchanges contributed to Kung-sun Shu's decision, he remained strictly on the defensive and abstained from interfering when imperial troops pacified northwestern Hu-pei. He did, nevertheless, welcome T'ien Jung and Yen Ts'en with open arms when they escaped to Si-ch'uan⁴), enfeoffed both as kings, and even made Yen Ts'en his Commander-in-chief (13,43: 15 b—16 a; 17,47: 14 a).

It is disappointing that so little is known about the relations between the two emperors, and nothing at all about the conditions in Kung-sun Shu's empire. Apart from the meagre information given above, the sources record that Kung-sun Shu was interested in books of prognostication, and auspicious omens⁵). We are told that he abolished the copper cash and introduced coins made of iron.

¹) Cf. *supra* p. 164.

²) Cf. *supra* pp. 161, 164.

³) HYKC, p. 37: 1 states that the emperor also dispatched Ma Yüan to Kung-sun Shu. The HHS mentions nothing about such an embassy. It simply may be a misunderstanding of the mission which Ma Yüan earlier carried out for Wei Ao. Cf. *supra* pp. 164, 182.

⁴) Cf. *supra* p. 157.

⁵) Cf. *infra* pp. 245 ff.

It is also stated that he built a palace in Nan-cheng, the capital of Han-chung¹⁾, a red tower ten stories high, and embellished boats (13,43; 15 b, 16 a). That, apart from the description of military events, is the sum total of our information. Wei Ao, who was no pretender, has a much richer biography, comprising 12 double-pages as compared with the 8½ devoted to Kung-sun Shu. One reason for this could be that perhaps only a small part of the archives survived the looting of Ch'eng-tu after the death of Kung-sun Shu²⁾. The relative richness of Wei Ao's biography may also be due to its authorship. It was in all probability written by Pan Ku³⁾, whose father Pan Piao had spent years at Wei Ao's court and so must have been well informed.

A. D. 30—34, limited military contacts.

After the defeat of T'ien Jung and Ts'in Feng in A. D. 29⁴⁾, the imperial General-in-chief Ts'en P'eng at once took measures against Kung-sun Shu. These measures had in the main a precautionary character. The pacification of northwestern Hu-pei had opened a vitally important front against the enemy. While the Ts'in-ling Range was most unfavourable to large-scale military operations, the Yang-tsi River offered a logical invasion route into Si-ch'uan. It could, of course, equally well be used for an offensive in the opposite direction, and Ts'en P'eng therefore protected the newly conquered area by establishing a number of fortified camps along the Yang-tsi. He divided his army into four groups, stationing them at the Kiang (Han) pass⁵⁾, Yi-ling, Yi-tao⁶⁾, and the Tsin district respectively (17,47; 14 a—14 b)⁷⁾. They included auxiliary troops which had been sent by the southern administrators after their surrender⁸⁾ (TKK 15: 7 a; SHS 2: 7 b).

The situation remained unchanged until the 3rd month (Apr. 22—May 20) of A. D. 30, when Kung-sun Shu ordered out T'ien Jung and others in a venture to conquer the Nan commandery. T'ien Jung had been forced to abandon Yi-ling only a year earlier⁹⁾, and might still have enjoyed local support which could be put to Kung-sun Shu's advantage. The force went through the Kiang (Han) pass and must have overrun the imperial camp which guarded it. It seems to have penetrated to the area between the Yi-ling and Lin-tsü prefectures and done some

¹⁾ Nan-cheng is shown on map 6.

²⁾ Cf. *infra* p. 197.

³⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 10.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 156—157.


⁵⁾ The text actually says Kiang-chou. Both Shen K'in-han and Wang Sien-k'ien agree that this is a mistake for the Kiang (Han) pass. Kiang-chou, which corresponds to the present Ch'ung-k'ing, was situated much further up the river and was not reached by the imperial troops until A. D. 35. Cf. 17,47: 14 a—14 b, *T'ai k'ie*.

⁶⁾ The Yi-tao prefecture during Han belonged to the Nan commandery and was situated NW of the present Yi-tu hien, Hu-pei.

⁷⁾ For this and the following events until A. D. 34 cf. map 33.

⁸⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 157—158.

⁹⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 156—157.



Map 33. Operations against Kung-sun Shu, A. D. 29-34.

damage, though T'ien Jung did not succeed in taking possession of the commandery, and the invasion eventually dwindled into a raid (1 B: 1 b; 13,43: 9 a, 16 a).

Kung-sun Shu's attack set into motion the series of events which led to the fall of Wei Ao. Emperor Kuang-wu ordered the latter to advance on Si-ch'uan from the north.¹⁾ He may have feared that the operation in the Nan commandery was the beginning of a major offensive, and have wished to lessen the pressure on that front by counterpressure on Kung-sun Shu's northern flank. At the same time, Kuang-wu cannot have been ignorant of the geographical difficulties involved. It has already been noted that another, and more realistic, purpose must have existed: namely to force a clear-cut political decision on Wei Ao.

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 168.

Kuang-wu did not neglect to cover himself against further assaults from Kung-sun Shu. In the summer of A. D. 30, he ordered three generals to enter the Han-chung commandery. After defeating enemy forces at Si-ch'eng¹), they withdrew and established an agricultural garrison at Shun-yang²) (1 B: 2 a—2 b; 15,45: 2 b—3 a). It is clear that this garrison served to protect the rich Nan-yang basin against invasion from Han-chung. The defence line against Kung-sun Shu was thus anchored on Shun-yang in the north and on the camps of Yi-ling, Yi-tao and Tsin in the south³). The intermediate area, between the Han and Yang-tsī Rivers, was one of rough mountains, through which no hostile movements were to be feared.

In the latter half of A. D. 30, Wei Ao recognized Kung-sun Shu as emperor and in the 3rd month (Apr. 11—May 10) of A. D. 31 received from him the rank of king⁴). What Kung-sun Shu had failed to bring about by diplomacy or force, now fell into his lap through Kuang-wu's offensive in Kan-su. It was a negative achievement. Wei Ao needed assistance, which Kung-sun Shu could not refuse, and Si-ch'uanese troops served in the northwest from A. D. 31—34. This did not mean that Wei Ao would now be a faithful subject. He had chosen the sovereign he feared least and, within the new political framework, remained eager to preserve the maximum of independence. Kung-sun Shu had therefore gained nothing but the opening of a new front. Nevertheless, the situation was not without certain advantages. While Kuang-wu's forces were engaged in Kan-su, no major offensive against Si-ch'uan was to be feared. It was also true that the balance of power would remain in favour of his rival as long as Kung-sun Shu was unwilling to take the military initiative himself. If he remained on the defensive, Wei Ao's final defeat was hardly in doubt. Thereafter, Kung-sun Shu would take the whole brunt of the attack.

Kung-sun Shu had been advised to expand eastwards even before he had ascended the throne⁵). This counsel was again renewed on the basis of the recent developments. The Chief Commandant of Cavalry, King Han, who seems to have had a keen appreciation of the strategical position, made the following recommendation⁶): If the enemy succeeded in conquering T'ien-shui, he would possess nine-tenths of the realm. In order to prevent this, T'ien Jung should invade the Nan commandery and transmit a call-to-arms. Central and southern China would then inevitably submit. Simultaneously, Yen Ts'en should be ordered to advance from Han-chung into the Land Within the Passes and pacify the capital commanderies. The northwest would then also be brought under control (TKK 23: 7 a—7 b; HHK 6: 7 a—8 a;

¹) The Si-ch'eng prefecture during Han belonged to the Han-chung commandery and was situated NW of the present An-k'ang hien, Shen-si.

²) The Shun-yang prefecture during Han (in Former Han times its name was Po-shan) belonged to the Nan-yang commandery and was situated E of the present Si-ch'uan hien, Ho-nan.

³) The garrison at the Kiang (Han) pass was probably also reestablished, since it is stated that Kung-sun Shu's forces in A. D. 33 conquered the Wu prefecture situated close to it. Cf. *infra* p. 187.

⁴) Cf. *supra* pp. 171—172.

⁵) Cf. *supra* p. 107.

⁶) HHS lists it under A. D. 31 and HHK under A. D. 32. TKK gives no date. A. D. 31 would seem the logical year for the advice.

HHS 13,43: 17 a—18 a)¹⁾. Evidently, King Han envisaged a pincer movement by which Kuang-wu would be squeezed from the south and west. The proposal had the additional advantage that Wei Ao's genuine obedience could be enforced.

Kung-sun Shu called a court discussion in which one of the Erudits spoke out against the proposal and referred to classical precedents. King Han retorted that the Eastern Emperor had no territorial power — a vast misrepresentation — and that this was not the time for idle chatter about Wu-wang. The plan, whose advantages were obvious, was finally adopted, and preparations were made to send out the two armies. Antagonism to the proposal remained strong, and the people are said to have been against it. Kung-sun Shu's younger brother Kuang made himself spokesman of the opposition, and the scheme was finally shelved. Though Yen Ts'en and T'ien Jung frequently requested its implementation, their pleas were of no avail (13,43: 18 a—18 b). Kung-sun Shu, quite apart from the fact that he seems instinctively to have been opposed to military ventures, and to have favoured a defensive policy, may also have over-estimated Wei Ao's ability to withstand the imperial forces.

Nothing happened until the 1st month (Feb. 18—Mar. 19) of A. D. 33, when Wei Ao died. This changed the situation completely. The one man who had been able to embody the separatist feelings of the northwest was gone, with no one of comparable stature to take his place. Kung-sun Shu would soon be totally isolated, the victim of his own misjudgment. Belatedly, he decided to adopt King Han's plan, but spoiled its effect by only using it in parts. No army was dispatched to the north, where indeed the obstacles presented by the terrain may after all have been too discouraging; and only one major force was ordered to advance against the enemy in the east.

In the 3rd month (Apr. 19—May 17) of A. D. 33, T'ien Jung, together with Kung-sun Shu's Grand Minister over the Masses²⁾ and a Grand Administrator designate for the Nan commandery, leading a great body of troops, made their way down the Yang-tsü on rafts. They penetrated the Kiang (Han) pass, conquered Wu³⁾, and pressing on, took the Yi-ling and Yi-tao prefectures. There they halted and built an intricate defence system. It was based on the King-men and Hu-ya Mountains⁴⁾, situated on both sides of the Yang-tsü. A floating bridge with war towers was constructed across the river, and palisades were set out in the water. The bridge was joined by fortifications to camps on the summits of the two mountains (1 B:5 b; 13,43: 19 a; 17,47: 15 a—15 b). The imperial forces were unable

¹⁾ HHS adheres closely to the text of TTK, while HHK has a number of slight variants. A lacuna in the text of the TTK probably represents a lost section. Where, in this case, the HHS differs from the HHK, it may follow an original TTK text.

²⁾ Jen Man then held this office. It is not known when he was appointed.

³⁾ The Wu prefecture during Han belonged to the Nan commandery and was situated E of the present Wu-shan hien, Si-ch'uan. Cf. map 33.

⁴⁾ According to ch'ü 22: 22 a, both mountains were situated within the area of the Yi-ling prefecture. The King-men Mountain still has the same name and is shown on 90. Ting, map 29. SKC 34: 9 b states that the Kiang River furthermore passes eastwards between the King-men and Hu-ya [Mountains]. Cf. map 33.

to interfere with this and for two years remained confined to their bastion at the Tsin district.

In A. D. 33, Kung-sun Shu also placed a body of troops at the Ho-ch'i prefecture, but this was defeated during the same year¹⁾.

Characteristically, Kung-sun Shu's attack was on a limited scale. He made no attempt either to invade central China or to conquer the Nan commandery and from there enter the rich Nan-yang basin. He confined himself to stationing an army at an advance strategic point that commanded the Yang-ts'i River, his purpose being merely to cut off the main invasion route into Si-ch'uan. Kung-sun Shu could not break away from his defensive thinking, and failed to understand that the military initiative still lay with the enemy. If no serious engagements took place for two years, this was due less to Kung-sun Shu's precautionary measures than to the fact that Kuang-wu preferred to wait until Kan-su was firmly under his control before attacking Si-ch'uan.

A. D. 35—36, the great offensive.

Ts'en P'eng passed these two years in enforced inactivity with his garrison at the Tsin district, but he profitably employed this breathing space by having great numbers of towered warships and other types of vessels built in anticipation of the coming attack. Only minor engagements took place between his troops and those of Kung-sun Shu (17,47: 15 b).

By A. D. 34, Kuang-wu had finally conquered the northwest. Only a single enemy remained, against whom the emperor immediately began his preparations. As a first step, the general Tsang Kung was stationed at the Chung-lu prefecture (18,48: 12 b)²⁾, from which he later joined the rest of the forces. The Commander-in-chief Wu Han also arrived together with two further generals. The combined armies included soldiers who had been mobilized in Nan-yang, Nan, and Wu-ling³⁾, as well as sailors from the Kuei-yang⁴⁾ and Ling-ling⁵⁾ commanderies and the Ch'ang-sha kingdom⁶⁾ (17,47: 15 b). The last three areas were located along one of the great routes of migration and trade which followed the Siang River upstream through Ch'ang-sha and then branched out in two directions: one route passing through Ling-ling over the watershed to the Kuei River, and the other along the Lei River through Kuei-yang to the Pei River⁷⁾. The men of these regions were therefore well experienced in water transport and would be invaluable for the invasion of Si-ch'uan. Wu Han, in contrast to Ts'en P'eng, seems to have been a typical army man with little understanding of amphibious operations. He com-

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 180.

²⁾ For this and the following events cf. map 34.

³⁾ This commandery was situated in northwestern Hu-nan, just south of the place where the imperial troops assembled.

⁴⁾ Situated in southern Hu-nan and northern Kuang-tung.

⁵⁾ Situated in southern Hu-nan and northern Kuang-si.

⁶⁾ Comprising the major part of Hu-nan.

⁷⁾ Cf. also 64. Bielenstein, pp. 136—137 and plate I (this map wrongly writes Lai-kiang for Lei-kiang).

plained that the sailors wasted provisions, and proposed sending them home. Ts'en P'eng submitted a memorial to the throne explaining the situation. The emperor agreed with him. He wrote that Wu Han was practised in the use of infantry and cavalry but did not understand naval warfare. Ts'en P'eng was placed in supreme command of the campaign (17,47: 15 b—16 a).

The great offensive began in the intercalated month (Apr. 27—Maj 25) of A. D. 35. Ts'en P'eng made known that whoever reached the enemy's floating bridge first would be rewarded. The boats moved rapidly upstream, helped by a strong wind¹⁾. For a moment they were held up by the palisades, and a Lieutenant General, who had volunteered to advance first, was killed. Fire brands ignited the timber, and the conflagration, fanned by the wind, spread quickly. The whole bridge collapsed in flames. Ts'en P'eng's navy again advanced, broke through, and gained a complete victory. Many of the enemy soldiers were drowned in the river. Kung-sun Shu's Grand Minister over the Masses was decapitated by one of his subordinates, who surrendered²⁾. The Grand Administrator designate of Nan was taken prisoner. Only T'ien Jung escaped to Kiang-chou³⁾ (1 B: 7 a; 13,43: 19 a; 17,47: 16 a 18,48: 13 a).

While Wu Han remained behind, supervising the building of further boats, and enlisting new soldiers (18,48: 5 a), Ts'en P'eng and Tsang Kung immediately continued the advance. They conquered Tsi-kuei, forced the Kiang (Han) pass, and proceeded in two columns on Kiang-chou. They were unable to take it, as T'ien Jung was well supplied. A unit was therefore detached to lay siege to the city. Ts'en P'eng himself, at the head of a flotilla, went north, and conquered Tien-kiang⁴⁾ and P'ing-k'ü⁵⁾, and also managed to capture great quantities of rice (1 B: 7 a; 17,47: 16 a—16 b; 18,48: 13 a).

Parallel with Ts'en P'eng's advance, Emperor Kuang-wu initiated an attack from the north, led by Lai Hi. In the 6th month (July 24—Aug. 22), he won some victories at Ho-ch'i and Hia-pien.⁶⁾ The late Wei Ao's General-in-chief Wang Yüan, and another officer, resisted him. They arranged to have Lai Hi murdered⁷⁾.

¹⁾ This must have been the summer monsoon.

²⁾ In contrast to 13,43: 19 a and 17,47: 16 a, 1 B: 7 a states that he was captured. This is probably an ellipsis.


³⁾ The Kiang-chou prefecture during Han was the capital of the Pa commandery and is identical with the present Pa hien (Ch'ung-k'ing), Si-ch'uan.

⁴⁾ The Tien-kiang prefecture during Han belonged to the Pa commandery and is identical with the present Ho-ch'uan hien, Si-ch'uan.

⁵⁾ This was a smaller unit than a prefectural city. The *Commentary* states that its location is unknown. According to Shen K'in-han, it was situated W of Ting-yüan which corresponds to the present Wu-sheng hien, Si-ch'uan. Cf. 17,47: 16 b, *Commentary* and *Tsi kie*. Shen K'in-han's suggestion seems, at least, possible.

⁶⁾ The Hia-pien prefecture during Han belonged to the Wu-tu commandery and was situated 30 li W of the present Ch'eng hien, Kan-su.

⁷⁾ According to the pen ki, Lai Hi was murdered in the 6th month (1 B: 7 a). Kung-sun Shu's biography records his death after events which took place in the 8th month (13,43: 19 b). The same source mentions Wang Yüan's role in the murder. Since Wang Yüan served on another front not later than the 8th month (cf. *infra*), the biography must be mistaken about the time of Lai Hi's death.



Map 34. The great offensive against Kung-sun Shu in A. D. 35.

Mortally wounded, he wrote a last memorial. The emperor is said to have been deeply moved. Lai Hi was posthumously made a marquis, and his body was brought to Lo-yang where Kuang-wu himself took part in the funeral rites (1 B: 7 a; 13,43: 19 b; 15,45: 11 b—12 a). The offensive petered out and was not again resumed. Both now and later, the northern front remained negligible.

Kung-sun Shu moved swiftly to protect the key area of his state. The sudden and rapid assault must have taken him by surprise, but his resources were far from exhausted. The garrison in the Wu-tu commandery has already been mentioned. In addition, Kung-sun Shu placed three armies at strategic points where, as he hoped, they would block the enemy's thrust towards the capital. He ordered his younger brother Hui, Yen Ts'en¹⁾, Wang Yüan²⁾, and Lü Wei³⁾ to take up defence positions at Kuang-han.⁴⁾ Another force was stationed at Tsī-chung⁵⁾, and a third at the Yellow Rocks⁶⁾ (17,47: 16 b). Ts'en P'eng had meanwhile retracted his steps and probably stood in the area north of Kiang-chou.

In the 8th month (Sept. 21—Oct. 20), Ts'en P'eng set into motion a double-pronged advance. Tsang Kung was instructed to attack Yen Ts'en's camp, proceeded northwards, passed P'ing-k'ü, and continued upstream along the Fou River⁷⁾. This operation was not accomplished without considerable difficulties; most of the troops were re-enlisted men of Kung-sun Shu, provisions were limited, and transports did not get through. Tsang Kung was afraid he might lose control over his army, and even considered retreat. At this moment, he heard that an imperial Internuncio was on his way to Ts'en P'eng with reinforcements, including soldiers and 700 horses. Tsang Kung forged a decree and appropriated these for himself. This enabled him again to move forward his infantry, cavalry, and boats, and make contact with the enemy. Yen Ts'en was completely routed in the ensuing battle⁸⁾. Although he himself managed to escape to Ch'eng-tu, his men either surrendered or were killed. Tsang Kung drove ahead without delay. When he reached the P'ing-yang district,⁹⁾ Wang Yüan capitulated with his troops

¹⁾ In this context, HYKC, p. 37: 2 refers to Yen Ts'en as the husband of Kung-sun Shu's younger sister. If this is true, Yen Ts'en was in the habit of marrying relatives of the men he served. He had previously received in marriage a daughter of Ts'in Feng (cf. *supra* p. 155).

²⁾ He must have been transferred to this sector after the death of Lai Hi.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 161.

⁴⁾ The Kuang-han prefecture during Han belonged to the commandery with the same name and was situated NW of the present Sui-ning hien, Si-ch'uan.

⁵⁾ The Tsī-chung prefecture during Han belonged to the Kien-wei commandery and was situated directly north of the present Tsai-yang hien, Si-ch'uan.

⁶⁾ Cf. *infra* p. 192, note 4.

⁷⁾ This river still has the same name.

⁸⁾ 1 B: 7 a states that the engagement took place at the Shen River (18,48:13 a writes Yüan River which is a mistake for *Shen*). The Shen River, a very small watercourse which enters the Fou River, originated in the Kuang-han prefecture of Han times (SKC 32: 20 b). The locality therefore corresponds exactly to the site where Kung-sun Shu had previously stationed his army, i. e. the battle was fought in the Kuang-han prefecture at the Shen River.

⁹⁾ SKC 32: 19 a records that Tsang Kung followed the Fou River upstream and arrived at P'ing-yang. The district must therefore have been situated at the river. Shen K'in-han states that P'ing-

(1 B: 7 a; 18,48: 13 a—13 b). Kung-sun Hui seems to have withdrawn to Fou¹). Nothing is known about the fate of Lü Wei. It is not clear whether Tsang Kung reached Mien-chu²) before the end of A. D. 35 or only in the following year (18,48: 13 b).

While these operations were in progress, Ts'en P'eng advanced by another route. He must have gone up the Yang-tsai as far as the mouth of its tributary the Ch'eng-tu River³), since we are told that he followed the latter upstream and defeated Kung-sun Shu's garrison at the Yellow Rocks⁴). He then hurried to Wu-yang⁵) in forced marches, took it, and sent off a cavalry force in the direction of Kuang-tu⁶) His

yang was located NW of T'ung-ch'uan chou, which would correspond to a place NW of the present San-t'ai hien, Si-ch'uan. This emplacement seems quite possible.

¹) Cf. *infra* p. 196.

²) The Mien-chu prefecture during Han belonged to the Kuang-han commandery and was situated 35 li N of the present Te-yang hien, Si-ch'uan.

³) The text says: [Ch'eng-tu River. It corresponds to the present Min River.

⁴) The location of the Yellow Rocks poses a problem. 1 B: 7 a, *Commentary* states that this name refers to the Yellow Rock Rapids. It quotes SKC 33: 19 b to the effect that the rapids were formed by the Yang-tsai at a place 100 li E of the Fou-ling prefecture. Hui Tung (cf. *ibidem*, *T'ai kie*) agrees with this. The commentary to SKC 33: 19 b adds that this was the site where Ts'en P'eng defeated Kung-sun Shu's general.

In spite of this general agreement, the location proposed is patently absurd. The Fou-ling prefecture is still called by that name, and is situated where the Wu River enters the Yang-tsai. One would therefore have to seek the rapids roughly at the spot marked with a cross on map 34. Although it is quite possible that rapids at that place were known as the Yellow Rocks, this could not possibly have been the spot where Ts'en P'eng fought his battle. He had already passed this area and reached Kiang-chou in the intercalated month (cf. *supra* p. 189), and had from there continued his advance against Kung-sun Shu. What is more, 17,47:16 b clearly states that Ts'en P'eng was following the Ch'eng-tu (Min) River upstream when he defeated enemy forces under Hou Tan. On the same page it is recorded that Kung-sun Shu had stationed Hou Tan at the Yellow Rocks. To make it doubly sure, 1 B: 7 a confirms that Ts'en P'eng defeated Hou Tan at the Yellow Rocks. It is therefore evident that the Yellow Rocks were situated, not on the Yang-tsai, but on the Ch'eng-tu River.

Having come this far, a new complication arises, since 17,47: 16 b goes on to say that Ts'en P'eng, after his victory, hurried a distance of more than 2000 li and then took Wu-yang. According to 99. Dubs, III, p. 160, note 9.7, the *li* of Han times equals 415.8 meters. 2000 li would therefore correspond to 831.6 kilometers. The distance from the mouth of the Ch'eng-tu River to Wu-yang is only 200 odd km, so that the figure given is quite impossible. (Nor is the distance applicable to the traditionally proposed location of the Yellow Rocks. If one measures 831 km from Wu-yang down the Ch'eng-tu River and then along the Yang-tsai, one would arrive in the area of the Tsai-kuei prefecture in Hu-pei, shown on map 34.) It is conceivable that the '2000 li' of the text is simply a mistake for '200 li'. This would correspond to 83.2 km. In other words, the Yellow Rocks would be situated on the Ch'eng-tu River, not quite half way between Wu-yang and the place where the river enters the Yang-tsai. Such a location seems eminently sensible. Kung-sun Shu had stationed three armies in strategic positions to defend the Ch'eng-tu area: one at Kuang-han, another at Tsai-chung, and the third at the Yellow Rocks (cf. *supra* p. 191). The garrisons would therefore have formed a straight defence line from the Fou River to the Ch'eng-tu River. The obvious purpose must have been to prevent enemy movements along these watercourses, while also blocking the areas between.

⁵) The Wu-yang prefecture during Han belonged to the Kien-wei commandery and was situated 15 li NE of the present P'eng-shan hien, Si-ch'uan.

⁶) The Kuang-tu prefecture during Han belonged to the Shu commandery and was situated SE of the present Hua-yang hien, Si-ch'uan.

offensive had carried him close to Kung-sun Shu's capital Ch'eng-tu. All this had taken place in the 8th month, even before Yen Ts'en's defeat at the Shen River (1 B: 7 a; 17,47: 16 b—17 a). The whole campaign had been remarkably swift, and, if Ts'en P'eng seems to have taken calculated risks, the outcome had more than justified his adventurous tactics. Not only was Ch'eng-tu directly threatened, but the victories also brought results from another quarter: Jen Kuei surrendered with the entire Yüehi commandery¹). Kuang-wu must have attached a great importance to this, as he went so far as to confirm Jen's self-assumed rank as king of K'ung-ku (17,47: 17 a; 86,116: 19 a).

In this situation, with the war seemingly won, Kuang-wu wrote to Kung-sun Shu asking for his capitulation. The latter discussed this with his officials, two of whom advised him to accept the terms. Kung-sun Shu is stated to have answered that a man's rise and fall were fated and that surrender was not a course open to the Son of Heaven (13,43: 19 a—19 b)²).

The imperial cause suffered a tragic loss when, in the 10th month (Nov. 20—Dec. 18), Kuang-wu's brilliant commander, Ts'en P'eng, was murdered. A man sent by Kung-sun Shu, and pretending to be a runaway slave, killed Ts'en P'eng by night (1 B: 7 b; 13,43: 19 b; 17,47: 17 a). The crime did not, as might have been expected, result in a major setback for the invaders, though it is certain that Ts'en P'eng's conquests along the Ch'eng-tu River were again lost.

In the 12th month (Jan. 18, A. D. 36—Feb. 15), the second wave of invaders entered Si-ch'uan. It was led by the Commander-in-chief Wu Han, who until then had stood by in reserve (1 B: 7 b; 18,48: 5 a; chī 10: 6 b). He ascended the Yang-tsi by boat as far as the Ch'eng-tu River, and continued along this water-course.

In the very beginning of A. D. 36³), Wu Han met enemy forces at the Yü-fou Ford,⁴) and after routing them advanced to Wu-yang, which he placed under siege (18,48: 5 a; chī 10: 6 b)⁵). Kung-sun Shu sent his son-in-law to relieve Wu-

¹) Cf. *supra* p. 181.

²) HYKC, p. 37: 2 mentions the letter and Kung-sun Shu's answer. It records that the proposals were brought by Lai Hi and Ma Yüan. According to HHS 13,43: 19 a—19 b, Kuang-wu made his approach after Ts'en P'eng had reached Wu-yang, i. e. at a time when Lai Hi was already dead. The account of the HYKC must therefore be wrong, as are so many of its statements for this period.

³) Wu Han's biography (18,48: 5 a) lists the battle at the Yü-fou Ford under the spring of A. D. 36. He soon fought another engagement (cf. *infra*) which took place in the 1st month. This would indicate that the battle of the Yü-fou Ford must have occurred in the 1st month of A. D. 36. Chī 10: 6 b, which in a number of instances has a version of its own, records the battle under the 12th month of A. D. 35.

⁴) In contrast to the other editions, the Ki ku ko edition writes *yü* with radical 85.

The Yü-fou Ford, according to chī 23 A: 15 b, was situated within the Nan-an prefecture. This text gives the name as Yü-k'i. Ts'ien Ta-chao corrects *k'i* to *fou* (cf. *ibidem*, *Tsi kie*). The only graphic difference between the characters is that *fou* also includes the element «mouth». The Nan-an prefecture during Han belonged to the Kien-wei commandery and was situated 20 li NW of the present Kia-kiang hien, Si-ch'uan. According to Shen K'in-han, the location of the Yü-fou Ford is 3 li W of the present Kia-kiang hien (cf. 18,48: 5 a, *Tsi kie*).

⁵) For this and the following events cf. map 35.

yang before the 1st month (Feb. 16—Mar. 16) was over, but Wu Han met, defeated, and killed him (1 B: 8 a; 13,43: 19 b; 18,48: 5 a—5 b; chī 10: 6 b)¹⁾. Little is known about the subsequent manoeuvres, except that Wu Han conquered Kuang-tu and that his horsemen burned down the Shī Bridge²⁾ (18,48: 5 b). Evidently he was not yet able to risk a direct attack on Ch'eng-tu. His army seems to have remained stationary in the Kuang-tu area for several months, while at the same time making attempts to disrupt the enemy's communications. Emperor Kuang-wu wrote once more to Kung-sun Shu and offered pardon even for the murders of Lai Hi and Ts'en P'eng if he now surrendered. This approach again proved futile (13,43: 19 b). The only other important event before the end of the autumn was the fall of Kiang-chou³⁾ in the 7th month (Aug. 11—Sept. 9). T'ien Jung was captured and executed (1 B: 8 a; chī 10: 6 b).

Kuang-wu was worried about the situation at Ch'eng-tu, warning Wu Han not to underestimate Kung-sun Shu and ordering him to stay in Kuang-tu. Above all he was not to seek engagements in advanced areas, but to await the attacks of the enemy troops. If they showed no signs of activity, he himself could move his camp forward, but he was only to strike when the strength of his opponents was exhausted. Wu Han disobeyed this order. He marched on Ch'eng-tu in two columns; one, which he commanded himself, advanced on the northern side of a river,⁴⁾ and another, led by one of his generals, accompanied it on the south side. They encamped at a distance of 10 li (circa 4 km) from Ch'eng-tu. The two units were 20 li (circa 8 km) apart, and divided by the river, although Wu Han had built a floating bridge. When the emperor received this report, he was much alarmed and immediately sent instruction to Wu Han pointing out that the two contingents were in danger of being separately defeated, and insisting on an immediate withdrawal to Kuang-tu (18,48: 5 b).

Before this order reached the imperial forces, Kuang-wu's fears were partly realized. In the 9th month (Oct. 9—Nov. 7), Kung-sun Shu dispatched his Grand Minister over the Masses⁵⁾ and the Bearer of the Gilded Mace with a large army against Wu Han. Wu Han was defeated, and both the camps were surrounded. For three days, Wu Han made no move. Then, after gagging his soldiers, he led them by night across the river to the southern bank and quietly brought the two halves of his force together. The next morning the enemy attacked both camps, only to find one empty. Wu Han, now at full strength, won a complete victory on the southern bank and killed Kung-sun Shu's two dignitaries. After this he returned


¹⁾ The pen ki (1 B: 8 a) states that the battle was fought at Wu-yang. According to chī 10: 6 b, it was fought at Kuang-tu.

²⁾ According to 13,43: 20 a, *Commentary*, the bridge was situated 4 li SW of Ch'eng-tu. SKC 33: 5 b confirms that a Shī Bridge was located SW of the city.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 189.

⁴⁾ The whole area around Ch'eng-tu is crisscrossed with watercourses. It is not possible to establish which of these is here concerned.

⁵⁾ HHS 13,43: 19 b and HYKC, p. 37: 2 write Grand Minister over the Masses. HHS chī 10: 6 b gives the title as Commander-in-chief. In all cases, the man concerned is Sie Feng.



Map 35. Operations against Kung-sun Shu in A.D. 36.

to Kuang-tu with the main body of his troops (1 B: 8 b; 13,43: 9 b; 18,48: 5 b—6 a; ch'i 10: 6 a).

Tsang Kung, who had been inactive in the Mien-chu area¹⁾ for the greater part of the year, continued his advance in the 9th month. He first conquered Fou²⁾, where Kung-sun Shu's younger brother Hui met his death³⁾. Then he turned and took the cities of Fan⁴⁾ and P'i⁵⁾ (1 B: 8 b; 18,48: 13 b; ch'i 10: 6 b).⁶⁾ Ch'eng-tu was now in danger on two fronts: Tsang Kung stood to the north, while Wu Han continued his pressure from the south (18,48: 6 a—6 b).

Kung-sun Shu discussed the crisis with Yen Ts'en and, on his advice, opened the treasury. Valuables were distributed to volunteers who, we are told, numbered more than 5000 men. They were placed under Yen Ts'en's command. The latter deployed some forces at the Shi Bridge, but did not advance against Wu Han. In secret, he had sent out another contingent, which now suddenly attacked the imperial troops from the rear. Wu Han was defeated, fell into the water, and saved himself only by holding on to a horse's tail (13,43: 19 b—20 a)⁷⁾. This defeat is mentioned neither in the pen ki nor in Wu Han's biography. In fact, from reading these sources, one gets the quite erroneous impression that the operations proceeded smoothly and without a hitch. It is stated that Wu Han in the 11th month (Dec. 7, A. D. 36—Jan. 5, A. D. 37) encamped in the suburbs of Ch'eng-tu, that Tsang Kung arrived at the same time, met Wu Han, and then took up position outside the Hien Gate⁸⁾ (13,43: 20 a; 18,48: 6 b, 14 a). All seems inevitably and logically to lead up to the final encounter.

What is not mentioned anywhere else in the HHS is fortunately preserved in the biography of a certain Chang K'an, and from this we learn that the imperial forces were in fairly desperate straits. Chang K'an had been sent by Kuang-wu with 7000 horsemen to supervise a transport of silk to Wu Han. While on his journey, he had been promoted to Grand Administrator designate of Shu. Upon arrival he discovered that Wu Han had supplies for only another seven days, that he had decided to retreat, and for this purpose was putting his boats in order. Chang K'an hurriedly went to see him and succeeded in changing his mind. Wu

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 192.

²⁾ The Fou prefecture during Han belonged to the Kuang-han commandery and is identical with the present Mien hien, Si-ch'uan.

³⁾ Kung-sun Hui's death is confirmed by SKC 32: 19 a. However, HHK 6: 16 b states that he was killed earlier, in the battle at Kuang-han (cf. *supra* pp. 191—192).

⁴⁾ The Fan prefecture during Han belonged to the Shu commandery and was situated 20 li N of the present Sin-fan hien, Si-ch'uan.

⁵⁾ The P'i prefecture during Han belonged to the Shu commandery and was situated 5 li N of the present hien of the same name, Si-ch'uan.

⁶⁾ HYKC, p. 37: 2 makes the truly fantastic statement that Tsang Kung attacked Kung-sun Shu via the road of the Ye Valley. This road went through the Ts'in-ling Range (cf. ch'i 19: 27 b), an area where Tsang Kung never once operated during his campaign.

⁷⁾ HYKC, p. 37: 2 describes the same event. It states that Yen Ts'en simulated an attempt to cross the Shi Bridge, which would indicate that this had been rebuilt.

⁸⁾ This was one of the northern gates of Ch'eng-tu.

Han then feigned weakness, so provoking Kung-sun Shu's last and fatal attack (31,61: 6 b—7 a).

It seems clear from this evidence that the imperial offensive was on the verge of breaking down. Although his troops stood under the gates of Ch'eng-tu, Wu Han was ready to give up the campaign as a failure. With over-extended supply lines, and soldiers whose reliability was becoming doubtful as provisions began to dwindle, retreat had become the only alternative to disaster. Kung-sun Shu could have stayed safely behind his walls and watched the departure of the invaders. It might then have taken years before Kuang-wu could have mounted his next attack. Ironically enough, Kung-sun Shu decided to leave the protection of his fortifications and meet the enemy in the open field. It is possible that, receiving reports about Wu Han's preparations for withdrawal, he hoped to rout him before it was too late.

On the morning of Dec. 24¹⁾, A. D. 36, Kung-sun Shu and Yen Ts'en made a sally. Their troops were at first victorious but became more and more exhausted. At noon, Wu Han threw in fresh forces which he had kept in reserve. This decided the battle. Kung-sun Shu, who had been wounded and fallen from his horse, died during the night in his city (1 B: 8 b; 13,43: 20 a; 18,48: 6 b, 14 a; ch'i 10: 6 b)²⁾.

On Dec. 25, Yen Ts'en surrendered Ch'eng-tu (13,43: 20 a). For two days all was quiet. Chang K'an entered first. He examined the treasury and memorialized a list of all the valuables (31,61: 7 a). Then, on Dec. 27, Wu Han suddenly gave the soldiers permission to loot.³⁾ The palace went up in flames, and great numbers of people were murdered. Kung-sun Shu's wife, children and other clan members were all executed, together with Yen Ts'en and his relatives. Kung-sun Shu's head was sent to Lo-yang (1 B: 8 b; 13,43: 20 a; 18,48: 6 b; ch'i 10: 6 b). It is evident that Wu Han had acted on his own initiative and overstepped the bounds of his authority. Kuang-wu was infuriated and horrified. He bitterly reprimanded Wu Han and also wrote a letter to the general Liu Shang, asking him how a member of the imperial clan could possibly have lent himself to such an action (13,43: 20 a—20 b).

The civil war was now at an end, and the victors assembled in the capital. Tou Jung and his followers were summoned in A. D. 36. They came triumphantly to Lo-yang with an enormous cortege (23,53: 8 a; 26,56: 10 a; 31,61: 6 a; 34,64: 1 b). In the 1st month (Feb. 4—Mar. 5) of A. D. 37, Wu Han also received his orders. A garrison was left behind in Ch'eng-tu, while he and the remaining troops went down the Yang-ts'i on boats. They arrived at the capital in the 4th month (May 4—June 2) of this year. The emperor gave a great banquet and distributed rewards

¹⁾ In contrast to 1 B: 8 b, ch'i 10: 6 b lists the sally under Dec. 23.

²⁾ 1 B: 8 b says that Kung-sun Shu was wounded. According to HHK 6: 18 a and HHS 13,43: 20 a, he was stabbed in the chest. 18,48: 6 b states that he was stabbed in the chest by the Commissioner over the Army, Kao Wu. Ch'i 10: 6 b repeats this information but gives Kao Wu's title as General and Commissioner over the Army. HYKC, p. 38: 1, as so often, has its own obscure version. It says that the cavalrist Kao P'ing pierced Kung-sun Shu's head with a lance.

³⁾ Ch'i 10: 6 b places this event wrongly on Dec. 25. Kuang-wu's letter to Liu Shang (cf. *infra*) refers to the interval of three days.

(1 B: 10 a; 18,48: 6 b; 36,66: 4 b). The blind musicians, the musical instruments of the ancestral temples, and the various types of chariots of the late Kung-sun Shu were brought to Lo-yang in the same month and there put to use. The HHS adds a remark which says much for the splendour of the former court in Ch'eng-tu: for the first time, the legal, ceremonial insignia of the emperor were complete (1 A: 10 a). In addition, Kuang-wu transferred Kung-sun Shu's archives to his capital, as had already been done in the case of Wei Ao. He later studied in person the correspondence of these men (26,56: 7 a)¹⁾, though it seems clear that relatively few documents can have survived the holocaust in Ch'eng-tu²⁾

With Kung-sun Shu's death, Kuang-wu had become sole master of the realm. During the remaining years of his life, though he was more than once forced to put down disorders, no more pretenders rose against him. The restoration of the dynasty was now a fact. Fourteen years had passed since the rebellion against Wang Mang, and Kuang-wu had come a long way since the days when he had been a very minor leader among the insurgents. He was 41 years old³⁾ and weary of war. A further two decades lay before him in which to continue the reorganization of the empire.

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 76—77.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 184.

³⁾ Kuang-wu was born on Jan. 13, 5 B. C. (1 B: 23 a).

CHAPTER VII. MILITARY TECHNIQUES OF THE CIVIL WAR

1. *Organization*

At the outbreak of the civil war little organization can have existed among the rebels. The Nan-yang junkers led their relatives and personal followers. The Troops from Sin-shī, P'ing-lin and the Lower [Yang-tsi-] kiang obeyed their own chieftains. When the Keng-shī Emperor ascended the throne on March 11, A. D. 23, the separate designations of the various bands of commoners disappeared, and an «Army of Han» began to emerge. The emperor installed the customary military dignitaries, and for a short time it looked as if the situation would be stabilized. However, the prestige of the court was soon in decline. After the defeat of the clique of the former chieftains in A. D. 24, a general deterioration set in, which gradually left the Keng-shī Emperor without a military apparatus. In the space of a little over two years, he had passed through the whole cycle from weakness to strength and back again to weakness, beginning with a number of separate semi-military bands and ending in the same way.

Not much can be learned about the organizations set up by the various pretenders and warlords. Various military titles are preserved in the sources, but all of them fit into the traditional pattern of Former Han. One may guess, therefore, that no drastic changes were made by any of the pretenders, but that the accepted practice of the Han was continued. The only exception is the Red Eyebrows, who began with literally no experience in military matters. It is recorded that order was maintained within their bands by word of mouth; that no special commands existed; that no documents were written; that no units were formed; and that no standards or banners were used. Only three kinds of titles were employed, namely those of subordinate, local officials, who were the only office-holders with whom uneducated commoners would normally have come in contact. Discipline was enforced by a simple and rigorous covenant: If a man killed another, he was executed; if he wounded another, he had to give compensation¹⁾. Later, in the beginning of A. D. 25, the Red Eyebrows organized themselves in 30 divisions, each under a Thrice Venerable and an Attendant Official²⁾. This arrangement may have been elaborated after the proclamation of their emperor, but no details are preserved.

One has to turn to the founder of the Later Han dynasty to obtain a more coherent picture. The present chapter must therefore, perforce, be centred around

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 138.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 91.

Emperor Kuang-wu and his armies. On this subject, odd items of information are scattered throughout the HHS, in addition to which the history presents a special survey of military titles and units in the treatise on the Hundred Officials (chī 24: 6 b—8 a), though even this source is meagre and often far from lucid. A further complication lies in the fact that the peace-time and war-time organizations were not the same. It is only the latter which, for the years of the civil war, concerns the present investigation.¹⁾

The highest ranking military offices were those of the Generals-in-chief and the Generals. The appointment by Kuang-wu of 11 Generals-in-chief and 35 Generals is recorded for the period from his ascension to the throne to the end of the war. Most of these appointments had a temporary character and were dictated by military necessity. Once the empire had been pacified, all except two²⁾ were discontinued.

If we examine the titles, we find that almost all of them incorporate certain flowery prefixes:³⁾

1. General-in-chief of Agile Cavalry (1 A: 16 b; 21 a; 1 b: 15 b).
2. General-in-chief Who Establishes Righteousness (1 A: 16 b).
3. General-in-chief Who Establishes Awe (1 A: 16 b).
4. General-in-chief Who Subdues the South (1 A: 20 b).
5. General-in-chief Who Subdues the West (1 A: 21 a).
6. General-in-chief of Strong Crossbow-men (18,48: 11 b)⁴⁾.
7. General-in-chief Who Traverses the Open Country (1 B: 4 b).
8. Tiger's Teeth General-in-chief (1 A: 16 b).
9. General-in-chief Who Routs the Caitiffs (1 A: 17 b)⁵⁾.
10. General-in-chief of the Western Provinces (13,43: 6 b).
11. General of the Van (1 A: 16 a; 21,51: 8 a; 22,52: 5 a; 15,45: 2 b).
12. General of the Right (21,51: 4 b; 1 A: 24 a).

¹⁾ The border defence system will be discussed in vol. III.

²⁾ The office of the General-in-chief of Agile Cavalry and of the General Who Is Martial and Stern.

³⁾ On Aug. 28, A. D. 25, Emperor Kuang-wu installed a General-in-chief (1 A: 16 b). This, according to chī 24: 6 b, was the highest military post in times of peace. Its first and only holder under Kuang-wu, Tu Mao, was transferred to the office of General-in-chief of Agile Cavalry on Feb. 1, A. D. 27 (1 A: 21 a—21 b). No new General-in-chief was appointed before Oct. 29, A. D. 89. It should also be noted that the HHS records no less than six military appointments under Aug. 28, A. D. 25 (1 A: 16 b) and that Tu Mao is at the bottom of the list. This makes it clear that the remark of chī 24: 6 b is not applicable to Tu Mao. The institution of the General-in-chief as a political appointee had existed in Former Han times and was not reintroduced before A. D. 89. Tu Mao was merely a top-ranking officer. His title may also have had a prefix which has not been preserved.

Two other men are referred to as «Generals» (31,61: 3 a; chī 10: 6 b). Both are mentioned only once in the HHS. Their titles may also originally have had prefixes.

Subtracting the 3 cases mentioned in this note, we have a total of 43 titles whose prefixes have been preserved.

⁴⁾ The holder of this office had been appointed General of Strong Crossbow-men in A. D. 24 or 25 (18,48: 11 a) and was promoted in A. D. 27.

⁵⁾ The second holder of this office was merely appointed as General Who Routs the Caitiffs (1 A: 20 b).

13. General of the Left (17,47: 19 b).
14. General of Chariots and Cavalry (16,46: 5 b).
15. General of Resolute Cavalry (21,51: 7 a).
16. General of Picked Cavalry (17,47: 12 b).
17. General Who Scouts and Attacks (1 A: 20 b).
18. General of Amassed Crossbow-men (TKK 14: 3 a).
19. General of Amassed Archers (17,47: 11 b).
20. General Who Penetrates the Roads (16,46: 20 b).
21. General Who Seizes the Caitiffs (22,52: 11 a).
22. General Who Awes the Caitiffs (17,47: 14 a).
23. General Who Punishes the Caitiffs (22,52: 8 a).
24. General Who Subdues the Caitiffs (20,50: 6 a).
25. General Who Exterminates the Caitiffs (20,50: 4 b).
26. General of the Five Majestic [Principles] (17,47: 12 b).
27. General Who Supports Majesty (22,52: 1 b; 18,48: 12 b).
28. General Who Awes the Bandits (38,68: 11 a).
29. General Who Inspires Awe (22,52: 7 a).
30. General Who Is Martial and Stern (20,50: 7 a).
31. General of the Martial Vanguard (23,53: 8 a).
32. General Who Manifests Firmness (22,52: 6 b).
33. General Who Manifests a Transformation (22,52: 9 b).
34. General Who Maintains in Peace What is Distant (86,116: 14 a).
35. General Who Pacifies the Ti Barbarians (22,52: 3 b; 17,47: 12 a)¹).
36. General Who Routs the Traitors (11,41: 13 b).
37. General [Who Attacks] the Red Eyebrows (21,51: 10 b).
38. General Who Proclaims Virtue (34,64: 1 b).
39. General Who Supports Han (1 A: 18 b).
40. General Who Re-establishes Han (1 A: 18 b).
41. General Who Is Loyal to Han (15,45: 6 b).
42. General Who Perfects Han (17,47: 13 b).
43. General of the Meng Ford (17,47: 3 a).

The use of titles with literary prefixes was nothing new in Chinese history. Such titles had been in vogue during Former Han, and Wang Mang used them almost exclusively²). It is clear that Kuang-wu simply continued an accepted practice³). He was not alone in this. The Keng-shī Emperor and various of the pretenders and warlords also adopted similar designations for their military officials or for themselves⁴).

¹) The third holder of this office was P'ang Meng. 1 A: 24 b and 12,42: 4 a give his title as above. 18,48: 9 b writes General Who Pacifies the Enemy.

²) Cf. 99. Dubs, III, pp. 104—106.

³) The prefixes in nos. 1, 3, 6—8, 11—18, 26, 32, 34, 35 (a total of 17 cases) had been used in military titles during the times of Former Han and Wang Mang.

⁴) The Keng-shī Emperor used the prefixes in nos. 9, 12, 29, 39, 40; Tsung Ch'eng the one in no. 8; Kung-sun Shu no. 39; Chang Pu no. 26; Wang Lang no. 7; and Liu Yung no. 39. In addition, the

Some of the titles seem to have been closely connected with the type of troops which their holders commanded¹⁾. Cavalry played a considerable role in the war. While the deployment of archers or crossbow-men is not specifically recorded, arrows are frequently mentioned in the sources. It is therefore not surprising to find military titles which specifically refer to these branches of the service.

Other titles had long since lost their meaning²⁾. For instance, Keng Ch'un was General of the Van until A. D. 26. Li T'ung held the same office from 29—31. Keng was sent on an independent mission against «Goitre Yang» in A. D. 26, and Li, with two generals under him, invaded Han-chung in A. D. 30³⁾. Neither of these men commanded only a «vanguard». The title of General Who Pacifies the Ti Barbarians may also be mentioned here⁴⁾; of the three men who held it between A. D. 25 and 29, not one was ever involved in any fighting on the northern frontier.

Another kind of title seems to have been created specially in connection with particular operations. When Ts'en P'eng in A. D. 26 was engaged in a campaign in Nan-yang, situated south of Lo-yang, Kuang-wu appointed him General-in-chief Who Subdues the South⁵⁾. Feng Yi, early in A. D. 25, was made General of the Meng Ford, at a time when he was ordered to hold this ford against the Keng-shi Emperor's garrison in Lo-yang⁶⁾. In 27, Feng Yi was promoted to General-in-chief Who Subdues the West⁷⁾ (1 A: 21 a) and served until his death in the northwestern theatre. A certain Keng Hin was in A. D. 24 appointed General [Who Attacks] the Red Eyebrows⁸⁾. He fell in battle in the Land Within the Passes. In all of these instances, the title gives the program for a military campaign. This practice was not carried through with complete consistency as far as Ts'en P'eng was concerned. He took part in the second attack on Wei Ao in A. D. 32 and later served against Kung-sun Shu. Although these operations carried him deep into West China, he retained the title of General-in-chief Who Subdues the South until his death.

A few titles were used not for military but political appointments. Wei Ao was made General-in-chief of the Western Provinces in A. D. 25⁹⁾. In the same year, the Grand Administrator of the Yi-chou commandery, corresponding to present Yün-nan, refused to submit to Kung-sun Shu. He sent messengers to Kuang-wu and was later rewarded with the title of General Who Maintains in

various protagonists of the civil war, like Emperor Kuang-wu, invented a good many prefixes of their own.

¹⁾ E. g. nos. 1, 6, 14—19.

²⁾ E. g. nos. 11—13, 31.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 122—123, 186.

⁴⁾ No. 35.

⁵⁾ No. 4. Cf. *supra* p. 154.

⁶⁾ No. 43. Cf. *supra* p. 87.

⁷⁾ No. 5.

⁸⁾ No. 37. Keng Hin served under Teng Yü.

⁹⁾ No. 10. Cf. *supra* pp. 110, 163.

Peace What is Distant¹⁾. Here Tou Jung can also be mentioned, whose self-assumed rank of Acting General-in-chief of the Five Commanderies West of the [Yellow] River was confirmed by Kuang-wu in A. D. 29²⁾.

The remaining titles have a literary and, like some of the preceding ones, possibly a magical flavour, designed to enhance the awe and splendour of the court. One may wonder whether a further and more practical reason may not have lain behind their adoption: during the long years of the civil war, with battles fought on many fronts, the prefixes made it easy to distinguish the numerous Generals-in-chief and Generals one from another. This must have greatly facilitated the work of the central bureaucracy.

The dignitaries ranking directly below the Generals were the Lieutenant Generals. During our period their titles are never embellished by prefixes. The rank is nowhere mentioned in the treatise on the Hundred Officials, and it is difficult to obtain a clear picture of its exact function.

Each General-in-chief, General (and perhaps Lieutenant General) commanded a single division (ying), except when directing a campaign with other high-ranking officers serving under him³⁾. Whenever a division halted in open country, the soldiers built a fortified camp, also called a »ying». The term denotes therefore the camp as well as its defenders. The divisions were divided into a number of regiments (pu). According to chī 24: 7 b, the division of a General-in-chief consisted of 5 regiments, which may suggest that those of Generals and Lieutenant Generals were progressively smaller. Each regiment was under the command of a Colonel, (hiao wei), who had as his chief subordinate a Major (kūn sī ma). Occasionally regiments were commanded only by Majors (chī 24: 7 b, 8 a). The regiments were in turn subdivided into companies (k'ü), each under a Captain (kūn hou), and these consisted of platoons (t'un), led by Platoon Commanders (t'un chang) (chī 24: 8 a). Summarizing this in tabular form we have:

General-in-chief, or	}	Division
General, or		
Lieutenant General		
Colonel	}	Regiment
Major		
Captain	:	Company
Platoon Commander:		Platoon

¹⁾ No. 34. Cf. *supra* p. 109.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 167.

³⁾ A number of instances seem to indicate that the Lieutenant Generals could also head divisions. In A. D. 25, the General of the Van, Keng Ch'un, was unable to lead his division because of illness. The emperor ordered Keng Chī to take command of the division (21,51: 9 a). Keng Chī had been appointed a Lieutenant General in A. D. 24 (21,51: 8 b) and retained this title until at least A. D. 26 (17,47: 12 b). In A. D. 29, Wang Pa stayed in his camp (ying) during the first phase of a battle (cf. *supra* p. 142). 1 A: 25 a and 20,50: 4 a—4 b agree that Wang Pa was a Lieutenant General. Only 12,42: 4 a gives his title as Chief Commandant of Cavalry. Hung Yi-hüan (1765—1837) corrects this to Lieutenant General (cf. *ibidem*, *Tsi kie*).

This is, of course, an idealized picture and represents no more than the skeleton outline of the whole organization. ChI 24: 8 a enumerates a number of minor offices without making it clear exactly how they fitted into the system. The various biographies of the HHS give the titles of still other posts which are not mentioned in the treatise. The most important is that of the Commissioners over the Army (hu kün), who sometimes combined this office with other functions¹⁾. The sources never particularize about the duties of the incumbents of these posts, though all but one are described as leading troops in the civil war, and as having taken part in the fighting. One of them (Kao Wu) mortally wounded Kung-sun Shu outside Ch'eng-tu²⁾. Other titles were Director of the Army (ling kün)³⁾, and Chief Clerk in Command of Troops (tsiang ping chang shi)⁴⁾.

The various offices so far mentioned all had to do with armies serving in the field and, as a rule, ceased to exist after peace had been restored. Some additional titles remain to be listed which, as they did not belong specifically to the wartime organization, were permanent offices. The most important of these were: the Generals of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household (chung lang tsiang);⁵⁾ the Chief Commandants of Cavalry (ki tu wei); and the Chief Commandants of Attendant Cavalry (fu ma tu wei).⁶⁾ Kuang-wu at times also made use in active warfare of such

¹⁾ E. g. Ma Ch'eng was in A. D. 25 appointed Commissioner over the Army and Chief Commandant (22,52: 6 b).

²⁾ TTK 9: 4 b; HHS 16,46: 5 a; 17,47: 16 b; 18,48: 6 b; 20,50: 7 a. Cf. also supra p. 197, note 2. The one Commissioner over the Army who is not recorded as having led troops served under Keng Yen. The text merely states that he advised the latter against the attack on Lin-tsi (19,49: 6 b. Cf. also supra p. 148).

³⁾ Only one holder of this office is mentioned. He commanded troops under Ts'en P'eng in A. D. 29 (17,47: 14 b).

⁴⁾ Only one is mentioned. He was appointed in order to enforce discipline among soldiers (29,59: 11 a—11 b).

⁵⁾ This office consisted of five branches:

- a. The General over All the Offices of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household (chI 25: 3 b).
- b. The General of the Left of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household (chI 25: 4 a).
- c. The General of the Right of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household (chI 25: 4 a).
- d. The General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household Rapid as Tigers (chI 25: 4 b).
- e. The General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household of the Feathered Forest (chI 25: 5 a).

These five dignitaries, who were all of the same rank, were normally in charge of ensuring the safety of the emperor. They went out on campaigns only when he took command in person: e. g. the General over All Offices of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household, Li Chung, followed Kuang-wu against P'ang Meng and Tung Hien (21,51: 4 a).

Apart from these officials, three men are mentioned who are merely referred to as General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household, and who led campaigns even when the emperor was not personally present. They were Wang Liang, Lai Hi and Ma Ch'eng (22,52: 4 b—5 a; 15,45: 9 b ff; 22,52: 7 a). It is not clear whether, in this case, the title is an ellipsis or whether it is a special feature of the civil war.

⁶⁾ The treatise (chI 25: 6 a) does not indicate how many Chief Commandants of Cavalry and of Attendant Cavalry were appointed in times of peace. So much is clear, that their number was far above the normal during the civil war. Almost all of these officers served on various campaigns without the emperor being present.

officials as Grand Palace Grandees (t'ai chung ta fu)¹⁾ and Internuncios (ye che).²⁾ These dignitaries were ordinarily the subordinates of the Superintendent of the Imperial Household (kuang lu hün), the official charged with the immediate personal protection of the emperor. His office controlled bodies of troops which frequently went into action during the civil war, even when the emperor himself was not present.

The picture that emerges is one of specifically appointed field commanders and members of the central bureaucracy fighting side by side. One may assume that the organization became tighter and more uniform as the war progressed, although it probably never corresponded in every detail to the idealized classification of the treatise.

There is no point in speculating about the size of the various military units. It is recorded, for example, that a regiment in Han times comprised 1,000 men and 111 officers.³⁾ This would imply that the division of a General-in-chief numbered 5,000 soldiers. Unfortunately it is impossible to know whether this figure is applicable to the civil war. Even in modern warfare, military units are rarely at full strength, either as regards officers or soldiers. It must be assumed that during the civil war, where conditions changed from year to year and from one campaign to another, the size of divisions, regiments, etc. varied considerably. The treatise recognizes this by saying: »The amount of their troops, in each case, is in accordance with the occasion» (ch'i 24: 8 a). The historian is almost never able or willing to commit himself any further; and the number of men in any given imperial army remains, as a rule, unrecorded.

The HHS describes all military operations from the viewpoint of the commanders. It centres events around the emperor and his generals. The lower the rank of an officer, the less likely was he to be mentioned in the history, unless the circumstances of his later career were such as to entitle him to a biography. The following list includes all the men referred to in the sources as holding the military ranks set out below, between the date of Kuang-wu's ascension to the throne on Aug. 5 A. D. 25 and the end of the civil war on Dec. 24, A. D. 36:

General-in-chief	12
General	46
Lieutenant General	11
Colonel	1
Major	0
Captain	0
Platoon Commander	0
Simple soldiers	3

¹⁾ E. g. the Grand Palace Grandee, Chang Ch'un, was sent out with cavalry in A. D. 29 (35,65: 1 b).
²⁾ E. g. the Internuncio, Chang K'an, was dispatched with cavalry and a transport of silk to Wu Han in A. D. 36 (cf. supra p. 196).
³⁾ Cf. 99. Dubs, III, p. 339, note 24.1.

Commissioner over the Army	8
Director of the Army	1
Chief Clerk in Command of Troops	1
General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household	3
Chief Commandant of Cavalry	12
Chief Commandant of Attendant Cavalry	2
	<hr/>
	total: 100

It will be seen that the generals and chief commandants number no fewer than 86, and the simple soldiers only 3.

The armed forces normally comprised three types of troops: infantry, archers and crossbow-men, and cavalry. Sailors are only mentioned as taking part in the invasion of Si-ch'uan. They manned the boats which carried armies and supplies up the Yang-tsi, Fou and Ch'eng-tu Rivers, and were recruited from areas where people were experienced in water transport¹⁾. One further arm seems to have existed. Among the military titles enumerated above, there is a General of Chariots and Cavalry²⁾. The fact that Light Chariots were used is proved by Emperor Kuang-wu's order on Apr. 14, A. D. 31, for their demobilization (1 B: 4 a). They are never mentioned in the description of the various campaigns, and their function in the civil war is unknown.

While the historian seldom has anything to say about the infantrymen, archers and crossbow-men, there are frequent references to the role of the cavalry. This may reflect its importance. Especially famous was the Shock Cavalry (t'u ki) of the north, which had won its experience in border fighting. One entry in the HHS throws an interesting light on the recruitment of these northern horsemen. It is stated that Wu Han in the battle at Kuang-lo of A. D. 27³⁾ led Wu-huan Shock Cavalry. The Wu-huan were nomads who lived in the area corresponding roughly to present Jehol. Some of their tribesmen must have enlisted in the Chinese forces, and so taken part in the civil war.

Horsemen were used for reconnaissance, for rapid or surprise movements against the enemy, for disrupting his supply lines; and occasionally they played a decisive role in battle when thrown in at the crucial moment. For example, Keng Yen commanded cavalry in A. D. 24—25 and acted as the avant garde of the army (19,49: 3 b). When Ts'en P'eng had taken Wu-yang in A. D. 35, his cavalry made a sudden thrust against Kuang-tu⁴⁾. At the end of A. D. 24, light cavalry was sent ahead in order to deprive the Wu-hiao bandits of provisions (18,48: 11 a). In the engagement at Nan-luan in A. D. 24, Wang Lang's troops were at first victorious, and the Han forces began to withdraw. The Shock Cavalry then struck and defeated

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 188.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 201, no. 14.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 138.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 192.

the enemy¹⁾. Cavalry was also sent in pursuit of a beaten enemy. After the battle at An-yi on Aug. 10, A. D. 25, Teng Yü led light cavalry, captured and killed two generals and one Grand Administrator, and took 500 seals²⁾. Mounted troops participated in every major campaign of the civil war. This applies even to the offensive against Kung-sun Shu, in which Ts'en P'eng, Tsang Kung and Wu Han all had horsemen under their command (17,47: 15 b; 18,48: 5 b—6 a, 13 a—13 b).

The armament of the Han forces has recently been described in a book on Chinese military weapons³⁾. It consisted of lances, knives, swords, axes, bows and crossbows.

The first and most immediate problem of all rebels was to increase the number of their troops. Except for the revolt in Nan-yang, the sources are usually uninformative on this point. Only for Emperor Kuang-wu is it possible to obtain some insight into the techniques of mobilization during the civil war.

When Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) on his escape from Wang Lang's forces in A. D. 24 reached the city of Sin-tu, he was accompanied by a few followers but possessed no army. Jen Kuang, the Grand Administrator of Sin-tu, had mobilized some soldiers. Liu Siu also received a small contingent of cavalry, sent from the Ho-jung commandery.⁴⁾ These units were far too small to allow of operations against Wang Lang. Once it had been decided to take up the fight against this pretender, the most urgent question was how to raise further troops. Jen Kuang advised that the Emergency Troops (pen ming) should be called up, a suggestion which was adopted (1 A: 9 b; 21,51: 1 b). After carrying out this program in the Sin-tu area, Liu Siu marched almost directly away from Han-tan, thereby increasing the distance between himself and the enemy. The purpose of this was simply to widen his base of operations so as to obtain more soldiers and badly needed supplies⁵⁾. The sources state that Liu Siu continued to mobilize Emergency Troops (1 A: 10 a).

Apart from the instances just quoted, Emergency Troops are mentioned on only two other occasions in the HHS⁶⁾. The term is explained by Ying Shao (circa 140—206) as Skilled Soldiers (ts'ai kuan) and Cavalrymen (ki shi) who were called up during emergencies⁷⁾. Wei Hung, a contemporary of Emperor Kuang-wu, says in his Han kiu yi that men at the age of 23 first served one year as Regular Conscrip-

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 75.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 94.

³⁾ 93. Chou, pp. 181—206, 227—228. Plate 47 shows swords, knives and arrow points of bronze, plate 48 halberd and lance heads, axes, arrow points and crossbow arrows of bronze, plate 58 arrow heads, whistling arrow heads, knives and swords of iron. Cf. especially the mechanism of a Han crossbow on p. 190 and plate 48. See also Schuyler van R. Cammann's article, «Archeological evidence for Chinese contacts with India during the Han dynasty» (*Sinologica*, no. V, 1956), which describes and illustrates the mechanism of a Han crossbow (pp. 9—19). Cf. also *ibidem* p. 10, note 39.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 67.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 79.

⁶⁾ In A. D. 21, Wang Mang's Shepherd of the King province mobilized Emergency Troops against the commoners but was defeated at Yün-tu (cf. vol. I, p. 135). In A. D. 48, Sung Kün called up Emergency Troops in Kiang-hia after the aborigines of the Wu-ling commandery had rebelled (41,71: 14 a).

⁷⁾ 72. Dubs, II, p. 154, note 2.4.

(cheng tsu), then one year as Guards (wei shī), and subsequently became Skilled Soldiers or Cavalrymen, trained in archery, driving, riding, galloping, fighting and tactics. In their 56th year, they were excused from further service¹⁾. The Emergency Troops may have formed a local militia. Whatever the theoretical justification for the levies, the fact remains that people were far from pleased at being called up. Jen Kuang recognized this and suggested a policy of terror to counter popular resistance. If prefectures were unwilling to submit, they should be threatened with full-scale looting. Since people were covetous of their property, it would then become possible to enlist soldiers (21,41: 1 b). In spite of Ying Shao's charming paraphrase of the term Emergency Troops: «when they hear the orders, they run eagerly [in order to assist]»²⁾, these clearly were impressed soldiers.

Liu Siu received further reinforcements when the Grand Administrators of Shang-ku and Yü-yang dispatched Shock Cavalry and infantry as their contribution to the campaign against Wang Lang.³⁾ After the pretender had been defeated, Wu Han was sent to the north to mobilize additional horsemen and foot soldiers (1 A: 12 a; 18,48: 2 a; 19,49: 3 b). The HHS describes Wu Han's return and adds the important remark that he then presented a register of the soldiers (18,48: 2 a). The Chinese bureaucratic instinct made itself felt even in times of stress.

Another way of augmenting one's forces was by embodying former enemy troops. This is not explicitly mentioned in each particular case, but seems to have been a standard practice. For instance, after the defeat of Wang Lang in A. D. 24, all soldiers were redistributed among Liu Siu's generals. It is more than likely that these included men who previously had served under Wang Lang. The majority wished to be placed under the command of Feng Yi, who seems to have been popular. He was known by his nickname of the «Big Tree General», as he liked to sit in solitude under a tree whenever the army made a halt (17,47: 2 b). Later in this year, when the T'ung-ma surrendered, they were also immediately enlisted and allotted to various officers (1 A: 12 b). After Wu Han had executed the Keng-shī Emperor's Shepherd of the Yu province in A. D. 24⁴⁾, he took over the latter's forces (18,48: 2 a).

In the early stages of the civil war, when every man counted, members of the gentry also brought considerable numbers of personal followers into Liu Siu's camp. This automatically guaranteed a warm reception and a promise of future rewards⁵⁾.

This general situation did not change during the first few years after Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) had ascended the throne. Troops were still impressed wherever they could be found, and the only authority needed was an edict or message stamped with the imperial seal (31,61: 4 b). Enemy troops were still absorbed whenever the need existed. For example, during the invasion of Si-ch'uan in A. D. 35, Tsang

¹⁾ 72. Dubs, I, p. 80, note 2.

²⁾ 72. Dubs, II, p. 154, note 2.4.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 71–72.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 79.

⁵⁾ E. g. the cases of Liu Chī and Keng Ch'un in A. D. 24 (cf. *supra* pp. 68–69).

Kung led soldiers of Kung-sun Shu who previously had capitulated¹⁾. The surrender of enemy officials who brought their own troops with them was still warmly welcomed. The Grand Administrator of Shang-tang, an appointee of the Keng-shī Emperor, had vigorously defended the T'ien-tsing pass against one of Kuang-wu's armies, but surrendered with all his men at the end of A. D. 25²⁾. The emperor immediately reappointed him to his former office (28 A, 58 A: 10 a). The same theme is illustrated, though in reverse, by the surrender of Pao Yung. He was an Acting General-in-chief of the late Keng-shī Emperor, and in A. D. 24 had pacified parts of Shan-si³⁾. He refused to believe that his sovereign was dead, and continued to defend the T'ai-yüan commandery⁴⁾. Only after he had sent a messenger to Ch'ang-an and received conclusive confirmation that the rumours were true, did he make preparations for joining Kuang-wu. But instead of bringing his troops with him, he demobilized them and met the emperor with no more than a few officers and followers. Kuang-wu gave him a distinctly sour reception and said: «Where are your troops, Sir?» Pao Yung prostrated himself and answered that he was ashamed to gain wealth and influence thanks to his former master's soldiers. The emperor remarked: «You speak big, Sir, and yet I am not pleased» (29, 59: 5 b—6 a).

Gradually, military affairs became more normal as the fighting changed from a succession of hastily met emergencies to a matter of routine. At some unspecified time, Tu Shī memorialized that current methods of mobilization were dangerous, since messages stamped with the imperial seal could be forged, with the result that troops could fall into the wrong hands. He urged that Tiger Tallies should be reintroduced, a suggestion which was adopted by the emperor (31, 61: 4 b). These tallies consisted of two parts: one half was given to the officer in charge of recruiting and leading troops, and served at the same time as his credentials; the other was preserved in the office of the Privy Treasurer in the capital (chī 26: 10 b).⁵⁾ This made it possible to check the two halves of the tally against each other, which was expected to prevent abuse.

As Emperor Kuang-wu gained increasing control over the Great Plain, he found it less and less necessary to move armies over large distances. He began to mobilize troops near the places where they were needed. In A. D. 28, four generals received orders to enlist soldiers in K'uai-ki, Tan-yang, Kiu-kiang, and Liu-an, in preparation for the attack on Li Hien⁶⁾. These commanderies were situated in the immediate vicinity of Lu-kiang, which was the stronghold of the pretender. Previous to the great offensive against Kung-sun Shu in A. D. 35, troops were mobilized in Nan-yang, Nan and Wu-ling, and sailors were recruited in south China⁷⁾. As the latter

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 191.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 102, 106.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 60.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 106.

⁵⁾ Cf. 68. Chavannes, II, p. 466, note 1; 72. Dubs, I, p. 56, note 3; and R. Des Rotours' article «Les insignes en deux parties sous la dynastie des T'ang» (T'oung Pao, no. XLI, 1952).

⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 142.

⁷⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 188.

had to be people with a particular kind of skill, they are a special case. Nan-yang, Nan and Wu-ling were adjoining commanderies north and south of the Yang-tsi, along which river the offensive was planned to take place. By that time, it also was possible to lighten the burden imposed by recruitment. It is stated that Wu Han's army in A. D. 35 included men whose punishment had been commuted (shihing) (18,48: 5 a). These were also used in the fighting on the northern border which will be described in the third volume. According to Hulsewé, the men involved were convicts who, although amnestied, had to finish the unexpired part of their sentence in government service¹).

When the war in East China had come to an end, Kuang-wu no longer needed to enlist former enemy forces in that area, and could even afford a partial demobilization of his own armies. Already in A. D. 27, when Feng Yi fought the powerful junkers in the Land Within the Passes,²) he had disbanded the units which surrendered and allowed the soldiers to return to their homes (17,47: 6 b). This was an early and isolated case, and was only made possible because of the cooperation of Wei Ao and because the northwest then seemed close to pacification. More typical is Chang Pu's capitulation in Shan-tung, A. D. 29. We are told that his men still numbered more than 100,000, though this figure cannot be checked. The banners and drums of the twelve commanderies, which Chang Pu previously had controlled, were set up in different places, and his soldiers were ordered to station themselves by the banners of their home areas. They were then sent back to their villages (19,49: 8 b). On Apr. 14, A. D. 31, the emperor also ordered a major demobilization, in which Light Chariots, Cavalrymen, Skilled Soldiers, sailors in the Towered Warships, and lower officers were all included (1 B: 4 a). It says much for Kuang-wu's military strength that such a measure was possible at a time when Wei Ao and Kung-sun Shu were not yet defeated.

A difficulty which was never quite overcome was that of enforcing discipline. Officers and soldiers alike had a tendency to loot. Although, in a general sense, this was deplored, it rarely proved possible to restrain the troops. The authors of the HHS make a half-hearted attempt to contrast Kuang-wu's attitude on this question with that of his enemies, but without much success. The facts speak for themselves. Undoubtedly, all «emperors» and warlords encountered the same disciplinary problems. It must be assumed that the men tried to enrich themselves, irrespective of whom they served, or where.

In the earliest stages of the rebellion discipline must have been almost completely lacking. The HHS records that in A. D. 22 the proceeds of looting were not equally divided, and that the troops were embittered against the members of the Liu clan, who seem to have appropriated more than their share (1 A: 3 a).³) In the following year, when the soldiers entered Wan, Jen Kuang was almost murdered because of his exquisite clothes, and his life was only saved through the intervention of

¹) 105. Hulsewé, pp. 240—241.

²) Cf. *supra* pp. 160—161.

³) Cf. vol. I, p. 107.

a very high official, the Superintendent of the Imperial Household (21,51: 1 a). This episode happens to be recorded because Jen Kuang has a biography in the HHS; the many other people who were plundered are passed by in silence. A short period of comparative order may have followed the Keng-shī Emperor's early victories. Discipline deteriorated again after the fall of the clique of the former chieftains, reaching its lowest point with the looting of Ch'ang-an and the fighting in the palace in A. D. 25.¹⁾

Emperor Kuang-wu faced similar difficulties, though he managed to remain master of the situation. Early in his reign, Tu Shī was appointed to the office of Attending Secretary, whose incumbents acted as censors (chī 26: 11 a). This man received special authority in Lo-yang at a time when the troops of an imperial general were tyrannizing the people. Remonstrations proving of no avail, Tu Shī had the general executed. He was called to an audience and rewarded by the emperor (31,61: 2 b—3 a). This warning did not produce notable results. In A. D. 26, K'ou Sūn became Grand Administrator of Ying-ch'uan. The Bearer of the Gilded Mace Kia Fu was then with his army in the neighbouring Ju-nan commandery. Some of his officers raided Ying-ch'uan and committed murders. K'ou Sūn had them arrested and executed in the market-place. When Kia Fu returned from his campaign²⁾ and was about to cross the borders of Ying-ch'uan, he determined to kill K'ou Sūn in revenge for the slight he felt he had suffered. K'ou Sūn received private information about this and gave orders that the soldiers of his antagonist should be welcomed with wine. He then started out to meet Kia Fu, as etiquette required, but soon turned back pretending illness. When Kia Fu wished to draw up his troops for pursuit, he discovered that all his officers and soldiers were drunk. The emperor made a special point of restoring peace and friendship between the two men (16,46: 19 a—20 a). He could not afford a quarrel among his chief assistants and does not seem to have made an issue of the lack of discipline in Kia Fu's army. In the same year, the imperial general Teng Feng revolted, embittered by the fact that the Commander-in-chief, Wu Han, had plundered his home area³⁾. The mutinies of Su Mao and P'ang Meng in A. D. 26 and 29 may have had similar causes⁴⁾.

Though attempts were made to enforce order among the troops, the evidence suggests that they were seldom successful. For example, in A. D. 27, one the generals appointed a certain Chī Hui as Chief Clerk in Command of Troops. Chī Hui took an oath from the soldiers that they should not seize, maim, or undress people and rape women. In spite of this, the men continued to loot and to open graves (29,59: 11 a).

The imperial troops were disciplined in the sense that they obeyed their generals and usually fought well. The only mutiny recorded for the period after Kuang-wu's

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 99.

²⁾ For this campaign cf. *supra* pp. 151—152.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 153.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 133—135, 144.

ascension to the throne, took place in Ho-tung, A. D. 32¹⁾). It must be assumed, however, that complete discipline could never be enforced, simply because the rations of the soldiers were too small²⁾ and because too many of the generals and lower officers were inclined to line their own pockets. Others may have had a brutal streak in their nature. One may recall Li Chung's savage persecution in Sin-tu³⁾ or Wu Han's repeated acts of cruelty. The latter killed the unfortunate Sie Kung with his own hands in Ye⁴⁾. He was responsible for the rebellion of Teng Feng. He sacked the city of Ch'eng-tu, an act which seems genuinely to have horrified the emperor⁵⁾. He was feared by his subordinates, whose obedience he ensured by drastic methods. At one occasion, he threatened to execute all officers who advanced without authority (18,48: 4 b). Though he would certainly have been able to do so, he did not restrain his men from looting.

One may approach the question from another angle. Generals are so rarely said not to have looted that such abstention clearly represented a notable and praiseworthy exception to the rule. Even then, the reason was not always pity for the people. In A. D. 29, Keng Yen issued a special instruction against pillaging, but it turns out that the order was given simply because Keng Yen expected an attack by Chang Pu on Lin-tsi⁶⁾ and wished to keep his troops together (19,49: 7 a). When Ts'en P'eng invaded Si-ch'uan in A. D. 35, he forbade his soldiers to plunder. «Not even an autumn hair was violated». The text goes on to say that Ts'en P'eng modestly refused to accept oxen and wine which were offered by the people (17,47: 16 a, 17 a). Such gifts were never voluntary, and considering the ever present difficulties of supply it seems very unlikely that Ts'en P'eng would have rejected them. The episode as reported is therefore most improbable. Yao K'i and Chu Yu are said never to have looted. Significantly enough, the source adds that this was resented by the men in Chu Yu's army (20,50: 2 b; 22,52: 2 a).

The pattern of loyalties in military forces was hierarchically structured. The men owed allegiance to their generals, and the generals were, with few exceptions, loyal to Kuang-wu. This meant that the emperor could only bring his influence to bear indirectly on the ordinary soldiers. In the rare instances where generals mutinied, they were always followed by their troops.

2. *Tactics*

Before Kuang-wu ascended the throne, he was constantly engaged in military actions, and led his troops in person. He even came close to losing his life early in A. D. 25, in a battle against the Yu-lai, Ta-ts'iang and Wu-fan bandits. His army was defeated, and he escaped only by flinging himself down the steep bank of a river, where he was given a new horse by a cavalryman (1 A: 13 b).

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 176.

²⁾ Cf. 101. Eberhard, pp. 5—7.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 75.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 86.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 197.

⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 149.

After Kuang-wu had become emperor, the war was mostly fought by his generals, although he still occasionally took personal command. He directed the campaign against Lo-yang at the end of A. D. 25; encountered the Red Eyebrows in March, 26; led operations in Nan-yang, in 27; on the southern plain in 28; in Nan, in January 29; on the southern plain and the Shan-tung peninsula in 29; against Wei Ao and on the southern plain in 32. The only campaigns in which the emperor took no part were the ones on the northern plain and against Kung-sun Shu. In the second, he took the precaution of shifting his headquarters temporarily to Ch'ang-an in the autumn of 35 (1 B: 7 a—7 b), probably in order to be closer to the scene of action.

The emperor's normal practice was to assign particular operations to individual generals, who had no choice but to obey. For example, the General-in-chief, King Tan, was in A. D. 26 ordered to pacify Hung-nung. Although he was afflicted by a dangerous illness, he did not dare to excuse himself from the task. Some ten days after his arrival in the commandery he died (22,52: 3 b—4 a). In A. D. 32, Chai Tsun was seriously ill, but was not relieved from his command. He died in his camp some time in the following year (20,50: 7 b). In both instances, Kuang-wu knew that the men were sick.

It is possible that on some occasions the emperor may have asked for volunteers. Early in A. D. 26, he discussed with his officers who should attack the cities of Yen and Wan. No one moved. The emperor hit the call-to-arms against the ground and said: 'Yen is strongest. Wan is next in order. Who will undertake to attack them?' Kia Fu hastily volunteered to march against Yen. Kuang-wu then ordered the Commander-in-chief, Wu Han, to conquer Wan (17,47: 19 a).

Generals who were engaged in campaigns kept in touch with the emperor through frequent reports. Kuang-wu was always well informed about the military situation, followed the movements of his armies in detail, and sent forward the necessary instructions. Absolute control over the various actions remained with him. The HHS records many instances that show how the emperor kept close check on his generals. Here are some examples:

When Teng Yü in A. D. 25 stood in the area north of Ch'ang-an, he considered it unwise to attempt an attack on the city¹⁾. Kuang-wu wrote ordering him to advance, but Teng Yü felt unable to do so (16,46: 4 b). An imperial order in A. D. 26 directed Teng Yü to avoid further battles with the Red Eyebrows, who were without provisions and would soon be forced to return eastwards where the emperor himself would deal with them (16,46: 5 b)²⁾. This proved an accurate analysis of the situation.

In A. D. 26, the general Teng Lung raised the siege of Ki and relieved Chu Fou³⁾. They did not join forces but encamped separately against P'eng Ch'ung. Kuang-wu received a report and was infuriated. He pointed out that the two camps were 100 li apart and correctly predicted their defeat (12,42: 9 a—9 b).

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 101.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 117.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 126.

In A. D. 27, the General-in-chief, Ts'en P'eng, was for a while unable to cross the Han River¹⁾. The emperor reprimanded him (17,47: 13 a).

In A. D. 28, one of Tung Hien's officers mutinied and took the city of Lan-ling).²⁾ Kuang-wu instructed his General-in-chief, Ko Yen, to attack T'an, which had just been evacuated by Tung Hien. Ko Yen disobeyed and marched to Lan-ling, where he barely escaped defeat. He then turned against T'an. En route, he received a letter from the emperor rebuking him, and pointing out that if he had assaulted T'an when first ordered to do so, he would have taken the city by surprise. Now it was too late. Ko Yen was, in fact, unable to take the city. Later he was frequently warned by Kuang-wu not to underestimate his opponent (18,48: 9 b—10 a).

Before the great offensive against Kung-sun Shu in A. D. 35, Wu Han wished to demobilize the sailors. Ts'en P'eng objected to this and sent a report to the court. The emperor endorsed Ts'en P'eng's view (17,47: 15 b—16 a)³⁾.

In A. D. 36, Kuang-wu cautioned Wu Han to proceed carefully in the Ch'eng-tu area. When a report was received that the troops had advanced in two columns, the emperor was greatly alarmed and ordered an immediate retreat⁴⁾. After Wu Han had extricated himself from his difficulties, Kuang-wu wrote him another letter with further, detailed instructions (18,48: 5 b—6 a).

It is clear that, in spite of the distances involved, the emperor never relinquished the supreme command over his armies. Although some of the generals did not obey orders to the letter, Kuang-wu was always eventually able to exert his authority.

Examining the time of year when the various campaigns were mounted, an interesting fact emerges:

26, 3rd month (Apr./May): First campaign on the southern plain⁵⁾.

26, 3rd month (Apr./May): Kia Fu's operations against Yen etc.⁶⁾.

26, spring: Ts'en P'eng's operations in Nan-yang⁷⁾.

26, spring: Wu Han's operations in Nan-yang⁸⁾.

27, 3rd month (Apr./May): Kuang-wu's operations in Nan-yang⁹⁾.

27, 4th month (May/June): Second campaign on the southern plain¹⁰⁾.

28, 2nd month (Mar./Apr.): Campaign against Chang Pu¹¹⁾.

28, spring: Campaigns against Chang Pu and Liu Yü¹²⁾.

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 156.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 140—142.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 188—189.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 194.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 133.

⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 151.

⁷⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 151.

⁸⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 153.

⁹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 154.

¹⁰⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 138.

¹¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 147.

¹²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 139.

- 28, 5th month (June/July): Operations in Cho¹).
- 29, 3rd month (Apr./May): Operations against T'ien Jung²).
- 30, 5th month (June/July): First campaign against Wei Ao³).
- 32, 1st month (Feb.): Lai Hi's attack on Lüe-yang⁴).
- 32, intercalated month (July/Aug.): Second campaign against Wei Ao⁵).
- 33, 8th month (Sept./Oct.): Third campaign against Wei Ao⁶).
- 35, intercalated month (Apr./May): Offensive against Kung-sun Shu⁷).

Of these 15 campaigns, 10 began not later than Apr./May, and at least 5 during these very two months. Only 2 began later than June/July. It was clearly considered preferable to embark on military operations in the spring. This holds true also for Kuang-wu's enemies. Su Mao tried to relieve Ch'ui-hui in the 2nd month (Mar./Apr.) of A. D. 29⁸). Kung-sun Shu invaded Nan in the 3rd month (Apr./May) of A. D. 30 and again during the same month in A. D. 33⁹).

The main explanation must have been climatic. Another factor which may have played a role was that during the warm months the armies to a certain extent could live off the land. A third incentive could have existed: namely, to attack at a time when the last year's harvest was partly consumed and the current year's grain not yet cut. This would seem to have been in Chu Fou's mind when he complained in A. D. 27 that, because of the absence of an imperial campaign in the north, P'eng Ch'ung had been able to take in the harvest (33,63: 3 a—3 b)¹⁰).

The sources constantly refer to the importance of supplies. It was not enough to call up soldiers; they also had to be fed to keep them from deserting. At the beginning of the civil war the Keng-shi Emperor, and later Liu Siu (Kuang-wu), hastened to widen their base of operations, not only to mobilize troops but also to increase the flow of provisions. In the 3rd month (Apr. 10 — May 8) of A. D. 23, a few weeks after the Keng-shi Emperor had ascended the throne, Liu Siu was dispatched to invade the Ying-ch'uan commandery. He sent back oxen, horses and grain (1 A: 4 a)¹¹). When, a year later, he started out from Sin-tu and in a circular movement expanded the area under his control, the purpose was as much to obtain provisions as to recruit soldiers¹²).

Communications at this time were disrupted, and it was difficult to lay up supplies to meet future needs. The economic situation permitted only a hand-to-mouth

¹) Cf. *supra* p. 130.

²) Cf. *supra* p. 156.

³) Cf. *supra* p. 169.

⁴) Cf. *supra* p. 173.

⁵) Cf. *supra* p. 173.

⁶) Cf. *supra* p. 178.

⁷) Cf. *supra* p. 189.

⁸) Cf. *supra* p. 142.

⁹) Cf. *supra* pp. 168, 187.

¹⁰) Cf. *supra* p. 128.

¹¹) Cf. vol. I, pp. 118—119.

¹²) Cf. *supra* pp. 69, 207.

existence. Liu Siu depended on what could be procured locally or what was sent to him by friendly officials. During the siege of Han-tan, for example, he received provisions from P'eng Ch'ung which placed him to no small extent in the latter's debt¹⁾.

After the defeat of Wang Lang, Liu Siu was anxious to gain the economic strength he needed for future operations, and made a special point of stationing his general K'ou Sün as Grand Administrator in Ho-nei²⁾. This commandery was rich and had not suffered from the war. K'ou Sün immediately imposed a tax in grain, sending what was collected to the army (16,46: 18 a—18 b). It is also recorded that Liu Siu's brother-in-law, Teng Ch'en, sent provisions from the Ch'ang-shan commandery (15,45: 8 a). In spite of this, supplies were barely sufficient. K'ou Sün's biography states that, when Liu Siu ascended the throne, the food supplies for the army were rapidly becoming exhausted. K'ou Sün repeatedly sent provisions from Ho-nei, and these were measured out to the various officials by the Masters of Writing (16,46: 18 b).

Emperor Kuang-wu's economic situation improved gradually, but all through the war it was a major problem to keep the armies provided with rations. In A. D. 26, Teng Yü ran out of supplies after his withdrawal to Kao-ling.³⁾ His soldiers starved and ate berries and herbs (16,46: 5 b). A year later, Feng Yi encountered similar difficulties in the northwest. The roads were cut, transports failed to get through, and the men had to subsist on wild fruits (17,47: 6 b). When the emperor marched against Wei Ao in A. D. 32 and met Tou Jung, it is specifically stated that the latter brought provisions to the rendezvous on more than 5,000 carts.⁴⁾ This special mention must reflect the importance that was attached to these supplies. As late as A. D. 35, during Tsang Kung's advance along the Fou River, stores were insufficient and transports did not reach him. He saved his army by forging an imperial decree and appropriating supplies intended for Ts'en P'eng (18,48: 13 a).⁵⁾

These difficulties did not, of course, affect Kuang-wu alone. The whole history of the Red Eyebrows is intimately bound up with the question of provisions. The peasants rose because they were starving. They lived off the land, and therefore had to stay on the move. They twice evacuated Ch'ang-an because there was not enough to eat, and finally left the Land Within the Passes when all supplies were exhausted. Kuang-wu anticipated this and met the Red Eyebrows when they were so weakened that they could no longer make a serious stand against the imperial armies.

To starve out the enemy was a major tactic in the warfare of the time. Attempts were made to cut enemy supply lines whenever this proved feasible. For instance, in the autumn of A. D. 24, Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) was engaged in

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 75.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 87.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 117.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 175.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 191.

operations against the T'ung-ma. They were eager to meet him in battle, but he stayed in the protection of his camp. His cavalry meanwhile disrupted the supply routes of the enemy and captured those who went out to seek provisions. The T'ung-ma had to withdraw and were defeated (1 A: 12 a). In A. D. 25, when the Wu-hiao bandits were retreating northwards, Ch'en Tsün gave Liu Siu important advice: he should send light cavalry ahead and instruct the people to protect themselves. In this way the Wu-hiao would find difficulty in obtaining food, and would be annihilated without a battle. The plan was adopted and proved successful (18,48: 11 a). In A. D. 26, when Chai Tsun was engaged against Chang Man,¹⁾ he avoided pitched battles and instead cut the enemy's supply lines (20,50: 6 a—6 b). In A. D. 29, Emperor Kuang-wu refused to attack Tung Hien's forces at Ch'ang-lu, although his officers wished to press forward. He advanced only after Tung Hien's provisions had been exhausted (12,42: 5 a).²⁾

Armies in the field had, to a certain degree, to live off the land. This is one of the reasons why looting could never be effectively curbed. They also tried to capture supplies from the enemy. For example, Ts'en P'eng in A. D. 35 obtained great quantities of rice in Si-ch'uan (17,47: 16 b)³⁾. It is not clear whether this rice came from Kung-sun Shu's army stores or whether it was requisitioned from the people. The sources very often record the taking or losing of stores in battle, and this preoccupation with supply questions is conclusive evidence of their importance. In the engagement at Po-jen in A. D. 24, Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) first lost and then reconquered his stores (1 A: 10 a—10 b)⁴⁾. Stores were also temporarily lost at Nan-luan (SHS 2: 13 a)⁵⁾. In the battle at She-k'üan⁶⁾, the bandits made a surprise attack on Yao K'i's stores (20,50: 2 a). Early in A. D. 25, Teng Yü captured stores on more than 1,000 carts at the Ki pass (16,46: 3 a)⁷⁾. When Liu Yung made a sally from Sui-yang in A. D. 27⁸⁾, the imperial forces captured his stores (18,48: 9 b). In A. D. 29, Ma Wu lost his stores to Su Mao's cavalry, though he was later able to regain them (20,50: 4 a—4 b)⁹⁾. After their defeat at the T'ao district¹⁰⁾, P'ang Meng and his confederates abandoned their stores (12,42: 5 a). Keng Yen captured the stores of Chang Pu's army at Kü-li (19,49: 6 b)¹¹⁾. In the battle at Lin-tsi¹²⁾, Chang Pu lost more than 2,000 cartloads of supplies to Keng Yen (19,49: 8 a). When Chang Pu surrendered, he still had over 7,000 cartloads of stores (19,49: 8 b). The importance of army stores is also brought out by the

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 150—151.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 145—146.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 189.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 71.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 75.

⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 84.

⁷⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 92.

⁸⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 138.

⁹⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 142—143.

¹⁰⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 145.

¹¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 147.

¹²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 149.

events in the northwest, A. D. 32. Provisions were getting low, whereupon Kuang-wu ordered Wu Han to demobilize his soldiers rather than retain them under arms and thereby court open desertion (18,48: 5 a). Before their retreat, the imperial forces burned their remaining stores to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy (17,47: 15 a)¹⁾.

It is not important whether the number of cartloads of supplies is in every case correctly given by the historian, or perhaps exaggerated; what is important is the fact that all the armies seem to have been chronically short of supplies, and that the generals made particular efforts to take stores from the enemy. This fact must, to no little degree, have guided the deployment of troops during an action, and so have influenced the tactical thinking of the time.

The above examples, which could easily be multiplied, are probably for the most part concerned with stores in the sense of foodstuffs, though military equipment of various kinds must also have been included. It is seldom that the sources refer to the latter alone. In A. D. 25, K'ou Sün sent more than 1,000,000 bamboo arrows and 2,000 horses from Ho-nei (16,46: 18 a—18 b).²⁾ In A. D. 35, an imperial Internuncio had orders to bring 700 horses to Ts'en P'eng (18,48: 13 a).³⁾ A year later, 7,000 horsemen and a consignment of silk reached Wu Han outside Ch'eng-tu (31,61: 6 b—7 a).⁴⁾ These few instances show that the military equipment of the armies, far from being overlooked, was replenished whenever possible. But this was overshadowed by the problem of how to keep the soldiers fed. One only has to recall that the great offensive against Kung-sun Shu almost broke down below the walls of Ch'eng-tu through the lack of stores.⁴⁾

It has been stressed that all the various armies and bandit groups engaged in looting in their search for food. Walled cities were not easily taken in the face of a determined defence, but even in the country districts people did not passively await the coming of marauders. The gentry clans built their own fortified camps, within which they and their followers could defend themselves (31,61: 1 a).⁵⁾ A resolute attack by disciplined troops could, of course, overrun such a camp, but the generals often had more important matters to attend to. Minor bandit groups and unorganized attacks were more easily resisted. The building of private camps seems to have been a special feature of the civil war, and was probably not restricted to the gentry clans. It is recorded, for example, that in A. D. 26 the people in the Three Adjuncts⁶⁾ built camps and protected themselves against the Red Eyebrows. When they came out from Ch'ang-an to loot, there was nothing they could take (11,41: 13 b). Fortified camps, a phenomenon closely connected

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 178.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 87.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 191.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 196—197.

⁵⁾ This is expressly mentioned of Fan Hung (32,62: 2 a; cf. also vol. I, pp. 57—58), Feng Fang (33,63: 7 b), Ti-wu Lun (41,71: 1 a), Chao Kang (77,107: 4 a), and Sun K'an (79 B, 109 B: 9 a). In the light of the general description given in 31,61: 1 a, these cases represent a rule rather than an exception.

⁶⁾ I. e. the three former capital commanderies.

with the supply problem, were thus another factor which the military leaders had to take into consideration.

Finally, as far as the mode of transporting stores is concerned, it is clear that this in every campaign was done on carts. The single exception was the offensive in Si-ch'uan, where boats and floats were used.

The generals often fought in areas with which they were not familiar. They could draw on the local knowledge of natives, and perhaps sometimes rely on their own officers. It is tempting to think that they also had maps at their disposal, as they are occasionally mentioned in the sources. While Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) was in Kuang-o, he showed Teng Yü a map depicting the commanderies and kingdoms of the empire.¹⁾ When T'ien Jung towards the end of A. D. 27 made preparations for surrender,²⁾ his brother-in-law, Sin Ch'en, tried to dissuade him and produced a map which showed the possessions of P'eng Ch'ung, Chang Pu, Tung Hien, Liu Yung, Li Hien, Kung-sun Shu, Wei Ao and Lu Fang, as contrasted with those controlled by Kuang-wu (SHS 2: 7 a—7 b; HHK 4: 12 b). In A. D. 31, Ma Yüan made contact with various of Wei Ao's officers in an attempt to induce them to change their allegiance to Kuang-wu.³⁾ In his letter to one of these men he refers to a map which showed the commanderies and kingdoms (24,54: 5 a).

These maps seem only to have been concerned with the larger administrative units of the empire.⁴⁾ It is no great step from such a map to one showing other features as well, such as cities, roads, and perhaps also rivers and mountains⁵⁾.

Primitive maps of the better known parts of the empire may very possibly have been in use during the civil war, though this may not apply to the more distant regions, where the generals seem occasionally to have been quite at a loss. Their irresolution during the campaign against Wei Ao in A. D. 32 will be remembered and how, in this situation, Ma Yüan made a topographical map out of rice in the presence of the emperor.⁶⁾

Coming to the actual battles, nothing is known about those in which the forces met each other in straightforward engagements. The sources then simply state that A defeated B at X. Occasionally the actions will include unusual features which the historian then describes with relish. It is possible, in this way, to gain some insight into the more spectacular battles of the civil war and, incidentally, to draw some general conclusions.

Quite often the sources mention that armies challenged each other to battle.⁷⁾

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 71.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 156.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 173.

⁴⁾ Such maps are nothing new in Chinese history. They are, for example, mentioned in the Chou li and in the HS.

⁵⁾ Li Ling submitted in 99 B. C. a map to Emperor Wu, showing «mountains, watercourses, and the configuration of places through which he passed». Cf. 103. Goodrich, p. 75.

⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 173.

⁷⁾ E. g. 1 A: 12 a; 12,42: 5 a; 20,50: 4 b, 6 b; 22,52: 7 a etc.

The technical term used is *t'iao chan* 挑戰. It may imply no more than that a general provocation to fight was offered. But there are also suggestions that the belligerents could make a formal approach to each other, issuing a challenge to battle, and fixing a certain day for the action. This happened in A. D. 27 when Feng Yi and the Red Eyebrows reached such an agreement (17,47: 5 b).

The commanding generals seem normally to have enjoyed full discretion about the employment of their officers, though departures from this rule were possible. In A. D. 26, Teng Yü let his subordinates draw lots to decide who would command the van and who the rear (38,68: 1 a).

Once an engagement had begun, the generals continued to control the movements of their forces and so direct the course of the battle. In primitive warfare, all control over the troops was lost during a hand-to-hand fight. The soldiers then simply hammered each other until one side gave up. The day of such battles was long since past. Two examples will illustrate how the military commanders of the civil war chose positions from which they could obtain a good view of the battle field and so, from moment to moment, make the necessary dispositions. This was, indeed, probably the general practice. In the action outside Hia-p'i, A. D. 29,¹⁾ Kuang-wu stationed himself on a hill south of the city. From there he watched his general Wang Ch'ang fighting at one of the gates. As arrows were falling thickly from the wall, the emperor dispatched a Palace [Attendant Within] the Yellow Gate to Wang Ch'ang with orders to withdraw (15,45: 6 b). During the same year, in the battle at Lin-tsai,²⁾ Keng Yen mounted the ruined terrace of the former royal palace in order to observe the movements of Chang Pu's army³⁾ (19,49: 7 b).

In desperate situations the generals would sometimes call for volunteers (they are referred to as *«dare-to-dies»*), or else soldiers would themselves volunteer. A famous example occurred in the battle of K'un-yang in A. D. 23, where Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) together with *«dare-to-dies»* attacked the enemy centre.⁴⁾ In the battle of She-k'üan in A. D. 24,⁵⁾ Keng Ch'un led *«dare-to-dies»*⁶⁾ (21,51: 8 b). When the forces of the imperial general Ma Wu were defeated in A. D. 29,⁷⁾ Lu Jun and other soldiers in Wang Pa's camp cut off their hair and volunteered to fight (20,50: 4 b).

The real ingenuity of the various military leaders is shown by the stratagems which they adopted. Although most of these are recorded for Kuang-wu's generals, simply because the history always concentrates on him and his followers, they were also successfully employed by others. The ruses are of the most varied kind, and some of the commanders were more skilled in using them than others. The master of them all was Keng Yen.

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 146.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 149.

³⁾ Cf. further *infra* p. 222.

⁴⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 77.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 84.

⁶⁾ Cf. further *infra* p. 221.

⁷⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 142-143.

When Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) in A. D. 24 led his little force from Sin-tu to T'ang-yang, he chose the hour after sunset and ordered the horsemen to carry burning torches. Their light was reflected by the sky, a sight which so filled the inhabitants of T'ang-yang with terror that they capitulated that very night (21,51: 2 a).

During the battle at She-k'üan in A. D. 24, Keng Ch'un selected volunteers who each carried a bow and arrows. He gagged the men to keep them from talking and marched them silently in a half circle until they were in the rear of the enemy. Then they began to shout and shoot their arrows, terrifying the bandits and turning them to flight (21,51: 8 b—9 a).

Shortly after the battle of She-k'üan, Wu Han took possession of Ye and hid his soldiers within the city. When the representative of the Keng-shi Emperor, Sie Kung, returned and unwarily entered Ye, he was killed (18,48: 2 b—3 a).¹⁾

In the battle at Wen, A. D. 25,²⁾ K'ou Sün ordered his soldiers to shout from the city wall that Liu Siu's (Kuang-wu's) troops were arriving. This caused a commotion in the enemy lines, which K'ou Sün exploited by an immediate and successful attack (16,46: 18 b).

In A. D. 26, P'eng Ch'ung made a frontal assault on the imperial general Teng Lung.³⁾ Simultaneously he dispatched light cavalry, which after a while attacked the rear of Teng Lung's army and defeated him (12,42: 9 b).

During the same year, the Red Eyebrows fought an action against Yen Ts'en at Tu-ling.⁴⁾ The latter was defeated, and his ally Li Pao⁵⁾ surrendered to the Red Eyebrows. Li Pao then sent a man to Yen Ts'en and secretly made certain proposals. The battle was resumed, and Li Pao stayed behind, seizing the unguarded camp of the Red Eyebrows, and exchanging their banners for his own. When the Red Eyebrows returned, tired from the fighting, they saw that the banners of their camp were now all white. They fled and were routed (11,41: 13 a—13 b).

The Red Eyebrows themselves used a stratagem against Feng Yi and Teng Yü in A. D. 27. They feigned defeat at the Hui Creek,⁶⁾ withdrew, and abandoned their supply carts, which they previously had covered with beans. The imperial soldiers were hungry and threw themselves over the food. At that stage, the Red Eyebrows reappeared and won a victory (17,47: 5 b). Feng Yi payed them back in kind. He first agreed on a certain day for a new battle.⁷⁾ Then he hid soldiers dressed like the Red Eyebrows along the road. During the action, his forces fought vigorously until the enemy was weakened. The hidden soldiers suddenly joined in the *melée*. Complete confusion followed, and the Red Eyebrows were decisively defeated (17,47: 5 b—6 a).

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 86.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 103.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 126, 213.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 117.

⁵⁾ The mention of Li Pao is a mystification. Before and after this battle, he appears in the sources as the Chancellor of Liu Kia, who was a bitter enemy of Yen Ts'en (14,44: 14 a; 16,46: 5 b).

⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 118.

⁷⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 220.

In A. D. 27, Ts'en P'eng was for some time unable to cross the well-defended Han River.¹⁾ Finally he issued orders to his army that on the following morning he would march westwards and pass over the river at Shan-tu. Some of his prisoners were then permitted to escape. As he had planned, they informed Ts'in Feng, who promptly moved to intercept the imperial forces. Meanwhile, Ts'en P'eng crossed the Han River unopposed, from his original position (17,47: 13 b).

Keng Yen used a whole series of stratagems against Chang Pu in A. D. 29.²⁾ After conquering the city of Chu-o, he intentionally let some of the enemy troops escape. Their accounts caused panic among Chang Pu's forces, who abandoned their defence line at Chung-ch'eng. Instead of attacking Li-hia, which seems to have been well fortified, Keng Yen next marched against Kü-li. He ordered his soldiers to cut down trees and spread the rumour that they would be used for filling in the moat surrounding the town. When Keng Yen learned from deserters that Chang Pu's commander, as intended, had heard about these preparations, and was planning to relieve Kü-li, he made it known in his army that the attack would take place in three day's time. He then permitted some of the prisoners to flee. These hurriedly returned to their old units and told what they had heard. On the third day, the enemy actually left his fortifications and advanced upon Kü-li, which allowed Keng Yen to defeat them in the open field. Later in the same year, Keng Yen had the choice of either attacking Si-an or Lin-tsī. The former was small but strong, the latter large but easier to take. Keng Yen gave orders that he would storm Si-an after five days. At the last moment, he led his troops in the opposite direction, took Lin-tsī by surprise and conquered it. Chang Pu soon made a counterattack, whereupon Keng Yen feigned weakness and withdrew. He watched this manoeuvre from the top of a ruined terrace and, when the right moment had come, attacked Chang Pu's flank with his best troops. The battle was resumed on the following morning. This time, Keng Yen had concealed soldiers along the roadside. Chang Pu fought until nightfall; then the hidden forces assaulted him on both flanks, and his army was overpowered (19,49: 6 a—7 b).

In A. D. 30, Feng Yi concealed soldiers in the city of Sün-yi. When Wei Ao's troops approached, they were surprised and defeated (17,47: 8 a—8 b).³⁾

Tsang Kung in A. D. 35 was stationed in Chung-lu, in preparation for the offensive against Kung-sun Shu.⁴⁾ He feared a revolt of the aboriginal people of the region. They outnumbered him so that he could not afford to risk open hostilities. After a while, the surrounding prefectures sent carts with stores. Tsang Kung had the wooden sill of a city gate sawn off by night and then had the carts noisily driven in and out of the city as long as darkness lasted. The aborigines thought that great bodies of troops had arrived and gave up their plan of a revolt (18,48: 12 b—13 a).

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 156.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 147—149.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 170.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 188 and map 34.

In A. D. 36, Wu Han incautiously divided his troops outside Ch'eng-tu and built two camps, 20 li (circa 8 km) apart, and separated by a river. When he realized his mistake, he ordered a rest of three days, entertained the troops and fed the horses. He then left the banners flying in the northern camp and kept the fires going all night. Meanwhile he gagged the troops and quietly led them to join the southern unit. This enabled him the following day to meet and defeat the enemy with his full force (18,48: 6 a).¹⁾

Many of these stratagems show common features such as the concealment of troops, the gagging of soldiers, the feigning of weakness, the intentional misleading of the enemy, and sudden attacks on the flanks or the rear.

The use of hidden forces in the later stages of a battle is, in a sense, comparable to the throwing in of reserves. We have seen that cavalry also acted as a reserve in the battle of Nan-luan in A. D. 24, and that Wu Han deployed reserves at Ch'eng-tu in A. D. 36.²⁾

The use of tactical reserves was a tremendous discovery in the art of war, marking a major step forward in its history. In the West, reserves may have been used as early as the end of the 5th century B. C., by Xenophon against Pharnabazus. These tactics reached their maturity in the battle of Zama-Narragara between the two great generals Hannibal and Scipio Africanus.³⁾ I do not know when the practice began in China, but it is clear that the value of reserves was fully understood by the generals of the civil war.

If the historian devotes little attention to the less spectacular battles, the same is true of sieges. The purpose of a siege was to starve the defenders until the city surrendered or was so weakened that it could be taken by storm. Such proceedings offered little of interest to the historian, who commonly restricts himself to telling us when the siege began and when the city in question fell. In a few instances, he gives a less routine description. The greatest attention is, of course, given to the siege of K'un-yang in A. D. 23, not so much because it was more exciting than the others, but because it involved the future founder of the dynasty. The lengthy description in the HHS must, therefore, be used with the greatest caution.⁴⁾ Nevertheless, it permits some observations. The text mentions towered chariots from which the besiegers at a distance gazed over the city walls; the use of battering rams; and the digging of subterranean passages. The question whether such engines or methods were really used at K'un-yang or not, is much less important than the fact that, as this text conclusively shows, they formed part of the military technique of the time.

Sieges seem rarely to have been so effective that the defenders were entirely cut off from the outside world. One has only to recall that in A. D. 27 Chu Fou, although besieged in Ki, was able to send a memorial to the emperor and to receive

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 194.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 75, 197, 206–207.

³⁾ Cf. 98. Delbrück, pp. 334 ff.

⁴⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 76 ff.

an edict in return.¹⁾ It was also possible for the defenders to make occasional attempts to replenish their stores. During the siege of Lo-yang in A. D. 25, Chu Wei marched out with some troops to seek contact with the enemy. A deep fog descended, whereupon Chu Wei ordered his soldiers to harvest millet. It was their bad luck that they were surprised and defeated by the imperial forces (SHS 2: 7 a).

The HHS describes two interesting cases in the northwest, both in A. D. 32, where the besiegers made use of water. After Lai Hi had captured Lüe-yang,²⁾ Wei Ao dammed up a river so that it flooded the town (15,45: 10 b). The imperial forces applied the same method when Wei Ao later defended himself in Si³⁾. They dammed up another river, and the water began to rise around the city wall. The text states that relief arrived when only about 1 chang (2.3 m) of the wall was still above water (17,47: 15 a).

After a new area had been subdued, it seems to have been the rule to place it under military government until such time as it could be incorporated in the civilian administration. This is a practice which is not restricted to the period under discussion, nor to China alone. The obvious reason for it was to ensure peace and order, guaranteed by force of arms. It involved no drastic departure from the normal choice of administrators, for, at this level, no difference was made between military and civilian officials. Many of the generals of the civil war served later in civilian posts.

The men recorded as having acted as military administrators are, in chronological order of appointment:

K'ou Sün: Grand Administrator of Ho-nei, 25—26 (16,46: 18 a, 19 a).

Yao K'i: Grand Administrator of Wei, 25—29 (20,50: 2 a—2 b).

King Tan: Grand Administrator of Hung-nung, 26 (22,52: 4 a).

Ch'en Tsün: Grand Administrator of T'ai-shan, 28—29 (18,48: 11 b).

Wang Liang: Grand Administrator of Shan-yang, 29 (22,52: 5 a).

Ch'en Tsün: Grand Administrator of Lang-ya, 29—38 (18,48: 11 b—12 a).

Feng Yi: Acting Grand Administrator of Pei-ti and An-ting, 30—? (17,47: 9 a).

Ma Ch'eng: Grand Administrator of T'ien-shui, 32 (22,52: 7 a).

Feng Yi: Acting Grand Administrator of T'ien-shui, 33—34 (17,47: 9 b).

Wang Pa: Grand Administrator of Shang-ku, 33—?⁴⁾ (20,50: 5 a).

Ts'en P'eng: Acting Grand Administrator of all commanderies he would conquer, 35 (17,47: 16 a).

Ko Yen: Grand Administrator of Tso-p'ing-yi, 35—? (18,48: 10 b).⁵⁾

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 128.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 173.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 175.

⁴⁾ He remained in the commandery until A. D. 59 (20,50: 5 b) but probably did not keep his title of general for the whole period.

⁵⁾ This is the only case where a commandery had not been recently pacified or was otherwise in danger. The exact reason for the appointment is not known.

All these officials retained their ranks as Generals-in-chief or Generals. It is probable that other military men may have been similarly employed, and that the list given above could be substantially increased.

3. *Appraisal of military actions*

The sources mention 145 battles (excluding sieges) fought in the civil war.

28 prefectural cities or smaller places were besieged. The following table gives a breakdown of this figure:

Siege layed to	Prefectural cities	Smaller places	Total
Successfully	15 ¹⁾	5	20
Unsuccessfully	5	1	6
Outcome unknown	2		2
Total	22	6	28

Table 2. Number of sieges during the civil war.

It is clear that prefectural cities, in contrast to smaller units, had a fair chance of surviving a siege. Only two-thirds of these were certainly successful.

The total number of sieges is extremely small. Since they often continued for months and years and required considerable bodies of troops, they were generally avoided unless the military reasons for undertaking them were overwhelming. Defeated pretenders and warlords, and their last faithful officers, often made their final stand behind the walls of a city. There was then no other way open but to starve them out of their strongholds. No less than 13 sieges, or nearly half of the total, fall into this category²⁾. Sieges, we may conclude, were not a common feature of the civil war except during the final stages of campaigns.

Cities which were taken by storm without a preceding siege are also few. Only 78 prefectural cities and 24 smaller places are mentioned by name. The former amount to no more than circa 6 % of the total number of prefectural cities in the areas affected by the civil war. This proves the importance of the walled towns. Such places would usually be able to close their gates in good time before the arrival of the enemy. Since to storm them always involved considerable risk, it was not often attempted. The cities were therefore able to preserve a more or less autonomous status till such time as they voluntarily joined one or another of the political factions. This made it all the more important for the belligerents to gain early victories.

Invading armies would, as a rule, take only towns that offered little resistance

¹⁾ Sui-yang was besieged twice (in A. D. 26 and 27) and is therefore counted twice.

²⁾ Among the remaining 15 sieges, 7 were conducted by Kuang-wu's enemies. Considering his sieges alone, 62 % of the total involved pretenders, warlords, or their officers, who had been reduced to the possession of single cities.

or could be conquered by surprise, normally avoiding those which were strong and well defended. The immediate objective was not the capture of cities but the defeat of the enemy in battle. The ever-present problem of supplies did not allow the enemy to stay indefinitely behind his walls. The side which controlled the open country also controlled the harvest. Sooner or later, the opposing forces had to meet in the field, and there victory or defeat would be decided.

Table 3 presents a chronological survey of the various kinds of military actions:

A. D.	Capture of pre-fectural cities by direct assault	Sieges of pre-fectural cities	Battles	Total
?	3		2	5
21	3		2	5
22	1	1	5	7
23	10	3	7	20
24	11	2	13	26
25	3	2	19	24
26	17	4	24	45
27	2	1	15	18
28	4	2	16	22
29	6	1	8	15
30	2		6	8
31	1		4	5
32	1	3		4
33	7	1	5	13
34			5	5
35	1	1	6	8
36	6	1	8	15
Total	78	22	145	245

Table 3. Number of military actions for each year of the civil war.

The decisive period was from A. D. 23 to 29 with 170 actions or 69 % of the total, the peak being reached in A. D. 26. At the end of A. D. 29, practically the whole of the Great Plain was under control, and the most dangerous part of the civil war for Emperor Kuang-wu was over.

It would be interesting if some idea could be obtained about the losses in dead and wounded; but this is quite impossible. Reliable information is only given where the highest ranking officers are concerned. The often risked death in battle and underwent considerable hardships. The following casualties occurred among Emperor Kuang-wu's 35 chief followers¹⁾ during the civil war:

6 were wounded in battle.²⁾

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 26-27.

²⁾ Kien T'an was wounded three times (22,52: 10 a), Yao K'i four times (20,50: 1 b, 2 a), and Kia Fu twelve times (17,47: 19 b). Keng Yen, Chai Tsun and Ma Yüan were each wounded once (19,49: 7 b; 20,50: 6 a; 24,54: 6 b).

- 2 received other injuries.¹⁾
- 2 were murdered.²⁾
- 1 was killed in battle.³⁾
- 5 died at their posts from natural causes.⁴⁾

Since Chai Tsun was first wounded, and later died a natural death while in office, the casualties amount to 15 men, or no less than 43 % of Kuang-wu's chief followers.

It is impossible to ascertain the numbers of ordinary soldiers who were killed or wounded. The history describes 145 major battles, but records losses for only 26.⁵⁾ The figures mentioned are far from precise, and are given in one of two ways: it is either said that more than 600; 1,000; 2,000; 3,000; 5,000; 10,000; 13,000; 15,000; 20,000; 30,000; or even 100,000 were killed, or it is said that several 100s or 1,000s were killed. With the first kind, I have taken the actual figures of the text; with the second, I have doubled the text figure. Summing them, and dividing them by 26, gives an average of roughly 10,000 killed in each battle. Taking this figure and multiplying it by the number of battles (145) recorded for the whole civil war, one arrives at circa 1.5 million dead. This total must still be considered too small, because in fact the historian never seems to enumerate the losses of both sides, but only those of the side that was defeated. This means that, accepting the statements in the history, the real total would be considerably higher than one and a half million.

Such a total is obviously absurd. One need only recall that Germany, for instance, with a total population of 65 million, lost 1,773,700 dead from all causes in the First World War ⁶⁾. China's population had been 57,671,400 in A. D. 2. In Kuang-wu's time it must have been somewhat lower, because of the consequences of the change in the course of the Yellow River and the hardships of migration. Yet, calculating from the figures of the history, one is asked to believe that in a period without firearms and continuous, organized warfare,⁷⁾ in a country with a smaller population than Germany, scattered over a vastly larger area, and under conditions where the mobilization and feeding of troops was difficult and armies necessarily small, the military losses were not much different from those suffered by Germany in World War I. This is clearly impossible.

There is probably a simple explanation for this fantastic figure. Most of the battles were won by Kuang-wu's forces. Either the historian or the military leaders themselves must have been tempted to make these victories appear even

¹⁾ Wu Han fell off his horse and injured a knee (18,48: 4 a). Keng Ch'un fell off his horse and injured a shoulder (21,51: 9 a).

²⁾ Lai Hi and Ts'en P'eng (cf. *supra* pp. 189—191, 193).

³⁾ Liu Chi (21,51: 7 a).

⁴⁾ Wang Ch'ang (15,45: 7 a), Feng Yi (17,47: 9 b), Chai Tsun (20,50: 7 b), Wan Siu (21,51: 4 b), King Tan (22,52: 4 a).

⁵⁾ I have excluded 3 cases where the figures concern Tibetans.

⁶⁾ Cf. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1947, vol. 23, p. 775.

⁷⁾ Although the civil war lasted from A. D. 22 to 36, the major battles were relatively few.

greater by attributing tremendous losses to the enemy. If the historian were the culprit, he could equally well have invented figures for all the battles. As losses are reported in only a few instances, one may perhaps attribute them to the officers. So much is certain: no serious consideration can be given to the figures.

4. *Psychological warfare*

Another aspect of the civil war must now be discussed, relating not to the contest of arms, but to a fight for the minds of people. The methods employed range over a wide field, from intimidation tempered by reward, to persuasion, blackmail, and various types of propaganda.

Terror was extensively employed as a weapon. For instance, when Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) in A. D. 24 arrived at Sin-tu and began to mobilize troops, Jen Kuang suggested that intimidation of the people would make the task easier (21,51: 1 b).¹⁾ Li Chung's slaughter of the gentry in Sin-tu, later in this year, was an act of brutality, but must also have served as a warning of what they might expect to the supporters of Wang Lang (21,51: 4 a).²⁾

It was a standard practice to execute high-ranking enemy officers who did not surrender voluntarily. If, on the other hand, they shifted their allegiance to Emperor Kuang-wu at an opportune moment, they were pardoned and often rewarded. A special point was made of sowing discord in the enemy ranks, and marquises were offered to those who killed their masters. The following survey tabulates in chronological order the fate of the various pretenders, warlords and rebellious officers:

Liu Wang, pretender. Killed A. D. 23. No details known.³⁾

Wang Lang, pretender. Killed A. D. 24 during escape.⁴⁾

Liu Ying (the Young Prince), pretender. Killed A. D. 25. No details known.⁵⁾

Liu Mao, warlord. Surrenders to Kuang-wu A. D. 25 and is made a king.⁶⁾

Keng-shi Emperor. Murdered by the Red Eyebrows A. D. 25.⁷⁾

Liu Yang (»Goitre Yang«). Plans to rebel and is executed A. D. 26.⁸⁾

Sun Teng, pretender. Killed A. D. 26 by subordinate who surrenders.⁹⁾

Chang Man, warlord. Captured and executed A. D. 27.¹⁰⁾

Liu P'en-tsi, pretender. Surrenders A. D. 27 and is pardoned.¹¹⁾

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 208.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 75.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 33—35.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 76.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 91.

⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 105.

⁷⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 101.

⁸⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 123.

⁹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 159.

¹⁰⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 151.

¹¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 119.

Teng Feng, rebellious officer of Kuang-wu. Surrenders and is executed A. D. 27.¹⁾
Liu Yung, pretender. Killed A. D. 27 by his officer K'ing Wu, who surrenders²⁾
and is made a marquis (12,42: 3 b—4 a).
Chang Feng, warlord. Arrested A. D. 28 by subordinate who surrenders. Chang
Feng is executed.³⁾
P'eng Ch'ung, warlord. Killed by his slave Ts'i-mi and others A. D. 29. Ts'i-mi
is made a marquis.⁴⁾
Tou Jung, warlord. Joins Kuang-wu voluntarily A. D. 29 and is showered with
rewards.⁵⁾
Ts'in Feng, warlord. Surrenders and is executed A. D. 29.⁶⁾
Liu Yü, warlord. Killed A. D. 29 by subordinate who surrenders.⁷⁾
Chang Pu, warlord. Kills Su Mao A. D. 29, surrenders, and is made a marquis.⁸⁾
Su Mao (cf. preceding entry).
Li Hien, pretender. Killed A. D. 30 by his subordinate Po Yi, who surrenders⁸⁾
and is made a marquis (12,42: 7 b).
Tung Hien, warlord. Killed A. D. 30 by the imperial Colonel Han Chan,⁹⁾ who
is made a marquis (12,42: 5 b).
P'ang Meng, rebellious officer of Kuang-wu. Killed A. D. 30 by a certain K'ien
Ling,⁹⁾ who is made a marquis (12,42: 5 b).
Wei Ao, warlord. Dies a natural death A. D. 33.¹⁰⁾
T'ien Jung, warlord. Captured and executed A. D. 36.¹¹⁾
Kung-sun Shu, pretender. Dies from wounds A. D. 36.¹²⁾
Yen Ts'en, warlord. Surrenders and is executed A. D. 36.¹²⁾
Lu Fang, pretender. Dies a natural death during the fifties (12,42: 12 a).¹³⁾

It is clear from this list that the pretenders and warlords ran great personal risks as soon as they began to lose in the political-military struggle. The rewards placed on their heads would eventually become too tempting for their followers to resist. Only one pretender (Liu P'en-tsi), 4 warlords (Liu Mao, Ts'in Feng, Chang Pu, Yen Ts'en), and one rebellious officer (Teng Feng) surrendered, out of the 26 men enumerated above. One warlord (Tou Jung) joined Kuang-wu voluntarily. The other 19 preferred to fight to the finish. 9 of these (Sun Teng, Liu Yung, Chang Feng, P'eng Ch'ung, Liu Yü, Su Mao, Li Hien, Tung Hien,

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 154.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 138.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 130.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 131.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 166—167.

⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 157.

⁷⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 146.

⁸⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 149.

⁹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 150.

¹⁰⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 178.

¹¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 194.

¹²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 197.

¹³⁾ Cf. further vol. III.

P'ang Meng) were killed by persons who wished to claim the promised rewards. In 6 of these cases, the murderers received marquisesates. This may well be true in the other 3 instances also, although no details are specifically mentioned in the sources.

Psychological pressure exerted on the enemy, taking the form of a combination of threats and promises, was a major weapon in the civil war, and was used by all parties. It is recorded, for example, that Wang Lang had offered a reward of the income of 100,000 households for Liu Siu's (Kuang-wu's) head (1 A: 9 a; 20,50: 3 a). Offers of this kind were so usual, and there was generally so little doubt about the outcome, that Emperor Kuang-wu seems to have been surprised when the Red Eyebrows surrendered Liu P'en-tsi alive into his hands. He was moved to compliment them on three points: that they did not exchange their old wives, that they chose a member of the Liu clan as their sovereign, and that they did not kill Liu P'en-tsi before their surrender (11,41: 14 b).

It may be added that Kuang-wu did not apply his policy with absolute consistency. He was partial to the members of his own clan. Among those of his enemies who finally surrendered (Liu P'en-tsi, Liu Mao, Ts'in Feng, Chang Pu, Yen Ts'en, Teng Feng), Chang Pu occupies a special position.¹⁾ All the others, with the exception of Liu P'en-tsi and Liu Mao, were executed. The last named was even made a king.²⁾ It may also be noted that Kuang-wu became less liberal as he became more powerful. In A. D. 24, after the capitulation of the T'ung-ma bandits, he incorporated the men into his army and enfeoffed their chieftains as marquises.³⁾ Three years later, the leaders of the Red Eyebrows, on their surrender, received no feudal rank at all.

Another method of drawing enemy officers onto one's own side was to approach them through their friends. Kuang-wu frequently did this. Ts'en P'eng persuaded a General-in-chief of the Keng-shi Emperor to surrender in Ho-nei, in A. D. 24.⁴⁾ In the following year, he induced his former commander Chu Wei to capitulate with the city of Lo-yang.⁵⁾ This kind of psychological pressure was used especially during the war against Wei Ao. Lai Hi brought about the surrender of the General-in-chief Wang Tsun in A. D. 31. The latter in A. D. 32 persuaded his former colleague Niu Han to follow his example. Wang Tsun was made a marquis, and both men received the rank of Grand Palace Grandee.⁶⁾ Kao Tsün capitulated at the instigation of Ma Yüan in A. D. 32 and was enfeoffed as marquis.⁷⁾ Other men who left Wei Ao were promptly summoned by Kuang-wu and appointed to offices. In A. D. 30, Tu Lin was made an Attending Secretary and questioned about conditions in the northwest (27,57: 6 a). In the same year, Cheng Hing became

¹⁾ He and Su Mao had been promised pardon and a marquiseate, depending on who would kill the other first. Cf. *supra* p. 149.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 105.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 83.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 84.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 105–106.

⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 172–173, 175.

⁷⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 175.

a Grand Palace Grandee (36,66: 3 a),¹⁾ while Shen-t'u Kang received the post of Attending Secretary not later than A. D. 31 (29,59: 3 b—4 a).

In some cases, Kuang-wu reached his objective by combining personal persuasion with calculated indiscretion. Early in A. D. 25, Feng Yi wrote a letter to Li Yi, who with Chu Wei and others defended the city of Lo-yang. Li Yi answered that he was ready to make peace. The contents of this letter were made public by Liu Siu (Kuang-wu). His purpose can only have been to weaken the enemy by creating discord in Lo-yang, and it proved eminently successful, since Chu Wei had Li Yi murdered.²⁾ When Liu Kia, who had lost his kingdom of Han-chung in A. D. 26, was fighting in the Land Within the Passes,³⁾ he hesitated whether to surrender to Emperor Kuang-wu or not. The latter wrote to the Grand Minister over the Masses, Teng Yü, that his old friend Liu Kia was an excellent man who only temporarily had been misled. Teng Yü made this known, probably following the emperor's instructions, whereupon Liu Kia submitted (14,44: 14 b).

The belligerents were particularly anxious to arrest the relatives of their opponents, as this offered the chance of blackmailing them into submission. In A. D. 24, Wang Lang's forces captured the relatives of Li Chung and P'ei T'ung in Sin-tu, and pressure was then brought on both these men to change parties. If they refused to do so their relatives would be executed, but rewards were promised if they obeyed (21,51: 3 b—4 a, 6 a). The HHS emphasizes that the loyalty of the two men remained unshaken. This in itself suggests that the arrest of relatives often enough brought the expected results, and there are a number of instances to exemplify the point. At the outbreak of the rebellion in Nan-yang, in A. D. 22, Wang Mang's officials imprisoned the relatives of the rebels. The leaders were already far too compromised to be seriously tempted,⁴⁾ but the same considerations did not apply to lesser figures. Fan Hung, the maternal uncle of Liu Po-sheng and Liu Siu (Kuang-wu), was a wealthy landowner.⁵⁾ When officials arrested his wife and children, threatening to execute them, he abstained from taking part in the revolt and stayed quietly on his estate (32,62: 1 b). The Red Eyebrows in A. D. 25 captured the Keng-shi Emperor's Lieutenant Chancellor, Li Sung. They promised to spare his life if his younger brother opened one of the gates of Ch'ang-an, and the latter complied.⁶⁾ At the end of the same year, the Grand Administrator of Shang-tang joined Kuang-wu's party.⁷⁾ Previous to his surrender, an imperial official had arrested his mother, younger brothers, wife and children (28 A, 58 A: 10 a).

Attempts were made to gain the goodwill of the common people by well-timed measures. After the second campaign against Wei Ao had failed in A. D. 32, Lai

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 167.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 102—103.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 116, note 1.

⁴⁾ It is interesting to note that Wang Mang's officials tried to play safe. They kept the relatives in custody until the rebel forces had been defeated at Siao-ch'ang-an. Only when the revolt seemed to be crushed, were the relatives executed. Cf. vol. I, p. 109.

⁵⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 95.

⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 100.

⁷⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 106.

Hi memorialized that the people of the northwest were starving. It would be good policy to distribute valuables and grain among them. This proposal was later put into effect (15,45: 11 a, 11 b).

Troops, when they were outnumbered, would sometimes try to create an impression of strength. For instance, before Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) marched out from Sin-tu in A. D. 24, the news was spread that he commanded an army of a million men (21,51: 1 b). When Wang Yüan at the end of A. D. 32 arrived with auxiliary forces from Si-ch'uan in order to relieve Wei Ao, he succeeded in giving the appearance of leading a larger army than he actually had.¹⁾

Mockery was also used as a psychological weapon, either to display one's own strength or to ridicule the enemy. After the defenders of Lo-yang had been defeated in several battles in A. D. 25, Feng Yi marched his troops in a circle around the city before returning to his encampment.²⁾ Tsang Kung acted similarly at Ch'eng-tu in A. D. 36. Having arrived from the north, he led his troops below the city wall to a rendezvous with Wu Han and, in spite of the latter's warning, returned the same way (18,48: 13 b—14 a). When Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) had broken with the Keng-shi Emperor in A. D. 24 and had incorporated the surrendered T'ung-ma bandits into his army, he was referred to by his enemies in Ch'ang-an as the 'T'ung-ma Emperor'.

The last example borders on propaganda. Another effective attempt to influence popular opinion, is provided in the following story of Kung-sun Shu. In A. D. 32,³⁾ the imperial armies appeared to have broken the last resistance of Wei Ao, and a great panic swept Si-ch'uan. Close to the city of Ch'eng-tu was an old granary, whose name Kung-sun Shu had changed to 'Granary of the White Emperor',⁴⁾ but which had stood empty ever since the time of Wang Mang. Kung-sun Shu now spread the rumour that it had produced mountains of grain. After the people had gone to look at it, he assembled all the officials and asked whether the Granary of the White Emperor had really brought forth grain. They answered that it had not. Kung-sun Shu then remarked that false talk could not be trusted and that this also applied to the rumour of Wei Ao's defeat (13,43: 18 b—19 a). This episode represents a simple case of propaganda, but more often the recorded instances are deeply tinged with superstition and display a strange mixture of credulity and political adroitness.

The intellectuals of the period speculated widely about the cyclical succession of dynasties based on the theory of the Five Elements. I do not propose to enter here on a discussion of the origin and development of this theory.⁵⁾ Suffice it to say that the Five Elements, which in turn had been correlated with the Five Di-

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 177—178.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* pp. 103—104.

³⁾ HYKC, p. 37: 2, places this event in A. D. 34.

⁴⁾ Kung-sun Shu was the White Emperor. Cf. *infra* p. 234.

⁵⁾ An excellent survey has recently been given by 106. Needham, II, pp. 232 ff. Cf. also 99. Dubs, III, pp. 106 ff., and 102. Fung, p. 58.

rections, the Five Colours, etc., were believed to govern the historical periods in continuous and endlessly repeated cycles. The pattern of the Five Elements may be presented in the following way:

North		
<i>Water</i>		
Black		
West	Centre	East
<i>Metal</i>	<i>Earth</i>	<i>Wood</i>
White	Yellow	Green
South		
<i>Fire</i>		
Red		

It was assumed that the Ts'in dynasty (221—207) had governed by the power of water. After some vacillation, fire came to be considered as the power of the Former Han dynasty, which meant that its colour was red. Wang Mang claimed that he ruled by the power of the element earth and the colour yellow (HS 99 A: 36 b). When Kuang-wu ascended the throne in A. D. 25 and founded the Later Han dynasty, he quite logically assumed that the element of Former Han had been restored to power. In the 1st month (Feb. 6—Mar. 7) of A. D. 26, he therefore adopted fire and the colour red (I A: 18 b).

In doing this, Kuang-wu was in accordance with one line of thought which had been expressed towards the end of Former Han. During the reign of Emperor Ch'eng (32—7 B. C.), a certain astrologer, by name Kan Chung-k'o, had rejected the assumption that the dynasty was reaching its end and maintained that it could receive a second Mandate from Heaven. Kan Chung-k'o was executed, but his pupil Hia Ho-liang continued to uphold the theory. He taught that the Han House would pass through a period of decline but then would again receive the Mandate of Heaven (HS 11: 5 a; HHS 1 B: 23 b). Although Hia Ho-liang succeeded in winning the support of Emperor Ai in July, 5 B. C., he was executed shortly after in September of the same year (HS 11: 5 a—6 a).¹⁾ Nevertheless, views similar to his remained current and did not disappear even under Wang Mang. It is recorded, for example, that the astrologer and scholar Ch'i Hui calculated on the basis of the movements of the planets that the Han dynasty would again receive the Mandate. Arriving in Ch'ang-an, he actually dared to affront Wang Mang by warning him not to disregard the intentions of Heaven. Ch'i Hui was arrested, refused to repent, and was in the end released (29,59: 9 b—11 a).

The idea that the Han dynasty, after passing through a period of decline, would rise again was not challenged by Wang Mang alone. The issue remained very much

¹⁾ Cf. 99. Dubs, III, pp. 6—8, 29—32; 107. Tjan, I, p. 124; 100. Eberhard, pp. 199—200.

alive throughout the years of the civil war. The theory of the cyclical succession presupposed that after the dynastic period governed by fire (i. e. that of the Han dynasty) had come to an end, the next four periods would be ruled by each of the other elements in turn. Fire could not again come to power until a whole new cycle had been completed. Kuang-wu evaded this problem by proclaiming that the rule of fire had never really been interrupted. The interregnum of Wang Mang was merely the predicted decline in the power of Han. He did not recognize that Wang Mang had ruled in virtue of the element earth, and denied that his reign represented a historical period at all.

Except for Kung-sun Shu, the elements adopted by the various pretenders during the civil war are not known. Those who were members of the imperial clan, or claimed to belong to it, may well have acted in the same way as Kuang-wu. Kung-sun Shu chose a bold policy of his own. He argued that yellow (earth) succeeded red (fire) and that this in turn was followed by the colour white (metal). The element metal corresponded to the direction west, i. e. to exactly that part of China where his state was situated (13,43: 16 b). He therefore announced that his rule stood under the colour white (13,43: 15a). In doing this, Kung-sun Shu openly recognized the reign of Wang Mang as a historical period which had ended the power of fire and had, now, in the cyclical sequence, been replaced by his own element, metal. In a theoretical sense, he thus denied Kuang-wu's right to the throne, and that he could carry out the intentions of Heaven. The widely held theory of the cyclical succession of dynasties under the power of successive elements was thus placed in sharp antithesis to the claim that an element which had completed its part in the cycle could be restored to power. The impact of this propaganda on the intellectuals of the time should not be underestimated, and Kuang-wu himself was greatly worried by it.

The theory of the Five Elements also taught that the victory of a new element, i. e. the beginning of a new historical period, was heralded by supernatural events. When towards the end of Former Han one portent after another was memorialized to the throne, people started to speculate that the fall of Han was imminent and tried to ascertain who would found the new dynasty. To find the answer, many turned to the prognostication texts (*ch'an*).¹⁾

The *ch'an* originally formed a separate class of literature. They were oracle-books which »couched in an enigmatical language, predicted luck and disasters». Another strange literature were the *wei*, literally the »woof», which constituted »the inner or esoteric» study to the Classics (*king*=»warp»). Later, the two were combined and the distinction between them lost. Tjan renders the term *ch'an wei* as »apocryphal books»²⁾ and shows that this literature attained a wide circulation towards the end of Former Han.³⁾ »The mystical contents . . . were innocuous and politically harmless, as long as society was stable. They gave rise to prophecies and

¹⁾ For this literature cf. 107. Tjan, pp. 100 ff.; 102. Fung, pp. 88 ff.; 99. Dubs, III, p. 6; 100. Eberhard, pp. 198 ff.

²⁾ 107. Tjan, I, p. 100.

³⁾ 107. Tjan, I, p. 102.

disturbances when a weak government could no longer cope with the social misery and unrest».¹⁾

The contents of the apocryphal books are of no concern to us here, except in so far as they were made use of in political arguments. In this respect they played an important role both during the last years of Former Han, under Wang Mang, and through the years of the civil war. Before we consider this type of psychological warfare in detail, let us look at some illustrative examples.

In A. D. 21, the administrator of the Wei commandery, a certain Li Yen, plotted with the soothsayer Wang K'uang to overthrow Wang Mang. The soothsayer said that the surname »Li« rimed with the musical note »chī« which in turn was equated with the element fire of the Han dynasty. Consequently, Wang K'uang composed for him a book of prognostications (HS 99 C: 12 a—12 b).²⁾

When Liu Yang planned to revolt in A. D. 26³⁾, he quoted a prognostication which stated: »After the Red Nine, Goitre Yang will be Master« (21,51: 9 a). The *Commentary* remarks that »Red« was the colour of the Han dynasty and that »Nine« refers to Kuang-wu's descent in the 9th generation from Emperor Kao.⁴⁾ The prophecy would therefore mean that Liu Yang, who suffered from goitre, would succeed Kuang-wu as emperor.

Chang Man⁵⁾ early in his career sacrificed to Heaven and Earth, i. e. he had ambitions for the throne. When he was executed in A. D. 27, he is reported to have said that the text of a prognostication had misled him (20,50: 6 b).

A magician had placed a stone in a five-coloured bag,⁶⁾ tied it to Chang Feng's⁷⁾ arm, and said that the stone contained an imperial seal. Before his execution in A. D. 28, the stone was smashed and Chang Feng saw that he had been deceived (20,50: 6 b—7 a).

It seems clear that in such cases the prophecies were employed as psychological weapons. Prophecies were widely believed, and the publicizing of suitable prognostications offered a way of controlling popular opinion. This made for a strange war of nerves. Those who spread prophecies, even though of recent manufacture, seem as a rule to have convinced themselves of their truth. At the same time they showed considerable political ability in the way they exploited these prophecies to influence their contemporaries.

The first man who systematically used propaganda to further his own purposes was Wang Mang. According to Dubs, he »was one of the cleverest moulders of educated public opinion that China has ever had«.⁸⁾ Deeply superstitious himself,

¹⁾ 107. Tjan, I, p. 142.

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 141. See also 99. Dubs, III, pp. 408—409. *Li* was pronounced **liag/lji* and *chī* **tjag/ti*; cf. Grammata nos. 980 a, 891 a.

³⁾ Cf. supra pp. 121—122.

⁴⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 98, note 4.

⁵⁾ Cf. supra p. 150.

⁶⁾ Probably the colours of the Five Elements. Five colours, instead of only one, presaged a brilliant future. Cf. 72. Dubs, I, p. 60, note 4.

⁷⁾ Cf. supra pp. 128—130.

⁸⁾ 74. Dubs, p. 219.

he tried to convince himself and others, by the use of magical means and prophecies, that the Han dynasty would not be restored. He claimed descent from the Yellow Lord. The colour yellow corresponded to the element earth, and the element fire was thought to produce earth. Wang Mang could therefore propagate the idea that his government, ruling by virtue of the element earth, had superseded that of the Han dynasty, which stood under the power of fire. After he had ascended the throne in A. D. 9, he abolished the metal-knife money, because the characters for »metal» 金 and »knife» 刀 made up part of the character *Liu* 劉, the name of the imperial clan in former Han. He also did away with the »Kang mao amulets»,¹⁾ since the character for *mao* 卯 was also held to form part of the name *Liu* (HS 99 B: 6 b—7 b).²⁾ Wang Mang resorted to many other magical practices which can only in part be classified as propaganda; for example, he had the spirits in the temple of Emperor Kao (the founder of the Han dynasty) attacked with swords and axes, and the walls whipped and sprinkled with peach-water (HS 99 C: 13 b).³⁾

After the outbreak of the revolt in Nan-yang, Wang Mang continued to prove himself a master of applied psychology. The rebels had taken up Chai Yi's accusation of A. D. 7 that Wang Mang had murdered Emperor P'ing by poison.⁴⁾ Wang Mang countered this by assembling his officials and opening a metal box. It contained a declaration, deposited in A. D. 5, in which he had offered to die instead of the then fatally ill Emperor P'ing. »He wept silently as he showed it to his various courtiers» (HS 99 A: 24 b; 99 C: 22 b).⁵⁾ Wang Mang also quoted the Book of Changes (Hex. 13: 3):

»He hides his weapons in a thicket (*mang*)
mounts (*sheng*) a high mound (*kao ling*),
and in the third year he will not prosper.»

This was explained in the following way: *Mang* was the personal name of the emperor. *Sheng* referred to Liu Po-sheng. *Kao ling* meant Chai Yi who was the son of the marquis of Kao-ling. The lines were therefore interpreted as a prophecy that Liu Po-sheng and Chai Yi would have troops with hidden weapons in the reign of Wang Mang, but that they would be extirpated and not prosper (HS 99 C: 22 b).⁶⁾

Wang Mang's enemies, the Han forces, also understood the value of propaganda. In A. D. 14, Wang had introduced the so-called »Currency Cash». This was a coin which on the one side had the legend *huo* 貨 »Currency», and on the other *ts'uan* 泉 »Cash» (HS 24 B: 26 a).⁷⁾ It was now proclaimed that the characters *huo ts'uan* were composed of the elements 白水真人 (HHS 1 B: 23 b) and so meant: »The True Man from Po-shui». This skilful twist must have annoyed Wang Mang consider-

¹⁾ For the amulets cf. 99. Dubs, III, pp. 537 ff.

²⁾ Cf. 99. Dubs, III, pp. 281—283.

³⁾ Cf. 99. Dubs, III, pp. 412—413.

⁴⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 89.

⁵⁾ 99. Dubs, III, pp. 216—217, 445.

⁶⁾ 99. Dubs, III, pp. 445—446.

⁷⁾ Cf. 99. Dubs, III, p. 501.

ably. In the time of Emperor Yüan (48—33), Liu Jen had been enfeoffed with the Po-shui district in Nan-yang.¹⁾ His cousin Hui had moved with him to Po-shui, and Hui was a direct ancestor of Liu Po-sheng. The «True Man» was therefore certainly none other than Liu Po-sheng.²⁾

Psychological techniques reached their climax during the civil war. They must have been used in some degree by most of the «emperors», but the only instances preserved concern Wang Lang, Kuang-wu and Kung-sun Shu. Undoubtedly, these men were themselves superstitious. Wang Lang was a soothsayer. In A. D. 36, Kung-sun Shu is said to have consulted a divination text before making his fatal sortie from Ch'eng-tu; it read: «the caitiffs will die below the city wall» (13,43: 20 a). Kung-sun Shu believed that the «caitiffs» could only be the Han troops. After his death the prophecy was reinterpreted. Kuang-wu was particularly inclined to believe in prognostications (82 A, 112 A: 2 a). When he ascended the throne in A. D. 25, he first employed the General Who Pacifies the Ti Barbarians, Sun Hien, as Acting Commander-in-chief. His reason was a prognostication which went: «Sun Hien Subdues the Ti Barbarians» (TKK 20: 8 a). The choice was not appreciated by the high officials, who finally succeeded in bringing the emperor to change his mind (22,52: 3 b). When Kuang-wu wished to appoint a Grand Minister of Works, he consulted another oracle which said: «Wang Liang lords Wei and functions as Hüan-wu».³⁾ It so happened that a ruler of Wei had shifted his capital to Ye-wang in the year 241 B. C.⁴⁾ As to Hüan-wu, the emperor took the view that, since it was the name of the Spirit of Waters (i. e. of the north), it referred to the Grand Minister of Works, who was in charge of water and earth. On Aug. 23, A. D. 25, he appointed as Grand Minister of Works the Prefect of Ye-wang, who actually had the name Wang Liang (1 A: 16 b; 22,52: 4 b). Kuang-wu continued to put his faith in oracles, although he met with opposition from independent thinkers. The scholar Huan T'an displeased him by memorializing against his superstitious habits. In spite of this, the emperor insisted on asking the advice of this very man when he wished to fix a site for the Divine Terrace by means of prognostications. Huan T'an answered after a prolonged silence: «Your subject does not study prognostications», a remark for which he was almost executed (28 A, 58 A: 3 b—5 a). On another occasion, Kuang-wu wanted to consult prognostications about certain aspects of the Suburban Sacrifice. He questioned the scholar Cheng Hing about this and received an equally non-committal answer. This threw

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 96.

²⁾ HHS 1 A: 23 b applies the line to Kuang-wu. This is only natural, as it consistently pushes Liu Po-sheng into the background. Ying Shao, in his *Han kuan yi*, also believes that «this was an auspicious presage of the restoration under the Epochal Founder (i. e. Kuang-wu)». Dubs has accepted this statement (III, p. 501, note 26.6). However, the interpretation given to the coin inscription could only have served a purpose while Wang Mang was still alive. At that time, Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) was negligible as a political figure. The «True Man» can only have been Liu Po-sheng.

³⁾ Hüan-wu was a general designation for the seven northern zodiacal constellations: tou, niu, nü, hü, wei, shi, pi. In the present instance, the *Commentary* explains the term as the Spirit of the Northern Region.

⁴⁾ Cf. 68. Chavannes, II, p. 105.

the emperor into such a fit of rage that Cheng Hing was frightened. He saved himself only by claiming ignorance (36, 66: 4 a), but his official career was destroyed. Kuang-wu also gave orders for editing the apocryphal books and expurgating those passages which had been introduced in support of Wang Mang. Yin Min refused this task, and so for a long time received no promotion (79 A, 109 A: 10 a—10 b). Another scholar by the name of Sie Han, who had specialized in portents and prognostications, accepted the commission (79 B, 109 B: 3 b—4 a). One year before his death in A. D. 56, the emperor went as far as to promulgate the apocryphal books throughout the empire (1 B: 22 b). It is well established, therefore, that Kuang-wu was extremely credulous on the subject of prognostications.

Since Heaven was expected to herald the ascendancy of the next element, i. e. the rise of a new dynasty, by auspicious signs, pretenders could strengthen their claims by drawing attention to supernatural phenomena connected with their births or occurring before their enthronements. Irrespective of whether they themselves believed such stories, these accounts of extraordinary events had a high propaganda value. For instance, the HS says of Liu Pang, founder of the Han dynasty, that his mother in a dream met a supernatural being. At that time, there was a thunderstorm, it became dark, and a dragon was seen above her. Subsequently she became pregnant and gave birth to a son (HS 1 A: 2 a—2 b). When the boy grew up, he frequently got drunk in the home of two old ladies, who on these occasions saw strange sights¹⁾ above him (HS 1 A: 3 b). A gentleman who considered that Liu Pang had an auspicious physiognomy gave him a daughter in marriage²⁾ (HS 1 A: 4 a—4 b). She and her children were later physiognomized by another person who predicted a great future for them. He further told Liu Pang that his physiognomy was »honourable beyond all telling» (HS 1 A: 5 a—5 b). Wherever Liu Pang went, there was always a misty emanation above him (HS 1 A: 7 b).³⁾ These and other instances might reflect beliefs that were current in the time of the authors of the history (Pan Piao, Pan Ku), and so may simply have been read into the historical situation of two centuries earlier. On the other hand, they might equally well be genuine records of propaganda. So much seems certain, that similar claims during the civil war served the definite purpose of smoothing the road to the throne and winning popular acceptance.

Wang Lang spread it about that he was born after his mother had been covered by a yellow emanation. Later, a Gentleman-of-the-Palace had realized Wang's Mandate from Heaven and had taken him for safety to Si-ch'uan (12,42: 1 a—1 b).⁴⁾ At Liu Siu's (Kuang-wu's) birth, a red brilliance was said to have illuminated the room. A soothsayer was consulted who remarked: »This omen is auspicious beyond all telling».⁵⁾ On one occasion, a messenger of Wang Mang visited Ch'ung-ling,

¹⁾ According to SK, they saw a dragon. Cf. 68. Chavannes, II, p. 326.

²⁾ The future Empress née Lü.

³⁾ Cf. 72. Dubs, I, pp. 28—33, 37.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 64.

⁵⁾ The historian uses almost exactly the same phrase as in the case of Emperor Kao above, which suggests a standard formula.

which was Liu Siu's home district.¹⁾ He sighed and said that the emanation was very auspicious. When Liu Siu hurried to the rendezvous at Ch'ung-ling after the outbreak of the rebellion in A. D. 22, a fiery light reached to the sky south of his home (1 B: 23 a—23 b). Shortly before his enthronement, Liu Siu told Feng Yi about a dream in which he had mounted a red dragon and ascended to Heaven. Feng Yi immediately prostrated himself, congratulated Liu Siu, and said that this proved that he had received Heaven's Mandate (17,47: 4 b). A parallel to this is Kung-sun Shu's insistence that a dragon had come out of his yamen, and that the lines in his hand were remarkable²⁾ (13,43: 15 a, 16 b). All these instances were undoubtedly publicized in the propaganda battle for the minds of the people.

As long as the military outcome of the civil war hung in the balance, any pretender who could quote prognostications which pointed to him personally as the future emperor had won an important psychological victory. A series of such prophecies are recorded about Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) and Kung-sun Shu, allowing a fascinating insight into the tug-of-war between the two.

Taking Liu Siu first, a number of prognostications are preserved which predicted the enthronement of a member of the Liu clan. This, by elimination, came to mean Liu Siu. It will be remembered that the powerful Li family in Nan-yang had originally taken the initiative in the rebellion against Wang Mang. Led by Li T'ung, the clan and its followers joined forces with Liu Po-sheng and his supporters.³⁾ Li T'ung's father, Shou, is said to have been interested in astrology and prognostications. He especially liked to quote one prophecy which went (15,45: 1 a—1 b):⁴⁾

»The Liu family will rise again (劉氏復起),
and the Li family will be a support.»

When Li T'ung told Liu Siu of this prediction at their first meeting (1 A: 2 b),⁵⁾ this must have served a threefold aim: The Li faction wished to negotiate with the Liu clan in preparation for a joint rebellion against Wang Mang, and used the prognostication for psychological pressure. Li T'ung was further anxious to ensure the prominence of his family in the restoration movement; and his father, with this in view, had probably improved the prophecy.⁶⁾ Finally, the prognostication could be used as propaganda against Wang Mang. It should be added that, at this stage, the prophecy could only have applied to Liu Po-sheng, who was then still undisputed leader of his clan. Much later, it was reinterpreted to mean Liu Siu.

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 99.

²⁾ They probably formed characters. For instance, during the reign of Wang Mang, the lines in the hand of a certain Chen Sün formed the characters »Son of Heaven» 天子. Before having Chen Sün executed, Wang Mang looked at his hand and cleverly reinterpreted the lines as »one big fellow» — 大子 (HS 99 B: 16 a). See 99. Dubs, III, p. 311.

³⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 102—103.

⁴⁾ This prognostication is, with a slight variation, also quoted by 1 A: 2 b (which substitutes 興 for 起), and HHK (which says: »Han ought to rise again . . . » 漢當復興).

⁵⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 102.

⁶⁾ Cf. further infra pp. 242—243.

When Liu Siu ascended the throne on Aug. 5, A. D. 25, he quoted in his prayer a prognostication which said: »Mao kin cultivates virtue and becomes Son of Heaven» (1 A: 16 a). The characters *mao* 卯 and *kin* 金 were supposed to constitute two of the three elements in *Liu* 劉, the name of the imperial clan, so that Liu Siu considered this prophecy as referring to himself.

In addition to these examples in which the family name of the new emperor is revealed, a number of predictions are recorded which actually state his given name as well. They present a curious problem. The facts are as follows:

1. In the year 6 B. C., Liu Hin changed his given name from Hin to Siu 秀, and his style from Tsi-tsün to Ying-shu (HS 36: 35 a—35 b). Yen Shī-ku's commentary quotes Ying Shao to the effect that Liu Hin wanted his name to conform with a certain prognostication.¹⁾

2. In the middle of A. D. 23, a group of men plotted in Ch'ang-an against Wang Mang. They included the General of the Guards, Wang She, the State Master, Liu Hin,²⁾ and others. Wang She held in great esteem a magician called Si-men Kün-hui, versed in astrology and prognostications, who announced that »a comet has swept in the [Heavenly] Palace. The Liu clan ought to rise again (劉氏當復興). [The next emperor] will have the surname and given name of the Duke State Masters (HS 99 C: 22 b).³⁾ According to HHS (1 B: 23 b—24 a), Si-men Kün-hui had also said: »Liu Siu ought to become Son of Heaven» (劉秀當爲天子).

3. At the end of Wang Mang's reign, Liu Siu was once staying with his brother-in-law, Teng Ch'en, in the city of Wan. They held a banquet at which a certain Ts'ai Shao-kung was present. This man was interested in prognostications and said: »Liu Siu ought to become Son of Heaven» (劉秀當爲天子). Someone inquired whether this referred to the State Master, Liu Siu (i. e. Liu Hin). The real Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) then asked jokingly how they could be sure that it was not he himself who was meant (15,45: 7 a). In A. D. 27, during an audience, Teng Ch'en reminded the emperor of this episode (15,45: 8 a), thanks to which it must have been recorded by the court scribes and so preserved in the archives.

4. Shortly before Liu Siu ascended the throne, a former fellow student, K'iang Hua, came from the Land Within the Passes. He brought with him a prophetic text which said (1 A: 15 a):

»Liu Siu will mobilize troops and arrest the impious.

The barbarians of the Four [Directions] will gather like clouds.

Dragons will fight in the open country.

At the junction of four and seven, fire will be the ruler».

The *Commentary* remarks to this that 4 multiplied by 7 equals 28. From the foundation of Former Han in 206 B. C. to the outbreak of the rebellion in Nan-yang,

¹⁾ Quoted *infra* in section 4.

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 121—123.

³⁾ 99. Dubs, III, pp. 446—447.

A. D. 22, the number of years is 228. In A. D. 22, the element fire of the Han dynasty had been restored to power.

In the prayer after his ascension, Liu Siu quoted one line from this prognostication: »Liu Siu will mobilize troops and arrest the impious» (1 A: 16 a).

A number of scholars have examined the questions raised by these prophecies, but little agreement has been reached. The difficulties are, in fact, such that it will probably never be possible to arrive at a definite answer.

The first problem concerns Liu Hin's change of his given name to Siu. Ying Shao (circa 140—206) believed that he did this in order to meet the prognostication (quoted above in section 4) which gave the name of a future ruler as Liu Siu. The HHS contains a passage which would seem to confirm this supposition. When Tou Jung held a conference to determine whether or not he should make common cause with Emperor Kuang-wu,¹⁾ reference was made to the prognostications. Some remarked that Liu Hin had changed his name to make it conform with the prediction and that Si-men Kün-hui had later said: »Liu Siu ought to become Son of Heaven». A plot had then been formed to enthrone Liu Hin. But in reality, the prophecy had applied to Kuang-wu (23,53: 3 a—3 b).

If we accept that Liu Hin changed his name in 6 B. C. because of the prognostication, we must presume that at that time he already had conscious ambitions for the throne. The rise of Wang Mang would have thwarted his plans until he saw another opportunity in A. D. 23. Eberhard is inclined to accept this hypothesis,²⁾ but I do not think that it really is tenable. The important question would seem to be whether the prognostication under discussion could have appeared as early as 6 B. C.

The modern Chinese scholar Ch'en P'an, has marshalled a number of arguments for his belief that Liu Hin's step was entirely unrelated to the prophecy. His two most convincing points are: that if the prognostication had been known in 6 B. C., no one could have dared openly to alter his name because of it; and that the general conditions of 6 B. C. do not fit in with the prophecy.³⁾ Another, although less cogent, point might also be made. If the *Commentary* is correct in explaining »the junction of four and seven» as the time span between 206 B. C. and A. D. 22, the prognostication can have been made in A. D. 22 at the very earliest. The figure implies after-knowledge. Considering these various arguments, it would seem to me that they strongly support Ch'en P'an's theory. There are good reasons for accepting his conclusion that the prophecy originated at a much later date than 6 B. C.

Why then did Liu Hin change his name? Ts'ien Mu suggests that he merely wished to avoid the tabooed personal name of Emperor Ai, a view which has the full agreement of Ch'en P'an.⁴⁾ This interpretation is not convincing, since the archaic and ancient pronunciations of the two characters are not the same:

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 166.

²⁾ 100. Eberhard, pp. 201—202.

³⁾ 92. Ch'en, p. 49.

⁴⁾ 92. Ch'en, p. 49.

Emperor Ai's name 欣 *χiɛn/χiɛn/hin.

Liu Hin's name 欽 *χiɛm/χiɛm/hin.¹⁾

Nor are the phonetica identical, so that, as remarked by Eberhard,²⁾ the change was not absolutely necessary. It was even more uncalled for that Liu Hin chose a new style. His real reasons will probably never be known, although it may be assumed that prophecies played no part in them.

If the crucial prophecy could not have existed in 6 B. C., the question arises: why, and when, was it invented? Ch'en P'an offers a far-fetched theory. The plot against Wang Mang which involved Liu Hin took shape after the battle of K'un-yang, where Liu Siu won his great victory. Ch'en believes that the prophecy was invented with special reference to Liu Siu, that it became known in Ch'ang-an, and that Si-men Kün-hui used it for his own purposes by applying it to Liu Hin.³⁾ The strongest argument against this theory is that Liu Siu in A. D. 23 was a minor personage of little or no political importance. His only achievement so far was his part in the victory of K'un-yang. No party had yet formed around him, and no one considered him a possible candidate for the throne. There was therefore no possible reason for inventing prognostications on his behalf.

The most likely explanation would seem to be that a number of prophecies were made up by Si-men Kün-hui himself in order to strengthen the plot against Wang Mang. He was personally in favour of enthroning the State Master, Liu Siu (Liu Hin), and so included his name in the prognostication. The latter seems to have been disinclined to follow the magician on this point, and only envisaged the arrest of Wang Mang and surrender to the Han troops. After the death of the conspirators, the prophecies containing the name of Liu Siu probably passed from circulation until the future Emperor Kuang-wu began to emerge as a political figure.

Reviewing the various prophecies, the interesting fact emerges that several are couched in very much the same formula. Si-men Kün-hui had said:⁴⁾

Liu shī tang fu hing.

Li Shou's prognostication, which is preserved in three variants, is almost identical):⁵⁾

Liu shī fu k'i.

Liu shī fu hing

Han tang fu hing.

Li Shou was a disciple of Liu Hin and interested in prophecies (15,45: 1 a). He held office in Ch'ang-an and probably moved in the same circles as Liu Hin and Si-men Kün-hui. It seems reasonable to suppose that he heard the latter's prognos-

¹⁾ Cf. *Grammata*, nos. 443 i, 653 j.

²⁾ 100. Eberhard, p. 201.

³⁾ 92. Ch'en, p. 50.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 240, section 2.

⁵⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 239 and *ibidem* note 4.

tication and adapted it for his own purposes, adding the part which went: «the Li family will be a support.»¹⁾ Li Shou's son T'ung in his turn used the enlarged prophecy as a psychological support in his negotiations with the Liu clan. If this surmise is correct, it would indicate that Si-men Kün-hui's prognostication «the Liu family ought to rise again» cannot have been made later than A. D. 22, since Li Shou was arrested and executed at the end of this year (15,45: 2 a—2 b).²⁾ The hypothesis is actually strengthened by the absence of any given name. The magician may, in a general way, have predicted the restoration of Han; but as Wang Mang was still in power and the rebellion had not yet begun, no name of a future emperor could be suggested. The situation was completely changed by the middle of A. D. 23, when it was clear that Wang Mang would soon be overthrown. It would seem that Si-men Kün-hui then came forward with another prognostication which said:³⁾

Liu Siu tang wei t'ien tsü.

This time, the magician unequivocally declared that «Liu Siu ought to become Son of Heaven», indicating that the State Master Liu Hin (Liu Siu) was his candidate for the throne. The prophecy must have enjoyed a wide circulation, and was certainly known to the rebels in Nan-yang. When Ts'ai Shao-kung quoted it at a banquet,⁴⁾ it is not surprising that one of the guests thought it referred to the State Master. This permits us to fix the date of the banquet at A. D. 23, or about the time of Liu Hin's abortive plot against Wang Mang. The HHS records the banquet in Teng Ch'en's biography previous to the description of the outbreak of the rebellion, but this cannot be correct. The mention of Liu Siu's (Liu Hin's) name excludes a date earlier than A. D. 23.⁵⁾ It seems probable that Teng Ch'en later deliberately improved the story by making it occur before the actual rebellion. This turned the prediction into a «true prophecy» of Emperor Kuang-wu's Mandate.

It can hardly be doubted, therefore, that the line «Liu Siu ought to become Son of Heaven» was originally invented for the State Master Liu Hin, and only later was reinterpreted to point to Liu Siu (Kuang-wu). The HHS naturally adopts the latter version and quotes the line as a prophecy of Kuang-wu's rise (1 B: 23 b—24 a). It inadvertently reveals the truth by attributing the origin of the prophecy not only to Si-men Kün-hui but also to Li Shou. Li was executed by Wang Mang soon after the outbreak of the rebellion in Nan-yang, i. e. before any incentive existed to invent prophecies on behalf of the State Master, Liu Hin, and even less so on behalf of Liu Siu. The prognostication can only have begun to circulate in A. D. 23, and it must have emanated from Si-men Kün-hui and the circle supporting the State Master.

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 239.

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 103.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 240.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 240.

⁵⁾ The banquet cannot have taken place later than A. D. 23. It was held in Wan, which Liu Siu subsequently did not visit until after his ascension to the throne.

The fact that Liu Hin had plotted against Wang Mang in A. D. 23, and the prophecies which were then made in his favour, must have persuaded contemporaries that some deeper meaning lay behind the change of name of 6 B. C. They projected the prognostications back in time and assumed that they must have been responsible for the altering of Hin to Siu. Tou Jung and his followers may therefore genuinely have accepted this erroneous belief.¹⁾

It remains to consider the prophecy:

»Liu Siu will mobilize troops and arrest the impious.

The barbarians of the Four [Directions] will gather like clouds.

Dragons will fight in the open country.

At the junction of four and seven, fire will be the ruler.»

As pointed out above, this was the prognostication which, according to Ying Shao, was the reason for Liu Hin's change of name in 6 B. C., although all the evidence speaks against its existence at that time.²⁾ The first appearance of the prediction in the sources is, in fact, as late as A. D. 25, immediately before Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) ascended the throne. The lines may have been inspired by the party around Liu Siu, which was anxious to proclaim him emperor; but another explanation is equally possible. It is specifically mentioned that K'iang Hua, who brought the text, came from the Land Within the Passes.³⁾ He may well have belonged to the circle of Si-men Kün-hui and Liu Hin, so that the prognostication could originally have been one of those intended as propaganda for the State Master. Two years later, K'iang Hua may have seen the advantage of reapplying the prophecy to Liu Siu, and decided to bring it to this future emperor.

It is, finally, a curious coincidence that Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) happened to have the same given name as the State Master, so making it possible to reinterpret the prognostications from the one man to the other. Various scholars have attempted to explain this fact. Chang Ping-lin makes the following suggestion: Liu Hin changed his name to Siu in 6 B. C. because of the prophecy discussed above. Kuang-wu was born at the end of that same Chinese year. His name was therefore chosen to meet the very prognostication which had impressed Liu Hin. This theory is untenable because, as has been shown, the prophecy could not have existed in 6 B. C.; and it is rightly discounted by Ch'en P'an.⁴⁾ Another explanation is proposed by Sung P'ei-wei⁵⁾ and has been followed by Tjan⁶⁾: Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) himself changed his original name — one that is no longer preserved — to Siu so that it would agree with the prophecy. A number of points throw doubt on this hypothesis. First, the HHS makes no reference to any change of name. It says that in the year of Liu's birth, the prefecture had an excellent harvest and

¹⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 241.

²⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 241.

³⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 240.

⁴⁾ 92. Ch'en, p. 48.

⁵⁾ 95. Sung, p. 13.

⁶⁾ 107. Tjan, I, p. 127.

that consequently he was given the name Siu (1 B: 23 b), which means «ear of grain, to go into ear, flourishing, luxuriant.» It could perhaps be argued that the historian intentionally gives a misleading version. More important is therefore the consideration that Liu Siu possessed his name as early as the occasion of the banquet with Teng Ch'en. Since this can only have taken place in A. D. 23, it proves that Liu Siu had his given name long before he harboured any conscious ambitions for the throne and when, as a minor political figure, such a drastic step as changing it to conform to a prophecy would have been much too dangerous. Liu Siu, moreover, was extremely superstitious and placed great faith in prognostications. It is doubtful whether such a man would have been cynical enough to adopt the barefaced trick suggested by Sung and Tjan. I am therefore inclined to agree with Ch'en P'an that Liu Siu received his name at birth¹⁾ and that the parallel between him and the State Master is accidental.

The prophecies in favour of Emperor Kuang-wu must have circulated widely, as is shown by the fact that they were known to Tou Jung in the far northwest. Such a situation was not acceptable to Kung-sun Shu, who began to pit his own prognostications against those of his rival. Soon both emperors were involved in an intensive battle of prophecies.

Kung-sun Shu publicized prophecies both general and particular. One said that «The same clan cannot for a second time receive the Mandate», and was clearly directed against the Liu family. Another went: «The Grand Administrator of the West crushes (乙) mao kin 卯金»²⁾ (13,43: 16 b). Kuang-wu countered this by amending 乙 to 乙未 and interpreting the line as: «The year *i-wei* 乙未 (A. D. 35) gives it to the Liu clan» (HYKC, p. 37: 1). This makes it probable that the counter-version was given circulation about the time of the great offensive.³⁾ Kung-sun Shu made the further claim that the twelve dukes of the Ch'un ts'iu corresponded to the twelve rulers of Former Han,⁴⁾ since the Chou and Han dynasties were both supposed to have ruled in virtue of the element fire. The number of Han rulers had therefore, in his opinion, reached its natural end with Emperor P'ing (13,43: 16 b). A similar prophecy was based on a «dream» of Kung-sun Shu. A man appeared to him and said: «Pa si ts'i hi 八子系, twelve is the limit» (13,43: 15 a). This prognostication, which is rimed, contains the characters forming together the name Kung-sun 公孫. The figure twelve again clearly refers to the twelve Former Han rulers. The line meant that Kung-sun Shu considered himself destined to replace the Han dynasty, which had come to an end with its twelfth sovereign. After Kung-sun Shu's death, the propagandists of Emperor Kuang-wu cleverly reinterpreted the prophecy. It was observed that the pretender had been killed in the twelfth year of his reign, which permitted a complete reversal of the prognostication. It lost its sting against Kuang-wu and became a warning to Kung-sun

¹⁾ 92. Ch'en, p. 49.

²⁾ I. e. Kung-sun Shu crushes the Liu clan.

³⁾ I differ from Ku Kie-kang (Ku shi pien, vol. 5, p. 466), who interprets *i-wei* as 206 B. C., i. e. the year of the founding of Han.

⁴⁾ From Emperors Kao to P'ing, including the Empress née Lü.

Shu himself: «Kung-sun, twelve [years] are your limit». This version was incorporated in the HHS and further elaborated by the historian. He describes the dream, how Kung-sun Shu awakened and asked his wife: «Although one is eminent, the dignity yet is short. What does it mean?» She answered: «If one hears the truth in the morning, it yet is possible to die [content] in the evening. How much more is twelve» (13,43: 15 a). It has already been shown that this interpretation is patently false.¹⁾ Kung-sun Shu could hardly have dreamt in divided characters, and even less in rime. More fantastic still, his wife's answer takes the form of a quotation from Lun yü (IV: 8). Furthermore, no one could have listened to and recorded a discussion between Kung-sun Shu and his wife in the middle of night. In reality, the original prophecy must have been invented by Kung-sun Shu, and directed against Kuang-wu. For greater effect, it was presented as a dream.

Kung-sun Shu put forth other prognostications which specifically mention a Kung-sun as the future ruler. One of them was: «One deposes the Ch'ang 昌 Emperor and sets up Kung-sun» (13,43: 16 b). *Ch'ang* undoubtedly refers to the descendants of Ch'ang-yi 昌意, who was a son of the Yellow Lord. Since Wang Mang claimed the Yellow Lord as his ancestor,²⁾ the line meant: «One deposes Wang Mang and sets up Kung-sun Shu». Kuang-wu accepted this prophecy but insisted that Kung-sun Shu had misunderstood its true meaning. The «Ch'ang Emperor» did not refer to Wang Mang but to Liu Ho, king of Ch'ang-yi 昌邑, who had been briefly emperor in 74 B. C. but was dethroned by the regent Ho Kuang³⁾ and replaced by Emperor Süan (HYKC, p. 37: 1). In other words, Kuang-wu and his propagandists denied that the prediction applied to Kung-sun Shu at all.

Another prophecy emanating from Kung-sun Shu's party was: «Emperor Hien-yüan received the Mandate. The Kung-sun family grasps [it]» (13,43: 16 b). Hien-yüan was a name of the Yellow Lord⁴⁾, so that «Emperor Hien-yüan» probably again refers to Wang Mang,⁵⁾ whom Kung-sun Shu expected to replace. Shu seems also to have made propaganda out of the lines in the palm of his hand.⁶⁾

Kung-wu did not concede any of these points. He remarked in a letter to Kung-sun Shu that he could hardly be familiar with the lines in his hand. As for the mention of Kung-sun's name in the prophecies, Kuang-wu claimed that this had nothing to do with Shu but referred to Emperor Süan of Former Han (TKK 23: 7 a; HHS 13,43: 16 b—17 a). He must have had in mind the curious event of 78 B. C., when insects ate through the leaves of a tree so that characters were formed. These, in conjunction with other portents, were interpreted by a certain Kuei Hung to mean that a commoner of the Kung-sun family would become emperor (HS 7: 7 b—

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 55, 58.

²⁾ Cf. 99. Dubs, III, p. 108.

³⁾ Cf. 72. Dubs, pp. 180—183.

⁴⁾ Cf. 68. Chavannes, I, p. 26.

⁵⁾ Another interpretation is possible. The family name of the Yellow Lord was Kung-sun (cf. 68. Chavannes, I, pp. 25—26) so that the line could read: «Emperor Hien-yüan received the Mandate. The Kung-sun family holds [it]». Taken in conjunction with the preceding prophecy, I think that this interpretation is unlikely.

⁶⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 239.

8 a; 75: 1 b). Kuei Hung was executed. Later the prophecy was thought to have been fulfilled through the enthronement of Emperor Süan, who was a commoner.¹⁾ Kuang-wu also quoted another prognostication which said: »The one who takes the place of Han is Tang-t'u Kao.«²⁾ In one of his letters he sarcastically asked Kung-sun Shu whether he was that person (TKK 23: 7 a; HHS 13,43: 16 b).

Finally, mention must be made of still another form of propaganda. This consisted of lampoons and the so-called »children's songs«. Only one lampoon is preserved, said to have appeared in Ch'ang-an. It accuses the Keng-shī Emperor of employing riffraff, such as hucksters and cooks (11,41: 5 a):³⁾

»Generals of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household,
who prepare food below the kitchen-range.
Chief Commandants of Cavalry,
who make hash of sheep stomachs.
Marquises Within the Passes,
who make hash of sheep heads.»

In reality, this ditty may well have originated in the circle around the future Emperor Kuang-wu.

The »children's songs« are recorded in the treatise on the Five Elements, which suggests that they were thought to have prophetic overtones. Far from being children's songs, they were, in my view, simply propaganda, written and circulated by the various parties. One of the songs refers to the rise of Kuang-wu and was perhaps made up by his supporters (chī 13: 10 b):⁴⁾

»To harmonize or not to harmonize
rests with the Red Eyebrows.
To obtain or not to obtain
rests north of the Yellow River.»

The Red Eyebrows represented the greatest single concentration of power in the empire, and were in the process of closing in on the Keng-shī Emperor. The land north of the Yellow River was the area where Kuang-wu won independence and where he was enthroned.

Another song was directed against Wei Ao, who was lame (chī 13: 10 b—11 a):⁵⁾

¹⁾ Cf. 72. Dubs, II, pp. 167—168, 168 note 7.2; 100. Eberhard, p. 199.

²⁾ Later, Yüan Shu († A. D. 199) thought that this prophecy applied to him (75,105: 7 a).

³⁾ The archaic and ancient rimes are: **ziang/ziang* — **tsiang/tsiang*, **giwəd/jwgi* — **iwəd/jwgi*, **d'u/d'zu* — **g'u/γzu*. Cf. Grammata, nos. 732 j, 727 f, 523 a, 525 b, 118 e, 113 a.

⁴⁾ The archaic and ancient rimes are: **g'er/γǎi* — **mǐər/mjwi*, **tək/tək* — **pək/pək*. Cf. Grammata, nos. 599 g, 567 a, 905 d, 909 a.

⁵⁾ The archaic and ancient rimes are: **muən/muan*, **g'iwən/g'iuən*, **nǐčn/nǐčn*, **t'ien/t'ien*, **điang/điang*, **mǐən/mǐčn*. Cf. Grammata, nos. 441 a, 459 d, 388 a, 361 a, 726 a, 457 a.

»I went out through the Wu Gate,¹⁾
 looked from a distance towards the T'i-k'ün [Mountain],
 and saw a lame man,
 who said that he wished to ascend Heaven.
 Supposing that Heaven could be ascended,
 how would one find people on earth?»

This song accused Wei Ao of harbouring ambitions for the throne, and ridiculed the idea.

Still another ditty served to make fun of Kung-sun Shu (13,43: 16 a—16 b; chī 13: 10 b):²⁾

»A yellow ox with a white belly,
 the Five Shu [Cash] ought to return.»

Yellow was Wang Mang's colour and white Kung-sun Shu's. The Five Shu Cash were Han coins which had been discontinued by Wang Mang. The song lumped Kung-sun Shu with Wang Mang and predicted the restoration of the Han dynasty.

The psychological warfare, then, had many facets, and played an important role during the civil war. Although the battle-field was the decisive arena, the contestants on both sides attempted to secure the support of the people, using for this purpose a wide range of psychological techniques, from the practical application of terror, threats, bribes and rewards, to more esoteric arguments based on the theory of the Five Elements, the prophecies of the apocryphal books, and specially fabricated prognostications. The whole was a fantastic, but effective, mixture of common sense and superstition.

¹⁾ This was one of the gates of the Ki prefecture in the T'ien-shui commandery (chī 13: 11 a).

²⁾ The archaic and ancient rimes are: *pīōk/pīuk — *b'īōk/b'īuk. Cf. Grammata, nos. 1034 h, d.

CHAPTER VIII. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

In order correctly to assess the role of Emperor Kuang-wu and his rivals, it is first of all necessary to penetrate behind the stereotypes presented in the texts. The historian displays a constant bias in favour of the founder of the dynasty and against his enemies, and this colours his description of events. Most of these historical distortions are easily discovered.

To begin with, the historian endows Kuang-wu with certain physical attributes which were considered as necessary to great emperors, irrespective of their real appearance. Kuang-wu is described as having a »beautiful beard and eyebrows, a big mouth, a prominent nose, and a sun-shaped bone [on his forehead]» (1 A: 2 a). This is suspiciously like the description given in the HS (1 A: 2 b—3 a) of the founder of the Former Han dynasty: »Kao-tsu was a man with a prominent nose and a dragon forehead. He had a beautiful beard on his chin and cheeks.»¹⁾ As remarked before,²⁾ the prominent nose, the beautiful beard, and the sun-shaped bone³⁾ are commonly attributed to outstanding Chinese rulers.

The features of Kuang-wu's rivals are not described. It is only by accident that we learn about the auspicious lines in Kung-sun Shu's hand,⁴⁾ which, although possibly an invention, would certainly have received great prominence had he been victorious. If the historian had dwelled on the physiognomies of the various unsuccessful pretenders, he doubtless would not have flattered them. This can be seen from the picture of Wang Mang in the HS (99 B: 16 a—16 b), which describes him as having »a large mouth and a receding chin, bulging eyes with brilliant pupils and a loud voice which was hoarse.»⁵⁾

The historian consistently belittles the role of Liu Po-sheng and gives Liu Siu (Kuang-wu) an early prominence which he did not possess. It is stated, for example, that at the outbreak of the rebellion the young men were terrified and went into hiding, saying: »Po-sheng kills us.» They became calm as soon as they saw Liu Siu (1 A: 2 b—3 a). When the first crisis occurred among the rebels because of

¹⁾ 72. Dubs, I, p. 29.

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 99.

³⁾ During a banquet, which probably took place in A. D. 24, Chu Yu is recorded to have said that Liu Siu's (Kuang-wu's) sun-shaped bone proved his Mandate from Heaven (22,52: 1 a—1 b). The historian either simply added the remark about the bone or Chu Yu intentionally flattered Liu Siu. It seems most unlikely that Liu Siu really possessed the physiognomical characteristics attributed to so many emperors.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 239.

⁵⁾ 99. Dubs, III, p. 312.

the unequal division of the booty, the situation was saved by Liu Siu (1 A: 3 a).¹⁾ When Wang Mang's great army approached from the north, deserters from the Han forces reported that Liu Siu did not loot (1 A: 4 b). Liu Siu single-handedly won the battle of K'un-yang.²⁾ When he was appointed Acting Colonel Director of the Retainers, his activities conformed exactly with the old regulations. Aged officials wept when they saw the dignified behaviour of Liu Siu and his subordinates (1 A: 7 b—8 a). When he went to the region north of the Yellow River, officials and people fought to present him with oxen and wine (1 A: 8 b). During his escape from Wang Lang's troops, Liu Siu entered a post-station and was recognized by the senior gatekeeper as a great man (1 A: 9 a).³⁾ When he took up the fight against Wang Lang, the people followed him joyfully (1 A: 10 a). When, after the fall of Han-tan, Liu Siu and Sie Kung had partitioned the city between themselves, the latter's officers looted, but Liu Siu «hated it deeply» (18,48: 2 b).⁴⁾ At the first invitation to ascend the throne, Liu Siu was «alarmed» (1 A: 14 b).

Such passages, which could be multiplied, represent formalized description and have little in common with historical fact. Two examples will suffice to illustrate the point. The historian makes a special effort to show that Liu Siu, in contrast to other military leaders, abstained from looting, but this does not prevent him from making occasional slips. Describing Liu Siu's difficulties to relieve the city of K'un-yang, he states: «The Generals were greedy and concerned about their property and wished each for himself to stay behind and defend it. Kuang-wu (Liu Siu) said: 'If we now crush the enemy, our valuables will be multiplied ten thousand times . . . » (1 A: 5 b). It is of no consequence that the historian undoubtedly invented the speech himself. The important point is that for the moment he has forgotten the role in which he normally casts Liu Siu, and makes him adopt an argument which, to his knowledge, was used by all military men. The HHS also stresses that Liu Siu understood the old regulations and that this made a deep impression on the older officials. Liu Siu, in fact, had no previous official experience. Other parts of the history record that, after Liu Siu had ascended the throne, the statutes were deficient. Few experienced ministers at court were able to give guidance. Far from knowing the old regulations himself, the emperor both welcomed and made use of suggestions by Hou Pa and Chang Ch'un (26,56: 6 b; 35,65: 1 b).

With the Keng-shī Emperor the situation is completely reversed. Just as the historian praises Liu Siu, he blames and ridicules his rival. This is brought out very clearly if we compare the descriptions of their enthronements. Liu Siu refused the invitation three times, which seems to have been common practice.⁵⁾ He then consented, sacrificed to Heaven, to the Six Venerable Ones, and to the Spirits, and performed a solemn prayer.⁶⁾ Of the Keng-shī Emperor the history simply

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 107.

²⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 80—81.

³⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 69—70.

⁴⁾ Cf. *supra* p. 77.

⁵⁾ Emperor Kao also declined the honour three times. Cf. 99. Dubs, III, pp. 50—51.

⁶⁾ Cf. vol. I, p. 43.

says that he ascended the throne, «felt ashamed, dripped with perspiration, lifted his hands, and could not speak» (11,41: 2 a). When the Keng-shi Emperor arrived in Ch'ang-an and gave an audience, he «felt ashamed, changed colour, hung his head, groped for the mat, and did not dare to look». He then asked the various generals how much loot they had taken. The palace officials looked at each other in alarm (11,41: 3 b). He spent days and nights drinking with the women in his harem and was often too drunk to give audience. He ordered a Palace Attendant to act on his behalf, sitting behind a curtain, but the officials realized that the voice was not his. A Lady née Han, who was particularly fond of wine, became his favourite drinking companion. When an official interrupted them with some business, she was infuriated, struck him, and destroyed his document. When another official criticized the Commander-in-chief of the Right, Chao Meng, the Keng-shi Emperor struck him with his sword. Chao Meng killed a Palace Attendant, against whom he had a grudge, in the presence of the emperor. Hucksters and cooks who received offices were so ignorant that they wore inappropriate clothes, such as female garments. A general who wrote a memorial criticizing the emperor was thrown into prison (1 A: 7 b; 11,41: 4 b—5 b; chi 13: 4 b).

It is not necessary to refute these intentional exaggerations and misstatements one by one. A few examples will serve our purpose. The timid and blushing appearance of the emperor is patently an invention of the historian. When, some time before the rebellion, the future Keng-shi Emperor was involved in a feud, he proved himself a resourceful and courageous man.¹⁾ Why should he have given the impression of a village idiot after he had ascended the throne? Or consider the pleasures of the harem. They were attractive to most emperors, not least to Kuang-wu himself, as is shown by his sixteen children. Historiographical practice was to depict «incompetent» rulers as libertines, but otherwise not to stress this aspect of the imperial activities. To mention a single parallel: once Wang Mang began to lose the civil war, the HS (99 C: 20 b) remarks, «Wang Mang was daily in the harem . . . giving himself up to lustful pleasures».²⁾ In other cases, the historian achieves his objective simply by emphasis. He records that the Keng-shi Emperor questioned his generals about the plunder they had obtained, and leaves it at that. A very similar description is given about Liu Siu. During his campaign against Wang Lang, he assembled his officers and asked what valuables they had won. But in this case, the text goes on to say that Liu Siu specially complimented and rewarded Li Chung because he had not looted (21,51: 3 b). The Keng-shi Emperor's officials are derided because they wore incorrect clothes. It would seem obvious that there must have been a certain shortage of official robes and other court paraphernalia. The HHS (1 A: 3 a) quite naively remarks that Liu Siu in the beginning rode on an ox because he had no horse. The TTK (1: 2 b) records that, having been appointed Grand Master of Ceremonies, Liu Siu had no seal appropriate to his office and used instead the seal of the Household Assistant of a certain marquis. Assuming that Liu Siu had been defeated in the political struggle, the history of his imaginary

¹⁾ Cf. vol. I, pp. 97—98.

²⁾ 99. Dubs, III, pp. 439—440.

successful rival would probably have seized upon such things and held them up to ridicule.

The pretender Liu P'en-tsi and his »court« present a more difficult problem. The HHS describes how he was kidnapped by the Red Eyebrows and put to herding cattle (11,41: 10 b—11 a). He was chosen as one of the three candidates who drew lots for the throne. At that time, »he had unbound hair, went barefooted, had worn-out clothes and red sweat. When he saw that the crowd saluted, he was frightened and on the point of weeping«. He continued to roam about like a child (11,41: 11 a—11 b). In Ch'ang-an, the officers of the Red Eyebrows »met daily, discussed their merits, disputed, clamoured and shouted, drew their swords, struck the pillars, and could not agree with each other« (11,41: 11 b). On the day of the Winter Sacrifice (Jan. 23, A. D. 26), Liu P'en-tsi gave a banquet. One man, who could write, began to make a list of those wishing to offer congratulations to their emperor. A crowd gathered around him. The Grand Minister of Agriculture tried to restore order but only made the confusion worse. In the middle of this brawl, soldiers broke into the palace and snatched away the wine and meat (11,41: 11 b—12 a; chi 13: 2 b). Liu P'en-tsi was frightened and wept day and night (11,41: 12 a). When he tried to abdicate on Feb. 6, A. D. 26, he wept and sighed. The leaders of the Red Eyebrows felt pity and embraced him. Liu P'en-tsi wailed (11,41: 12 b).

The description of the behaviour of the Red Eyebrows and their emperor clearly belongs to the pattern of formalized exaggeration. For instance, the historian describes with relish how the officers of the Red Eyebrows wrangled, shouted and struck the pillars with their swords. An almost identical story is recorded about Emperor Kao, the founder of Former Han. In his presence, »the crowd of officials drank, strove to excell each other, and got intoxicated. Some shouted recklessly, drew their swords and struck the pillars« (HS 43: 15 a). The difference lies only in the emphasis. In Emperor Kao's case, the text goes on to say that he ordered the drawing up of a new court ceremonial. In the other version, the reader is intentionally left with an unfavourable impression of the Red Eyebrows. All the same, the historian may have found his depreciation of the Red Eyebrows a relatively easy task. Liu P'en-tsi had been kidnapped in his childhood and was still a boy. He cannot have received any education and undoubtedly made a very unhappy emperor. The leaders of the Red Eyebrows were simple men and certainly unable either to conduct court ceremonies or to observe the correct etiquette. It is likely, therefore, that in spite of its extravagances, the account given of the Red Eyebrows contains a greater element of truth than those relating to Kuang-wu and the Keng-shi Emperor.

The HHS does not apply this stereotyped descriptive technique to any of the other pretenders. Only Kung-sun Shu is made the target of some straightforward criticisms, not couched in special formulae. He is described as having a petty nature, and being unable to see great issues. He is accused of changing the names of commanderies, prefectures and offices. Another ground of complaint is that he enfeoffed his two sons as kings, and gave preference in official appointments to members of his own clan, thus causing resentment among his ministers (13,43: 18 b).

Some of these criticisms may be justified. Others are unwarranted. The changing of place-names and official titles was originally one of the accusations brought against Wang Mang.¹⁾ If Kung-sun Shu adopted a similar policy, no trace of it has been preserved. Those of his titles which are mentioned in the sources all conform to the Han terminology. It may be suspected, therefore, that the historian simply repeated one of the old criticisms against Wang Mang. As for Kung-sun Shu's enfeoffing his sons as kings, he was merely following accepted practice. Kuang-wu enfeoffed no less than ten of his sons.

If the traditional historian exaggerates, distorts and shifts emphasis in order to show why one man was worthy of the Mandate of Heaven and all others unworthy, this must be countered by discarding his formulae and many of his judgments, and letting the actual events, in so far as they can be reconstructed, speak for themselves.

Considering first the rise and fall of the Keng-shi Emperor, we must reject the historian's implication that he was a weakling and a libertine. He had amply proved his courage as a young man, and his difficulties as emperor were not all of his own making. Before his enthronement, he had been a member of the Troops from P'ing-lin, although holding only a minor rank. When the chieftains of the commoners agreed to proclaim him emperor, their motive was neither respect nor loyalty. They merely seized upon a member of the imperial clan who happened to be among them in order to forestall the plans of Liu Po-sheng and his supporters among the Nan-yang gentry. Their action forced the hand of the junkers, who had no choice but to swing behind the new emperor. Neither the clique of the chieftains nor that of the Nan-yang gentry were whole-hearted supporters of the new ruler. He had not risen to the throne surrounded by faithful followers who guided and obeyed him, and this meant that he could remain in control of policy for only as long as he was able to play one clique against the other. The Keng-shi Emperor was faced by a much more complicated situation than that which confronted Liu Yung, Liu Siu, Kung-sun Shu and the rest. They all were helped by partisans whose hopes of fame and fortune depended on the success of their masters. The Keng-shi Emperor stood alone, without the support of a party of personal followers.

It would have required an extraordinary ability to overcome such handicaps, and perhaps the Keng-shi Emperor should not be judged too severely for having failed. His character does not emerge well from the sources, except that he seems to have been brave, capable of generosity, and, as proved by his enfeoffment policy, able to show good judgment in some issues. These virtues were overshadowed by the extreme incapacity he showed in making major political decisions.

The Keng-shi Emperor was largely in control of policy up to the fall of the clique of the former chieftains in A. D. 24. He was therefore personally responsible for the four gross mistakes which toppled him from his throne: Having had the leaders of the Red Eyebrows in his power, he let them rejoin their bands. Having executed Liu Po-sheng, he sent his brother Siu on an independent mission to the north. Having established himself at Lo-yang, he moved to Ch'ang-an. Having not un-

¹⁾ Cf. e. g. vol. I, p. 125.

successfully played the two cliques against each other for a year, he permitted the victory of the Nan-yang gentry. Each of these errors was dangerous in itself; together they proved fatal. The Red Eyebrows were allowed again to become the greatest single power in the empire. Liu Siu, once outside the orbit of the court, turned against his ruler and became yet another formidable enemy, dividing the strength of the imperial armies. Lo-yang would have been the logical capital for the growing state of the Keng-shī Emperor; but in Ch'ang-an he was far removed from the centre of activities, and his positions on the Great Plain collapsed. Once the Red Eyebrows attacked, the Land Within the Passes became a trap from which there was no escape. In a government where the ruler normally acted on the advice of his chief ministers, the emperor became the prisoner of the Nan-yang gentry as soon as they broke the influence of his own relatives and of the former chieftains.

The Keng-shī Emperor was not the witless drunkard depicted by the historian, but equally he was not the stuff of which dynastic founders were made. He was an average man whom fate accidentally brought to the throne of China, and who was not great enough for the task.

Little or nothing is known about the characters and policies of the pretenders Wang Lang, Kung-sun Shu, Liu Yung, and Li Hien, or the warlords Wei Ao, Tung Hien, Chang Pu, and Ts'in Feng. Only one fact stands out. With the possible exception of Wang Lang, they never seriously considered a policy of expansion. They all enlarged their territories up to a certain saturation point which depended on such factors as geographical and political conditions, economic resources and manpower. Beyond this they did not go. Their entire thinking was defensive, and their aim was to hold what they possessed. In marked contrast to these men, Liu Siu consistently took the offensive until the empire was his.

Liu Siu briefly showed his great military gifts at K'un-yang, but was again pushed back into relative obscurity with the execution of Po-sheng. He survived this crisis by repudiating his brother. He cleverly cultivated the right officials and succeeded in having himself sent to the area north of the Yellow River. The rise of Wang Lang almost cost him his life, but, in the end, proved a stroke of luck. The loyalists on the northern plain were forced to throw in their lot with him, and this increased his following and gave him an army with which, after the defeat of Wang Lang, he was able to conquer the northern plain and to ascend the throne as Emperor Kuang-wu.

Even then, he was only one pretender among many, and more than a decade of civil war still lay ahead. That he succeeded where others failed was not entirely due to his own ability. Chance often favoured him. When his brother was executed, the Keng-shī Emperor spared Liu Siu, and later sent him to the one area which could form a base for future expansion. The northern plain was rich and populous. In contrast to the southern plain, it had not suffered from the change of course of the Yellow River and had so far escaped the civil war. Liu Siu was again fortunate to survive the first hectic weeks following the rise of Wang Lang. After Wang's death he encountered no disciplined armies, but only unorganized bands of commoners. The conquest of the northern plain in a few brief campaigns

gave him the resources for operations on a larger scale. He was helped by the complete absence of cooperation between his enemies, but he also actively tried to neutralize them through diplomatic manoeuvres. Chang Pu and Tung Hien recognized Liu Yung in theory as their emperor, but in practice continued jealously to guard their own independence. If they had ever acted in concert against their common enemy, Kuang-wu might have found himself in serious difficulty. But each stayed within, and guarded, his own region, and Kuang-wu was able to defeat them one by one. Wei Ao did not turn against Kuang-wu until he was himself attacked, and joined Kung-sun Shu only when it was too late. The latter never attempted to expand beyond Si-ch'uan and abstained from intervening in the civil war when he could have affected its outcome. He allowed Kuang-wu to pacify the east and north, and so threw away the only chance of checking his enemy. The presence of so many independent pretenders and warlords, all of whom remained on the defensive, actually facilitated the victory of the man who purposefully set out to conquer the empire.

Emperor Kuang-wu was an accomplished strategist and tactician. With the exception of Liu Yung and Lu Fang¹⁾, he was the only pretender who commanded armies in person, and the military experience he gained gave him a tremendous advantage over his rivals. He had the ability to attract able men to his side, and himself grew in stature with his ever increasing responsibilities. This is not the place to attempt a final assessment of his character,²⁾ although a few points may be made. The real Kuang-wu was never the paragon depicted in the pages of the HHS. He was clever, though not a man of great vision, and it took him longer than his followers to realize that the throne was within reach. Nevertheless, once he had made up his mind to win the empire, he clung to his decision with stubborn single-mindedness. He became a forceful and demanding leader who did not spare himself. He could be generous or ruthless as the situation demanded, and was more often just than not. He was superstitious and resented criticism of this trait. As a politician, he was shrewd, though sometimes limited, and generally a good judge of human nature. Unlike the Keng-shi Emperor, he remained a policy maker who attended to his duties ably, if not always wisely.

A notable feature of the civil war is its extreme regionalism. With the fall of Wang Mang the various parts of the empire pulled away from each other. Men like Wei Ao, Liu Yung, Chang Pu, Tung Hien, P'eng Ch'ung and Ts'in Feng, were all leaders of regional parties. Kung-sun Shu understood how to exploit regional sentiment, although he, more so than any of his rivals, stood above such forces. After the fall of the former chieftains, the Nan-yang clique dominated the government of the Keng-shi Emperor. Liu Siu's chief followers came from a number of different regions, but those from Nan-yang made up the largest single group. When Liu Siu had defeated his rivals, this was, in a sense, the victory of one region over all the rest, the temporary apotheosis of his native area, although various

¹⁾ For Lu Fang cf. further vol. III.

²⁾ I will return to this point in vol. III.

modifications took place during his long reign in the struggle with other regional cliques.


The regional forces of the civil war resemble vertical cross sections cutting through all layers of society, though always under gentry control. The great exception is the Red Eyebrows and the other peasant groups, which represent a low horizontal stratum of the common people who originally banded together because they starved. In spite of this marked contrast between gentry-led parties and peasant-led bands, it cannot be sufficiently stressed that the civil war was not a revolution, or a class war. The victory of Emperor Kuang-wu and his generals, whom Tsien Po-tsan calls »the butchers of the peasants»,¹⁾ was not a victory of the gentry over the peasantry. To see it in these terms is to project modern concepts into a period where they have no validity. The common people had not risen in protest against social injustices but under the pressure of economic hardship which, directly or indirectly, resulted from the change in the course of the Yellow River.

Social contrasts could sharpen existing rivalry, as in the struggle between the two cliques under the Keng-shī Emperor. Yet the main issue between the gentry and the former chieftains was not that the latter were upstarts, but that they exercised a dominating influence over the ruler. Having broken the power of their rivals, the junkers were content. They did not challenge the position of the chieftains as new gentry. The peasant leaders, in turn, had no wish to suppress the gentry and all it stood for. Far from reacting against the social order of their time, the Red Eyebrows chose for their emperor a member of the imperial Liu clan. They attempted to reproduce the court ceremonial and official organization of the Han dynasty. It is probable that they would have welcomed gentry assistance on a larger scale. If the Red Eyebrows had been victorious, their leaders, like the chieftains of the Troops from Sin-shī, P'ing-lin and the Lower [Yang-tsī-]kiang, would have become a new gentry with no desire to change the existing society or to persecute the old gentry.


The lack of intimate cooperation between the gentry and the Red Eyebrows was not due to class prejudice. It was rather that members of the gentry, because of their family ties and local connections, naturally came to identify themselves with one or other of the regional parties. These parties acclaimed various pretend-ers and warlords, who were usually men from their own locality, and who enjoyed their support as long as they remained successful. The regional parties were sufficiently numerous to absorb all the political energy of the gentry clans. The gentry had no reason to ally themselves with the Red Eyebrows, and would have done so only if the Red Eyebrows had shown signs of permanently gaining the upper hand.

The civil war was fought for power, the power of individuals and parties, and not for the victory of one class over another. The interests which underlay the various groupings and regroupings were political, not social. None of the parties wished to overthrow the existing social order. They only strove for influence within it.

¹⁾ 45. Tsien, p. 432.



Map I. The commanderies and kingdoms of A. D. 2. (The names of kingdoms are underlined.) For the Great Plain and adjacent areas see map II.



Map II.

QUOTED LITERATURE

Whenever in the notes to this volume the names of authors are prefixed by numbers lower than 91, the reader is referred to the bibliography in vol. I.

Chinese and Japanese literature:

91. CH'ANG K'ü (± 347), Hua yang kuo chf. In Si pu ts'ung k'an, vol. 65. (Quoted: HYKC)
92. CH'EN P'AN (Rep.), Ts'in Han kien chi so wei fu ying lun lile. Academia Sinica, Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology, XVI, 1947, pp. 1-67.
93. CHOU WEI (Rep.), Chung kuo ping k'i shf kao. San lien shu tien, Peking 1957.
94. LI TAO-YÜAN († 527), Shui king chu. Edited by Wang Sien-k'ien (1842-1917), Ch'ang-sha 1892. (Quoted: SKC)
95. SUNG P'EI-WEI (Rep.), Tung Han tsung kiao shf. Commercial Press, Shang-hai 1931.
96. Unknown author (Han), San fu huang t'u. In Ch'en han lou ts'ung shu, pa chung, by Lo Chen-yü (1866-1940), publ. 1914.
97. UTSUNOMIYA, KIYOYOSHI, Kandai shakai keizaishi kenkyü. Tokyo 1955.

Western literature:

98. DELBRÜCK, H., Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, I. Berlin 1900.
99. DUBS, H. H., The history of the Former Han dynasty. Translation III. Baltimore 1955.
100. EBERHARD, W., Contributions to the astronomy of the Han period, III. Astronomy of the Later Han period. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, no. 1, 1936, pp. 194-241.
101. EBERHARD, W., Bemerkungen zu statistischen Angaben der Han-Zeit. T'oung Pao, no. XXXVI, 1940, pp. 1-25.
102. FUNG YU-LAN, A history of Chinese philosophy, II. Translated by D. Bodde. Princeton 1953.
103. GOODRICH, L. C., A short history of the Chinese people. New York 1943.
104. HERRMANN, A., Atlas of China. Harvard-Yenching Institute Monograph Series, vol. I, Cambridge, Mass., 1935.
105. HULSEWÉ, A. F. P., Remnants of Han Law, I. Leiden 1955.
106. NEEDHAM, J., Science and civilisation in China, II. Cambridge 1956.
107. TJAN TJOE SOM, Po hu t'ung. The comprehensive discussions in the White Tiger Hall, I. Leiden 1949.
108. WALEY, A., The Nine songs, London 1955.
109. WILBUR, C. M., Slavery in China during the Former Han dynasty. Anthropological Series, Field Museum of Natural History, vol. 34, Chicago 1943.

91. 常璩，華陽國志
92. 陳榮，秦漢間之所謂符應論略
93. 周緯，中國兵器史稿，三聯書店
94. 鄭道元，水經注
95. 宋佩章，東漢宗教史
96. 闕名，三輔黃圖，宸翰樓叢書，八種，羅振玉
97. 宇都宮清吉，漢代社會經濟史研究

INDEX

Whenever entries are prefixed by numbers lower than 1345, the Chinese characters are given in the index of vol. I.

- 1345. Accessory Clerks, 38.
- 162. Acting Colonel Director of the Retainers, 32, 32 note 6, 37, 250.
- 165. Acting Commander-in-chief, 32 note 6, 37, 37 note 5, 61, 237.
- 264. Acting General-in-chief, 32 note 6, 41, 60, 87, 209.
- 1346. Acting General-in-chief of the Five Commanderies West of the [Yellow] River, 110, 167, 203.
- 274. Acting Grand Administrator, 32 note 6, 39, 56, 65, 67 note 1, 71, 75, 102, 124, 224.
- 596. Acting Lieutenant Chancellor, 32 note 6, 49.
- 597. Acting Lieutenant General, 32 note 6, 39.
- 2. Ai, Emperor, 36, 38 note 1, 233, 241, 242.
- 3. Ai Chang, 31, 32, 42 note 7.
- 1347. An-ch'eng (hien), 67 note 4.
- 6. An-hui (province), 64, 133, 142, 157, 157 note 3.
- 1348. An-k'ang (hien), 186 note 1.
- 9. An-ting (commandery), 25, 91 note 3, 115 notes 4-5, 163, 171, 172, 172 notes 1-2, 173 note 4, 175, 175 note 2, 178, 224.
- 1349. An-yang (prefecture), 76 note 1.
- 1350. An-yi (prefecture), 92, 94, 97, 97 note 1, 207.
- 10. Ao Granary, 105, 133.
- 1351. Apocryphal Books, 234, 238.
- 1352. Arsenal, 51, 105.
- 15. Attendant Official, 91, 96, 168, 199.
- 17. Attending Secretary, 78, 211, 230, 231.
- 1353. Bearer of the Gilded Mace, 17-19, 56, 130, 194, 211.
- 1354. Big Tree General (Feng Yi), 208.
- 1355. Book of Changes, 96 note 2, 236.
- 1356. Braves and Stalwarts, 132 note 1, 139, 160, 160 note 4, 170.
- Cammann, S. van R., 207 note 3.
- 1357. Captain, 60, 203, 205.
- 1358. Cavalryman, 207, 208, 210.
- 24. Chai Tsun, 76 note 1, 130, 213, 217, 226 note 2, 227, 227 note 4.
- 26. Chai Yi, 65, 177 note 2, 236.
- 27. Chancellor, 47 note 3, 156, 221 note 5.
- 1359. chang (2.3 m), 224.
- 30. Chang Ang, 17-19, 21, 22, 35 notes 2 and 4, 52-54, 60, 92, 97-99, 101, 102.
- 32. Chang Ch'un, 205 note 1, 250.
- 1360. Chang Feng, 128-130, 229, 235.
- 35. Chang Han, 42 note 5.
- 40. Chang K'an, 196, 197, 205 note 2.
- 1361. Chang-k'iu (hien), 147 note 4.
- 1362. Chang Kuei, 60 note 2.
- 1363. Chang Man, 150, 151, 217, 228, 235.
- 1364. Chang Ping-lin, 244.
- 45. Chang Pu, 29, 30, 48, 58, 59, 90, 109, 127, 132, 133, 135, 137-140, 142, 144, 146, 147, 149, 177, 180 note 10, 201 note 4, 210, 212, 214, 217, 219, 220, 222, 229, 230, 253, 255.
- 1365. Chang Ts'an, 64.
- 52. Chang-ye (commandery), 25, 110, 110 note 3.
- 58. Ch'ang-an, 24, 27, 32, 33, 45, 49-51, 52 note 1, 58, 64, 68, 74 note 1, 83 note 5, 86, 88, 91-94, 97-101, 105, 106, 109, 113-117, 159, 160, 160 note 4, 163, 165, 168-170, 173, 178, 179, 209, 211, 213, 216, 218, 231-233, 240, 242, 247, 251, 253.
- 1366. Ch'ang-ch'eng (prefecture), 68, 68 note 7.
- 1367. Ch'ang-ko (hien), 84 note 1.
- 1368. Ch'ang K'ü, 107 note 1.
- 1369. Ch'ang-lo Palace, 51, 98 note 4, 99, 100.
- 1370. Ch'ang-lu (prefecture), 145, 145 note 7, 146, 217.
- 1371. Ch'ang-p'ing,
 - a) hien, 130 note 3.
 - b) prefecture, 65, 65 note 5.

67. Ch'ang-sha (kingdom), 42 note 4, 47 note 3, 100, 101, 158 note 2, 188.
1372. Ch'ang-shan (commandery), 45 notes 1 and 3, 53 note 2, 69 note 5, 70 notes 3 and 8, 216.
1373. Ch'ang-she (prefecture), 84, 84 note 1.
1374. Ch'ang-sin Palace, 99.
1375. Ch'ang-ts'ing (hien), 41 note 2, 147 note 5.
1376. Ch'ang-wu (hien), 172 note 2.
1377. Ch'ang-yang (hien), 108 note 2.
1378. Ch'ang-yi, 246.
1379. Ch'ang-yi (kingdom), 246.
68. Chao,
 - a) kingdom and commandery, 37, 37 note 2, 48, 62, 64, 71, 71 note 1.
 - b) hien, 65 note 4.
71. Chao Hi, 21.
72. Chao-hua (hien), 107 note 5.
1380. Chao Hung, 42 note 7.
1381. Chao Kang, 218 note 5.
1382. Chao-ling (prefecture), 152, 152 note 2.
1383. Chao Meng, 51—53, 56, 57, 60, 61, 87, 98—101, 251.
1384. Chao Yung, 44 note 5, 77 note 5.
1385. Ch'ao-na (prefecture), 172, 172 note 1.
1386. Ch'ao-yang (prefecture), 147, 147 note 4.
1387. Chart of the Distaff Relatives, 169.
- Chavannes, E., 35 note 8, 52 note 3, 60 note 6, 209 note 5, 237 note 4, 238 note 1, 246 notes 4—5.
1388. Che (district), 153, 153 note 6, 154.
77. Che-kiang (province), 48, 142, 157.
1389. Che-yang (prefecture), 151 note 6, 153 note 6, 154.
78. Chen Fou, 44 note 1.
81. Chen-p'ing (hien), 153 note 1.
1390. Chen Sün, 239 note 2.
82. Chen-thing,
 - a) kingdom, 42 note 4, 64 note 3, 70, 70 notes 1 and 5, 121—123, 132.
 - b) prefecture, 64, 64 notes 3—4, 70, 70 note 7, 122, 123, 126.
1391. Chen-yüan (hien), 91 note 3.
1392. Ch'en K'iao, 87.
94. Ch'en-liu (commandery), 35, 40, 53 note 6, 132, 133 notes 5—7, 134, 177 note 2.
95. Ch'en Mao, 29, 33.
96. Ch'en Mu, 16, 18, 19, 53, 56, 87 note 1, 97, 99, 102.
1393. Ch'en P'an, 241, 242, 244, 245.
1394. Ch'en-ting (commandery) 35, 35 note 5, 44 note 1.
1395. Ch'en-ts'ang (prefecture), 160 note 3, 161.
1396. Ch'en Tsun, 44 note 4.
99. Ch'en Tsün, 16 note 3, 217, 224.
1397. Ch'en Yi, 28, 28 notes 3—4.
1398. Cheng (prefecture), 92, 92 note 8, 96, 97, 97 note 1.
101. Cheng Hing, 49, 50, 110, 164, 167, 230, 237, 238.
1399. Cheng-ting (hien), 64 note 3.
1400. Cheng-yang (hien), 76 note 1.
1401. Ch'eng,
 - a) Emperor, 64, 75, 233.
 - b) dynasty, 107.
 - c) kingdom, 107 note 1.
 - d) prefecture, 95 note 4.
 - e) hien, 173 note 3, 189 note 6.
1402. Ch'ang-an (prefecture), 151 note 6.
1403. Ch'eng-kao (prefecture), 102, 102 notes 7 and 9.
1404. Ch'eng-lang River, 73 note 2.
108. Ch'eng Tan, 20, 53, 92, 97, 99, 101 note 6, 102.
109. Ch'eng-tu (prefecture), 30, 60, 109, 181—183, 191—198, 204, 212, 214, 218, 223, 232, 237.
1405. Ch'eng-tu River, 192, 192 notes 3—4, 193, 206.
1406. Ch'eng-yang (kingdom and commandery), 58, 95, 96.
1407. ch'i (musical note), 235.
112. Ch'i Hui, 211, 233.
114. Ch'i Chao-p'ing, 81.
1408. Ch'i-p'ing (prefecture), 80, 80 note 3.
1409. Ch'i-t'ing (commandery), 36 note 2.
1410. Chief Clerk, 16 note 3, 39, 49, 165—167.
1411. Chief Clerk in Command of Troops, 204, 206, 211.
115. Chief Commandant, 35 note 4, 45 note 1, 47 note 3, 61, 61 note 2, 73, 137, 137 note 2.
1412. Chief Commandant of Attendant Cavalry, 204, 204 note 6, 206.
1413. Chief Commandant of Cavalry, 58, 186, 203 note 3, 204, 204 note 6, 206, 247.
118. Cho (commandery), 128, 129 note 1, 130, 130 notes 1—2, 215.
120. Chou (dynasty), 32, 164, 168, 245.
1414. Chou-ch'eng-hiu (prefecture), 176 note 5.
124. Chou Kien, 132 note 1, 135, 135 note 6, 138, 140, 142, 143.
125. Chou li, 219 note 4.
1415. Chou Wei, 207 note 3.
1416. Ch'ou (prefecture), 151 note 6.

133. Chu Fou, 79 note 1, 124, 126, 128, 129, 129 note 1, 130, 213, 215, 223.
1417. Chu-ko Chf, 96.
1418. Chu-o (prefecture), 147, 147 note 5, 222.
141. Chu Wei, 16, 19, 23, 24, 35 note 4, 37, 52-56, 87, 92, 92 note 6, 97, 102-105, 224, 230, 231.
1419. Chu-yang (prefecture), 26, 26 note 3.
143. Chu Yu, 76 note 1, 212, 249 note 3.
144. Ch'u,
 - a) feudal state, 28 note 1.
 - b) kingdom and commandery, 59, 135, 140 notes 5 and 7, 144.
1420. Ch'u-ch'eng Gate, 100, 100 note 4.
1421. Ch'u-li, 28.
1422. ch'u-lou (sacrifice), 98, 98 note 3.
1423. Ch'ui-hui (agglomeration), 138, 138 note 4, 140, 142, 143, 215.
1424. Ch'un-hua (hien), 101 note 3.
148. Ch'un ts'iu, 245.
1425. Chung-ch'eng, 147, 147 note 7, 222.
1426. Chung-lien (bandits), 79, 83.
1427. Chung-lu (prefecture), 27 note 1, 188, 222.
1428. Chung-mou (prefecture), 176, 176 note 4.
154. Chung-shan (kingdom), 42 note 2, 65 note 2, 69 notes 3-4, 105.
1429. Chung-tsü-lu, 27 note 1.
156. Chung-wu (prefecture), 29, 158.
1430. Ch'ung-k'ing, 184 note 5, 189 note 3.
159. Ch'ung-ling (district), 16 note 3, 21, 29, 238, 239.
161. Colonel, 100, 203, 205, 229.
1431. Colonel of Hu Cavalry, 166.
164. Commandant of Justice, 17, 18, 21 note 1, 56.
1432. Commandant of the Palace Guards, 17, 18, 96, 182.
165. Commander-in-chief, 15, 16, 18, 19, 33, 37, 52, 56, 64, 71, 91, 104, 106, 107, 107 note 3, 119, 124 notes 5-6, 135, 138, 147, 153, 175, 182, 183, 188, 193, 194 note 5, 211, 213.
1433. Commander-in-chief of the Left, 37 note 4, 56, 87, 96.
1434. Commander-in-chief of the Right, 37 note 4, 56, 96-98, 251.
1435. Commander-in-chief of the Van, 56.
1436. Commissioner over the Army, 197 note 2, 204, 204 note 2, 206.
1437. Commissioner over the Army and Chief Commandant, 204 note 1.
1438. company, 203.
1439. Currency Cash, 236.
1440. dare-to-dies, 220.
- Delbrück, H., 223 note 3.
1441. Department of Merit, 39.
1442. Dependent State of An-ting, 26 note 2, 48, 58, 110.
169. Dependent State of Chang-ye, 61.
1443. Dependent State of San-shui, 26 note 2.
1444. Director of a Confederation, 36 note 2.
71. Director of Mandates, 35 note 3.
173. Director of Service of the Lieutenant Chancellor, 31-32.
1445. Director of the Army, 204, 206.
1446. Divine Terrace, 237.
1447. division, 91, 96, 199, 203, 205.
- Dubs, H. H., 13 note 1, 25 note 4, 32 note 5, 42 note 2, 52 note 3, 114 note 5, 160 note 4, 192 note 4, 201 note 2, 205 note 3, 207 note 7, 208 notes 1-2, 209 note 5, 232 note 5, 233 note 1, 234 note 1, 235, 235 notes 2, 6 and 8, 236 notes 1-3 and 5-7, 238 note 3, 239 note 2, 240 note 3, 246 notes 2-3, 247 note 1, 249 notes 1 and 5, 250 note 5, 251 note 2.
184. Eastern Tsin (dynasty), 107 note 1.
- Eberhard, W., 212 note 2, 233 note 1, 241, 241 note 2, 242, 242 note 2, 247 note 1.
1448. Emergency Troops, 207, 207 note 6, 208.
189. Eminent Founder; cf. also Kao, Emperor, 52.
196. Empress née Lü, 114 note 6, 238 note 2, 245 note 3.
1449. Empress née Tou, 169 notes 2-4.
1450. Empress née Yin, 157.
199. Epochal Founder; cf. also Liu Siu and Kuang-wu, Emperor, 104, 237 note 2.
200. Erudit, 187.
1451. Expectant Appointee, 166.
1452. Fan (hien), 56 note 1.
1453. Fan (prefecture), 196, 196 note 4.
1454. Fan Chung, 81.
204. Fan Ch'ung, 40, 80-83, 87, 92 note 2, 95, 96, 120.
206. Fan Hung, 218 note 5, 231.
218. Fan Ye, 180.
219. Fan Ye, 78, 107 note 1.
1455. Fang-ch'eng (hien), 151 note 6.
1456. Fang city, 140 note 6.
1457. Fang-shan (hien), 130 note 1.
1458. Fang-tsi (prefecture), 69, 69 note 6, 70 note 7.
1459. Fang-tung (prefecture), 140 note 6.

220. Fang Wang, 24, 58, 91, 95, 162.
 1460. Fang Yang, 95.
 1461. Fang-yü (prefecture), 150, 150 note 2.
 1462. Fei-ch'eng (prefecture), 139, 139 note 4.
 1463. Fei-lei (prefecture), 70, 70 note 1, 73 note 2.
 1464. Fen-yin (prefecture), 99, 99 note 4.
 1465. Feng (clan of Fu-ch'eng prefecture), 76 note 1.
 228. Feng Fang, 218 note 5.
 1466. Feng-k'iu (prefecture), 133, 133 note 6, 135 note 1.
 1467. Feng-tsie (hien), 108 note 2.
 1468. Feng Tsün, 47 note 3.
 233. Feng Yi, 63, 76 note 1, 87, 102, 103, 117-119, 160, 202, 208, 210, 216, 220-222, 224, 227 note 4, 231, 239.
 1469. Fish Gate, 135 note 3.
 1470. Five Elements, 232 ff.
 1471. Five Family Branches (SK 59), 169.
 1472. Five Shu (Cash), 248.
 1473. Fou (prefecture), 192, 196, 196 note 2.
 1474. Fou-ling (prefecture), 192 note 4.
 1475. Fou River, 191, 191 notes 8-9, 192 note 4, 206, 216.
 1476. Fou-yang (hien), 53 note 4.
 245. Fu Chan, 45 note 1.
 246. Fu-ch'eng (prefecture), 22, 22 note 3, 23, 32, 33, 76 note 1.
 1477. Fu Fish, 136.
 1478. Fu-k'iang (hien), 178 note 1, 180 note 1.
 249. Fu Lung, 121 note 3, 135, 137, 137 note 3, 138.
 1479. Fu-p'ing,
 a) prefecture, 80, 80 note 4.
 b) bandits, 80, 81, 121, 127, 128, 131, 135 note 7.
 1480. Fu-yang (prefecture), 151 note 7.
 1481. Full Marquis, 21, 40, 73, 76 note 1, 83.
 Fung Yu-lan, 232 note 5, 234 note 1.
 253. General, 16 note 3, 24, 200, 200 note 3, 203, 205, 225.
 1482. General and Commissioner over the Army, 197 note 2.
 1483. General of Amassed Archers, 201 (no. 19).
 1484. General of Amassed Crossbow-men, 201 (no. 18).
 255. General of Chariots and Cavalry, 201 (no. 14), 206.
 1485. General of Picked Cavalry, 201 (no. 16).
 1486. General of Resolute Cavalry, 201 (no. 15).
 1487. General of Strong Crossbow-men, 200 note 4.
 256. General of the Five Majestic [Principles], 20, 21 note 1, 29, 201 (no. 26).
 257. General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household, 204, 204 note 5, 206, 247.
 1488. General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household of the Feathered Forest, 204 note 5.
 1489. General of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household Rapid as Tigers, 204 note 5.
 258. General of the Guards, 240.
 1490. General of the Left, 201 (no. 13).
 1491. General of the Left of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household, 204 note 5.
 1492. General of the Martial Vanguard, 201 (no. 31).
 1493. General of the Meng Ford, 87, 201 (no. 43), 202.
 1494. General of the Right, 58, 200 (no. 12).
 1495. General of the Right of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household, 204 note 5.
 1496. General of the Van, 200 (no. 11), 202, 203 note 3.
 261. General over All the Offices of the Gentlemen-of-the-Household, 204 note 5.
 1497. General [Who Attacks] the Red Eyebrows, 201 (no. 37), 202.
 1498. General Who Awes the Bandits, 201 (no. 28).
 1499. General Who Awes the Caitiffs, 201 (no. 22).
 1500. General Who Detests the Sin [Dynasty], 29, 151 note 2.
 1501. General Who Establishes Han, 30.
 1502. General Who Exterminates the Caitiffs, 201 (no. 25).
 1503. General Who Inspires Awe, 20, 201 (no. 29).
 1504. General Who Is Loyal to Han, 201 (no. 41).
 1505. General Who Is Martial and Stern, 200 note 2, 201 (no. 30).
 262. General Who is Pillar of Heaven, 20.
 1506. General Who Maintains in Peace What is Distant, 201 (no. 34), 202-203.
 1507. General Who Manifests a Transformation, 201 (no. 33).
 1508. General Who Manifests Firmness, 201 (no. 32).
 1509. General Who Pacifies the Enemy, 201 note 1.
 1510. General Who Pacifies the Ti Barbarians, 201 (no. 35), 202, 237.

1511. General Who Penetrates the Roads, 201 (no. 20).
1512. General Who Perfects Han, 201 (no. 42).
1513. General Who Proclaims Virtue, 201 (no. 38).
1514. General Who Punishes the Caitiffs, 201 (no. 23).
1515. General Who Re-establishes Han, 201 (no. 40).
263. General Who Routs the Caitiffs, 24, 24 note 2, 37, 200 note 5.
1516. General Who Routs the Traitors, 201 (no. 36).
1517. General Who Scouts and Attacks, 201 (no. 17).
1518. General Who Seizes the Caitiffs, 201 (no. 21).
1519. General Who Subdues the Caitiffs, 201 (no. 24).
1520. General Who Supports Han, 30, 201 (no. 39).
1521. General Who Supports Majesty, 201 (no. 27).
264. General-in-chief, 16 note 3, 17, 21 note 1, 24 note 2, 47 note 3, 59, 64, 79, 84, 110, 112, 124, 133, 144, 147, 151, 156, 160, 164, 166, 172, 175, 177, 178, 184, 189, 200, 200 note 3, 203, 205, 213, 214, 225, 230.
266. General-in-chief of Agile Cavalry, 20, 21 note 1, 200 (no. 1), 200 notes 2-3.
1522. General-in-chief of Li-k'iu, 28 note 3.
1523. General-in-chief of Strong Crossbow-men, 200 (no. 6).
1524. General-in-chief of the Western Provinces, 110, 163, 200 (no. 10), 202.
1525. General-in-chief of Waters and Parks, 20.
1526. General-in-chief Who Approaches Han, 29.
1527. General-in-chief Who Establishes Awe, 200 (no. 3).
1528. General-in-chief Who Establishes Righteousness, 200 (no. 2).
1529. General-in-chief Who Has No Superior, 128.
1530. General-in-chief Who Is Pillar of State, 20.
1531. General-in-chief Who Routs the Caitiffs, 200 (no. 9).
1532. General-in-chief Who Shelters Han, 59.
269. General-in-chief Who Shields Westwards, 20, 31.
1533. General-in-chief Who Subdues the South, 200 (no. 4), 202.
1534. General-in-chief Who Subdues the West, 200 (no. 5), 202.
1535. General-in-chief Who Supports Han, 58.
1536. General-in-chief Who Sweeps the Earth, 28.
1537. General-in-chief Who Traverses the Open Country, 200 (no. 7).
270. Gentleman, 29.
273. Gentleman-of-the-Palace, 64, 238.
- Goitre Yang, see Liu Yang.
- Goodrich, L. C., 219 note 5.
- Grammata Serica by B. Karlgren, 235 note 2, 242 note 1, 247 notes 3-5, 248 note 2.
274. Grand Administrator, 30, 31, 36, 38, 38 note 1, 39, 41, 44, 45 note 1, 47, 58, 59 61, 65, 67, 67 note 1, 72-74, 77 note 5, 78, 79, 83-87, 101, 102, 106, 109-112, 124, 126, 128, 132, 134, 134 note 1, 137, 137 note 3, 140, 144, 151 note 8, 152 note 3, 153, 157 note 3, 158, 158 note 2, 160, 163 note 10, 177, 180, 180 note 10, 183, 187, 189, 196, 202, 207-209, 211, 216, 224, 231, 245.
1538. Grand Commandant, 107 note 3.
278. Grand Master, 31.
279. Grand Master of Ceremonies, 16, 16 note 3, 18, 24, 251.
280. Grand Minister of Agriculture, 96, 253.
281. Grand Minister of Works, 15, 16, 18, 19, 56, 87 note 1, 96 note 3, 104, 106 note 6, 107, 107 note 3, 124 note 5, 164, 182, 237.
282. Grand Minister over the Masses, 15, 16, 18, 23, 32 note 1, 33, 37, 37 note 4, 49, 77, 87 note 1, 104, 107, 107 note 3, 110, 114, 119, 127, 187, 189, 194, 194 note 5, 231.
1539. Grand Palace Grandee, 135, 172-175, 205, 205 note 1, 230, 231.
287. Grandee Remonstrant and Consultant, 75.
288. Grandee Secretary, 87, 96, 106, 162.
1540. Great Granary, 51.
1541. Guard, 208.
290. Hai-k'ü (prefecture), 138 note 1.
1542. Hai-si (prefecture), 138, 138 note 1.
1543. Han Chan, 229.
1544. Han-ch'ang (prefecture), 69 note 3.
1545. Han-ch'eng (hien), 99 note 5.
293. Han-chung (commandery and kingdom), 30, 30 note 4, 53, 54, 60, 88, 108, 109, 117 note 2, 154 note 3, 181, 184, 186, 186 note 1, 202, 231.

1546. Han Fu, 47 note 3.
 1547. han-fu period, 162.
 296. Han Hin, 77.
 1548. Han Hung, 36 note 1, 37 note 6, 38, 39.
 1549. Han kiu yi, 207.
 300. Han-ku pass, 87, 118, 119.
 1550. Han kuan yi, 237 note 2.
 Han pass, see Kiang (Han) pass.
 303. Han River, 56, 88, 109, 150, 156, 186, 214, 222.
 306. Han-tan (prefecture), 62—64, 69, 69 note 1, 71, 74—78, 207, 216, 250.
 Hannibal, 223.
 312. Heir-apparent, 26, 123.
 1551. Hereditary Houses of the Distaff Relatives (SK 49), 169.
 Herrmann, A., 61 note 2, 100 note 4, 109 note 1.
 1552. Hia (hien), 92 note 4.
 1553. Hia Ho-liang, 233.
 318. Hia-k'ü-yang (prefecture), 64, 64 note 4, 67, 69, 69 note 2.
 1554. Hia-p'i (prefecture), 146, 146 note 1, 220.
 1555. Hia-pien (prefecture), 189, 189 note 6.
 319. Hia-po (prefecture), 67.
 1556. Hia-yang (prefecture), 99, 99 note 5.
 1557. Hien Gate, 196.
 1558. Hien-yüan, 246, 246 note 5.
 1559. Hing (agglomeration), 151, 151 note 7, 154.
 331. Hiung-nu, 26, 72, 86, 110, 113, 127, 130.
 1560. Ho (prefecture), 70, 70 note 8, 94 note 1, 104, 104 note 3.
 1561. Ho-ch'eng, 64 note 2.
 1562. Ho-ch'eng Gate, 100 note 4.
 1563. Ho-ch'i (prefecture), 180, 188, 189.
 1564. Ho-ch'uan (hien), 189 note 4.
 1565. Ho-jung (commandery), 45 notes 1 and 3, 64 note 2, 67, 207.
 336. Ho Kuang, 26, 246.
 338. Ho-nan,
 a) commandery, 23 notes 1—2, 29, 35, 47, 84, 84 note 2, 87, 102, 102 note 7, 103 note 1, 104 note 1, 105, 119 note 1, 105, 119 note 1, 151 note 4, 176, 176 note 4.
 b) province, 11.
 339. Ho-nei (commandery), 45 note 2, 84, 84 notes 4 and 8, 86 note 1, 87, 87 note 5, 88, 102, 102 note 4, 103 note 2, 151 note 5, 216, 224, 230.
 340. Honorary Regular Attendant, 107 note 1.
 1566. Ho-tung (commandery), 92, 92 note 7, 94, 99 note 4, 176, 212.
 354. Hou Pa, 39, 44 note 4, 45 note 1, 129 note 1, 130, 250.
 1567. Household Assistant, 251.
 1568. Hou Tan, 192 note 4.
 356. Hu, 26.
 360. Hu (prefecture), 92, 118.
 1569. Hu (prefecture), 160 note 3.
 1570. Hu-ling (prefecture), 135, 135 note 5, 136, 138, 145.
 358. Hu-nan (province), 157.
 359. Hu-pei (province), 11, 108 note 2, 150, 157, 168, 183, 184.
 361. Hu San-sing, 16.
 362. Hu-t'o River, 67, 72.
 1571. Hu-ya Mountain, 187, 187 note 4.
 365. Hu-yang (prefecture), 27, 151 note 6, 153 note 4.
 1572. Hu Yin, 53, 54, 98—101.
 1573. Hua (hien), 92 note 8.
 1574. Hua-chung, 148, 148 note 3.
 1575. Hua-yang (hien), 192 note 6.
 370. Hua yang kuo chi, 107 note 1.
 371. Hua-yin (prefecture), 92, 97, 97 note 1, 118.
 1576. Huai (prefecture), 102, 102 note 4, 103, 105, 105 note 5.
 1577. Huai-lai (hien), 65 note 5.
 377. Huai-li (prefecture), 165 note 4.
 1578. Huai-nan (kingdom), 29, 29 note 1, 133, 139.
 372. Huai-p'ing (commandery), 39.
 373. Huai River, 39, 133.
 374. Huai-shan, 48, 150.
 376. Huai-yang (kingdom and commandery), 21, 35, 35 note 4, 53, 54, 59, 105, 134, 134 note 1, 135, 152, 152 note 2.
 380. Huan T'an, 237.
 1579. Huan Wen, 107 note 1.
 1580. Huang-yu,
 a) agglomeration, 153 note 5, 156.
 b) river, 153 note 5.
 1581. Hui (hien), 180 note 5.
 1582. Hui Creek, 118, 221.
 1583. Hui-min (hien), 80 note 4.
 387. Hui Tung, 95 note 4, 108 note 2, 192 note 4.
 Hulsevé, A. F. P., 180, 210.
 1584. Hundred Officials, treatise on, 200, 203.
 390. Hung Liang-ki, 35 note 6.
 1585. Hung-men (commune), 98 note 1.

391. Hung-nung,
a) commandery, 24, 30 note 5, 91 note 7, 118 notes 1—2, 151 note 5, 159, 160, 180, 213, 224.
b) prefecture, 91, 97 note 7, 92, 92 notes 1 and 5—6.
1586. Hung Yi-hüan, 16 note 3, 203 note 3.
1587. Huo-lu (hien), 70 note 3.
1588. Huo-so (bandits), 80, 81, 121, 121 note 3, 127, 128, 131, 135.
1589. Huo-yang (agglomeration), 151, 151 note 4.
1590. hū (constellation), 237 note 3.
392. Hū-ch'ang (hien), 54 note 2.
1591. Hüan-wu, 237, 237 note 3.
399. Imperial Household Grandee, 137.
Indo-China, 157.
401. Inspector, 86.
403. Internuncio, 38, 39, 191, 205, 205 note 2, 218.
1592. Jang (prefecture), 27 note 1, 53, 153, 153 note 4, 154.
1593. Jehol, 206.
1594. Jen-ch'eng (prefecture), 145, 145 notes 3 and 5.
406. Jen Kuang, 45 note 1, 67, note 5, 68, 73, 74, 207, 208, 210, 211, 228.
1595. Jen Kuei, 60, 90, 107, 181, 193.
1596. Jen Man, 107 note 3, 187 note 2.
408. Jen Yen, 45 note 1, 137 note 2.
1597. Jo (prefecture), 27 note 1.
1598. Jo pass, 108 note 2.
1599. Ju Chang, 160 note 4.
412. Ju-nan (commandery), 20, 28, 29, 33, 40, 53 note 4, 54 note 1, 59, 60, 76 note 1, 152 note 2, 211.
1600. Junior Tutor, 76.
1601. Ju-yin (prefecture), 53, 53 note 4.
1602. Kan Chung-k'o, 233.
1603. Kan-su (province), 25, 25 note 3, 58, 61, 88, 110, 110 note 2, 115 note 2, 161, 166, 186, 188.
1604. Kan-yü,
a) hien, 59 note 1.
b) prefecture, 58, 58 note 6, 150.
1605. Kang-mao (amulets), 236.
423. Kao, Emperor, 52, 52 note 2, 95, 114, 119, 162, 235, 236, 238 note 5, 245 note 3, 249, 250 note 5, 253.
1606. Kao (prefecture), 70, 70 notes 2 and 6, 73 note 2.
1607. Kao-ch'eng, 70 note 2.
1608. Kao-ch'eng (hien), 70 note 1.
1609. Kao ch'eng hien chí, 73 note 2.
1610. Kao Hu, 146 note 2.
1611. Kao-hu (bandits), 79, 83.
1612. Kao-hu (marquisate), 79 note 4.
1613. Kao-ling,
a) marquisate, 236.
b) prefecture, 99, 99 note 7, 100, 117, 216.
1614. Kao-mi (commandery), 58.
1615. Kao P'ing, 197 note 2.
429. Kao-p'ing (prefecture), 175, 175 notes 2—3, 178, 179.
427. Kao Tsün, 175, 178, 179, 230.
1616. Kao Wu, 197 note 2, 204.
1617. Kao-yi,
a) hien, 69 note 6.
b) prefecture, 70 note 8, 104.
430. Keng,
a) clan of Mao-ling prefecture, 126 note 3.
b) clan of Sung-tsí prefecture, 73 note 2.
c) district, 73, 73 note 2.
1618. Keng Ai, 35, 37, 44 note 4, 45 note 1.
1619. Keng Chí, 203 note 3.
432. Keng Ch'un, 36 note 1, 37, 37 notes 3 and 6, 69, 69 notes 1—2, 73, 73 notes 1—2, 122, 123, 132, 140, 202, 203 note 6, 208 note 5, 220, 221, 227 note 1.
1620. Keng Hin, 202, 202 note 8.
444. Keng K'uang, 39, 44 note 4, 45 note 1, 65, 65 note 5, 72, 72 note 2, 73, 78, 126.
454. Keng-shí Emperor; cf. also Liu Hüan, 13—15, 16 note 3, 17 note 2, 19, 21—24, 30—51, 53, 54, 56 note 1, 58, 59, 59 note 3, 61—63, 65, 70 note 5, 72—75, 77—80, 83—86, 88—91, 95, 95 note 5, 97—102, 105—107, 109, 110, 115, 117 note 2, 119, 120, 124, 132—134, 134 note 1, 137, 137 note 2, 139 note 1, 140, 144, 144 note 2, 150, 151, 158, 161, 162, 169, 176, 181, 199, 201, 201 note 4, 202, 208, 209, 211, 215, 221, 228, 230, 232, 247, 250, 251, 253, 255, 256.
455. keng-shí period, 15, 16.
462. Keng Yen, 65—67, 72, 72 note 2, 78, 79, 126, 128, 147, 147 note 9, 149, 204 note 2, 206, 212, 217, 220, 222, 226 note 2.
1621. Ki (prefecture), 26, 26 note 5, 27.
465. Ki,
a) hien, 68 note 7.
b) prefecture, 178, 178 note 1, 179, 180 note 1, 248 note 1.
468. Ki (prefecture), 65, 67, 69 note 2, 126, 128, 129, 129 note 1, 213, 223.
469. Ki (province), 144 note 2.

1622. Ki,
a) mountain, 128.
b) pass, 92, 118, 217.
1623. ki-hai (cyclical characters), 105 note 1.
1624. Ki-t'ou Mountain, 173, 173 note 3.
470. Ki-yang (prefecture), 52 note 1, 151 note 6.
1625. K'i (hien), 87 note 4.
1626. K'i (prefecture), 140, 140 note 4.
1627. K'i Park, 87, 87 note 5.
1628. Kia (prefecture), 176, 176 note 2.
474. Kia Fu, 151, 151 note 8, 152, 211, 213, 214, 226.
1629. Kia-kiang (hien), 193 note 4.
1630. Kia Meng, 29 note 1, 43 note 4.
1631. Kiang-chou (prefecture), 184 note 5, 189, 189 note 3, 191, 192 note 4, 194.
478. Kiang-hia (commandery), 157, 158 note 2, 207 note 6.
1632. Kiang-ling (prefecture), 157 note 1.
1633. Kiang (Han) pass, 108, 108 note 2, 181, 184, 184 note 5, 186 note 3, 187, 189.
479. Kiang-si (province), 28 note 5, 48, 60, 88, 106, 157, 158 note 2.
480. Kiang-su (province), 142.
482. K'iang Hua, 240, 244.
1634. Kiao (province), 157, 157 note 6, 158, 158 note 2.
1635. Kiao-chi (commandery), 47 note 3, 158 note 2.
1636. Kiao K'iang, 135, 135 note 6, 138, 140 note 6, 143-146.
484. Kiao-tung (kingdom and commandery), 53, 54, 58.
1637. Kie (prefecture), 92, 92 note 7.
1638. Kie-ts'üan (prefecture), 179, 179 note 3.
1639. kien-shi period, 96.
487. Kien T'an, 226 note 2.
1640. Kien-tsai Gate, 100 note 4.
488. Kien-wei (commandery), 30 note 4, 108, 181, 191 note 5, 192 note 5, 193 note 4.
489. kien-wu period, 104, 157 note 7.
1641. Kien-yang (prefecture), 146, 145 note 8.
492. K'ien (prefecture), 170-172, 176, 178, 179.
1642. K'ien Ling, 229.
1643. Kin-ch'eng (commandery), 25, 110 note 3, 163, 163 note 10, 171.
1644. Kin-hiang (hien), 140 note 6.
1645. Kin-men Mountain, 151, 151 note 5.
1646. Kin Tan, 110.
1647. King (prefecture), 23, 23 notes 1-2, 29, 33.
501. King (province), 56.
496. King-chao-yin, 45 note 4, 92 note 8, 160 note 2, 170 note 1.
497. King, Emperor, 11, 70 note 5, 169 note 3.
1648. King Han, 186, 187.
1649. King-men Mountain, 187, 187 note 4.
503. King Tan, 73, 213, 224, 227 note 4.
1650. King Who Establishes Majesty, 21.
1651. King Who Is Near to the [Yang-tsai] River, 28 note 4.
1652. King Who Is the Pacifier of the North, 172.
1653. King Who Pacifies Westwards, 110.
1654. King Who Succeeds Everywhere, 28 note 4.
1655. King-yang (prefecture), 115, 115 note 5.
1656. K'ing Wu, 229.
1657. Kiu-kiang (commandery), 29 note 1, 48, 133, 142, 142 note 1, 209.
1658. kiu k'ing tsiang kün, 16.
1659. K'üing-ku (kingdom), 60, 90, 193.
1660. K'üing-lai (hien), 30 note 2.
- Korea, 44, 47, 47 note 3, 88, 112, 158.
512. Ko Yen, 73, 124 note 6, 133, 134 note 1, 135, 137 note 2, 138, 138 note 3, 140-142, 144, 145, 145 note 2, 152, 214, 224.
513. K'ou Sün, 39, 73, 87, 102, 103, 211, 216, 218, 221, 224.
1661. Ku-an (hien), 130 note 2.
1662. Ku-k'ou (prefecture), 117 note 2.
1663. Ku Kung, 44 note 2.
519. Ku-yüan (hien), 175 note 2.
1664. K'u-hing (prefecture), 69, 69 note 3.
1665. K'u-ts'ung Mountain, 92, 96 note 1.
521. K'uai-ki (commandery), 45 note 1, 47 note 2, 137 note 2, 142, 209.
1666. Kuan (prefecture), 73 note 2.
523. Kuan-kün (prefecture), 26, 33, 117 note 2.
526. Kuang-han,
a) commandery, 30 notes 3-4, 107 note 5, 192 note 2, 196 note 2.
b) prefecture, 191, 191 notes 4 and 8, 192 note 4, 196 note 3.
c) hien, 30 note 3.
1667. Kuang-hua (hien), 26 note 3.
1668. Kuang-ling (commandery), 138 note 1.
572. Kuang-lo, 134-136, 138, 206.
1669. Kuang-o (prefecture), 71, 71 note 2, 72-74, 219.
1670. Kuang-p'ing (commandery), 45 note 2.
1671. Kuang-si (province), 157.
1672. Kuang-tu (prefecture), 192, 192 note 6, 194, 194 note 1, 196, 206.

528. Kuang-tung (province), 157.
529. Kuang-wu, Emperor; cf. also Liu Siu and Epochal Founder, 13–16, 23 note 3, 32 note 9, 38, 42, 44, 47 note 3, 57, 61, 70 notes 2 and 5, 74, 76, 94 note 1, 100 note 2, 101 note 4, 104–106, 109–114, 117–124, 126–128, 130, 132–140, 142, 144 note 2, 145, 149, 150, 153, 154, 156–161, 163–168, 171–183, 185–191, 193–198, 200–221, 225 note 2, 226–235, 237–247, 249, 251, 253–256.
1673. Kuei-chou (province), 107 note 1, 109, 157.
531. kuei-hai (cyclical characters), 94 note 1.
1674. Kuei Hung, 246, 247.
1675. Kuei Palace, 117.
1676. Kuei River, 188.
1677. Kuei-yang (commandery), 158 note 2, 188.
1678. K'un-ming Pond, 114.
533. K'ung-yang (prefecture), 20–23, 29, 33, 38 note 1, 61, 151 note 6, 223, 242, 250, 253.
1679. Kung (prefecture), 103, 103 note 1.
1680. Kung-k'iu (prefecture), 145 note 3.
1681. Kung Lin, 91.
1682. Kung-sun (clan), 246, 246 note 5.
1683. Kung-sun Hui, 86, 107, 107 note 3, 191, 192, 196, 196 note 3.
1684. Kung-sun Kuang, 107, 107 note 3, 187.
538. Kung-sun Shu, 14, 29–31, 44, 48, 60, 77, 86, 90, 107–109, 113, 117 note 2, 133, 157, 158, 161, 163–165, 167 note 2, 168, 169, 171–175, 177, 178, 180–198, 201 note 4, 205–207, 209, 210, 213–215, 218, 219, 222, 229, 232, 234, 237, 239, 245–249, 253–255.
540. K'ung Jen, 35 note 3, 42 note 6.
1685. Kuo (clan of Kao prefecture), 70, 122.
545. Kuo Ki, 45 note 1.
1686. Kuo Sheng-t'ung, 70, 122, 123.
1687. Kū (prefecture), 147, 147 note 10, 148, 149.
1688. Kū-li (agglomeration), 147, 147 note 8, 217, 222.
549. Kū-lu,
a) commandery, 37, 37 note 2, 45 note 2, 61, 64 note 2, 65 note 4, 68 notes 4–5, 69 note 4, 71 note 2, 75 note 1, 122, 128 note 2.
b) prefecture, 74, 74 note 2, 75.
c) hien, 75 note 1.
1689. Kū-yen (hien), 61 note 2.
1690. Kū-yung pass, 39.
1691. Kūn-tu (prefecture), 130, 130 note 3.
1692. K'ü (prefecture), 146, 146 note 3, 149.
1693. K'ü-fou (hien), 40 note 2.
1694. K'ü-yang (prefecture), 59 note 1.
1695. Lady, 60.
1696. Lady née Han, 251.
556. Lai Hi, 165, 166, 169, 171–175, 178–180, 189–191, 193 note 2, 194, 204 note 5, 215, 224, 227 note 2, 230–232.
1697. Lai-wu (hien), 140 note 1.
1698. Lan-ling (prefecture), 141, 141 note 1, 142, 214.
561. Lan-t'ien (prefecture), 160 note 5.
562. Land Within the Passes, 49, 50, 88, 108, 115, 117 note 2, 154 note 3, 160, 163, 166, 169, 176, 186, 202, 210, 216, 231, 240, 244, 253.
563. Lang-ya (commandery), 29, 29 note 3, 48, 58, 58 note 6, 59, 132, 138 note 1, 177, 180 note 10, 224.
1699. Lei River, 188.
1700. li (415.8 m), 192 note 4.
565. Li (clan of Wan prefecture), 11, 50, 239, 243.
1701. Li (prefecture), 153, 153 note 2.
566. Li Chang, 180 note 10.
1702. Li-ch'eng,
a) hien, 147 note 8.
b) prefecture, 147 note 6.
1703. Li-ch'eng (prefecture), 59 note 1.
1704. Li-ch'eng Gate, 100 note 4.
567. Li Chung, 74, 75, 77, 204 note 5, 212, 228, 231, 251.
1705. Li-hia, 147, 147 note 6, 222.
570. Li Hien, 14, 28, 29 note 1, 30, 43, 44, 48, 90, 109, 133, 137, 139, 142, 149, 157, 209, 219, 229, 253.
1706. Li Hiung, 107, 107 note 3.
1707. Li-k'iu (district), 26, 26 note 5, 28 notes 1 and 3, 156, 157.
1708. Li Li, 76.
1709. Li Ling, 219 note 5.
573. Li Man-k'ing, 64.
1710. Li Mountain, 147 note 6.
1711. Li Pao, 20, 21, 221, 221 note 5.
1712. Li Shi, 107 note 1.
575. Li Shou, 239, 242, 243.
577. Li Sung, 32, 49–53, 56, 57, 60, 87, 91, 92, 98–101, 231.
1713. Li-ts'üan (hien), 117 note 2.
578. Li T'ung, 11, 20, 21, 32 note 1, 51, 54–57, 202, 239, 243.

579. Li Tsi-tu, 40 note 2, 41, 41 note 5, 59 note 3, 68, 80.
582. Li Yen, 235.
583. Li Yi, 11, 20, 21 note 1, 23, 35, 37, 37 note 3, 51, 53, 57, 87, 102, 103, 231.
585. Li Yü,
a) 43 note 2.
b) 64.
588. Liang,
a) kingdom, 35 note 5, 42, 45 note 1, 59, 132, 135, 135 note 4, 138, 144, 145 note 4.
b) prefecture, 84, 84 note 2, 151 note 4.
c) province, 108 note 2.
1714. Liang (province), 25 note 3, 110, 163, 167.
1715. Liang-hiang (prefecture), 130, 130 note 1.
1716. Liang-k'ü (district), 176, 176 note 5.
592. Liao Chan, 17, 17 note 2, 18, 19, 53, 56, 98-102, 117 note 2.
1717. Liao-ning (province), 65 note 6.
1718. Liao-tung (commandery), 65.
596. Lieutenant Chancellor, 32 note 1, 33, 37 notes 4-5, 49, 56, 57, 64, 87 note 1, 91, 96, 98, 231.
1719. Lieutenant Chancellor of the Left, 37 note 4, 56, 100.
597. Lieutenant General, 16 note 3, 17, 20, 23, 24 note 2, 28, 157, 189, 203, 203 note 3, 205.
1720. Light Chariots, 206, 210.
1721. Lin (hien), 86 note 1.
1722. Lin-chang (hien), 62 note 1.
599. Lin-huai (commandery), 39 note 3, 45 note 1, 47 note 2, 59, 136, 177.
1723. Lin-ju (hien), 84 note 2, 151 note 6, 176 note 5.
1724. Lin-king (prefecture), 91, 91 note 3.
1725. Lin-k'iu (prefecture), 56 note 1, 87.
1726. Lin-k'ung (prefecture), 30, 30 note 2.
1727. Lin-p'ing (prefecture), 128, 128 note 2.
1728. Lin-tsin (hien), 92 note 7.
1729. Lin-tsü (prefecture), 27 note 1, 184.
602. Lin-tsü,
a) hien, 148 notes 2-3.
b) prefecture, 148, 148 note 1, 149, 204 note 2, 212, 217, 220, 222.
606. Ling-ling (commandery), 158 note 2, 188.
1730. Ling-pao (hien), 87 note 6, 91 note 7.
608. Liu,
a) clan of Ch'ang-ch'eng prefecture, 68.
b) imperial clan, 11, 42, 50, 52, 54, 123, 162, 168, 210, 230, 236, 239, 242, 245, 245 note 2.
1731. Liu (prefecture), 140, 140 note 5.
1732. Liu-an (commandery), 142, 209.
610. Liu Chang, 95.
618. Liu Chi, 68, 70, 70 note 7, 73, 122, 122 note 3, 208 note 5, 227 note 3.
619. Liu Chi, 16 note 3, 21, 24, 53.
634. Liu Hi, 53.
1733. Liu Hien, 47 note 3.
640. Liu Hin, 240-244.
1734. Liu Hing, 47 note 3.
1735. Liu Ho, 246.
648. Liu Hui, 237.
649. Liu Hui-k'ing, 26.
1736. Liu Hü, 41, 45 note 1.
653. Liu Hüan; cf. also Keng-shi Emperor, 11, 12.
655. Liu Jen, 237.
662. Liu Kia, 16 note 3, 21, 53, 54, 60, 108, 109, 117 note 2, 221 note 5, 231.
663. Liu K'iang, 123.
672. Liu K'ing, 53.
681. Liu Kung, 41 note 1, 95, 100, 101, 113, 119, 120.
686. Liu Li, 42, 42 note 2.
687. Liu Liang, 16, 97.
688. Liu Liang, 29, 30.
1737. Liu Lin, 64.
691. Liu Mai, 11.
692. Liu Mao,
a) 29, 29 note 8, 30, 47, 48, 59, 90, 105, 105 note 5, 228-230.
b) 95, 96.
1738. Liu Pang; cf. also Kao, Emperor, and Eminent Founder, 57, 238.
700. Liu P'en-tsü, 14, 84, 95, 96, 96 note 1, 97 note 1, 100, 106, 107, 113, 114, 114 note 3, 120, 159, 228-230, 252.
702. Liu Pin, 41 note 3.
- Liu Po-sheng, see Liu Yen.
707. Liu Shang, 197, 197 note 3.
1739. Liu Shao-kung, 106.
715. Liu Sin, 35, 53, 60, 106.
716. Liu Siu; cf. also Kuang-wu, Emperor, and Epochal Founder, 14, 16-18, 20-24, 32, 36 note 1, 37, 38, 40, 49, 56 note 1, 61-79, 81-90, 92, 94, 97, 102-105, 107, 121, 122, 124, 207, 208, 215-217, 219, 221, 228, 230-232, 237 note 2, 238-245, 249-251, 253-255.
718. Liu Sun-k'ing, 26.
1740. Liu Te, 123.
738. Liu Tsi-yü, 64, 65, 75.

739. Liu Ts'i, 16—19, 21, 23, 33, 35, 37, 49, 50, 53, 56, 57, 97.
1741. Liu Ts'i-k'ing, 26.
743. Liu Wang, 14, 29, 30, 33, 35, 228.
746. Liu Wen-po; cf. also Lu Fang, 26.
751. Liu Yang (Goitre Yang), 70, 70 note 5, 121, 123, 202, 228, 235.
753. Liu Yen (style: Po-sheng), 11, 12, 14, 16, 16 note 3, 18, 20, 21, 23, 23 note 3, 24, 37, 57, 62, 94, 102, 105, 231, 236, 237, 237 note 2, 239, 249, 253, 254.
765. Liu Ying (the Young Prince), 14, 91, 95, 228.
768. Liu Yung, 14, 42, 45 note 1, 59, 90, 106, 106 note 6, 107, 109, 128 note 4, 132—139, 140 note 6, 143, 144, 152, 201 note 4, 217, 219, 229, 253—255.
773. Liu Yü, 138—141, 142—146, 214, 229.
1742. Lo (prefecture), 30, 30 note 3.
1743. Lo Chen-yü, 100 note 4.
1744. Lo-ch'eng Gate, 100 note 4.
1745. Lo-lang (commandery), 47 note 3, 112, 158.
1746. Lo-men (agglomeration), 180, 180 note 1.
1747. Lo-ning (hien), 118 notes 4—5.
777. Lo-yang,
a) hien, 150 note 5.
b) prefecture, 31—35, 37, 38, 40, 41 note 1, 42, 45, 49, 51, 83 note 5, 87, 92, 92 note 6, 95 note 5, 101, 102—106, 107 note 1, 109, 114, 117 note 2, 119 note 1, 120—122, 130—135, 149—151, 154, 156, 157, 159, 161, 167, 167 note 5, 172, 176, 177, 180, 191, 197, 198, 202, 211, 213, 224, 230, 231, 232, 253, 254.
1748. Lo-yang (prefecture), 70, 70 notes 3—4.
1749. Lu,
a) commandery and kingdom 59, 135, 139 note 5, 145 note 6.
b) prefecture, 40 note 2, 149.
1750. Lu (prefecture), 41, 41 note 2.
1751. Lu (prefecture), 130, 130 note 4.
780. Lu Fang, 14, 26, 30, 48, 50, 58, 59, 88, 110, 113 note 1, 165, 219, 229, 255, 255 note 1.
1752. Lu-hun pass, 87, 118, 119.
1753. Lu Jun, 220.
781. Lu-kiang,
a) commandery, 28, 28 note 5, 29, 29 note 1, 48, 133, 142 note 2, 209.
b) hien, 142 note 2.
1754. Lu-nu (prefecture), 65, 65 note 2, 69, 69 note 2.
783. Lu-shan (hien), 151 note 6.
787. Lun yü, 246.
788. Lung (hien), 115 note 6, 117 note 1.
1755. lung-hing period, 107.
789. Lung-lü,
a) mountain, 86, 86 note 1.
b) prefecture, 86 note 1.
1756. Lung-p'ing (hien), 71 note 2.
1757. Lung-si,
a) commandery, 25, 163, 175 notes 4—5, 178, 180 note 4.
b) hien, 180 notes 3—4.
790. Lung Slope, 115, 115 note 2, 163, 169, 173.
1758. Lung yü, 115 note 2.
1759. Lü Wei, 161, 163, 191, 192.
1760. Lüe-yang (prefecture), 173, 173 note 1, 175, 179, 215, 224.
794. Ma Ch'eng, 204 notes 1 and 5, 224.
1761. Ma Ch'ung, 74.
798. Ma Wu, 18 note 1, 19, 20, 77, 77 note 4, 86, 102, 142, 217, 220.
1762. Ma Yüan, 44 note 5.
799. Ma Yüan, 44 note 5, 110, 164, 164 note 4, 165—167, 173, 175, 178, 182, 183, 183 note 3, 193 note 2, 219, 226 note 2, 230.
1763. Major, 203, 205.
1764. Man (barbarians), 61 note 2.
1765. Man-chung (agglomeration), 150, 150 note 5, 151.
1766. Mao (district), 92.
801. Mao-ling (prefecture), 155, 164, 182 note 3.
1767. Marquis of Wei-k'i (Tou Ying. SK 107), 169.
1768. Marquis Who Assists the State, 41.
1769. Marquis Who Attaches Himself to Virtue, 21.
1770. Marquis Who Chisels Away the Tibetans, 166.
1771. Marquis Who Conforms to Righteousness, 73.
1772. Marquis Who Elevates Righteousness, 73.
1773. Marquis Who Elevates Virtue, 21.
1774. Marquis Who Establishes Faithfulness, 73.
1775. Marquis Who Establishes Loyalty, 73.
1776. Marquis Who Establishes Merit, 73.
1777. Marquis Who Establishes Plans, 76 note 1.
1778. Marquis Who Fears Majesty, 100.

1779. Marquis Who Institutes Righteousness, 73.
1780. Marquis Who Is Brave and Meritorious, 21.
1781. Marquis Who Is Loyal and Continent, 59.
1782. Marquis Who Is Martial and Accomplished, 73.
1783. Marquis Who Is Martial and Righteous, 76 note 1.
1784. Marquis Who Is Martial and Solid, 73.
1785. Marquis Who Is Martial and Trust-worthy, 24.
1786. Marquis Who Is Not Righteous, 131.
1787. Marquis Who Is Pillar of Merit, 21.
1788. Marquis Who Knows the Mandate, 21.
1789. Marquis Who Makes Han Far-reaching, 21.
1790. Marquis Who Observes Righteousness, 73.
1791. Marquis Who Supports Han, 21.
803. Marquis Within the Passes, 72, 76 note 1, 175, 247.
804. Master of the Army, 24, 58.
1792. Master of Writing, 37, 54, 101 note 4, 216.
1793. Mei (prefecture), 115, 115 note 1.
1794. Mei Ken, 43 note 3, 60 note 1.
1795. Member of the Suite of the Heir-apparent, 29.
1796. Meng (hien), 87 note 2.
1797. Meng (prefecture), 145, 145 note 4.
1798. Meng-ch'eng (hien), 138 note 4.
1799. Meng Ford, 87, 87 note 5, 102, 102 note 8.
1800. Meng-tsin (hien), 104 note 1.
809. Mi (prefecture), 23, 23 note 2, 29, 33, 151 note 8.
1801. Mien (hien), 196 note 2.
1802. Mien-chu (prefecture), 192, 192 note 2, 196.
1803. Min-ch'i (hien), 118 note 1, 119 note 2.
1804. Min-ch'i (prefecture), 119, 119 note 2.
812. Min River, 181, 192 notes 3-4.
816. Mother Lü, 79, 80.
820. Nan (commandery), 26, 26 note 5, 27, 27 note 1, 28 note 2, 48, 150, 157 notes 1-2, 168, 184, 184 note 6, 185-187, 187 note 3, 188, 189, 209, 210, 213, 215.
1805. Nan-an (prefecture), 193 note 4.
1806. Nan-cheng (prefecture), 60, 60 note 4, 108, 117 note 2, 184, 184 note 1.
1807. Nan-k'ou, 39 note 2.
1808. Nan-luan (prefecture), 75, 75 note 1, 206, 217, 223.
827. Nan-yang (commandery), 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22-24, 26 note 3, 27-30, 40, 48, 50-52, 53 notes 1 and 7-8, 54-57, 71, 72, 77 note 4, 83, 87, 94, 97-99, 101, 124, 150-154, 156, 157, 186, 186 note 2, 188, 199, 202, 207, 209, 210, 213, 214, 231, 236, 237, 239, 240, 243, 253-255.
1809. Nan-yen (prefecture), 40 note 4, 53 note 3.
- Needham, J., 232 note 5.
1810. Nei-hiang (hien), 153 note 2.
1811. Nie-sang (commune), 139, 139 note 6.
1812. Nie-yang (prefecture), 153, 153 note 1.
829. Nine Ministers, 15-19, 20 note 1, 96, 123, 139.
1813. Ning (hien), 101 note 2, 171 note 1.
1814. Ning-hia (province), 61, 61 note 2, 110 note 2.
1815. Ning-yang (hien), 95 note 4, 139 note 5.
1816. niu (constellation), 237 note 3.
1817. Niu Han, 175, 230.
1818. nü (constellation), 237 note 3.
- Ordos, 110 note 2.
1819. O-t'ou Mountain, 156, 156 note 3.
1820. Pa,
 - a) commandery, 30 note 4, 60, 107, 108 note 2, 181, 189 notes 3-4.
 - b) hien, 189 note 3.
834. Pa-ling (prefecture), 101.
836. Palace Attendant, 95 note 5, 98, 144 note 2, 251.
1821. Palace [Attendant Within] the Yellow Gate, 49, 220.
837. Palace Commandant, 47 note 3.
1822. Palace Ladies, 51.
840. Pan Ku, 168 note 1, 184, 238.
841. Pan Piao, 110, 167, 168, 168 note 1, 184, 238.
1823. P'an Kien, 134 note 1.
1824. P'an-sü (Valley), 114 note 3, 115, 115 note 2, 170, 173.
844. P'ang An, 83, 96, 120.
1825. P'ang Meng, 144, 144 note 2, 145, 145 note 2, 146, 149, 150, 153, 201 note 1, 204 note 5, 211, 217, 229, 230.
1826. Pao-ki (hien), 160 note 3.
1827. Pao Si, 134 note 1, 152 note 3.
849. Pao Yung, 60, 84, 106, 109, 209.
850. Pei-hai (commandery), 58, 149 note 2.
1828. Pei River, 188.

851. Pei-ti (commandery), 101 note 2, 170, 171, 171 note 1, 178, 224.
852. P'ei,
a) commandery, 59, 132 note 1, 135, 135 note 6, 138 note 4, 140 notes 4 and 8.
b) hien, 139 note 6, 140 note 5.
853. P'ei T'ung, 44 note 4, 45 note 1, 64, 67, 67 note 5, 68, 68 note 3, 76 note 1, 122, 123, 231.
1829. P'eng-ch'eng (prefecture), 140, 140 note 7, 144, 146.
1830. P'eng Chu, 131.
854. P'eng Ch'ung, 38, 38 note 1, 39, 45 note 1, 65, 67 note 1, 71-73, 75, 78, 83, 122, 124-131, 139, 213, 215, 216, 219, 221, 229, 255.
1831. P'eng Hung, 38 note 1.
1832. P'eng-shan (hien), 192 note 5.
1833. P'eng Wu, 131.
Pharnabazus, 223.
1834. pi (constellation), 237 note 3.
1835. Pi-yang (prefecture), 53, 53 note 7.
1836. P'i (hien), 146 note 1.
1837. P'i (prefecture), 145, 145 note 6, 146.
1838. P'i (prefecture), 196, 196 note 5.
861. Pien (prefecture), 27 note 1.
866. P'ing, Emperor, 42, 42 note 2, 47 note 3, 177, 236, 245 note 3.
1839. P'ing-ch'eng Gate, 99.
1840. P'ing-hiang (hien), 74 note 2.
1841. P'ing-k'ü, 189, 191.
1842. P'ing-liang (hien), 115 notes 4-5, 172 note 1, 173 notes 3-4.
870. P'ing-shi (prefecture), 54, 151 note 6.
1843. P'ing-shou (prefecture), 149, 149 note 2.
1844. P'ing-yang (district), 191, 191 note 9.
1845. P'ing-yin (prefecture), 103-104, 104 note 1.
873. P'ing-yüan,
a) commandery, 45 note 1, 45 note 3, 80, 80 note 4, 128 note 5, 147 note 5.
b) prefecture, 128, 128 note 5, 131, 147.
1846. platoon, 203.
1847. Platoon Commander, 203, 205.
1848. Po (hien), 140 note 8.
1849. Po-hai (commandery), 131.
1850. Po-hiang (hien), 70 note 8.
1851. Po-hua (bandits), 151, 151 note 3.
1852. Po-jen (prefecture), 71, 71 note 1, 217.
1853. Po-ma Creek, 151, 151 note 5.
1854. Po-ma-ti, 108, 163, 180, 180 note 7.
1855. Po-shan (prefecture), 186 note 2.
1856. Po-shui,
a) hien, 99 note 6.
b) district, 237.
c) pass, 107, 107 note 5, 181.
d) prefecture, 107 note 5.
1857. Po Yi, 229.
877. P'o-yang Lake, 28 note 5, 48.
879. Prefect, 30, 84, 137, 176, 237.
880. Prefect of the Masters of Writing, 74, 74 note 1, 129 note 1, 130.
1858. Privy Treasurer, 209.
1859. Pu-ki (prefecture), 29, 29 note 3.
1860. P'u (hien), 128 note 3.
888. P'u-yang (prefecture), 40, 40 note 4, 83, 176 note 3.
890. Red Eyebrows, 12, 37 note 4, 40, 40 note 2, 41, 41 note 5, 47-50, 64, 79-84, 87-97, 99-102, 106, 109, 113-120, 149 note 1, 150, 159, 160, 163, 177 note, 3, 199, 213, 216, 218, 220, 221, 228, 230, 231, 247, 252, 253, 256.
1861. regiment, 203, 205.
1862. Regional Division, 38, 45 note 1.
1863. Regular Conscript, 207.
1864. Regular Palace Attendant, 36.
1865. Retinue, 49.
Rotours, R. Des, 35 note 8, 209 note 5.
1866. San fu huang t'u, 100 note 4.
895. San-shui (prefecture), 26, 26 note 2.
896. San-t'ai (hien), 191 note 9.
1867. Sang-chung, 176, 176 note 3.
Scipio Africanus, 223.
1868. shaman, 95, 95 note 1.
1869. Shan-sang (prefecture), 138 note 4.
1870. Shan-si (province), 45, 60, 77, 88, 109, 122, 159, 209.
1871. Shan-tu (prefecture), 156, 156 note 2, 222.
899. Shan-tung (province), 12, 29, 40, 40 note 2, 41, 41 note 5, 47, 58-60, 79-81, 90, 95, 113, 115, 121 note 3, 127, 132, 133, 135-137, 137 note 3, 149, 177, 177 note 3, 210, 213.
1872. Shan-yang (commandery), 37 note 4, 59, 84, 84 note 8, 86, 135 notes 5-6, 140 note 6, 144, 150 note 2, 224.
901. Shan-yü, 86, 127.
1873. Shang (commandery), 101, 159.
909. Shang,
a) hien, 24 note 4.
b) prefecture, 30 note 5.
1874. Shang-kiang (bandits), 80, 84.
906. Shang-k'iu (hien), 145 note 4.

907. Shang-ku (commandery), 39, 45 notes 1 and 5, 65, 65 note 5, 66, 67 note 1, 71—73, 77, 78, 126—128, 130, 130 note 3, 208, 224.
1875. Shang-kuei (prefecture), 175, 175 note 4, 176—178.
911. Shang-tang (commandery), 106, 209, 231.
1876. Shang-tung Gate, 105.
1877. She (prefecture), 151 note 6, 154.
1878. She-k'üan (agglomeration), 84, 84 note 4, 86, 87, 115 note 3, 217, 220, 221.
918. Shen K'in-han, 27 note 1, 41 note 3, 69 note 2, 73 note 2, 147 note 7, 148 note 3, 151 note 3, 156 note 3, 180 note 3, 184 note 5, 189 note 5, 191 note 9, 193 note 4.
1879. Shen River, 191 note 8, 193.
920. Shen-si (province), 60, 109, 122, 159, 159 note 5, 181.
923. Shen-t'u Kang, 231.
924. Shen-t'u Kien, 20, 31, 49, 52 note 1, 54, 97 note 3, 98, 99.
1880. Shen Yi, 44 note 1.
927. Shepherd, 25, 30, 35, 35 note 3, 36 note 2, 38, 41, 45 note 1, 59 note 3, 78, 79, 124, 137, 144 note 2, 157, 158, 158 note 2, 167, 183, 207 note 6.
1881. shī (constellation), 237 note 3.
1882. Shī (marquisate), 41 note 1, 95, 95 note 4.
1883. Shī (prefecture), 68, 68 note 5, 69.
1884. Shī Bridge, 194, 194 note 2, 196, 196 note 7.
1885. Shī-hiang (agglomeration), 102, 102 note 9.
1886. shī hing, 210.
930. Shī Shen, 42 note 7.
1887. Shock Cavalry, 206, 208.
1888. Shou (hien), 142 note 1.
1889. Shou-ch'un (prefecture), 129 note 1, 142, 142 note 1.
933. Shou-kuang (hien), 147 note 10.
1890. Shou-liang,
a) commandery, 36 note 2.
b) prefecture, 36 note 3.
935. Shu,
a) commandery, 30, 30 notes 1—2 and 4, 31, 48, 60, 64, 107, 167, 181, 182, 192 note 6, 196, 196 notes 4—5.
b) kingdom, 107 note 1.
1891. Shu (prefecture), 142, 142 note 2, 149.
1892. Shu-lu (hien), 68 note 5.
1893. Shun-yang (prefecture), 186, 186 note 2.
1894. Shuo-fang (province), 110, 163.
945. Si (prefecture), 154 note 3.
1895. Si (prefecture), 175, 175 note 5, 177, 178, 224.
1896. Si-an (prefecture), 148, 148 note 2, 222.
1897. Si-an Gate, 99 note 1.
1898. Si-ch'eng (prefecture), 186, 186 note 1.
941. Si-ch'uan (hien), 186 note 2.
1899. Si-fang, 140, 140 note 6, 143, 144.
1900. Si-ho (commandery), 101.
1901. Si Kuang, 47 note 3.
944. Si-men Kün-hui, 240—244.
1902. Si-p'ing (prefecture), 54, 54 note 1.
1903. Si Tso-ch'i, 26 note 5, 28 note 4.
947. Siang River, 48, 188.
1904. Siang-wu (prefecture), 180, 180 notes 3—4.
1905. Siang-yang,
a) hien, 27 note 1, 156 notes 2—3.
b) prefecture, 27 note 1.
1906. Siang yang ki, 26 note 5.
1907. Siang yang k'i kiu ki, 28 note 4.
1908. Siang-yi (prefecture), 53, 53 note 6, 133, 135 note 1.
950. Siao (prefecture), 56 note 1, 78, 78 note 1.
948. Siao-ch'ang-an (agglomeration), 11, 19, 154 note 2, 231 note 4.
1909. Siao-yüe-chī, 175.
1910. Sie Feng, 194 note 5.
954. Sie Han, 238.
1911. Sie Kung, 74, 74 note 1, 75, 77—79, 84—86, 144 note 2, 212, 221, 250.
955. Sie Lu, 84, 96, 100, 101, 120.
958. Sin (dynasty), 11 note 1.
1912. Sin-an (prefecture), 118, 118 note 1.
1913. Sin Ch'en, 156, 219.
1914. Sin-ch'eng (prefecture), 119, 119 note 1, 150 note 5.
1915. Sin-fan (hien), 196 note 4.
959. Sin-feng (prefecture), 98, 98 note 1, 99.
1916. Sin-ho (hien), 68 note 4.
1917. Sin-lo (hien), 69 note 4.
1918. Sin-shī (prefecture), 69, 69 note 4.
962. Sin-si (prefecture), 152.
964. Sin-tu,
a) kingdom and commandery, 45 notes 1 and 3, 68 note 7, 73—75, 122, 123.
b) prefecture, 67, 67 note 4, 68, 69, 74, 75, 77, 207, 215, 221, 228, 231, 232.
968. Sin-yang (hien), 158 note 1.
969. Sin-ye (prefecture), 27, 153, 153 notes 4—5.
1919. Siu-wu (hien), 84 note 8.
971. Six Venerable Ones, 250.

1920. Skilled Soldier, 207, 208, 210.
976. Southern Palace, 106.
1921. Staff of Authority, 35, 35 note 8, 37, 38, 56, 60, 61, 69 note 1, 75, 78, 88, 101 note 4, 123, 135, 137, 166, 175.
977. State General, 31.
978. State Master; cf. also Liu Hin, 240, 242—245.
1922. Su (clan of Ho prefecture), 70.
1923. Su (hien), 140 note 4.
982. Su Mao, 91, 92, 103, 103 note 1, 106, 134, 135, 135 note 1, 138, 140, 142—146, 149, 153, 211, 215, 217, 229, 230 note 1.
1924. Suan-tsoo (prefecture), 133, 133 note 5, 135 note 1.
1925. Suburban Sacrifice, 237.
983. Sui (dynasty), 48.
1926. Sui (hien), 53 note 6.
984. Sui (prefecture), 53, 53 note 8.
1927. Sui-ning (hien), 191 note 4.
987. Sui-yang (prefecture), 42, 132, 133, 135, 135 note 3, 137, 138, 138 note 3, 140, 145, 217, 225 note 1.
1928. Sun Hien, 237.
1929. Sun K'an, 218 note 5.
1930. Sun Mien, 41 note 3.
1931. Sun Teng, 14, 14 note 1, 159, 228, 229.
1932. Sung (feudal state), 140 note 6.
1933. Sung (hien), 87 note 8.
1934. Sung Kün, 207 note 6.
1935. Sung P'ei-wei, 244, 244 note 5, 245.
1936. Sung-tsi (prefecture), 65, 65 note 4, 69, 69 note 1, 73 note 2.
1000. Superintendent of the Imperial Household, 17—19, 205, 211.
1937. Supervisor of the Masters of Writing, 74 note 1.
1003. Supreme Duke Who Establishes the State, 16, 31 note 2, 32.
1004. Supreme Duke Who Perfects the State, 16, 21 note 1.
1005. Supreme General, 96, 110.
1938. Supreme General of the Western Provinces, 99, 110.
1939. sü (cyclical character), 106 note 4.
1008. Sü (province), 41, 59, 59 note 3, 135.
1009. Sü Süan, 84, 87, 92 note 2, 96, 120.
1011. Süan, Emperor, 26, 246, 247.
1013. Süan-p'ing Gate, 100 note 1.
1940. Sün-yi (prefecture), 101, 101 note 1, 170, 222.
1016. Sī-ch'uan (province), 31 note 1, 48, 60, 64, 86, 107 note 1, 108, 108 note 2, 109, 157, 161, 163, 164, 167 note 3, 169, 172, 177, 181—186, 188, 193, 206, 208, 212, 217, 219, 232, 238, 255.
1019. Sī-ma Ts'ien, 169.
1941. Sī-River, 145.
1942. Sī-shui (hien), 102 note 7.
1943. Ta-ch'eng (dynasty), 107 note 2.
1944. Ta-ts'iang (bandits), 79, 80, 83 note 1, 104, 212.
1945. Ta-t'ung (bandits), 79, 81, 84, 149 note 1.
1946. Ta-yao (prefecture), 101, 101 note 2.
1947. Ta-yung (bandits), 79 note 3.
1948. Tai (commandery), 77.
1949. t'ai-lao (sacrifice), 171.
1030. T'ai-shan (commandery), 41 note 2, 58, 95 note 4, 139, 139 note 4, 140, 140 note 1, 224.
1033. T'ai-yüan (commandery), 106, 109, 209.
1950. Tan-yang (commandery), 64, 142, 157 note 3, 209.
1951. T'an (district), 80, 80 note 2.
1952. T'an (prefecture), 141, 141 note 2, 142, 146, 149, 214.
1953. T'an-ch'eng (hien), 141 note 2.
1954. T'an-hiang (bandits), 80, 81 note 3, 121.
1955. Tang-t'u Kao, 247.
1037. Tang-yang (hien), 27 note 1.
1038. T'ang (dynasty), 48, 80 note 2, 134 note 2.
1039. T'ang-ho (hien), 53 note 7.
1956. T'ang-yang (prefecture), 68, 68 note 4, 221.
1957. T'ao (district), 145, 145 note 3, 217.
1958. Te-yang (hien), 192 note 2.
1046. Teng,
 - a) hien, 27 note 1.
 - b) prefecture, 27 note 1, 53, 156.
1044. Teng Ch'en, 22, 23, 29 note 8, 45 note 1, 153, 216, 240, 243, 245.
1045. Teng Feng, 153, 154, 211, 229, 230.
1959. Teng Lung, 122, 123, 126, 213, 221.
1047. Teng Ye, 56 note 4.
1048. Teng Yü, 62, 63, 70 note 4, 71, 88, 92, 94, 94 note 1, 99, 101, 101 note 4, 104, 110, 114, 114 note 7, 115, 117, 117 note 2, 118, 119, 202 note 8, 207, 213, 216, 217, 219—221, 231.
1960. T'eng (hien), 145 notes 6—7.
1049. Three Adjuncts, 45 note 4, 60, 88, 218.
1050. Three Dukes, 15—19, 123, 139.
1051. Thrice Venerable, 38, 91, 96, 199.

1052. Thrice Venerable of the State, 16, 97.
 1961. Ti-wu Lun, 218 note 5.
 1962. Ti-yi, 175 note 3.
 1963. T'i-k'ün Mountain, 248.
 481. Tibetans, 26, 110, 163, 163 note 10, 171, 173, 175, 180, 227 note 5.
 1964. T'ie-hing (bandits), 79, 84, 84 note 6.
 1965. Tien-kiang (prefecture), 189, 189 note 4.
 1966. T'ien Jung, 26 note 4, 28, 28 notes 3-4, 30, 48, 150, 156, 156 note 4, 157, 183-187, 189, 194, 215, 219, 229.
 1967. T'ien Li, 56 note 1, 87.
 1059. T'ien-shui,
 a) commandery, 24, 86, 99, 161-163, 164 note 4, 167, 168, 173 note 1, 178, 178 note 1, 179 notes 3-4, 180, 186, 224, 248 note 1.
 b) hien, 175 notes 4-5.
 1968. T'ien-tsing pass, 102, 106, 209.
 1969. Tiger Tallies, 209.
 1062. Tiger's Teeth General, 30.
 1970. Tiger's Teeth General-in-chief, 124 note 6, 200 (no. 8).
 1971. Ting (hien), 65 note 2.
 1066. Ting-t'ao,
 a) kingdom, 35 note 6.
 b) prefecture, 53.
 Ting, V. K., 24 note 4, 87 note 6, 102 note 6, 188 note 5, 173 note 3, 187 note 4.
 1972. Ting-yüan (prefecture), 189 note 5.
 Tjan Tjoe Som, 233 note 1, 234, 234 notes 1-3, 235 note 1, 244, 244 note 6, 245.
 1069. Tou (clan), 167 note 4.
 1973. tou (constellation), 237 note 3.
 1070. Tou Jung, 60, 61, 88, 110, 161, 163, 163 note 10, 164, 166-169, 171, 172, 175, 176, 179, 197, 203, 216, 229, 241, 244, 245.
 1974. Tou Ying, 169 note 4.
 1975. Towered Warships, 210.
 1073. Troops from P'ing-lin, 11, 12, 16, 17, 19, 94, 117 note 2, 199, 253, 256.
 1074. Troops from Sin-shi, 11, 12, 16, 19, 77 note 4, 94, 199, 256.
 1075. Troops from the Lower [Yang-tsai-] kiang, 11, 12, 17, 19, 20, 22, 22 note 1, 94, 144 note 2, 199, 256.
 1976. Ts'ai Shao-kung, 240, 243.
 1079. Ts'ai-yang (prefecture), 27 note 1.
 1977. Tsang-ko (commandery), 30 note 4, 109.
 1081. Tsang Kung, 188-191, 191 note 9, 192, 196, 196 note 6, 207-209, 216, 222, 232.
 1978. ts'ang t'ou, 131 note 1.
 1082. Ts'ang-wu (commandery), 158 note 2.
 1979. Ts'ao Hü, 37.
 1980. Ts'ao King, 37, 37 note 4, 56, 100.
 1088. Ts'en P'eng, 21, 35 notes 2 and 4, 105, 151, 151 note 6, 153, 154, 156, 157, 184, 188-192, 192 note 4, 193, 193 note 2, 194, 202, 204 note 3, 206, 207, 212, 214, 216-218, 222, 224, 227 note 2, 230.
 1981. Tsi (commandery), 58.
 1090. Tsi-mo (hien), 29 note 3.
 1982. Tsi-nan (commandery), 35 note 7, 41, 45 note 1, 58, 140, 147, 147 notes 4 and 6.
 1983. Tsi-ning (hien), 145 note 5.
 1984. Tsi-pei (kingdom), 95 note 4.
 1985. Tsi-p'ing (commandery, 35, 35 note 6, 37.
 1092. Tsi-yin (commandery), 35 note 6, 59, 176.
 1986. Tsi-yüan (hien), 92 note 3.
 1093. Ts'i,
 a) area, 95.
 b) commandery, 148 notes 1-2.
 c) kingdom, 137.
 1098. Ts'i,
 a) hamlet, 70.
 b) prefecture, 170, 173.
 1987. Ts'iao (prefecture), 140, 140 note 8.
 1102. Tsien Po-tsan, 114 note 7, 256.
 1988. Ts'ien Mu, 241.
 1107. Ts'ien Ta-chao, 26 note 2, 129 note 1, 193 note 4.
 1108. Ts'ien Ta-hin, 36 note 2, 47 note 3, 95 note 4.
 1989. Ts'ien-t'ang River, 48.
 1990. Ts'ien-ts'iu (commune), 104.
 1991. Tsin (district), 156, 157 note 1, 184, 186, 188.
 1110. Tsin (hien), 128 note 2.
 1992. Tsin-ch'eng (hien), 102 note 6.
 1113. Ts'in (dynasty), 168, 233.
 1114. Ts'in-an (hien), 173 note 1, 179 note 3.
 1993. Ts'in Feng, 26, 26 note 4, 28, 28 notes 1 and 3, 30, 33, 48, 90, 109, 150, 153, 155, 156, 156 note 4, 157, 184, 191 note 1, 222, 229, 230, 253, 255.
 1115. Ts'in-ling Range, 48, 60, 88, 109, 114, 150, 182-184, 196 note 6.
 1994. Ts'in-yang (hien), 84 note 4.
 1120. Ts'ing (province), 59, 135, 137.
 1119. Ts'ing-ho (commandery), 45 note 2.
 1121. Ts'ing-shui (prefecture), 179, 179 note 4.
 1995. Ts'ing-tu (bandits), 80, 84, 87, 121, 126, 126 note 5, 159 note 6.

1996. Tsiu-ts'üan (commandery), 25, 110 note 3.
1123. Tso-p'ing-yi, 45 notes 1 and 4, 99 notes 5—6, 99 note 7, 101 note 3, 117 note 2, 160 note 2, 170 note 1, 224.
1997. Tsou, 98, 98 note 1.
1128. Ts'ui Fa, 42 note 7.
1998. Tsun-kiang (commandery), 30.
1999. Tsung Ch'eng, 30, 31, 201 note 4.
2000. Tsung Kuang, 101, 101 note 4.
1130. Tsung Tiao, 20, 21 note 1, 54.
2001. Tsü-yang (prefecture), 65 note 5.
2002. Tsi-ch'uan (kingdom), 147 note 10.
2003. Tsi-chung (prefecture), 191, 191 note 5, 192 note 4.
2004. Tsi-kuei (prefecture), 157, 157 note 2, 189, 192 note 4.
2005. Tsi-lu On the City Wall (Yüan Tseng), 41, 41 note 5, 45 note 1, 68, 81.
2006. Tsi-mi, 131, 229.
2007. Tsi-tsün (Liu Hin's style), 240.
2008. Tsi-yang (hien), 80 note 2.
2009. Tsi-yang (hien), 191 note 5.
2010. Tsi-yang (Kung-sun Shu's style), 167.
1139. Tu Lin, 110, 167, 230.
1140. Tu-ling (prefecture), 117, 117 note 2, 160 note 5, 221.
1141. Tu Mao, 200 note 3.
1142. Tu Shi, 209, 211.
2011. Tu Wei, 75, 76.
2012. Tun-huang (commandery), 25, 110 note 3.
1151. Tung (commandery), 36, 36 note 2, 40, 40 note 4, 56 note 1, 80 note 3, 132, 176, 176 note 3, 177 note 2.
1152. Tung-hai,
 - a) commandery, 41 note 5, 53 note 5, 59, 115 note 3, 138 note 1, 141 notes 1—2, 145 notes 7—8, 146 notes 1 and 3.
 - b) hien, 59 note 1, 138 note 1, 146 note 3.
2013. Tung Hien,
 - a) 36.
 - b) 59, 90, 109, 132, 133, 135, 136, 138, 138 note 1, 139, 140, 142—147, 149, 150, 204 note 5, 214, 217, 219, 229, 253, 255.
2014. Tung Hin, 153, 154.
1160. Tung-lai (commandery), 41, 45 note 1, 58, 137.
2015. Tung-lien (bandits), 79 note 5.
1162. Tung-p'ing (commandery and kingdom), 41 note 5, 137, 140, 145, 145 note 5.
2016. Tung Ts'i-chung, 80, 81 note 3.
2017. Tung-tu Gate, 100.
2018. Tung-yang (agglomeration), 154, 154 note 5, 155.
2019. T'ung (hien), 130 note 4.
2020. T'ung-ch'uan chou, 191 note 9.
2021. T'ung kien k'ao yi, 129 note 1.
2022. T'ung-ma (bandits), 79, 83, 84, 159 notes 4 and 6, 208, 217, 230, 232.
2023. T'ung-po (hien), 151 note 7.
2024. T'ung-shan (hien), 140 note 7.
2025. Utsunomiya, Kiuoyoshi, 100 note 4.
2026. Wa (commune), 173, 173 note 4. Waley, A., 95 note 1.
1170. Wan (prefecture), 11, 15, 16 note 3, 20, 21, 21 note 5, 24 note 3, 31, 32, 32 note 9, 39 note 1, 53, 56, 84, 97, 153, 153 note 7, 154, 154 note 2, 210, 213, 240, 243 note 5.
1171. Wan Siu, 73, 227 note 4.
2027. Wang (district), 76 note 1.
1175. Wang Ch'ang (Wang Lang), 14, 48, 62—69, 69 note 1, 70—72, 72 note 1, 74—77, 83, 121, 122, 124—126, 144 note 2, 201 note 4, 206—208, 216, 228, 230, 231, 237, 238, 250, 251, 253.
1176. Wang Ch'ang, 17, 18, 18 note 1, 19, 21, 21 note 1, 22 note 1, 53, 54, 102, 220, 227 note 4.
1179. Wang Chung, 64.
1180. Wang Feng, 16, 18, 19, 21 note 1, 53, 102.
2028. Wang Hiang, 25 note 4, 36, 43 note 2.
2029. Wang Hung, 36, 36 notes 2 and 6, 44 note 4, 58, 59, 139, 139 note 1, 149.
2030. Wang K'in, 44 note 4.
1184. Wang K'uang, 235.
1185. Wang K'uang,
 - a) 16, 18, 19, 32, 53, 60, 92, 97, 99, 101, 102.
 - b) 31, 32, 42 note 7.
1186. Wang Lang, see 1175. Wang Ch'ang.
1187. Wang Liang, 76 note 1, 104, 124 note 5, 204 note 5, 224, 237.
1189. Wang Lin, 42 note 7.
1191. Wang Mang, 11—13, 15, 16 note 3, 20, 25, 25 notes 3—4, 28—36, 38—43, 47 note 3, 50, 51, 60, 61, 64, 65, 70 note 5, 81, 91, 95, 100, 100 note 4, 119, 132, 157, 161, 163, 168, 181, 198, 201, 201 note 3, 207 note 6, 231—236, 237 note 2, 238—244, 246, 248—251, 253, 255.
2031. Wang ming lun, 168, 168 note 1.
1195. Wang Pa, 72, 76 note 1, 142, 203 note 3, 220, 224.

1196. Wang She, 240.
1197. Wang Sien-k'ien, 29 note 1, 69 note 4, 140 note 6, 173 note 3, 180 note 3, 184 note 5.
2032. Wang Sün, 25 note 4, 42 note 5.
2033. Wang T'an, 25 note 4, 36.
2034. Wang T'iao, 47 note 3, 112, 158.
2035. Wang Ts'en, 30 notes 5—6.
1203. Wang Tsie, 166 note 1.
1204. Wang Tsun, 172, 175, 230.
1207. Wang Wu, 42 note 7.
2036. Wang Yen, 42 note 7.
1209. Wang Yi, 42 note 5.
1210. Wang Yü, 42 note 2.
Wang Yü-ch'üan, 32 note 7.
2037. Wang Yüan, 166 note 1, 175, 177, 178, 180, 189, 189 note 7, 191, 232.
1215. Wei (clan), 180.
1216. Wei,
a) feudal state, 237.
b) clan, 26, 42 note 2.
1213. Wei (commandery), 37, 37 note 2, 62 note 1, 224, 235.
2038. wei (constellation), 237 note 3.
2039. Wei (hien), 149 note 2.
1217. Wei Ao, 24—26, 30, 31, 36, 43, 44, 48, 50, 58, 59, 77, 86, 87, 87 note 1, 88, 91, 97, 97 note 3, 98, 99, 101 note 4, 109, 110 note 2, 113, 115, 115 note 2, 158, 161—178, 180 note 7, 183—187, 189, 198, 202, 210, 213, 215, 216, 219, 222, 224, 229—232, 247, 248, 253, 255.
2040. Wei Ch'un, 178, 180, 180 note 2.
1219. Wei Hung, 207.
2041. Wei Mao, 180 note 7.
1225. Wei River, 99, 117 note 2, 118, 159.
2042. Wei Sün, 166, 171, 175.
2042. Wei Sün, 166, 171, 175.
1227. Wei Ts'ui, 24, 58, 86.
1229. Wei-yang Palace, 51.
1230. Wei Yi, 24, 58, 86.
1235. Wen, Emperor, 42, 61, 162, 167 note 4.
2043. Wen (prefecture), 103, 103 note 2, 221.
2044. Wen-ming Hall, 78.
2045. Wen Ts'i, 44 note 5.
2046. Wen-yang (prefecture), 139, 139 note 5.
2047. White Tiger Duke, 87.
Wilbur, C. M., 131 note 1.
2048. Winter Sacrifice, 106, 253.
2049. Wu (prefecture), 186 note 3, 187, 187 note 3.
2050. Wu-chi (hien), 102 note 4.
2051. Wu-chi (prefecture), 115, 115 note 4, 173 note 4.
1246. Wu, Emperor, 26, 61 note 2, 110, 155, 162, 219 note 5.
2052. Wu-fan (bandits), 80, 83 note 1, 84, 84 note 6, 104, 159 note 4, 212.
2053. Wu Gate, 248.
1247. Wu Han, 38, 38 note 2, 71, 72, 76 note 1, 79, 86, 104, 119, 124 notes 5—6, 128, 131, 140, 147, 149, 150, 153, 153 note 7, 154, 175, 178, 188, 189, 193, 193 note 3, 194—197, 205 note 2, 206—208, 210—214, 218, 221, 223, 227 note 1, 232.
2054. Wu-hiao (bandits), 80, 83, 104, 121, 126, 128, 128 note 4, 142, 145, 146, 146 note 2, 149, 206, 217.
1249. Wu-huan, 206.
2055. Wu-ki (hien), 69 note 3.
2056. Wu-k'i (agglomeration), 180, 180 note 3.
1254. Wu-ling (commandery), 158 note 2, 188, 207 note 6, 209, 210.
2057. Wu-lou (bandits), 80, 121.
1255. Wu-lü (commune), 67.
1256. Wu pass, 24, 32, 87, 154 note 3.
2058. Wu Po, 87, 102, 102 note 9, 103.
2059. Wu River, 192 note 4.
2060. Wu-shan (hien), 187 note 3.
2061. Wu-she Ford, 103 note 1.
2062. Wu-sheng (hien), 189 note 5.
2063. Wu-tu (commandery), 25, 109, 163, 180, 180 note 7, 189 note 6, 191.
1257. Wu-wang, 187.
1258. Wu-wei (commandery), 25, 110, 110 note 3.
1259. Wu-yang (prefecture), 151 note 6.
2064. Wu-yang (prefecture), 192, 192 notes 4—5, 193, 193 note 2, 194 note 1, 206.
1261. Wu-yin (prefecture), 53, 87.
Xenophon, 223.
2065. Ya (prefecture), 99, 99 note 6.
1271. Yang (province), 35.
2066. Yang-hiang (prefecture), 130, 130 note 2.
1272. Yang-ti (prefecture), 23, 23 note 2, 84, 151 note 8.
1273. Yang-ts'i River, 28 note 5, 29, 47, 48, 64, 88, 90, 108, 109, 133, 135, 137 note 2, 150, 157, 157 note 3, 168, 184, 186, 187, 187 note 4, 188, 192, 192 note 4, 193, 197, 206, 210.
1275. Yang Yin, 84, 96, 120.
1277. Yao K'i, 69, 70 notes 4 and 7, 78 note 2, 212, 217, 224, 226 note 2.
2067. Yao Mountain, 118.

2068. Yao-shan (hien), 71 note 1.
 2069. Yao Wei, 35 note 4.
 2070. Ye (prefecture), 62, 62 note 1, 84, 86, 212, 221.
 2071. Ye Valley, 196 note 6.
 1279. Ye-wang (prefecture), 84 note 4, 237.
 2072. Yellow Lord, 236, 246, 246 note 5.
 1281. Yellow River, 12, 28 note 5, 30, 35, 37, 40, 41 note 5, 45, 48, 49, 56, 59—62, 64, 68, 78—81, 81 note 3, 83, 84, 87, 88—92, 102, 103, 103 note 1, 109, 110, 110 note 2, 115 note 2, 118, 119, 121, 126, 128, 132, 134, 135 note 7, 142, 142 note 3, 147, 151 note 5, 159 note 5, 161, 163, 166, 168, 171, 176, 177, 177 note 3, 227, 247, 250, 253, 256.
 2073. Yellow Rocks, 191, 192, 192 note 4.
 2074. Yen,
 a) kingdom, 129.
 b) prefecture, 40 note 4, 53, 53 note 3.
 1286. Yen (prefecture), 54, 152, 213, 214.
 1287. Yen (province), 36 note 2.
 1282. Yen-ch'eng (hien), 152 note 2.
 1288. Yen Shi-ku, 240.
 1289. Yen Shuo, 21 note 5.
 2075. Yen-sin (bandits), 151, 151 note 2.
 2076. Yen Sün, 73.
 2077. Yen Ts'en, 26, 26 note 4, 30, 33, 117, 117 note 2, 154, 154 note 3, 155—157, 160 note 5, 183, 186, 187, 191, 191 note 1, 193, 196, 196 note 7, 197, 221, 221 note 5, 229, 230.
 2078. Yen-tsin (hien), 40 note 4, 133 note 5.
 1291. Yen Yu, 29, 33.
 1292. Yi (barbarians), 61 note 2.
 2079. Yi (hien), 53 note 5, 141 note 1, 145 note 8.
 2080. Yi (province), 30, 30 note 4, 31, 86, 167, 181.
 2081. Yi-ch'ang (hien), 28 note 2.
 2082. Yi-ch'eng,
 a) hien, 26 note 6, 27 note 1.
 b) prefecture, 27 note 1, 53.
 2083. Yi-chou (commandery), 30 note 4, 109, 202.
 Yi king, see Book of Changes.
 2084. Yi-k'ü (prefecture), 171, 171 note 1.
 2085. Yi-ling (prefecture), 28, 28 note 2, 156, 157, 184, 186, 187, 187 note 4.
 2086. Yi-tao (prefecture), 184, 184 note 6, 186, 187.
 2087. Yi-tu (hien), 184 note 6.
 2088. Yi-yang (prefecture), 118, 118 note 2, 119, 120, 151 note 5.
 1306. Yin Min, 238.
 2089. Yin-p'an (prefecture), 172, 172 note 2.
 2090. Yin-p'ing (prefecture), 53, 53 note 5.
 2091. Yin Tsun, 54, 152 note 1.
 2092. Ying (district), 76 note 1.
 2093. Ying (prefecture), 140, 140 note 1.
 1310. Ying-ch'uan (commandery), 20, 23, 35, 40, 54 note 2, 60, 84 note 1, 151 notes 6 and 8, 176, 176 notes 2 and 5, 177 note 2, 211, 215.
 2094. Ying Shao, 207, 208, 237 note 2, 240, 241, 244.
 2095. Ying-shu (Liu Hin's style), 240.
 1311. Ying-yang (prefecture), 22, 23, 33, 76 note 1.
 2096. Ying-yin (prefecture), 54, 54 note 2.
 1312. Young Prince, see Liu Ying.
 1315. Yu (province), 78, 79, 124, 126, 130, 208.
 1313. Yu-fu-feng, 45 note 4, 101 note 1, 115 note 1, 117 note 1, 160, 160 notes 2—3, 164, 170 note 1, 182 note 3.
 2097. Yu-lai (bandits), 79—81, 83 note 1, 84, 86, 104, 159 note 6, 212.
 1314. Yu-lai Mountain, 79.
 2098. Yu-pei-p'ing (commandery), 126, 127.
 2099. Yung,
 a) province, 25, 25 note 3.
 b) district, 40, 40 note 4, 83.
 2100. Yung-ho (hien), 99 note 4.
 2101. Yung-pu, 30, 30 note 4.
 1318. Yung-yang,
 a) hien, 23 note 1.
 b) prefecture, 105, 105 notes 4—5, 176.
 2102. Yü (prefecture), 135, 135 note 4.
 2103. Yü-chang (commandery), 29, 60, 106, 158 note 2.
 1320. Yü-ch'eng,
 a) hien, 135 note 4.
 b) prefecture, 134 note 2.
 2104. Yü-ch'eng (hien), 147 note 7.
 2105. Yü-fou Ford, 193, 193 notes 3—4.
 2106. Yü-fu (prefecture), 108 note 2.
 2107. Yü-k'i Ford, 193 note 4.
 1328. Yü River, 15.
 2108. Yü-t'ai (hien), 135 note 5, 150 note 2.
 1331. Yü-yang (commandery), 38 notes 1—2, 39, 45 notes 1 and 5, 65, 66, 67 note 1, 71, 75, 78, 83, 124—128, 130 note 4, 131, 208.

1332. Yü-yang (prefecture), 153, 154, 154 notes 2 and 5.
2109. Yü-yi (prefecture), 114 note 3, 117, 117 note 1.
1335. Yüan, Emperor, 95, 237.
2110. Yüan River, 191 note 8.
2111. Yüan-shi (prefecture), 53, 53 note 2, 69, 123.
2112. Yüan Shu, 247 note 2.
2113. Yüan Tseng, see Tai-lu On the City Wall.
2114. Yüe-hi (commandery), 30 note 4, 60, 90, 107, 181, 193.
2115. Yün-nan (province), 48, 86, 107 note 1, 109, 157, 202.
1344. Yün-tu (prefecture), 207 note 6.
2116. Yün-yang (prefecture), 101, 101 note 3, 114, 114 note 7, 117, 117 note 2. Zama-Narragara, 223.

CORRIGENDA TO VOLUME I

- 15¹⁰, for 25th year read 22nd year.
 15¹¹, for 24th of January read 23rd of January
 19³⁰, delete the hyphen in *K'ao-cheng*.
 48¹, for Wei ki read Wei shu.
 51 note 3, for identification read emplacement.
 75 note 1 and 77 note 4, for Ye read She.
 76³⁰, for regiments and companies read divisions and regiments.
 99³⁰, for (1A: 1b) read (1A: 2a).
 99³¹, for (1A: 2b) read (1A: 2b-3a).
 112 note 1, for (died \pm 25 A. D.) read (died A. D. 56).
 115¹, for mad read made.
 116³⁵, for outmanoeuvred read outmanoeuvred.
 116³⁵, for groups was read groups were.
 128⁵, for (11,41: 2b) read (11,41: 2b-3a).
 128⁵, for great-grandson of Li T'ung's great-grandfather's brother read son of Li T'ung's father's brother.
 142 note 1, for scetched read sketched.
 144¹, for Sargents read Sargent.
 151³⁵ and 196 no. 877, for Po-yang Lake read P'o-yang Lake.
 163³⁵, for 26 read 25/26. After Liu Yung insert Sun Teng: ascended in 26.
 164⁶, for The Empress, née Chao, exchanged this child for another baby boy. read This child was exchanged for another baby boy.
 164¹⁷, for two read three.
 164³¹, add the sentence Nothing is known about Sun Teng.
 164³⁵, for ten read eleven.
 186 no. 491, for k'ien hing read k'ien-hing.
 193 no. 777, for note 8 read notes 6 and 8.
 194 no. 783, for 55 read 51.
 196 no. 869, for note 4 read note 5.
 196 no. 888, for 143 read 147.
 200 no. 1032, for t'ai shi read t'ai-shi.
 204 no. 1155, delete the entire text and read Tung Hien,
 a) 158.
 b) 62.
 c) 139-140.
 205 no. 1135, delete the Chinese characters. For the correct characters see no. 2010 of the index to vol. II.
 206 no. 1235, delete the entire text and read. Wen, Emperor,
 a) (179-157), 124, 158, appendix no. 3.
 b) (424-453), 15.
 Map 4, for Ying-ch'uan read Ying-yang.
 Map 8, for Ku-t'ien Yi read Kua-t'ien Yi.

1345.佐史 1346.行河西五郡大將軍事 1347.安城 1348.安康 1349.安陽 1350.安邑 1351.譙緯 1352.武庫 1353.執金吾
 1354.大樹將軍 1355.易 1356.豪傑 1357.軍候 1358.騎士 1359.丈
 1360.張豐 1361.章邱 1362.長貴 1363.張滿 1364.章炳麟 1365.張
 參 1366.昌成 1367.長葛 1368.常璩 1369.長樂宮 1370.昌
 慮 1371.昌平 1372.常山 1373.長社 1374.長信宮 1375.長清
 1376.長武 1377.長陽 1378.昌意 1379.昌邑 1380.趙閔 1381.趙綱
 1382.召陵 1383.趙萌 1384.趙永 1385.朝那 1386.朝陽 1387.外屬
 團 1388.堵 1389.堵陽 1390.甄尋 1391.鎮原 1392.陳僑 1393.陳
 槃 1394.陳定 1395.陳倉 1396.陳遵 1397.陳襄 1398.鄭 1399.正
 定 1400.正陽 1401.成 1402.成安 1403.成阜 1404.成郎水 1405.
 成都江 1406.城陽 1407.徵 1408.荏平 1409.治亭 1410.長史
 1411.將兵長史 1412.尉馬都尉 1413.騎都尉 1414.周承休
 1415.周緯 1416.雒 1417.諸葛禪 1418.祝阿 1419.筑陽 1420.尉城
 門 1421.楚黎 1422.猛腰 1423.垂惠 1424.淳化 1425.鍾城 1426.
 重連 1427.中盧 1428.中牟 1429.中沮廬 1430.重慶 1431.胡
 騎校尉 1432.衛尉 1433.左大司馬 1434.右大司馬 1435.
 前大司馬 1436.護軍 1437.護軍都尉 1438.曲 1439.貨泉 1440.
 敢死 1441.功曹 1442.安定屬國 1443.三水屬國 1444.卒
 正 1445.領軍 1446.靈臺 1447.營 1448.奔命(兵) 1449.寶后 1450.
 陰后 1451.侍詔 1452.范 1453.繁 1454.樊重 1455.方城 1456.防
 邑 1457.房山 1458.房子 1459.防東 1460.方陽 1461.方輿 1462.
 肥城 1463.肥桑 1464.汾陰 1465.馮 1466.封丘 1467.奉節 1468.
 馮駿 1469.魚門 1470.五行 1471.五宗 1472.五銖 1473.浹

1474. 涪陵 1475. 涪水 1476. 阜陽 1477. 鰲魚 1478. 伏羌 1479. 富平
1480. 復陽 1481. 列侯 1482. 護軍將軍 1483. 積射將軍 1484. 積
弩將軍 1485. 越騎將軍 1486. 驍騎將軍 1487. 彊弩將軍
1488. 羽林中郎將 1489. 虎賁中郎將 1490. 左將軍 1491. 左
中郎將 1492. 武鋒將軍 1493. 孟津將軍 1494. 右將軍 1495.
右中郎將 1496. 前將軍 1497. 赤眉將軍 1498. 威寇將軍
1499. 威虜將軍 1500. 厭新將軍 1501. 定漢將軍 1502. 討虜
將軍 1503. 振威將軍 1504. 漢忠將軍 1505. 武威將軍 1506.
鎮遠將軍 1507. 揚化將軍 1508. 揚武將軍 1509. 平敵將
軍 1510. 平狄將軍 1511. 通路將軍 1512. 成漢將軍 1513. 宣
德將軍 1514. 誅虜將軍 1515. 復漢將軍 1516. 破姦將軍
1517. 游擊將軍 1518. 捕虜將軍 1519. 征虜將軍 1520. 輔漢
將軍 1521. 輔威將軍 1522. 黎丘大將軍 1523. 彊弩大將
軍 1524. 西州大將軍 1525. 水衡大將軍 1526. 就漢大將
軍 1527. 建威大將軍 1528. 建義大將軍 1529. 無上大將
軍 1530. 柱天大將軍 1531. 破虜大將軍 1532. 翼漢大將
軍 1533. 征南大將軍 1534. 征西大將軍 1535. 輔漢大將
軍 1536. 埽地大將軍 1537. 橫野大將軍 1538. 太尉 1539. 太
中大夫 1540. 太倉 1541. 衛士 1542. 海西 1543. 韓湛 1544. 漢昌
1545. 韓城 1546. 韓福 1547. 漢復 1548. 韓鴻 1549. 漢舊儀 1550. 漢
官儀 1551. 外戚世家 1552. 夏 1553. 夏賀良 1554. 下邳 1555. 下
辯 1556. 夏陽 1557. 咸門 1558. 軒轅 1559. 杏 1560. 鄣 1561. 和成
1562. 和城門 1563. 河池 1564. 合川 1565. 和戎 1566. 河東 1567. 家
丞 1568. 侯丹 1569. 鄆 1570. 湖陵 1571. 虎牙山 1572. 胡殷 1573. 華

1574. 畫中 1575. 華陽 1576. 懷 1577. 懷來 1578. 淮南 1579. 桓溫 1580. 黃
 郵 1581. 徽 1582. 國溪 1583. 惠民 1584. 百官志 1585. 鴻門 1586. 洪順
 值 1587. 獲鹿 1588. 獲索 1589. 霍陽 1590. 盧 1591. 玄武 1592. 獲 1593.
 熱河 1594. 任城 1595. 任貴 1596. 任滿 1597. 若 1598. 弱開 1599. 汝章
 1600. 少傅 1601. 汝陰 1602. 甘忠可 1603. 甘肅 1604. 穀檢 1605. 剛卯
 1606. 婁 1607. 婁城 1608. 蕪城 1609. 婁城縣志 1610. 高恩 1611. 高滿
 1612. 高胡 1613. 高陵 1614. 高密 1615. 高平 1616. 高午 1617. 高邑 1618.
 耿艾 1619. 耿植 1620. 耿訢 1621. 邕 1622. 葵 1623. 己亥 1624. 雞頭山
 1625. 洪 1626. 斷 1627. 洪國 1628. 郊 1629. 夾江 1630. 賈萌 1631. 江州 1632.
 江陵 1633. 江(杆, 捍)關 1634. 交 1635. 交趾 1636. 佼彊 1637. 解 1638. 街
 泉 1639. 建世 1640. 建子門 1641. 建陽 1642. 黔陵 1643. 金城 1644. 金
 鄉 1645. 金門山 1646. 金丹 1647. 京 1648. 荆郢 1649. 荆門山 1650. 立
 威王 1651. 臨江王 1652. 朔寧王 1653. 西平王 1654. 周成王
 1655. 徑陽 1656. 慶吾 1657. 九江 1658. 九卿將軍 1659. 邛殺 1660.
 邛崃 1661. 國安 1662. 谷口 1663. 谷恭 1664. 苦陘 1665. 枯槎山
 1666. 關 1667. 光化 1668. 廣陵 1669. 廣阿 1670. 廣平 1671. 廣西 1672.
 廣都 1673. 貴州 1674. 桂弘 1675. 桂官 1676. 桂江 1677. 桂陽 1678.
 昆明池 1679. 鞏 1680. 龔丘 1681. 弓林 1682. 公孫 1683. 公孫恢
 1684. 公孫光 1685. 郭 1686. 郭聖通 1687. 劇 1688. 亘里 1689. 居延
 1690. 居庸關 1691. 軍都 1692. 駒 1693. 曲阜 1694. 曲陽 1695. 夫人
 1696. 韓夫人 1697. 萊蕪 1698. 蘭陵 1699. 來江 1700. 里 1701. 鄺 1702.
 歷城 1703. 利成 1704. 利城門 1705. 歷下 1706. 李熊 1707. 黎丘
 1708. 李立 1709. 李陵 1710. 歷山 1711. 李實 1712. 李勢 1713. 離 1714.
 涼 1715. 良鄉 1716. 梁驤 1717. 遼寧 1718. 遼東 1719. 左丞相

1720.輕 車 1721.林 1722.臨 漳 1723.臨 汝 1724.臨 涇 1725.鹿 丘 1726.
 臨 邛 1727.臨 平 1728.臨 晉 1729.臨 沮 1730.靈 寶 1731.留 1732.六
 安 1733.劉 意 1734.劉 興 1735.劉 賀 1736.劉 翻 1737.劉 林 1738.劉
 邦 1739.劉 少 公 1740.劉 德 (得) 1741.劉 次 卿 1742.雄 1743.羅 振 玉
 1744.洛 城 門 1745.樂 浪 1746.落 門 1747.洛 寧 1748.樂 陽 1749.魯
 1750.盧 1751.潞 1752.陸 渾 關 1753.路 潤 1754.盧 奴 1755.龍 興 1756.
 隆 平 1757.隴 西 1758.隴 右 1759.呂 館 1760.略 陽 1761.馬 龍 1762.
 馬 員 1763.軍 司 馬 1764.蠻 1765.蠻 中 1766.務 1767.魏 其 侯 1768.
 助、國 侯 1769.歸 德 侯 1770.銅 羌 侯 1771.奉 義 侯 1772.興 義
 侯 1773.興 德 侯 1774.建 信 侯 1775.建 忠 侯 1776.建 功 侯 1777.
 建 策 侯 1778.長 威 侯 1779.造 義 侯 1780.勇 功 侯 1781.忠 節
 侯 1782.武 成 侯 1783.武 義 侯 1784.武 固 侯 1785.武 信 侯 1786.
 不 義 侯 1787.柱 功 侯 1788.知 命 侯 1789.廣 漢 侯 1790.承 義
 侯 1791.輔 漢 侯 1792.尚 書 1793.府 1794.枚 根 1795.太 子 舍 人
 1796.孟 1797.蒙 1798.蒙 城 1799.孟 津 1800.孟 津 1801.綿 1802.縣 竹
 1803.涇 池 1804.醴 池 1805.南 安 1806.南 鄭 1807.南 口 1808.南 絲
 1809.南 燕 1810.內 鄉 1811.晉 桑 1812.洹 陽 1813.寧 1814.寧 夏 1815.
 寧 陽 1816.牛 1817.牛 邯 1818.女 1819.阿 頭 山 1820.巴 1821.中 黃
 門 1822.宮 女 1823.潘 塞 1824.潘 須 1825.雁 萌 1826.寶 雞 1827.暴
 汎 1828.北 江 1829.彭 城 1830.彭 殊 1831.彭 安 1832.彭 山 1833.彭
 午 1834.璧 1835.比 陽 1836.邳 1837.蕃 1838.邾 1839.平 城 門 1840.平
 鄉 1841.平 曲 1842.平 涼 1843.平 壽 1844.平 陽 1845.平 陰 1846.屯
 1847.屯 長 1848.屯 1849.渤海 1850.柏 鄉 1851.柏 華 1852.柏 人 1853.
 白 馬 溪 1854.白 馬 氏 1855.博 山 1856.白 水 1857.帛 意 1858.少

府 1859. 不 其 1860. 濮 1861. 部 1862. 部 1863. 正 卒 1864. 中 常 侍 1865.
從 官 1866. 三 輔 黃 圖 1867. 桑 中 1868. 巫 1869. 山 桑 1870. 山 西
1871. 山 都 1872. 山 陽 1873. 上 1874. 上 江 1875. 上 邳 1876. 上 東 門
1877. 葉 1878. 射 犬 1879. 沈 水 1880. 沈 意 1881. 室 1882. 式 1883. 黃 1884.
市 橋 1885. 士 鄉 1886. 弛 刑 1887. 突 騎 1888. 壽 1889. 壽 春 1890. 壽
良 1891. 舒 1892. 東 鹿 1893. 順 陽 1894. 朔 方 1895. 西 1896. 西 安 1897.
西 安 門 1898. 西 城 1899. 西 防 1900. 西 河 1901. 錫 光 1902. 西 平
1903. 習 鑿 齒 1904. 襄 武 1905. 襄 陽 1906. 襄 陽 記 1907. 襄 陽 耆
舊 記 1908. 襄 邑 1909. 小 月 氏 1910. 謝 豐 1911. 謝 躬 1912. 新 安
1913. 辛 臣 1914. 新 城 1915. 新 繁 1916. 新 河 1917. 新 樂 1918. 新 市
1919. 修 武 1920. 材 官 1921. 持 節 1922. 蘇 1923. 宿 1924. 醴 棗 1925. 郊
祀 1926. 睢 1927. 遂 寧 1928. 孫 威 1929. 孫 堪 1930. 孫 愐 1931. 孫 登
1932. 宋 1933. 嵩 1934. 宋 均 1935. 宋 佩 韋 1936. 宋 子 1937. 尚 書 僕
射 1938. 西 州 上 將 軍 1939. 戊 1940. 柁 邑 1941. 泗 水 1942. 汜 水 1943.
大 成 1944. 大 槍 1945. 大 彤 1946. 大 要 1947. 大 彤 1948. 代 1949. 太
牢 1950. 丹 陽 1951. 檀 1952. 郊 1953. 郊 城 1954. 檀 鄉 1955. 當 塗 高
1956. 堂 陽 1957. 桃 1958. 德 陽 1959. 鄧 隆 1960. 滕 1961. 第 五 倫 1962.
第 一 1963. 經 群 1964. 鐵 歷 1965. 塋 江 1966. 田 戎 1967. 田 立 1968.
天 井 關 1969. 虎 符 1970. 虎 牙 大 將 軍 1971. 定 1972. 定 遠 1973.
斗 1974. 寶 嬰 1975. 樓 船 1976. 蔡 少 公 1977. 泔 柯 1978. 蒼 頭 1979.
曹 翽 1980. 曹 竟 1981. 濟 1982. 濟 南 1983. 濟 寧 1984. 濟 北 1985. 濟
平 1986. 濟 源 1987. 譙 1988. 錢 穆 1989. 錢 塘 江 1990. 千 秋 1991. 津
1992. 晉 城 1993. 秦 豐 1994. 沁 陽 1995. 青 懷 1996. 酒 泉 1997. 掖 1998.
遼 江 1999. 宗 成 2000. 宗 廣 2001. 沮 陽 2002. 留 川 2003. 資 中 2004.

秣 歸 2005. 城 頭 子 路 2006. 子 密 2007. 子 駿 2008. 滋 2009. 資 陽
 2010. 子 陽 2011. 杜 威 2012. 敦 煌 2013. 董 憲 2014. 董 訢 2015. 董 連
 2016. 董 次 仲 2017. 東 都 門 2018. 東 陽 2019. 通 2020. 遼 川 州 2021.
 通 鑑 考 異 2022. 銅 馬 2023. 桐 柏 2024. 銅 山 2025. 宇 都 宮 清
 吉 2026. 瓦 2027. 王 2028. 王 向 2029. 王 閔 2030. 王 欽 2031. 王 命 齡
 2032. 王 旬 2033. 王 譚 2034. 王 調 2035. 王 岑 2036. 王 延 2037. 王 元
 2038. 危 2039. 淮 2040. 隗 純 2041. 隗 茂 2042. 隗 恂 2043. 溫 2044. 溫 明
 殿 2045. 文 齊 2046. 文 陽 2047. 白 虎 公 2048. 臘 2049. 巫 2050. 武 陟
 2051. 烏 氏 2052. 五 幡 2053. 吳 門 2054. 五 校 2055. 無 極 2056. 五 谿
 2057. 五 樓 2058. 武 勃 2059. 烏 江 2060. 巫 山 2061. 五 社 津 2062. 武
 勝 2063. 武 都 2064. 武 陽 2065. 衛 2066. 陽 鄉 2067. 嶠 山 2068. 堯 山
 2069. 橋 2070. 鄴 2071. 斜 谷 2072. 黃 帝 2073. 黃 石 2074. 燕 2075. 厭 新
 2076. 嚴 宣 2077. 延 岑 2078. 延 津 2079. 嶧 2080. 益 2081. 宜 昌 2082. 宜
 城 2083. 益 州 2084. 義 渠 2085. 夷 陵 2086. 夷 道 2087. 宜 都 2088. 宜
 陽 2089. 陰 榮 2090. 陰 平 2091. 尹 遵 2092. 應 2093. 贏 2094. 應 劭 2095.
 顯 叔 2096. 顯 陰 2097. 尤 來 2098. 右 北 平 2099. 雍 2100. 榮 河 2101.
 庸 部 2102. 虞 2103. 豫 章 2104. 禹 城 2105. 魚 濤 津 2106. 魚 復 2107.
 魚 泣 津 2108. 魚 臺 2109. 郁 夷 2110. 沅 2111. 元 氏 2112. 袁 術 2113.
 爰 曾 2114. 越 嶺 2115. 雲 南 2116. 雲 陽

MARGINALIA ON SOME BRONZE ALBUMS

BY

BERNHARD KARLGREN

In an extensive paper published in the Bulletin 9 (1937): New Studies on Chinese Bronzes, I examined a large number (1285) of Chinese ritual vessels from the Archaic period ($\pm 1500 - \pm 900$ B. C.).¹⁾ I studied them exclusively from the point of view of their décor, and I arrived at a distinction between two large groups: the A-style vessels and the B-style vessels. The criteria of the former were the "realistic" T'aot'ie (i. e. a coherent picture of the "animal"), the Cicada, the Vertical dragon, and the Uni-décor (i. e. the décor on the belly not being divided into horizontal zones but the principal theme running from the rim to the lower limit, without neck-belt or separate décor band on top). The criteria of the B-style were: Dissolved T'aot'ie, Animal triple band (really a dissolved T'aot'ie compressed into a narrow band), De-tailed bird, Circle band, Square with crescents, Compound lozenges (with or without Spikes), Interlocked T's, Vertical ribs and, less frequent, Eyed spiral band and Eyed band with diagonals. The important fact deduced from my lengthy investigation in the said paper was this: The A-style elements combine freely and frequently on the Archaic vessels: a T'aot'ie is very often flanked by Vertical dragons, a T'aotie combines with rows of Cicadas, vessels with Uni-décor have preferably the belly covered with T'aot'ie, and so on. On the other hand, the B-style elements combine just as freely and frequently: a vessel with the belly covered with Compound lozenges or Interlocked T's or Vertical ribs might very well have a neck-belt containing Animal triple band or Square with crescents or De-tailed birds and so on. But with T'aot'ie (A) on the belly you will not find Animal triple band (B) in the neck-belt; with Compound lozenges (B) or Interlocked T's (B) or Vertical ribs (B) on the belly you will not find real T'aot'ie (A) or Cicadas (A) in the neck-belt; with Cicadas (A) or real T'aot'ie (A) in the neck-belt you will not find Animal triple band (B) or Squares with crescents (B) in the foot-belt, and so on. In short, the set of A-style décor elements as a rule never mix with the set of B-style elements. Besides these elements there are

¹⁾ The Yin dynasty, the orthodox dating of which gives 1766—1122 B. C., can be shown to have ruled somewhat later: $\pm 1500 - 1028$ B. C., see B. Karlgren in BMFEA 17, 1945, pp. 112—121. The Yin time bronze art was continued on the whole unaltered, with but few innovations, during the "Yin-Chou" era. i. e. the reigns of the earliest Chou kings, until approximately 900 B. C., when the new Middle-Chou style brought about a great and fundamental change.

a great many other "neutral" features which combine with both A-style and B-style elements: such are Dragons of various kinds, Birds, Snakes, Whorl circles, Spiral bands, Blades.

Thanks to the said investigation the vessels of the Archaic period were divided into two large stylistic groups. It has been gratifying for me to find that the various publications of early Chinese bronzes that have appeared since 1937 have amply corroborated my conclusions. The distinction between A-style and B-style vessels was therefore maintained in my catalogue of the remarkable Pillsbury collection.

The said distinction, however, forms only a rough division. It is evident that a further examination of the distinctive groups *within* each of these styles is needed.¹⁾ But such an analysis cannot be achieved by philosophizing and aestheticizing over three or four individual vessels, chosen to be "type specimens" of so many "styles".²⁾

The first and absolutely indispensable thing to do is to scrutinize as many specimens as possible which fall within the said total era and try to establish which of them are normal, regular, typical vessels and which are irregular, atypical or indeed eccentric vessels. We should be in an ideal position for a conclusive investigation if we could compare and classify all the Archaic vessels brought to light hitherto. Unfortunately a large percentage of them are hidden in collections that have never been published and are inaccessible to the student. An extensive material has, however, been published since 1937, and the total material is now comprehensive enough to make it possible to ascertain the principal regular types within the Archaic A-style and B-style.

The investigation published in the present paper concerns only a section of the said material, and a sequel to it will, I hope, soon be published. A close scrutiny of this section, however, reveals some highly curious and unexpected phenomena.

The section chosen for this first investigation comprises:

1. the round Ting with cylindrical legs (leaving aside on the one hand the square Ting, on the other the Ting with supporting animals);
2. the Li-ting;
3. the Eared Kuei;
4. the Earless Kuei;
5. the broad Yu³⁾ (minus the lid, if any such has been preserved).

¹⁾ The variants of the Dragon and its evolution have been studied by me in a special paper: Notes on the Grammar of Early Bronze Décor, BMFEA 23, 1951.

²⁾ Professor M. Loehr writes (Archives of the Chinese Art Society of America VII, 1953, p. 42): "Nor would it further our purpose to collect large numbers of relevant examples. A style cannot be approached by way of statistics; large numbers cannot actually tell us more about a style than does *one* example, thoroughly analyzed and understood. For if the vessels are of the same style they will always tell the same story again, and nothing is gained thereby". — It would be difficult indeed to find a more foolish pronouncement.

³⁾ The "tall Yu" is really a misnomer; this type of vessel has an elongated neck which rises well above the points of attachment of the handle, and it should properly be termed Hu. In Jung Keng's Shang Chou yi k'i the vessels 641, 642, there called Yu, have exactly the same shape as the vessels 709, 710, there called H'in a bad piece of inconsistency.

The characteristic common to all these vessels, which makes them comparable and a subject for fruitful study, is that they all have a rounded belly below the horizontal rim, without any elongated or tall neck.

In the present paper I have based myself exclusively on photographically published materials, as well as unpublished photographs in my possession, and I have left out of account the Chinese albums with drawn pictures. The following abbreviations have been used:

Ackerman = Phyllis Ackerman, *Ritual Bronzes of Ancient China*, 1945.

Antiques = *Collection of Chinese Bronze Antiques*, Tokyo 1910.

BMFEA = *Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities*, Stockholm (Bulletins 6, 8, 9, 20, 21, 24, 30).

Burchard = L. Reidemeister, *Chinesische Kunst* I, II. 1935.
(Auction catalogues from Burchard and Co.).

Chengsung = Lo Chen-yü, *Cheng sung t'ang ki kin t'u*, 1935.

Ch'ian = Li T'ai-fen, *Ch'i an ts'ang kin*, 1940.

Chicago = C. F. Kelley and Ch'en Meng-chia, *Chinese Bronzes from the Buckingham Collection*, the Art Institute of Chicago, 1946.

Cull = W. P. Yetts, *The Cull Chinese Bronzes*, 1939.

Dubosc = J. P. Dubosc, *Mostra d'Arte Cinese / Exhibition of Chinese Art*, 1954.

Eumorfopoulos = *The George Eumorfopoulos Collection Catalogue of the Chinese and Korean Bronzes . . . by W. P. Yetts*. 1, 2. 1929, 1930.

Exhibition = *The Chinese Exhibition, a Commemorative Catalogue of the International Exhibition of Chinese Art*, London 1936.

Freer = *Freer Gallery of Art, a Descriptive and Illustrative Catalogue of Bronzes acquired during the Administration of J. E. Lodge*, 1946.

Hakkaku = Hakkaku (Hakuzuru) *kikkin shū*, 1934.

Heusden = Willem van Heusden, *Ancient Chinese Bronzes of the Shang and Chou Dynasties, an Illustrated Catalogue of the van Heusden Collection*, 1952.

Ill. Cat. = *Illustrated Catalogue of Chinese Government Exhibits for the International Exhibition of Chinese Art in London*, 1936.

Jung = Jung Keng, *Shang Chou yi k'i t'ung k'ao*, 1941.

Kanan = S. Umehara, *Kanan Anyō ihō, Selected Ancient Treasures found at An-yang, Yin sites*, 1940.

Kidder = J. E. Kidder, Jr., *Early Chinese Bronzes in the City Art Museum of St. Louis*, 1956.

Kobijutsu = *Shina kobijutsu zufu*, 1918.

Koop = A. J. Koop, *Early Chinese Bronzes*, 1924.

Kwankarō = S. Umehara, *Kwankarō kikkin zu*, 1947.

Lochow = Gustav Ecke, *Sammlung Lochow, Chinesische Bronzen* I, 1943.

Loo 1939 = J. L. Davidson, *An Exhibition of Chinese Bronzes*, C. T. Loo and Co., 1939.


Loo 1940 = J. M. Menzies, *An Exhibition of Ancient Chinese Ritual Bronzes loaned by C. T. Loo and Co.*, 1940.

Mengwei = Lo Chen-yü, *Meng wei ts'ao t'ang ki kin t'u*, 1917.

- Mengwei sü = Id., Sü pien 1918.
- Menten = A. Salmony, Sammlung J. F. H. Menten, Chinesische Grabfunde und Bronzen, 1948.
- Nedzu = S. Umehara, Seizansō seishō, vol. VI, 1942.
- Palmgren = Selected Chinese Antiquities from the Collection of Gustaf Adolf, Crown Prince of Sweden, 1948.
- Paoyün = Jung Keng, Pao yün lou yi k'i t'u lu, 1929.
- Pillsbury = B. Karlgren, A Catalogue of the Chinese Bronzes in the Alfred F. Pillsbury Collection, 1952.
- Seikwa = S. Umehara, Shina kodō seikwa or Selected Relics of Ancient Chinese Bronzes from Collections in Europe and America, 1933.
- Seligman = S. H. Hansford, The Seligman Collection of Oriental Art, I. 1957.
- Senoku = K. Hamada, Senoku seishō, 2nd ed. 1924.
- Shant'u = Jung Keng, Shan chai yi k'i t'u lu, 1936.
- Shierkia = Shang Ch'eng-tsu, Shi er kia ki kin t'u lu, 1935.
- Shuang kien ki kin = Yü Sing-wu, Shuang kien yi ki kin t'u lu, 1934.
- Shuangkien k'iwu = Yü Sing-wu, Shuang kien yi ku k'i wu t'u lu, 1940.
- Shūkan = Shūkan ihō, Selected Relics of Han and pre-Han Dynasties, 1932.
- Si Ts'ing shīyi = Jung Keng, Si Ts'ing yi k'i shī yi, 1940.
- Sungchai = Jung Keng, Sung chai ki kin t'u lu, 1933.
- Sungchai sü = Jung Keng, Sung chai ki kin sü lu, 1936.
- Sün = Sun Hai-po, Sün hien yi k'i, 1937.
- Tch'ou = Tch'ou Tō-yi, Bronzes antiques de la Chine, 1924.
- Trautmann = Gustav Ecke, Frühe chinesische Bronzen aus der Sammlung Oskar Trautmann, 1939.
- Tsun = Huang Sün, Tsun ku chai so kien ki kin t'u, 1936.
- Visser = H. F. E. Visser, Asiatic Art in private collections of Holland and Belgium, 1947.
- Voretzsch = E. A. Voretzsch, Altchinesische Bronzen, 1924.
- Waterbury = Florance Waterbury, Early Chinese Symbols and Literature: Vestiges and Speculations, 1942.
- White = W. C. White, Bronze Culture of Ancient China, 1956.
- Wuying = Jung Keng, Wu ying tien yi k'i t'u lu, 1934.
- Yechung I = Huang Sün, Ye chung p'ien yü ch'u tsi, 1935.
- Yechung II = Huang Sün, Ye chung p'ien yü er tsi, 1937.
- Yechung III = Huang Sün, Ye chung p'ien yü san tsi, 1943.
- Yenk'u = Liang Shang-ch'un, Yen k'u ki kin t'u lu, 1943.

CHAPTER ONE: SHAPES

In the first place we shall examine the shape of the body, the bowl. There are four principal types (which cannot always be clearly distinguished, since there are sometimes intermediate cases):



Type α: Pls. 1 a (Cohen Coll.), 1 b (MFEA) is essentially hemispherical, the decisive feature being the (profile.

Type β: Pl. 2 a (Royal Scottish Museum) has likewise a fairly half-globular lower part, but towards the rim the neck curves out forming an "S" profile.

Type γ: Pls. 2 b (MFEA), 3 a (Chengsung shang 11) is broadened out, the bottom becoming wider and somewhat flat, and the sides, straighter than in cat. α, sloping slightly inwards towards the rim.

Type δ: Pl. 3 b (Kunstindustrimuseum, Copenhagen) widens towards the rim, the sides sloping smoothly outwards and forming a "chalice"-like shape.

These four types occur in the classes of vessel studied here in the following way.

Ting A.

Type α:

This is the absolutely predominant type here. There are scores of A-style Ting in various collections which have this (profile; we have already given two examples (Pls. 1 a, b). An enumeration would be futile; a few instances from well-known collections will suffice: BMFEA 8 Pls. 3,6; Ibid. 9 Pls. 3—6; Pillsbury Pl. 6; Koop Pl. 3; Exhibition Pls. 1,2; Trautmann Pls. 1,4; Lochow Pls. 2,4; Kidder Pl. 9; White Pl. 76; Seikwa Pls. 88, 89; Chengsung shang 7; Paoyün 13, 17, 21; Wuying 22; Shierkia IV, 5, 6; Hakkaku Pl. 2; Tsun 1: 12—14; Yechung I shang 8; II shang 5; III shang 5—7.

Type β:

There is only one category of A-style Ting which deviates from the general rule described above and shows shape β (S profile). This is a homogeneous group in that it invariably has hanging Blades with Cicadas for belly décor. It is fairly comprehensive. Besides the vessel illustrated in Pl. 2 a, we find it, as a rule with Beaked (or Winged) dragons in the neck-belt, in: BMFEA 9 Pl. 4; Ibid. 20 Pl. 9; Palmgren Pl. 103; Maandblad Jan. 1935; Trautmann Pl. 2; Lochow II, 12; E. Consten, *Das alte China* 1958 Pl. 29; Chengsung shang 3, 5; Yechung III shang 8; further specimens in the collections of v. d. Heydt and the Nelson Gallery of Art. Our Pl. 4 a (C. T. Loo coll.) shows the same Blades with Cicadas, but the neck-belt has Snakes instead of Dragons — an unusual variant.

A quite aberrant specimen with this β shape, our Pl. 55 a (Kwankarō A: 3) has a badly disjointed T'aot'ie on the belly and several other irregular features.

Among the excavated specimens from An-yang there are several peculiar types diverging from those generally current in the art collections. In K'ao ku hüe pao 1954 there is a Ting apparently belonging to this décor class (very poor photograph) with the S profile but with an exaggeratedly tall body. Another, our Pl. 55 b (Li Chi, *The Beginnings of Chinese Civilization* 1957, Pl. 42) has a strongly spherical body and only a suggestion of the S profile, its décor being merely a neck-belt with Cicadas.

Type γ:

This type, with its broadened-out shape and almost flat bottom, is practically unknown among the A-style Ting.

Exceptions are two large Ting in the MFEA, our Pl. 56 a, b, both of Early Chou date.

Type δ:

This chalice-like bowl is entirely unknown in the A-style Ting class.

Ting B.

Type α:

Here again this type is quite predominant. Examples: Pls. 4 b (MFEA) and 5 a (C. D. Carter coll.). There are a great many analogous specimens in various collections, e. g. BMFEA 8 Pls. 4,5; Ibid. 9 Pls. 30—33; Voretzsch Pl. 7; Mengwei sü 2; Kwankarō A: 4,5; Paoyün 18; Shierkia VII: 3,4; Ibid. VIII: 3; Sungchai sü 3; Yechung III shang 11; Yenku' shang 6—8; etc.

Type β:

This shape, with the S profile, is not a regular feature in the Ting B class.

Isolated exceptions do occur, e. g. our Pl. 57 a (Yechung I shang 14) with a dissolved T'aot'ie and large Squares with crescents on the belly; and our Pl. 57 b (Ackerman Pl. 15) with the belly covered with Interlocked T's; further Pl. 58 a (Trautmann 3) with Lozenges

and spikes on the belly and Dragon neck-belt; and Pl. 58 b (Yechung I shang 9, 10) with bare bellies and Snakes and Dragons in the neck-belts; some An-yang pieces, e. g. Pl. 59 a (Li Chi, Beginnings Pl. 15) with a large vertical handle on one side, are very queer. As we shall see further below the décor of some of these sporadic specimens (belly with Squares with crescents of Interlocked T's) is highly unusual on Ting vessels, so that these cases of β -type body cannot be said to constitute a real group within the Ting B class, but are exceptional.

Type γ :

This shape, on the contrary, is quite common, a typical feature of the Ting B style (as compared with Ting A where, as we saw, it is quite exceptional). It occurs with all kinds of B-style décor elements. It exists with Animal triple band (i. e. dissolved bodied T'aot'ie) in the neck-belt, e. g. our Pl. 5 b (White Pl. 74), with Deformed dragons, e. g. Pl. 6 a (MFEA), and, particularly often, with De-tailed birds, e. g. Pls. 3 a and 6 b (Oeder collection). This shape mostly belongs to the Early Chou period. The γ class is richly represented in various collections: Mengwei shang 7; Mengwei sü 6; Wuying 23; Sungchai 2,3; Sungchai sü 4—9; Shierkia XI: 18; Shant'u 26, 28, 30, 31; Shuangkien k'iwu shang 3; etc.

Type δ :

This is missing altogether in the Ting B class.

Li-ting.

There are very few Li-ting with a B-style décor: Pl. 59 b (Wuying 17) bare body and neck-belt with Animal triple band; Pl. 60 a (Ill. Cat. 7) the same and the belt bordered in by Circle bands; BMFEA 21 Pl. 7 belly covered with Dissolved T'aot'ie; Ibid. 20, Pl. 9 belly covered with zigzag bands reminiscent of the Yin luxus pottery (and a very similar vessel in the Brundage collection).

If we disregard the tripartite bulbous bottom of the Li-ting A and go by the profile, we find:

Type α :

This type, with its (profile, is the rule practically without exception. Examples: Pl. 7 a (Spencer Churchill coll.), and Pls. 22 a, 23 a, b, 40—43.

Types β , γ , δ :

These are missing altogether in the Li-ting class.

Eared Kuei A and B.

Type α :

This type, which is very common in the Kuei of the Middle Chou style (see, for instance, BMFEA 8 Pls. 38—40) and which is dominant in the Ting and Li-ting classes studied above, is almost non-existent in the Kuei of the Archaic period.

The stray examples that actually do exist are rare: a Kuei with bare belly and a neck-belt with Animal triple band our Pl. 61 a (Trygger coll.) and an identical specimen in Wuying 73; analogous specimens with other figures in the neck-belt in Shuangkien kikin 14 and Ill. Cat. 29; a nearly globular body with Vertical ribs our Pl. 61 b (Loo 1939 Pl. 6); also an eccentric case in Seikwa 12. On the whole, the part played by shape α is quite insignificant in this class.

Type β :

This S-profiled shape is the normal and exceedingly common type in the Eared Kuei class. Examples: Pls. 7 b (Barling) and 8 a (Karlbeck). There are scores of fine Kuei with this shape in the wellknown collections. An enumeration is unnecessary, a few examples will suffice: BMFEA 8 Pl. 11; Ibid. 9 Pls. 11—13; Pillsbury Pls. 49, 50, 52, 53; Trautmann 9; Seikwa 108—112; Sungchai sū 26—37; Yechung III shang 27, 28; Kwankarō A: 19—22; Tsun 1: 45—48.

Type γ :

This shape, so common in the Ting B class, is even more unusual here than type α .

A stray example in our Pl. 62 a (Seligman Pl. 8).

Type δ :

This type occurs in two variants.

On the one hand, there are Kuei with the ordinary vertical ears and a bowl that widens upwards only very slightly. Examples: Pls. 8 b (Oeder coll.), 9 a (Menten coll.) 9 b (C. T. Loo); a few only in the A style (our Pl. 8 a just mentioned; Senoku 42; Seikwa 113), somewhat more common in the B style, particularly so with Compound lozenges and spikes on the belly: our Pl. 9 a just mentioned; Yechung I shang 16; Tch'ou 8; Kwankarō A: 17; but also with Dissolved T'aot'ie on the belly: our Pl. 9 b above; with bare belly and neck-belt with Squares with crescents: Paoyün 46, 48; neck-belt with Animal triple band our Pl. 10 a (White Pl. 56); the same Yechung III shang 26; with large Birds on the belly Seikwa 116.

On the other hand there are Kuei with "Bent ears" and bodies that are strongly widening upwards. Example: Pl. 10 b (Academia Sinica, from An-yang). Further examples: K'ao ku hūe pao 7 Pl. 5 (An-yang); Seikwa 117; our Pl. 11 a (Toledo Museum); Freer Pl. 25; Tsun 2: 6; Jung 286.

Thus, in the Eared Kuei class, the type δ (the chalice-like shape) though by no means so common as the predominant type β , occupies an important position; it is not an exceptional feature but one of the two regular shapes.

Earless Kuei A.

Type δ :

The Earless Kuei is not a very large class. Its vessels, when they have a forceful and "realistic" bodied T'aot'ie, with a neck-belt mostly with Dragons, have as

a rule the shape of type δ ; our Pl. 3 b shows the typical chalice-like body. Further examples our: Pls. 29 b, 46 a; Pillsbury Pl. 54; Heusden Pl. 20; Paoyün 58; similar vessels in the Fogg Museum and in C. T. Loo collection.

Type β :

This S-profiled type, on the other hand, occurs, for instance Pl. 11 b (Lundgren coll.), in a number of vessels with a more advanced elaboration of the décor: the bodied T'aot'ie drawn out (somewhat "dragonized") or on the way to being dissolved. Further examples: our Pls. 30 a, 46 b, 69 a; Seligman Pl. 10; Wuying 50, 51; vessels in the collections C. D. Carter (Detroit), Lange (Klefeld), Seattle Museum, Musée Guimet, Museum f. Kunst und Gewerbe Hamburg.

Only rarely does a Kuei A with a forceful and "realistic" T'aot'ie fall within this group: our Pl. 62 b (Wessén coll.).

Types α and γ are entirely missing in this class.

Earless Kuei B.

Type δ :

A considerable group of vessels with Lozenges and spikes on the belly have this chalice-like shape, but the widening upwards is less pronounced than in the A-style vessels of type δ described above. Sometimes the shape approaches somewhat type α or type β , but the δ character is, after all, the decisive feature. Example: Pl. 12 a (Karlbeck). This group is fairly large: BMFEA 9 Pl. 42; Ibid. 21 Pl. 14; Palmgren Pl. 102; Visser Pl. 11; Senoku 41; Voretzsch Pl. 145; Lochow 10; Kwan-karō A: 16, 18; Asiatische Kunst Ausstellung Zürich 1941 p. 85; Wuying 52, 54; Shant'u 53; Tsun 1: 39; Yechung III shang 25; Vessel in C. T. Loo coll. Sporadic cases with a décor other than the Lozenges occur, e. g. Si Ts'ing shiyi 9 and 10 (our Pl. 63 a): belly bare, neck-belt and foot-belt with Dragons; and Tsun 1: 38 and Ch'ian 18: belly bare, neck-belt with Circle bands.

Type β :

This type (S profile), however, obtains in some other important though fairly limited groups here.

On the one hand, there are a number of vessels with Compound lozenges and spikes, quite analogous to those described under δ above, but here with the β shape: Pl. 12 b (Royal Scottish Museum). Further examples our Pl. 31 b; Senoku 40; vessels in the Academia Sinica and the Oppenheim collections.

On the other hand, there are some vessels with bare belly and a figured neck-belt (sometimes also foot-belt): Pl. 13 a (MFEA); further: BMFEA 9 Pl. 51; Shuang-kien kikin 18; Shierkia IV: 8; White Pl. 49; K'ao ku hüe pao 5: Kuo pl. 16 (An-yang).

Types α and γ are altogether absent.

Yu.

The broad Yu lends itself less well to a study of the shape of the body than the preceding classes of vessel. In fact the lower part of the Yu, from the rim down, has sometimes type α , sometimes type γ in both Yu A and Yu B. But there is a marked tendency observable: the α type, with the (profile, is much more common in Yu B than in Yu A. Two specimens: Pls. 13 b (Seikwa 72) and 14 a (MFEA) may illustrate the difference.

* * *

To sum up:

Type α , with the (profile, is predominant in Ting A and Ting B and the absolute rule in Li-ting A, but it hardly exists in Eared Kuei and Earless Kuei (though it becomes common in Middle-Chou Eared Kuei), and it is again quite common in Yu, particularly in Yu B.

Thus a contrast: Ting, Li-ting, Yu > < Eared Kuei, Earless Kuei.

Type β , with the S profile, occurs in a well-defined category of Ting A; it appears only in rare exceptions in Ting B; it is altogether missing in Li-ting; it is predominant in Eared Kuei A and B; but it is limited to certain definite sub-categories of Earless Kuei A and B. It does not occur in Yu.

Thus a contrast: Ting, Eared Kuei, Earless Kuei > < Li-ting, Yu.

Type γ , with the broadened-out shape and somewhat flat bottom, is almost unknown in Ting A; it is very common in Ting B; again, it is unknown in both Eared Kuei and Earless Kuei; but it is common in Yu, particularly Yu A.

Thus a contrast: Ting B, Yu > < Ting A, Eared Kuei, Earless Kuei.

Type δ , the chalice-shape, is unknown in Ting, Li-ting and Yu but it occurs in certain definite classes of Eared Kuei as well as Earless Kuei.

Thus a contrast: Eared Kuei, Earless Kuei > < Ting, Li-ting, Yu.

CHAPTER TWO: ARRANGEMENT OF THE DECOR

Ting A.

There are four principal schemes.

Type a:

Belly with Uni-décor (here: large T'aot'ie with no neck-belt above). In most cases Hanging blades are incised on the upper part of the legs. Examples with leg décor: Pls. 1 a and 14 b; without leg décor: Pl. 15 a (Musée du Louvre). This category is well represented in various collections, and it will suffice to cite a few more instances. With leg décor: BMFEA 9 Pl. 2; Voretzsch Pl. 4; Koop Pl. 3; Trautmann Pl. 1; Ackerman Pl. 15; Chicago Pl 19; Seikwa 88, 89; Paoyün 13; Tsun 1: 13; Yechung II shang 5; Yechung III shang 5—7; without leg décor: Loo 1939 Pl. 4; Shierkia IV: 5; Shuangkien k'iwu shang 5.

Type b:

Belly with large T'aot'ie, above which is a neck-belt with Dragons. This is likewise a regular type. Examples: Pls 15 b (Lundgren coll.), 16 a (Somerville coll.). Further instances: (with incised Hanging blades on the legs, as under a:) BMFEA 9 Pl. 3; Exhibition Pl. 1; Loo 1940 Pl. 6; Lochow 2; Kidder Pl. 9; vessels in Fogg Museum, Musée Cernuschi, coll. v. d. Heydt (without leg décor:) Trautmann Pl. 4. An isolated case with Snakes instead of Dragons in a private collection.

Type c:

Belly with Hanging blades with Cicadas, above which is a figured neckbelt. This large category falls into two separate groups.

On the one hand, there is the important group with an S profile, e. g. Pls. 2 a and 16 b (Trautmann Pl. 2) recorded and discussed in Chap. I: Ting A β above. The neck-belt of this group has almost invariably Beaked dragons. In a few cases (Consten Pl. 29 and the Nelson Gallery specimen) there are incised Blades on the legs, in the majority of the cases the legs are bare.

On the other hand, there is a large group with the ordinary (profile, and here there is a great variety of figures in the neck-belt. Only a few specimens have incised Blades on the legs. Examples:

(Neck-belt with Beaked or Jawed dragons:) Pls. 1 b and 17 a (Pillsbury 6); further Palmgren Pl. 4; Shierkia IV: 4; vessel in Brundage collection;

(Neck-belt with Trunked or Turning dragons and Whorl circles:) BMFEA 9 Pl. 6; Voretzsch Pl. 5; Chengsung shang 7;

(Neck-belt with Birds and Whorl circles:) Pl. 17 b (MFEA);

(Neck-belt with Bodied T'aot'ie:) BMFEA 9 Pl. 4; Waterbury Pl. 1; Dubosc No. 33; Wuying 22;

(Neck-belt with Mask T'aot'ie with or without Whorl circles:) Pl. 18 a (v. d. Heydt coll.); Exhibition Pl. 2.

A variant of this group with (profile and Hanging blades is shown in our Pl. 18 b (Malmö Museum); here the Blades have no Cicadas but instead the neck-belt has a row of Cicadas. Further examples: Voretzsch Pl. 8; Paoyün 17; Shuangkien k'iwu shang 2.

Cognate to this group are some exceptional cases. Our Pl. 63 b (Calmann coll.) which has Hanging blades without Cicadas and in the neck-belt instead of Cicadas Bodied (somewhat dragonized) T'aot'ie (a similar case in Yenku shang 7); our Pl. 64 a (Lochow 4), which has the Dragons, Whorl circles and Blades with Cicadas but at the same time plastic heads on the legs, a feature foreign to our group here but characteristic of group d. below; our Pl. 56 b (MFEA) showing an eccentric vessel combining the preceding characteristics; yet another vessel (Low-Beer coll.) having the Blades without Cicadas as in Pl. 18 b but in the neck-belt, instead of Cicadas, the Mask T'aot'ie of Pl. 18 a. Such aberrant specimens are very rare indeed.

Type d:

Here we have a limited and strictly defined group which has a bare body, above which is a neck-belt with Bodied T'aot'ie, and with plastic heads on the upper part

of the legs. Example: Pl. 19 a (Hakkaku Pl. 2). Further: BMFEA 9 Pl. 3; White Pl. 76; Jung No. 22; Yechung I shang 8; vessels in Staatl. Mus. Berlin, in Kunstindustrimuseum Copenhagen, in C. D. Carter and C. T. Loo colls. and in our Pl. 56 a (this latter is irregular in another respect, see Chap. I); a vessel with Disjointed T'aot'ie in the neck-belt in Ill. London News June 23 1956.

Apart from this particular group the arrangement with bare belly, above which is a figured neck-belt, is exceedingly rare in Ting A. We already saw an exceptional case in Pl. 55 b with Cicadas in the belt and an unusual shape; the same constellation in Pl. 64 b (MFEA) with its abnormally tiny legs; another aberrant case with Cicadas and Whorl circles in the neck-belt and the shape with the S profile in Ill. Cat. of Chinese Art, Burlington Art Club 1915 Pl. 36; a vessel with bare belly and Bodied T'aot'ie in the neck-belt but with bare legs in the C. D. Carter collection. None of these irregular specimens have the plastic heads on the legs described above.

Ting B.

Here we find three principal schemes.

Type e:

Bare belly, above which is a neck-belt with B-style décor elements and no décor on the legs. As an arrangement it is kindred to type d. of the A style above: bare belly and figured neck-belt, but in the A class we regularly had plastic heads on the legs, to which there is no counterpart here. Particularly common groups are:

(Neck-belt with Animal triple band): Pls. 5 a, b, and Pl. 19 b (Wuying 21); further: BMFEA 9 Pl. 30; Voretzsch Pl. 3; Paoyün 18, 19; Shierkia VII: 4, VIII: 2; Tsun 1: 16, 19; Shant'u 26; Sungchai sü 3—5.

(Neck-belt with De-tailed birds:) Pls. 3 a and 20 a (Freer Gallery); further: Mengwei shang 7; Mengwei sü 6; Chengsung shang 24; Shant'u 28, 30, 31; a vessel in Fogg Museum etc.

(Neck-belt with Squares with crescents and whorl circles:) Pl. 20 b; further: Shierkia XI: 18; a vessel in the Cranbrook Academy of Art. There are other combinations belonging to this category: neck-belt with Circle bands (Shierkia IV: 7) etc.

Many vessels with "neutral" décor elements (neither A-style nor B-style criteria) belong to this category, e. g. Pl. 65 a (Bluett): neck-belt with dragonized T'aot'ie.

Type f:

As we shall see further below, and as already fully described in BMFEA 9, there are three motifs of B-style character, indeed three of the most important B-style criteria, which frequently occur as décor for covering larger surfaces: Compound lozenges, (mostly with Spikes), Vertical ribs and Interlocked T's. Here, on the Ting B, however, the last two are practically non-existent, but the first is characteristic of an important class. It divides into two sub-groups:

On the one hand, there is a type with the belly covered with Compound lozenges and fairly stout, protruding Spikes and a neck-belt with Dragons (the legs with or

without incised Blades). Example: Pl. 21 a (Wessén coll.); further: BMFEA 9 Pl. 32; Voretzsch Pl. 7; Ill. London News Apr. 3, 1954; Kwankarō A: 5; vessels in the Kleykamp and the Brundage collections; and our Pl. 58 a, aberrant in regard to the shape (see Chap. I above).

On the other hand, there is a type with the belly similarly covered with Compound lozenges but with circles merely suggesting "spikes", above which is a neck-belt with Dragons or Spiral bands. Examples: Pl. 4 b and Pl. 21 b (Musée Guimet); further: Yechung III shang 11; Yen-k'u shang 6; Shuangkien k'iwu shang 1 (here the neck-belt has a figure derived from a badly distorted Cicada).

Other cases of a B-style décor covering the belly are sporadic and indeed exceedingly rare. We saw (Pl. 57) two such exceptions, one with Interlocked T's, one with Squares with crescents (Shan chai ki kin lu 2: 26 gives a drawn picture of another Ting with Interlocked T's). Another such rare piece is Pl. 65 b (Shuangkien k'iwu shang 3) with a Dissolved T'aot'ie on the belly; the same idea on a vessel in Waterbury Pl. 37. A large Bird on the belly, Pl. 6 b, is rare in the Ting class, though common in the Kuei, as we shall see later.

We observe that in the Ting B there is nothing corresponding to certain Ting A types. Ting A: a (Uni-décor) is one of the fundamental criteria of the A style as against the B style. But nor has type A: c (Hanging blades on the belly) any parallel in Ting B — we could imagine, for instance Hanging blades on the belly combined with B-style elements in the neckbelt, but there is nothing of the kind. Moreover, we have seen that B: e (bare belly, neck-belt with B elements) cannot be said to form a real parallel to A: d (bare belly, neck-belt with the A element Bodied T'aot'ie), since the latter type has plastic heads on the legs, as a rule unknown in B: e.

Li-ting.

As stated in Chap. I above, the Li-ting very seldom shows a bare belly and a décor in a neck-belt only; there is thus no Li-ting group corresponding to Ting A: d above.

Two exceptional specimens were adduced in Chap. I which have a B-style neck-belt (our Pls. 59 b and 60 a). An analogous case with an A-style neck-belt is our Pl. 66 a (MFEA) with Cicadas in the belt. Another one with Dragons in the belt in K'ao ku hüe pao 5, Pl. 18.

The ordinary types are the following:

Type g:

Belly with Uni-décor (a large T'aot'ie with no neck-belt above); as a rule bare legs (incised Blades only in some rare exceptions). Example: Pl. 7 a. This is a very common type and we cite a few instances only: BMFEA 30, Pl. 4; Eumorfopoulos I: 1; Tch'ou Pl. 14; Trautmann Pl. 6; Seligman Pl. 1; Senoku 2; Paoyün 10; Wuying 15; Chengsung shang 9; Shierkia VI: 1 and VIII: 1; Shuangkien ki kin 6; Yechung I shang 11; Tsun 1: 18; Paoyün 8 (incised legs); Tsun 1: 26 (incised legs).

Thus our type g. in Li-ting reminds us closely of type a. in Ting A, but there is the surprising difference that the latter mostly has incised Blades on the legs, whereas our Li-ting here as a rule have bare legs.

Type h:

This is very closely related to the preceding, the only difference being that above the big T'aot'ie there is on the belly a border band, mostly with a simple spiral pattern. It is too narrow and subordinate to be considered as a real neck-belt, but none the less it conveys a different impression from the Uni-décor in type g. above. Here again the legs are bare (without incised Blades). Example: Pl. 22 a (von Rosen coll.). This is likewise a very common type, represented in many collections. A few instances: BMFEA 9 Pl. 9; Ibid. 27 Pl. 3; Heusden Pl. 15; Kidder Pl. 8; Ackerman Pl. 14; Cull Pl. 2; Waterbury Pl. 46; Visser Pl. 2; Senoku 1; Seikwa 91; Kwankarō A: 7; K'ao ku hüe pao 7 Pl. 24; Paoyün 4—7; Wuying 10, 11, 13, 14; Chengsung shang 10, 16; Mengwei sü 4; Shierkia XI: 17; Yechung I shang 12; Shant'u 20; vessel in Musée Cernuschi, etc.

Type i:

Belly with large T'aot'ie, above which is a figured neck-belt; in this group the legs are sometimes bare, sometimes have incised Blades. There are two sub-groups:

On the one hand, there is a row of Cicadas, alone or alternating with Whorl circles, in the neck-belt. Examples: Pls. 22 b (Ernest Erickson coll.), 23 a (Oppenheim coll., an exactly similar vessel in D. Weill coll.); further: our Pls. 41 b and 42 b; Kidder Pl. 7; Dubosc No. 30; Kwankarō A: 8; Yechung III shang 9; vessels in colls. C. T. Loo, Brundage, Gump, Chang Nai-chi. — Observe the striking fact that though in Ting A there is a large group with T'aot'ie on the belly and figured neck-belt, the figures are nearly always Dragons, and there are never Cicadas in the neck-belt combined with T'aot'ie on the belly, as in our present important Li-ting group.

On the other hand, there is a group mostly with Dragons or Dragonized T'aot'ie in the neck-belt, rarely Snakes or other figures. Example: Pl. 23 b (Malmö Museum); further: our Pl. 43 a (3 vessels: Hardt, Oeder, Bloemendahl colls.) and 43 b (Senoku 3); BMFEA 6 Pl. 10; Pillsbury Pl. 7; Waterbury Pl. 9; Hakkaku 1; Paoyün 12; vessels in Freer Gallery and Nelson Gallery of Art. This group corresponds fairly well to the class Ting A: b above, but the incised Blades on the legs are much rarer here than in that category.

Eared Kuei A.

Here we find two principal types.

Type j:

Belly with Uni-décor and (always) figured foot-belt (mostly with Dragons, sometimes Snakes or Birds), vertical ears; the shape of vessel here is regularly type β (S profile). There are two sub-groups:

On the one hand, there is a large T'aot'ie on the belly. Example: Pl. 24 a (C. T. Loo). This is common, e. g. BMFEA 9 Pl. 11; Pillsbury Pl. 52; Kidder Pl. 21; Seikwa 108, 110; Paoyün 54, 56; Wuying 40, 42—44; Si Ts'ing shiyi 5; vessels in Freer Gallery, Staatl. Mus. Berlin, C. T. Loo coll.

On the other hand, there are large confronted Gaping dragons on the belly with the body formed like an enormous spiral in high relief. Example: Pl. 24 b: further: BMFEA 6 Pl. 11; Loo 1939 Pl. 6; Seikwa 111; Shūkan Pl. 17; Pao-yün 53; vessels in Museum Fine Arts Boston and City Art Museum St. Louis.

—The first sub-group above corresponds in regard to the décor arrangement to Ting A: a and to Li-ting: g, but in shape there is a strong contrast: in those types always the shape α , i. e. (profile, here always the shape β , S profile. The second sub-group has no counterpart in Ting or Li-ting.

Type k:

Belly with large T'aot'ie, above which is a neck-belt mostly with Dragons, and a foot-belt, likewise with Dragons; vertical ears. Here again the shape is nearly always type β (S profile), a few cases only of type δ (chalice-shape, e. g. our Pl. 8 b), see Chap. I above. There are two sub-groups:

On the one hand, there is no further décor above the neck-belt; this is the most common arrangement. Example: Pl. 25 a (Pillsbury Pl. 50); further: BMFEA 8 Pl. 12; Ibid. 9 Pl. 12 (two vessels); Pillsbury Pl. 49; Freer Pl. 19; Burchard I Pl. 27; Dubosc No. 50; Lochow 11; Senoku 35, 42, 107; Senoku zoku 180; Seikwa 109, 112; Tsun 1: 47; Sungchai sü 26; Jung No. 205; vessels in Brooklyn Museum, Museum of Fine Arts Boston, Oeder collection.

On the other hand, there is a not very large group with a row of Rising blades above the neck-belt. Example: Pl. 25 b (University Museum Philadelphia); further: Voretzsch Pl. 23; Loo 1940 Pl. 11; vessels in the Fogg Museum (two vessels), Fitzwilliam Museum, Månsson coll., Brundage coll.

The first of these sub-groups under k. corresponds (apart from the shape, discussed in Chap. I) exactly to Ting A: b above and to Li-ting: i (2nd part). But the second sub-group, that with the Rising blades, has no counterpart in the classes Ting A and Li-ting.

For an isolated exception see the eccentric vessel in Pl. 55 a.

Type 1:

The category Kuei with bent ears occurs in both styles. Those with A-style décor have Hanging blades (*nota bene*: not with Cicadas) as in Pl. 11 a and Freer Pl. 25 and K'ao ku hūe pao 7 Pls. 4 and 5 (An-yang).

An aberrant case Pl. 66 b (Jung 286) has Uni-décor with Dissolved T'aot'ie (i. e. with A and B features combined).

A most striking fact, when we compare our Eared Kuei A with Ting A in regard to the décor arrangement is that the important categories Ting A: c (belly with Hanging blades with Cicadas) and Ting A: d (belly bare, neck-belt with Bodied T'aot'ie) have no counterpart at all in the class Eared Kuei A.

Eared Kuei B.

There are three principal types:

Type m:

The most common type here (with shape β , S profile, or δ , chalice-shape, vertical ears) is a bare belly, above which is a neck-belt with B-style figures, and a figured or non-figured foot-belt. The foot-belt, when figured, may have the same figures as the neck-belt or any other of the B-style figures. Such are: Animal triple band, De-tailed bird, Eyed spiral band, Eyed band with diagonals, Circle band, Squares with crescents. The foot-belt, when non-figured, may often have one or two horizontal raised lines. This type m. is extremely common, and we need only cite some examples:

(Neck-belt with Animal triple band, figured foot-belt, mostly Animal triple band as well:) Pl. 26 a; further: BMFEA 6 Pl. 21; Ibid. 8 Pl. 11; Ibid. 9 Pl. 36; Ibid. 27 Pl. 5; White Pl. 56; Paoyün 41, 43, 45; Wuying 59; Mengwei shang 25; Sungchai 8; Sungchai sü 31; Shierkia IV: 9, V: 7, XII: 5; Tsun 1: 45, 48; Yechung III shang 26; (the same neck-belt but non-figured foot-belt:) Shierkia VI: 6; White Pl. 70; Sungchai sü 28—30, 32.

(Neck-belt with De-tailed birds, figured foot-belt:) Pl. 26 b (Kwankarō A: 22); further: BMFEA 9 Pl. 37; Ibid. 27 Pl. 5; Mengwei shang 24, 27; Tsun 2: 1; (the same neck-belt but non-figured foot-belt:) Shant'u 54—57.

(Neck-belt with Squares with crescents, alternating or not with Whorl circles, figured foot-belt:) Pls. 27 a (Gutman coll.), 27 b (MFEA); further: Paoyün 46, 48; Shant'u 58; Tsun 1: 40; vessels in Ton Ying and Gutman collections.

Other combinations are less usual, e. g. neck-belt and foot-belt with Eyed band with diagonals (of the same kind as in Pl. 26 b) in Tsun 1: 41; neck-belt and foot-belt with Eyed spiral band Pl. 67 a (Tsun 1: 42); neck-belt and foot-belt with Spiral band bordered by Circle bands Wuying 61; etc.

This large category m. corresponds quite closely to Ting B: e in regard to the décor scheme, though the shape of the bowl differs radically: here type β , S profile, sometimes type δ , chalice-shape, there type α , (profile.

Type n:

Belly covered with a B-style décor, figured neck-belt and figured foot-belt, vertical ears, shape mostly β , sometimes δ . This again is a very large category, and the principal variants are the following.

(Belly covered with Vertical ribs:) Pl. 28 a (Seligman coll.); further: BMFEA 9 Pls. 40, 41; Exhibition Pl. 7 (two vessels); Voretzsch Pl. 22; Loo 1939 Pl. 7; Loo 1940 Pl. 12; Palmgren Pl. 4; Heusden Pl. 21; Dubosc No. 51; Stanford University Museum, Arts of the Chou Dynasty No. 23; Ill. London News Jan. 22, 1938; Ibid. Apr. 3, 1954; Senoku 39; Senoku zoku 181; Paoyün 51, 52; Wuying 65—67, 69, 71; Mengwei shang 23, 33; Si Ts'ing shiyi 6; vessels in several private collections.

(Belly covered with Compound lozenges and spikes:) Pl. 28 b (Metropolitan Museum of Arts); further: BMFEA 8 Pl. 13; Ibid. 9 Pls. 37, 40; Ibid. 30 Pl. 13;

Ackerman Pl. 30; Burchard II, No. 1129; Senoku 36; Seikwa 105, 106; Shūkan 16; Kwankarō A: 17; Yechung I shang 16; vessels in Cranbrook Academy of Arts, in the Metropolitan Museum of Arts and several private collections. The spikes are sometimes strongly protruding, in other cases quite short; in one case (Senoku 37) they are missing (quite exceptional). Observe the important fact that there exists here no counterpart to the class of Ting B which have Compound lozenges with circles merely suggesting "spikes".

An isolated instance with Rising blades above the neck-belt in our Pl. 67 b (Somerville coll.).

(Belly covered with large Birds with raised tails:) Pl. 29 a (Chengsung shang 33); further: Seikwa 115, 116; Jung No. 270; Wuying 48; vessel in Musée Guimet.

More unusual cases are specimens with the belly covered with Interlocked T's, e. g. Pl. 68 a (Yechung III shang 28) (another example in Shuangkien kikin 19, this one with Rising blades above the neck-belt); and specimens with the belly covered with Dissolved T'aot'ie, e. g. Pl. 68 b (Kwankarō A: 19), another example our Pl. 9 b and BMFEA 9 Pl. 39.

The category n. here, very large, is interesting in that it stands in strong contrast to the Ting B class. In general arrangement it is a counterpart to Ting B: f; here, as there, we find large groups with Compound lozenges and spikes for belly décor, and here, as there, we have a few (indeed exceptional) cases of Interlocked T's and Dissolved T'aot'ie on the belly. But whereas the Ting B never have Vertical ribs, the Kuei B class, as we have seen, has a large group with this for belly décor.

Type o:

The small class of Kuei B with bent ears has the belly bare and neck-belt with Animal triple band (Pl. 10 b) or De-tailed birds (Seikwa 117 and Tsun 2: 6). Cf. Kuei A: 1 above.

Earless Kuei A.

Type p:

Belly with large T'aot'ie, figured neck-belt and figured foot-belt (mostly Dragons). There are two sub-groups:

On the one hand, there is a group with no décor above the neck-belt; shape mostly δ (chalice) or, more rarely, β (S profile). Example: Pl. 29 b (Museum für Kunst und Gewerbe Hamburg); further: our Pls. 3 b and 46 a; Pillsbury Pl. 54; Heusden Pl. 20; Archives Chin. Art Soc. America 1954, VIII p. 49; Paoyün 58; Wuying 50 (shape β); vessels in Fogg Museum, in C. T. Loo coll.; vessel in Seattle Art Museum (shape β).

On the other hand, there is a group with Rising blades above the neckbelt; shape regularly β (S profile), not δ as in the preceding group. Example: Pl. 30 a (Museum van Aziatische Kunst Amsterdam); further: our Pls. 11 b, 46 b, 69 a; Seligman Pl. 10; Wuying 51; Shierkia XII: 6; vessels in Musée Guimet, Seattle Museum, colls. Lange, Heramaneck, C. D. Carter.

In one of these instances, Pl. 69 a (Freer Gallery), there are Cicadas on the Rising blades, a quite exceptional phenomenon.

The Earless Kuei A contrasts with Eared Kuei A in that it has no type with Uni-décor, which is common in the latter. Furthermore, whereas the Eared Kuei A mostly have shape β (S profile) and very rarely shape δ (chalice), the Earless Kuei A have preponderatingly shape δ in one of the sub-groups.

Earless Kuei B

There are two principal types:

Type q:

Belly bare, neck-belt with B-style elements, figured or non-figured foot-belt, shapes β or δ . This is a small category corresponding to type m. in Eared Kuei B. Example: Pl. 30 b; further examples with non-figured foot-belt: Shuangkien kikin 18; Shierkia IV: 8; examples with figured foot-belt: our Pl. 13 a; Tsun 1: 38.

Type r:

Belly covered with Compound lozenges and spikes, figured neck-belt and figured foot-belt, shapes β or δ . There are two sub-groups.

On the one hand, there is no décor above the neck-belt. Example: Pl. 31 a (C. T. Loo); further: Pl. 12 a; BMFEA 9, Pl. 42; Ibid. 21 Pl. 14; Voretzsch Pl. 145; Loo 1939 Pl. 7; Palmgren Pl. 102; Visser Pl. 11; Lochow 10; Ill. London News Aug. 1949; Senoku 40, 41; Kwankarō A: 16, 18; Wuying 52; Shant'u 53; Tsun 1: 39; vessels in collections v. d. Heydt and C. T. Loo.

On the other hand, there are Rising blades above the neck-belt. Example: Pl. 31 b (Kanan Pl. 31); further: our Pl. 12 b; vessels in Oppenheim coll., Miller coll.; slightly aberrant in shape Pl. 69 b (Academia Sinica, from An-yang).

A vessel with Dissolved T'aot'ie on the belly, figured neck belt and Rising blades on top in the C. D. Carter collection is quite exceptional.

The curious fact here is that whereas the corresponding type n. in Eared Kuei B likewise had a large group with Compound lozenges and spikes like our type r. here, it had in addition large groups with other B-style décor motifs on the belly: Vertical ribs and Birds with raised tails. To these our class Earless Kuei B has no counterpart.

Yu A.

We have seen that Ting A, Li-ting A, Eared Kuei A all had important groups with Uni-décor, whereas Earless Kuei A has no such category. The Yu A follow the latter scheme: there are only some very rare and exceptional cases.

There is Pl. 70 a (Yechung I shang 18), and Yamanaka & Co. Ancient Chinese Bronzes Exhib. 1925 Pl. 6. A third instance Pl. 70 b (Higginson coll.) is a hybrid vessel: a broad neck-belt set off by a raised line from the lower part, the neck-belt bare.

The normal type is the following:

Type s:

Belly covered with large T'aot'ie, figured neck-belt and figured foot-belt. Examples: Pls. 32 a (Bluett coll.) and 32 b (Brundage coll.). This is a large category; some instances: our Pl. 13 b; BMFEA 9 Pls. 15, 16; Pillsbury Pl. 18; Voretzsch Pl. 146 (exceptionally: foot belt bare); Eumorfopoulos 20; Cull Pl. 4; Visser Pl. 3; Freer Pl. 16; White Pl. 8; Senoku 58, 59; Seikwa 73, 74; Antiques Pl. 22; Nedzu Pls. 15—17, 31, 32; Kobijutsu 6, 7, 10; Yamanaka & Co Ancient Chinese Bronzes Exhib. 1925 Pl. 2; Paoyün 98; Mengwei sü 26; Yechung II shang 17; Shuangkien k'iwu shang 29; vessels in Museum of Fine Art Boston, in Fogg Museum, in Freer Gallery; etc.

Yu B.

There are two principal types:

Type t:

As in Eared Kuei B above, the commonest type here is a bare belly, above which a neck-belt with B-style figures and a figured or non-figured foot-belt. This is a large category; here a few examples only.

(Neck-belt with Animal triple band:) Pl. 33 a (Lochow 14); further: Shierkia X: 14; Shant'u 112; Sungchai sü 50; Shuangkien k'iwu shang 30; (in the last case a non-figured foot-belt, the preceding all figured).

(Neck-belt with De-tailed birds:) Pl. 33 b (H. M. the King of Sweden); further: BMFEA 9 Pl. 43; Senoku 63; Seikwa 81; Kobijutsu 13; vessels in the Palace Museum Peking and several private collections (all with non-figured foot-belt).

(Neck-belt with some element, mostly Compound lozenges, bordered by Circle bands): Pl. 34 a (Yenk'u shang 22); further, examples with non-figured foot-belt: our Pl. 14 a; J. Trübner, Yu und Kuang Pl. 37; White Pls. 45, 48; Kobijutsu 8, 9, 12; Seikwa 77; Shant'u 110; Yechung I shang 20; Tsun 2: 11, 12; Yenk'u shang 21, 23; Shuangkien k'iwu shang 26; Si Ts'ing shiyi 12; K'ao ku ku hüe pao 7 Pl. 20 (An-yang); vessels in several private collections; examples with figured foot-belt: BMFEA 9 Pl. 45; Antiques Pls. 28, 44; Eumorfopoulos I: 18; Sungchai sü 50.

Type u:

Belly covered with a B-style décor, figured neck-belt and figured foot-belt. There are three sub-groups.

First and principally there is a group of vessels which have the belly covered in its upper part with Vertical ribs, in its lower part with large Birds; in the belts either Dragons or Birds. The relief in this group is much higher and stronger than the ordinary B-style relief, and the vessels have high, even clumsy flanges, sometimes also curious projections. Indeed, the group forms a category apart from the rest of the ordinary B-style classes. Example: Pl. 34 b (Pillsbury coll.); further: BMFEA 8 Pl. 26; Freer Pl. 29; Waterbury Pl. 68; Umehara Henkin no kōkogakuteki no kōsatsu Pls. 7, 11; Exhibition Pl. 12; Ill. London News June 22, 1940.

Secondly we have a small group with the belly covered with large tail-raising Birds, e. g. Pl. 35 a (Wuying 130); further: Senoku 66, 67; Seikwa 75; L. Bachhofer, A short History of Chinese Art Pl. 20; a specimen in the Freer Gallery (this last with no neck-belt above the birds).

In the third place there is a small group with the belly covered with Interlocked T's. Example: Pl. 35 b (Oeder coll.); further: BMFEA 9 Pl. 45; Seikwa 76.

A vessel with Vertical ribs Pl. 71 a (Knapp coll.) of more ordinary type than those in the first sub-group above appears to be quite exceptional (yet the Po ku t'u lu 9: 14 gives a parallel).

We thus find that Yu with the belly covered with B-style motifs are on the whole not frequent. Vertical ribs, Tail-raising birds and Interlocked T's form fairly limited groups. Similarly, Ting B had these motifs in a few exceptional cases only and Earless Kuei never. The Eared Kuei B class, on the contrary, had them in large groups. Equally remarkable: the motif Compound lozenges, which occurs in an important groups of Ting B and in large categories of Eared Kuei B and Earless Kuei B, is here, in the Yu B, entirely missing.

CHAPTER THREE: RETROSPECT

In connection with our analysis in the preceding chapter of the décor arrangement we have already determined the use of certain fundamental motifs in the nine vessel classes under survey (Ting A, B, Li-ting A, Eared Kuei A, B, Earless Kuei A, B, Yu A, B). It is suitable to recapitulate here the general principles for their employment.

I. UNI-DECOR:

This is a very important A-style criterion. It plays an important rôle in Ting A (type a), in Li-ting (type g), in Eared Kuei A (type j), but does not, as a rule, exist in Earless Kuei A and Yu A — a very remarkable fact.

Thus a contrast Ting, Li-ting, Eared Kuei > < Earless Kuei, Yu.

Closely resembling the Uni-décor is an arrangement with large T'aot'ie on the belly, and above it a narrow neck band with spirals. This type occurs exclusively in the Li-ting A class, but never in Ting A nor in the Eared Kuei A. This difference between Ting A and Li-ting A is very curious.

Thus a contrast: Li-ting > < Ting, Eared Kuei.

II. CICADA:

Ting A has a large category (type c) with Cicadas on Hanging blades or (in one variant) Cicadas in neck-belt below which are Hanging blades. Ting A never has Cicadas in the neck-belt combined with T'aot'ie on the belly.

Li-ting has a considerable category (type i., first section) with Cicadas in the

neck-belt and T'aot'ie on the belly, thus combining these important motifs in an arrangement unknown in Ting A.

Eared Kuei A, Earless Kuei A and Yu A do not have the Cicada motif at all — a most remarkable phenomenon.

Thus a contrast (occurrence of Cicada): Ting, Li-ting > < Eared Kuei, Earless Kuei, Yu.

A second contrast (Cicada in combination with T'aot'ie): Li-ting > < Ting.

III. PLASTIC HEADS ON THE UPPER PART OF THE LEGS:

This motif occurs exclusively in Ting A (type d): bare belly and neck-belt with Bodied T'aot'ie. Such heads do not exist in the other large categories within Ting A, nor in Ting B, nor in Li-ting.

Thus a contrast: Ting A > < Ting B, Li-ting.

IV. BELLY BARE AND FIGURED NECK-BELT:

This arrangement (so very common in the B-style categories e, m, o, q, t) occurs in the A style exclusively in the Ting A category just mentioned above: type d., with Bodied T'aot'ie in the neck-belt. It is a most striking fact that, but for a few exceptional cases, it does not exist in Li-ting A, nor in Eared or Earless Kuei A, nor in Yu A.

Thus a contrast: Ting > < Li-ting, Eared Kuei, Earless Kuei, Yu.

V. DRAGONS WITH BODY FORMED AS A LARGE SPIRAL:

This is a motif restricted to Eared Kuei A, where it obtains in a large group (type j., second part). Curiously enough it does not, as a rule, occur in Ting A, Li-ting A, Earless Kuei A or Yu A.

Thus a contrast: Eared Kuei > < Ting, Li-ting, Earless Kuei, Yu.

VI. RISING BLADES:

This motif is entirely absent in Ting A and B and in Li-ting but it plays an important rôle in Kuei, although here in a highly curious manner. We have it in a small category (type k., T'aot'ie on belly and figured neck-belt) of Eared Kuei A and a corresponding one (type p., same arrangement) of Earless Kuei A (both with shape β , S profile). But besides this we have it in a sub-group of Earless Kuei B (type r., second part, belly with Compound lozenges and figured neck-belt, likewise S profile), to which there is nothing corresponding in Eared Kuei B. Finally the Yu, have no Rising blades on the body proper but very often on the corresponding lid (e. g. Pl. 32 b).

Thus a contrast: Eared Kuei A, Earless Kuei A, B > < Ting, Li-ting, Eared Kuei B, Yu.

VII. INCISED BLADES ON LEGS:

In Ting A there are large categories (with T'aot'ie on the belly) which in the majority of cases have this motif: types a. (without neck-belt) and b. (with figured neck-belt); in other groups (with Cicadas) it is mostly absent: type c.

In Ting B it is entirely lacking in a large category: type e. (bare belly, figured neck-belt), but in type f. (belly with Compound lozenges and spikes) it crops up in part of the instances.

In Li-ting it is as a rule absent in some large categories: types g. and h. (T'aot'ie on belly, without figured neck-belt) but appears in a number of instances in type i. (T'aot'ie on belly, above which is a figured neck-belt). Thus there is a curious difference in regard to this motif between Ting A and Li-ting A: Ting A with T'aot'ie on the belly and no figured neck-belt mostly have Blades on the legs, Li-ting with the same décor scheme mostly have not.

Thus a tendency to a contrast: Ting > < Li-ting.

VIII. FOOT-BELT DECOR:

In Eared Kuei A, Earless Kuei A and Yu A the foot-belt is always figured. In Eared Kuei B, Earless Kuei B and Yu B there are certain categories which may have a non-figured foot-belt (with or without thin, raised horizontal lines). These categories indeed vacillate between figured and non-figured foot-belt; they are: type m. (Eared Kuei B), type q. (Earless Kuei B), type t. (Yu B). They all have the same general characteristic features: bare belly and neck-belt containing B-style elements. All other Kuei B and Yu B (those with figured belly) have figured foot-belt, like the A-style classes.

Observe that a non-figured foot-belt, wherever it occurs, thus is a criterion of B style.

IX. COMPOUND LOZENGES:

The important B-style motif Compound lozenges and spikes occurs frequently both in Ting B (type f., first section) Eared Kuei B (type n., one section) and Earless Kuei B (type r.) but — and this is a highly remarkable fact — not at all in Yu B.

Thus a contrast: Ting, Eared Kuei, Earless Kuei > < Yu.

A curious variant of the preceding motif: Compound lozenges with circles merely suggesting spikes but not raised up in relief, appears in Ting B only (type f., second section), and it has no counterpart in the two Kuei B classes nor in Yu B.

Thus a contrast: Ting > < Eared Kuei, Earless Kuei, Yu.

Furthermore, compound lozenges (without spikes) occur as décor of neck-belts in Yu B (frequently, type t., one section), in Earless Kuei B (fairly frequently, type q.), but practically speaking never in Eared Kuei B (for an isolated exception see Yechung I shang 16) or in Ting B.

Thus a contrast: Yu, Earless Kuei > < Ting, Eared Kuei.

X. VERTICAL RIBS:

This motif occurs as covering of the belly in a large category of Eared Kuei B (type n.) and, in a particular formulation, in Yu B (type u., one section), but it is entirely missing in Ting B and Earless Kuei B.

Thus a contrast: Eared Kuei, Yu > < Ting, Earless Kuei.

XI. INTERLOCKED T'S:

This motif is on the whole a not very common element in the classes of vessel studied here, but it is a clear B-style criterion, since it always combines with B-style motifs, never with A-style motifs. It is only in the Yu B class that it forms a real group (type u., one section), otherwise there are only exceptional cases in Ting B (Pl. 57 b) and Eared Kuei B (Pl. 68 a).

Thus a contrast Yu > < Ting, Eared Kuei, Earless Kuei.

XII. NEUTRAL DECOR ELEMENTS:

In contrast to the décor motifs which are leading criteria of the A style (Uni-décor, real T'aot'ie, Cicada and Vertical dragon) and the B style (Dissolved T'aot'ie, Animal triple band, De-tailed bird, Eyed band, Circle band, Squares with crescents, Compound lozenges, Vertical ribs, Interlocked T's) respectively, there are a number of motifs that are "neutral" in the sense that they combine freely with the A-style motifs as well as with the B-style motifs; they consequently belong to the décor resources of both the A-style bronze masters and the B-style masters. Such elements are: Dragons of various kinds, Birds, Snakes, Whorl circle, Spiral band. Now it often happens that a vessel carries exclusively such "neutral" décor motifs, and it is then sometimes doubtful whether it should be attributed to the A-style class or to the B-style class. The facts adduced in the preceding chapters will largely obviate this difficulty.

In the first place, we have obtained two important additional criteria of the B style:

On the one hand, Ting vessels like Pl. 36 a (Burchard coll.) with a shape of type γ (broadened out, bottom wide and somewhat flat) may thanks to this shape be determined as belonging to the B style, on the analogy of vessels like Pls. 3 a, 5 b, 6 b.

On the other hand, Kuei and Yu vessels with a non-figured foot-belt (with or without raised horizontal lines), such as Pls. 14 a, 29 a, 30 b, have been shown to carry various B-style décor motifs but never A-style motifs. Hence Kuei and Yu with this kind of foot-belt, even if they have only "neutral" décor motifs, such as Pls. 36 b (Trautmann 9), 37 a (Axel Johnsson coll.) may safely be determined as B-style specimens.

In the second place, we have seen that all the B-style classes of vessel in question (Ting B, Eared Kuei B, Earless Kuei B, Yu B) have categories characterized by

a bare belly and a neck-belt with B-style elements; these categories are indeed very large (types e, m, q, t). On the other hand, neither in the Eared Kuei nor in the Earless Kuei nor in the Yu class do there exist any groups with bare belly and A-style décor elements (such as Bodied T'aot'ie or Cicada) in the neck-belt; and in the Ting class there is only one fairly restricted category (type d) which has bare belly and Bodied T'aot'ie in the neck-belt; moreover, this group is as a rule characterized by a special feature: plastic heads on the upper part of the legs. Hence, when we find numerous Ting, Kuei and Yu which have bare legs, bare belly and a neck-belt with "neutral" elements only, e. g. Dragons or Birds or Whorl circles, such as Pl. 37 b (Kwankarō A: 4), 38 a (MFEA), they should decidedly be linked up with the B-style categories just mentioned.

These considerations entail that a considerable number of vessels may be more closely defined than was possible hitherto. The vessels enumerated in BMFEA 9, p. 26 (Ting Nos. 139—161), p. 35 (Eared Kuei Nos. 404—425), p. 42 (Yu Nos. 558—589) are all such B-style vessels. As further examples in the more recent publications may be cited:

Ting (now defined as Ting B): Pillsbury Pl. 5; Kwankarō A: 9; Yechung II shang 6, 7; Sungchai sü 2; K'ao ku hüe pao 7, Pls. 22, 23.

Kuei (now defined as Kuei B): Trautmann Pl. 9; Visser Pl. 11; Kwankarō A: 20; Yechung III shang 26, 27; Si Ts'ing shiyi 7; Jung No. 275.

Yu (now defined as Yu B): Pillsbury Pl. 24; Heusden Pl. 12; Kidder Pl. 16; Chicago Pl. 27; Yechung III shang 31, 32.

CHAPTER FOUR: T'AOT'IE

The various kinds of Dragons and their rôle as forming part of a "Bodied T'aot'ie" (two confronted Dragons combining to form a T'aot'ie with double bodies) have been the subject of a lengthy article in the Bulletin 1951¹⁾ in which the different types and their gradual evolution have been examined in detail. Here we shall study the T'aot'ie from a different point of view, and we shall now discuss the T'aot'ie which decorates the large surfaces on the bellies of the categories of vessel discussed above (Ting A, Li-ting A, Eared Kuei A, Earless Kuei A and Yu A).


In BMFEA 9, 1937 (New Studies on Chinese Bronzes) a distinction was made between Mask T'aot'ie and Bodied T'aot'ie on the one hand, criteria of the A style, and Dissolved T'aot'ie (as in our Pl. 9 b here) criterion of the B style on the other. We shall, however, have to make one more distinction here. The term Bodied T'aot'ie will be reserved for a figure that is more or less "realistic", a coherent picture of the kind shown in our Pl. 29 b (also Pls. 14 b, 15 a, b, etc.). Contrasting with this we shall have to employ the term Disjointed T'aot'ie, a T'aot'ie with detached body, for the type illustrated for instance in our Pl. 41 a, 43 a in which the body and tail, detached from the head, as separate figures independently fill the space at the side of the head.

¹⁾ Bernhard Karlgren, Notes on the Grammar of Early Bronze Décor, BMFEA 23, 1951.

I. BODIED, DISJOINTED AND MASK T'AOT'IE

We shall first examine the rôle of these three variants. At the same time we shall investigate two more prominent features in the T'aot'ie shape.

On the one hand, the forehead, between or slightly below the horns, may be adorned with a hooked "forehead shield", as in Pls. 1 a, 3 b, 29 b, or by a simple bow-line, as in Pls. 7 a, 14 b.



On the other hand, the formation of the mouth¹⁾ may be such (see the figure to the left) may be such as to make the upper lip curve outwards at the corners, as in Pl. 14 b, or (figure to the right) such as to make it curve inwards, as in Pl. 29 b.

Ting A.

Type a:

The type a. (in Chap. II above), i. e. vessels with T'aot'ie as Uni-décor, regularly have the Bodied T'aot'ie, with stout vertical Flanges, one flange forming the central line (nose line) in the face, the next ones (right and left) just behind the bodies, forming two panels for one T'aot'ie. There are three sub-groups:

1. Bodied T'aot'ie, forehead Bow-line, Outcurving mouth. Example: Pl. 38 b (Kahn coll.); further: our Pls. 14 b, 15 a; BMFEA 9 Pl. 2; Tsun 1: 13; Yechung II shang 5.

2. Bodied T'aot'ie, forehead Shield, Outcurving mouth. Example: Pl. 39 a (Trautmann Pl. 1); further: our Pl. 1 a; Voretzsch Pl. 4; Koop Pl. 3; Loo 1939 Pl. 4; Loo 1940 Pl. 17; Seikwa 89; Paoyün 13; Shierkia IV: 5; Tsun 1: 12 (irregular feature: head on leg); Yechung III shang 6, 7; vessels in Burnet coll. and Yamanaka coll.

3. Bodied T'aot'ie, forehead Shield, Incurving mouth. Example: Pl. 39 b (Shuangkien k'iwu shang 5); further: Seikwa 88.

Thus, in this category a., the cases of Incurving mouth are rare, whereas forehead Shield and forehead Bow-line are both common. The Incurving mouth does not go with the forehead Bow-line.

Type b:

The type b. (in Chap. II), i. e. belly with T'aot'ie with vertical Flanges and a neck-belt with Dragons. Here we have only one regular type:

¹⁾ As a rule only the upper part is visible, the lower part is missing, probably because the T'aot'ie was fundamentally a ritual magician's mask, which had to leave enough of the mouth free for incantation.

4. Bodied T'aot'ie, forehead Shield, Incurving mouth. Example: Pl. 40 a (C. T. Loo); further: our Pls. 15 b, 16 a; BMFEA 9 Pl. 3; Lochow Pl. 2; Trautmann Pl. 4; Kidder Pl. 9; vessels in the Fogg Museum, Buffalo Museum, v. d. Heydt coll. etc.

An unusual formation of the T'aot'ie on a vessel Pl. 71 b (Exhibition Pl. 1) and a similar vessel in the Nelson Gallery of Art.

Consequently the Incurving mouth occurs principally on vessels with a figured neck-belt (Dragons), but very rarely with Uni-décor. The most important point, however, is that Ting A on the belly has, as a rule, Bodied T'aot'ie, never Disjointed or Mask T'aot'ie — in strong contrast, as we shall see, to some other categories below.

Li-ting A.

Types g. and h:

The types g. and h. (in Chap. II), i. e. belly with T'aot'ie as Uni-décor (g) or T'aot'ie surmounted by a narrow neck band with spirals (h) follow the same rules in regard to the formation of the T'aot'ie. There are two groups:

1. Mask T'aot'ie, without any Flanges at all, forehead Bow-line, Outcurving mouth; flanked by Vertical dragons. Example: Pl. 40 b (Werner coll.); further: our Pls. 7 a, 22 a; BMFEA 9 Pl. 7; Ibid. 27 Pl. 3; Ibid. 30 Pl. 4; Sirén, History of Early Chinese Art I Pl. 26; Burchard I Pl. 27, II Pl. 13; Eumorfopoulos I: 1; Ackerman Pl. 14; Waterbury Pl. 46; Trautmann Pl. 6; Heusden 15; Lochow Pl. 3; Kidder Pl. 8; Loo 1940 Pl. 6; Yamanaka, Ancient Chin. Bronzes 1925, Pl. 10; Visser Pl. 2; Senoku 1; Seikwa 91; Kobijutsu 2; Kwankarō A: 7; Paoyün 4—8; Wuying 10, 11, 13, 14; Mengwei shang 5; Mengwei sü 4; Chengsung shang 8—10, 16; Shierkia VI: 1, XI: 17; Shant'u 20; Tsun 1: 18, 26; Yechung I shang 12; Yechung III shang 12; many more in museums and private collections.

2. The second sub-group is a very limited category, in which we find: Disjointed T'aot'ie (in contrast to the Mask T'aot'ie in the preceding), forehead Bow-line, no Flanges, distorted mouth, no vertical dragons. Example: Pl. 41 a (Tsun 1: 20); further: Senoku 2; Transactions Or. Ceramic Soc. 26, Pl. 25; Shierkia VIII: 1; Wuying 15; K'ao ku hüe pao 7 Pl. 24; Jung No. 15; with forehead shield: Tch'ou Pl. 14.

There are a few exceptional cases which have Bodied T'aot'ie. There is a vessel in the Victoria and Albert Museum which has exactly the décor of Ting A in Pl. 15 a. More aberrant are our Pl. 72 a (Seligman 1) and a vessel in Paoyün 10.

Type i:

The type i. above (in Chap. II), i. e. belly with T'aot'ie, above which is a figured neck-belt (either Cicadas or Dragons etc.). There are several variants of the T'aot'ie in this large category.

3. Bodied T'aot'ie with central Flange, forehead Shield, Incurving mouth. This is a close parallel, in these respects, to the type b. of Ting A above. Examples:

Pl. 41 b (University Museum Philadelphia), Pl. 42 a (C. T. Loo); further: our Pl. 23 b; Pillsbury Pl. 7; Dubosc No. 30; Yechung III shang 9; vessels in the Freer Gallery, the Nelson Gallery of Art and in the colls. Kahn, Brundage, Gump, Chang Nai-chi, Yamanaka, C. T. Loo; Kidder Pl. 7 (in this last no flange).

4. Mask T'aot'ie, with or without Flange, forehead Shield, Incurving mouth. Example: Pl. 42 b; further: our Pls. 22 b, 23 a; Waterbury Pl. 9 (here Outc. m.).

5. Disjointed T'aot'ie, with or without Flange, forehead Shield, Incurving mouth. Examples: Pl. 43 a (Hardt coll., identical vessels in colls. Oeder and Bloemendahl), Pl. 43 b (Senoku 3); Further: Paoyün 12, Hakkaku 1 (these two with bovine T'aot'ie).

A specimen in Pl. 72 b (C. T. Loo) shows a curiously formed T'aot'ie body: another irregular piece in BMFEA 6 Pl. 10.

If we sum up the results of this inquiry with particular reference to a comparison with the Ting A, we shall find that there is a surprising contrast between Ting A and Li-ting A:

Vessels without figured neck-belt (types a. and g/h):

Ting A (a)	Li-ting A (g/h) (two sub-groups)	
Bodied T'aot'ie	Mask T'aot'ie	Disjointed T'aot'ie
Flanges	No Flanges	No Flanges
Bow-line or Shield	Bow-line	Bow-line
Outcurving mouth	Outcurving mouth	
(Incurving rare)		

Vessels with figured neck-belt (types b. and i):

Ting A (b)	Li-ting A (i) (three sub-groups)		
Bodied T'aot'ie	Bodied T'aot'ie	Mask T'aot'ie	Disjointed T'aot'ie
Flanges	Flanges	Flanges or no Fl.	Flanges or no Fl.
Shield	Shield	Shield	Shield
Incurving mouth	Incurving mouth	Incurving mouth	Incurving mouth

The contrast between such Ting A and Li-ting A as have no figured neck-belt is really striking — the former having Bodied T'aot'ie and Flanges (a very large category), the latter having Mask T'aot'ie and no Flanges (likewise a very large category) or Disjointed T'aot'ie and no Flanges (a small category), moreover the Ting often have forehead Shield, the Li-ting not.

Thus a contrast, on three points (T'aot'ie, Flanges, Nose line): Ting > < Li-ting.

In the vessels with figured neck-belt the contrast is less strong. One of the three Li-ting sub-groups indeed agrees perfectly with the Ting (Flanges, Shield, Incurving mouth). The other two, however, diverge in that they have Mask T'aot'ie or Disjointed T'aot'ie and only in part Flanges.

Thus a contrast, on two points (T'aot'ie and Flanges): Ting > < Li-ting.

On the other hand, there are curious parallels between Ting A and Li-ting A in regard to the contrast between vessels without or with figured neck-belt: the former have as a rule Outcurving mouth and the latter Incurving mouth in both classes of vessel; the former have forehead Bow-line (exclusively in Li-ting, to a large extent in Ting), the latter have regularly forehead Shield.

Eared Kuei A.

The treatment of the T'aot'ie on the belly is on the whole not very much varied in the different groups discussed under types j. and k. (in Chap. II above). Common to them all is the forehead Shield, and there is either no central Flange at all, barely a slight ridge taking its place, or a Flange that is very low and thin when compared to the stout Flanges in the Ting A class.

Type j:

This is the Uni-décor category. There are several sub-groups:

1. Disjointed T'aot'ie, Incurving mouth. Example: Pl. 44 a (Victoria and Albert Museum); further: our Pl. 24 a; Kidder Pl. 21; Dubosc Nos. 28, 50; Paoyün 54, 56; Wuying 44; Si Ts'ing shiyi 5; vessels in Staatl. Mus. Berlin, the Freer Gallery, the Schoenlicht collection.

2. Disjointed T'aot'ie, Outcurving mouth: Wuying 40, 42, 43.

3. Bodied T'aot'ie, Incurving mouth: Example: Pl. 44 b (Wannieck); further: Pillsbury Pl. 52; Seikwa 108.

4. Bodied T'aot'ie, Outcurving mouth: Seikwa 110.

Type k:

This is the category with a T'aot'ie above which is a figured neck-belt. There are two sub-groups:

5. Disjointed T'aot'ie, Incurving mouth. Example: Pl. 45 a (Museum of Fine Arts Boston); further: our Pls. 7 b, 25 b; Senoku 35, 107; Senoku zoku 180; Seikwa 109; Sungchai sü 26; Jung No. 205; vessels in the Brooklyn Museum, Fogg museum, Museum of Fine Arts Boston, colls. Brundage, Oeder, Parish-Watson.

6. Bodied T'aot'ie, Incurving mouth. Example: Pl. 45 b (Axel Jonsson coll.); further: our Pls. 8 b and 25 a; BMFEA 8 Pl. 12; Ibid. 9 Pls. 11, 12; Pillsbury Pls. 49, 50; Freer Pl. 19; Lochow 11; Loo 1940 Pl. 11; Paoyün 50; Wuying 46; Tsun 1: 47; Senoku 42 (this last: Outcurving mouth).

There are only a few isolated aberrant cases: Mask T'aot'ie with Vertical dragons in Pl. 73 a (Pillsbury 48), this vessel, moreover, is unusually broad and low; a case of forehead Bow-line in Wuying 40.

To sum up: The Eared Kuei A class stands in a remarkable contrast to Ting A and Li-ting A.

The Mask T'aot'ie, so predominant in the Li-ting class, is entirely missing here, just as in the Ting A.

Thus a contrast: Li-ting > < Eared Kuei, Ting.

The Disjointed T'aot'ie, which is unknown in the Ting A class, and occurs only in a very small sub-group of the Li-ting A class, is here quite preponderant in the Uni-décor group and just as frequent as the Bodied T'aot'ie in the group with figured neck-belt; it may, indeed, be said to be a favourite theme in the Eared Kuei A class.

Thus a contrast: Ting > < Eared Kuei.

Furthermore, the forehead Bow-line, which was the rule in the Uni-décor category of Li-ting A and just as frequent as the Shield in the Uni-décor category of Ting A, is here entirely absent, the forehead Shield being universal.

Thus a contrast: Ting, Li-ting > < Eared Kuei.

Again, the Outcurving mouth, so predominant in the Uni-décor categories of Ting A and Li-ting A, plays a very modest rôle here, the Incurving mouth being absolutely preponderant.

Thus a contrast: Ting, Li-ting > < Eared Kuei.

Finally, in regard to the Flanges, it follows neither the model of Ting A nor that of Li-ting A: its Flange, when not simply replaced by a slight ridge, is far smaller than in those classes.

Thus a contrast Ting, Li-ting > < Eared Kuei.

Earless Kuei A.

Type p:

Common to all the vessels in type p. (in Chap. II) is the forehead Shield and the central Flange. For the rest we find:

1. Bodied T'aot'ie, Incurving mouth. Example: Pl. 46 a (Kobijutsu 5); further: our Pls. 11 b, 29 b, 62 b; Seligman Pl. 10; Wuying 50, 51; Paoyün 58; Shierkia XII: 6; vessels in Musée Guimet, Seattle Art Museum, coll. Heramaneck (New York), C. D. Carter (Detroit), Lange (Krefeld).

2. Bodied T'aot'ie, Outcurving mouth. Example: our Pl. 3 b; further: Pillsbury Pl. 54; Heusden Pl. 20; Archives Chin. Art. Soc. Am. VIII: p. 49; a vessel in the Fogg Museum (all these in the vessel shape δ , chalice-shape).

3. Disjointed T'aot'ie, Incurving mouth. Example: Pl. 46 b; further: our Pls. 30 a, 69 a; a vessel in the Museum f. Kunst und Gewerbe Hamburg.

An isolated case shows the forehead Bow-line: Pl. 73 b (Seattle Art Museum).

Thus we find that the Earless Kuei agrees with the Eared Kuei (and the Ting) in so far that the Mask T'aot'ie is absent.

Thus a contrast: Li-ting > < Earless Kuei (Ting).

But for the rest our Earless Kuei deviates remarkably from the Eared Kuei. The Disjointed T'aot'ie, so strong in the latter, plays a very modest rôle here. And above all: the central Flange, which in the Eared Kuei class was either missing or thin and minute (as against Ting A) crops up very forcefully in our present class. It is invariably present, and though in about half the instances it shows the same thin and delicate character that it has in the Eared Kuei class, in the other half it is just as stout and heavy as in Ting A, see for instance Pls. 3 b, 11 b, 29 b, 30 a, 46 a, Pillsbury Pl. 54 etc.

Thus a contrast: Earless Kuei (Ting, Li-ting) > < Eared Kuei.

Observe also the curious phenomenon that whereas in Ting A and Li-ting A the Outcurving mouth appertains to the categories without figured neck-belt and those with a figured belt regularly have Incurving mouth, we find, in our present class as well as in the preceding, that a sub-group of vessels, in spite of their figured neck-belt, have the said Outcurving mouth.

Thus a contrast: Ting, Li-ting > < Earless Kuei, (Eared Kuei).

Yu A.

As stated in Chap. II, we have to deal almost exclusively with a type (s) having T'aot'ie on the belly and above this a figured neck-belt.

Type s, Bodied T'aot'ie, Flanges:

1. Forehead Shield, Incurving mouth. Example: Pl. 47 a (Nedzu); further: our Pls. 13 b, 32 b; Freer Pl. 16; Visser Pl. 3; Senoku 59; Seikwa 73, 74; Mengwei sü 26; Shuangkien k'iwu shang 28; Yechung II shang 17; vessels in Freer Gallery and colls. Yamanaka, Sparks, Murayama.

2. Forehead Shield, Outcurving mouth. Example: Pl. 47 b (Senoku 58); further: Cull. Pl. 4; White Pl. 8; Shuangkien k'iwu shang 29; vessel in the Fogg Museum.

3. Forehead Bow-line, Incurving mouth. Example: Pl. 48 a (C. T. Loo).

4. Forehead Bow-line, Outcurving mouth: BMFEA 9 Pl. 15; Antiques Pl. 22; Nedzu Pls. 15, 16.

Type s, Disjointed T'aot'ie, no Flanges:

5. Forehead Shield, Incurving mouth. Example: Pl. 48 b (C. T. Loo); further: Voretzsch Pl. 146; Kobijutsu 6 and 10; Nedzu 32, 33; Paoyün 98.

6. Forehead Shield, Outcurving mouth. Example: Pl. 32 a; further: Pillsbury Pl. 18; vessel (with bovine T'aot'ie) in the Museum of Fine Arts Boston.

There are two vessels with Mask T'aot'ie (bovine), Shield and Outcurving mouth in BMFEA 9 Pl. 16 and Eumorfopoulos I: 20 — quite sporadic cases.

The Yu, which as a rule has a figured neck-belt above the belly T'aot'ie, should only be compared with the corresponding categories of Ting A (type b), Li-ting A (type i), Eared Kuei A (type k) and Earless Kuei A (type p).

The Yu, like all the preceding classes, possesses a large sub-group with Bodied T'aot'ie, and, besides, another sub-group with Disjointed T'aot'ie, in this respect unlike the Ting A but like the Li-ting and both Kuei classes.

Thus a contrast: Yu (Li-ting, Kuei) > < Ting.

The Bodied T'aot'ie group, however, diverges from the corresponding categories in all the preceding classes in that it sometimes has forehead Bow-line, which otherwise only appertains to types without figured neck-belt (i. e. types a, g, h).

Thus a contrast: Yu > < Ting, Li-ting Eared Kuei, Earless Kuei.

And the occurrence of Outcurving as well as Incurving mouth has a parallel only in Earless Kuei A, while diverging from the other classes.

Thus a contrast: Yu, (Earless Kuei) > < Ting, Li-ting, Eared Kuei.

Accordingly, we find that the grammar of Yu A in regard to the features of the T'aot'ie on the belly is not identical with that of any of the preceding groups.

Let us sum up these facts and view them against the background of the preceding classes. On p. above there is a comparative table of the Ting A and the Li-ting A. We draw up here, as a counterpart, a table for the Kuei A and Yu A.

Vessels without figured neck-belt (type j):

Eared Kuei A (j) (two groups)		Earless Kuei A	Yu A
Disjointed T'aot'ie	Bodied T'aot'ie		
No or thin Flanges	No or thin Flanges		
Shield	Shield		
Incurving mouth	Incurving mouth		
(Outc. rare)	(Outc. rare)		

Vessels with figured neck-belt (types k, p, s):

Eared Kuei A (k) (two groups)		Earless Kuei A (p) (two groups)	
Disjointed T'aot'ie	Bodied T'aot'ie	Bodied T'aot'ie	Disjointed T'aot'ie
No or thin Flanges	No or thin Flanges	Flanges	Flanges
Shield	Shield	Shield	Shield
Incurving mouth	Incurving mouth	Incurving or Outc. mouth	Incurving mouth

Yu A (s) (two groups)

Bodied T'aot'ie	Disjointed T'aot'ie
Flanges	No Flanges
Shield or Bow-line	Shield
Incurving or Outc. mouth	Incurving or Outc. mouth

II. FORMATION OF THE EAR

So far the examination of the principal features of the T'aot'ie has been limited to a few fundamental elements. But there are various other features that should be studied. One of them is the formation of the ear. Here again we shall find surprising distinctions between the various classes of vessels or their sub-categories. The discussion will still bear upon the large T'aot'ie as *décor* on the belly.

The *Bodied T'aot'ie* sometimes has no ear depicted at all, as in our Pls. 14 b, 38 b, 40 a, or, mostly, the ear has the shape of a pointed leaf with a cross-lined figure inside, as in our Pls. 1 a, 16 a, 22 b, 23 b, 25 a, 29 b.

The *Disjointed T'aot'ie* mostly has no ear depicted, as in Pls. 41 a, 43 b, but in some cases the leaf-shaped ear appears here as well, as in Pls. 25 b, 30 a (rarely other shapes, as in Pl. 43 a). This is all very simple.

The *Mask T'aot'ie*, on the contrary, presents some curious phenomena. As we have seen above, the *Mask T'aot'ie* on the belly occurs as a regular feature only in certain major categories of the Li-ting, but not in Ting, Kuei or Yu. On the Li-ting we found it (see the preceding paragraph) in two important categories:

1. On the one hand, the *Mask T'aot'ie* appertains to the vessel types g. and h. (i. e. belly with T'aot'ie and no figured neck-belt). This is, as we have seen, an exceedingly large category. Here the *Mask T'aot'ie* as a rule always has an ear depicted, and *in nine cases out of ten it is shaped as a scale*. Example: Pl. 49 a; further: Pls. 7 a, 22 a, 40 b; BMFEA 27 Pl. 3; Ibid. 30 Pl. 4; Visser Pl. 2; Ackerman Pl. 14; Heusden Pl. 15; Lochow 3; Kidder Pl. 8; Seikwa 91; Kwankarō A: 2; Wuying 11, 14; Shierkia XI: 17; Shant'u 20; Yechung I shang 11, 12; Shuangkien k'iwu shang 4; many more could be cited. In BMFEA 24 (1952) pp. 17—23 a detailed investigation was made of the Scale as magical *décor* element on Archaic Chinese bronzes. Its most frequent use is certainly as an ear in this category of Li-ting.

This category, however, also contains a certain number of vessels showing the same leaf-shaped ear that regularly appertains to the *Bodied T'aot'ie*, e. g. our Pl. 49 b; further examples in Paoyün 8; Wuying 13; Eumorfopoulos I: 1, Tsun 1: 18; Trautmann Pl. 6; Waterbury Pl. 46.

2. On the other hand, the *Mask T'aot'ie* occurs in a smaller category (i) as *décor* on the belly, above which is a figured neck-belt. *Here we find exclusively the leaf-shaped ear or other shapes, not the scale shape*. It is a curious phenomenon indeed that the scale-shaped ear, which is the predominant type in vessels without neck-belt, is absent in vessels with neck-belt.

III. FORMATION OF THE HORN

The horn of the T'aot'ie is shaped as a recumbent C in nine cases out of ten, for instance our Pls. 1 a, 3 b, 7 a etc. and 49 a, b. We shall revert below to certain significant details of the horns. First, however, it should be stated that other shapes do occur, though to a very limited extent:

1. Standing C shape. Example: Pl. 50 a; further: Ting in our Pl. 40 a; Voretzsch Pl. 4; Koop Pl. 3; Kidder Pl. 9; Loo 1939 Pl. 4; Paoyün 13; Yechung III shang 7;

Li-ting in our Pl. 72 a; Eared Kuei in our Pl. 8 b; Wuying 46; Earless Kuei in Wuying 50.

2. Recumbent S shape. Example: Pl. 50 b; further: Ting in Exhibition Pl. 1; Li-ting in Waterbury Pl. 9; Eared Kuei in our Pls. 7 b, 25 b, 45 b; Loo 1940Pl. 11; vessels in Fogg Museum and Brundage coll.; Earless Kuei in our Pls. 29 b, 30 a; Seligman Pl. 10; Wuying 51; Shierkia XII: 7; vessel in C. D. Carter collection.

3. T shape. Example: Pl. 51 a (Freer Gallery); further: Li-ting in Tch'ou Pl. 14; Kuei in Wuying 42 and 43.


4. Straight bovine shape. Example: Pl. 51 b (Ackerman Pl. 10); further: Li-ting in BMFEA 6 Pl. 10; Hakkaku 1; Paoyün 12; Jung 15; Eared Kuei in Brooklyn Museum; Yu in Eumorfopoulos I: 20; Antiques Pl. 45.

It is at once observed that there is an interesting phenomenon here: neither the standing C shape nor the S shape, which are after all not so very uncommon in the Ting, Li-ting and Kuei classes, occur in the Yu class.

Thus a contrast: Ting, Li-ting, Eared Kuei, Earless Kuei > < Yu.

IV. DECOR ON THE RECUMBENT C HORN

As we have seen by far the most common horn shape is, in all the classes, the recumbent C horn. Sometimes it is drawn out into an angle at one corner (as in our Pl. 15 b, and, more strongly, Pl. 24 a). But there are some highly remarkable distinctions. There are, in fact seven principal types:



aa. single hook; bb. consecutive hooks; cc. scales; dd. bottom torus; ee. C-hooked-quill border; ff. T-scores border; gg. bare.

These occur in the following way:

A. BODIED T'AOT'IE:

Ting A. There are two groups.

1. Pattern *aa*. (single hook), as in our Pls. 14 b, 15 a, 16 a, 38 b, 39 a. This is the rule in the great majority of the vessels in the large category on p. above.
2. There are a few cases in which there have been added to the type *aa*. the T scores of type *ff*., as in our Pl. 1 a; further: BMFEA 9 Pl. 3; Trautmann Pl. 4; Lochow 2; Seikwa 89; vessels in the Fogg museum and v. d. Heydt collection.

Li-Ting A. There are three groups.

1. Pattern *cc*. (scales), as in our Pls. 23 b, 41 b; further: Dubosc No. 30; vessels in Nelson Gallery of Art; colls. of C. T. Loo and Brundage.
2. Pattern *aa*. (single hook), as in our Pl. 42 a; further: Visser Pl. 2; vessels in Freer Gallery and C. T. Loo collection.
3. Pattern *ff*. (T-scores border), e. g. our Pl. 52 a (Yechung III shang 9); further our Pl. 22 b; Kidder Pl. 7; vessels in Victoria and Albert Museum, colls. Yamanaka, Chang Nai-chi, Gump.

Eared Kuei A. There are two groups.

1. A kind of *dd*. (bottom torus), yet lined and not quite identical with that of the Disjointed T'aot'ie below. Example: Pls. 25 a, 44 b; further: Seikwa 108; Freer Pl. 19.
2. Pattern *gg*. (bare), as in our Pl. 52 b (Tsun 1: 47); further: Seikwa 110; Lochow 11.

Some sporadic cases show aberrant patterns: pattern *aa*. (single hook) in Paoyün 50; pattern *ff*. (T-scores border) in Senoku 42; pattern *ee*. (C-hooked-quill border) in our Pl. 74 a (Pillsbury 49); Dubosc No. 50.

Earless Kuei A. There are two groups.

1. Pattern *aa*. (single hook), as in our Pls. 3 b, 62 b; further: Pillsbury Pl. 54; Heusden Pl. 20; Archives Art Soc. Am. VIII: p. 49; vessels in Fogg Museum and coll. Lange (Krefeld).
2. Pattern *ff*. (T-scores border), as in our Pl. 53 a (Seattle Museum of Art); further: our Pls. 11 b, 46 b; vessels in Musée Guimet and coll. Heeramanek.

Yu A. There are two groups.

1. Pattern *aa*. (single hook), as in our Pls. 13 b, 47 a, 48 a; further: BMFEA 9 Pl. 15; Freer Pl. 16; White Pl. 8; Cull Pl. 4; Antiques Pl. 22; Seikwa 73; Nedzu Pl. 16; Yechung II shang 17; vessels in Freer Gallery, Fogg Museum, Yamanaka collection.
2. Pattern *ff*. (T-scores border), as in our Pls. 32 b, 47 b; further: Visser Pl. 3; Seikwa 74; Kobijutsu 7; Nedzu Pl. 15; Mengwei sü 26; Shuangkien k'iwu shang 29; vessels in Freer Gallery and Murayama collection.

B. *DISJOINTED T'AOT'IE*:

Li-ting A. There are two groups.

1. Pattern *gg*. (bare), as in our Pl. 41 a; further: Senoku 2; Shierkia VIII: 1; Wuying 15.
2. Pattern *aa*. (single hook), as in our Pl. 43 a, b; further: K'ao ku hüe pao 7, Pl. 24.

Eared Kuei A. There are two groups.

1. Pattern *dd*. (bottom torus), as in our Pls. 24 a, 44 a, 45 a; further: Dubosc No. 28; Burchard No. 267; Senoku 35, 107; Senoku zoku 180; Paoyün 54, 56; Wuying 44; Si Ts'ing shiyi 5; Jung No. 205; vessels in colls. Oeder and Schoenlicht.
2. Pattern *ff*. (T-scores border), as in Pl. 53 b (Wuying 40); further: Pillsbury 52; Seikwa 109.

A sporadic case of pattern *aa*. in Kidder Pl. 21.

Earless Kuei.

There are a few instances, e. g. our Pls. 46 b and 69 a, both with pattern *ff*. (T-scores border).

Yu A:

Pattern *dd*. (bottom torus) as in Pls. 48 b and 32 a; further: Kobijutsu 10; Nedzu 32, 33; Voretzsch Pl. 146.

A specimen in Pillsbury Pl. 18 has pattern *ff*., and one in Senoku 59 has pattern *ee*.

C. *MASK T'AOT'IE*.

This concerns only the class **Li-ting**. There are four groups.

1. (no figured neck-belt:) Pattern *bb*. (consecutive hooks), as in our Pls. 7 a, 22 a, 40 b; 49 a; this is the rule in the great majority of the very numerous vessels recorded on p. above.
2. (no figured neck-belt:) Pattern *aa*. (single hook), as in our Pl. 49 b; further: Eumorfopoulos I: 1; Burchard No. 1138; Waterbury Pl. 46; Paoyün 10; Wuying 13; Shant'u 20; vessel in Musée Cernuschi.
3. (figured neck-belt:) Pattern *cc*. (scales), as in our Pls. 23 a (3 vessels) and 42 b.
4. (figured neck-belt:) Pattern *ff*. (T-scores border), as in our Pl. 22 b; further: Trautmann Pl. 6; Paoyün 8.

Summing up these data we shall now point out some interesting phenomena. Pattern *aa*. (single hook) and pattern *ff*. (T-scores border) follow each other to a large extent, the latter being merely an embellished version of the former. They appertain principally to the Bodied T'aot'ie (and only a few Li-ting A with Dis-

jointed T'aot'ie). But whereas they are typical of the Bodied T'aot'ie of the entire classes Ting A, Earless Kuei A and Yu A, and a small sub-group of Li-ting A, the Bodied T'aot'ie of Eared Kuei A has other patterns (either *dd.*, bottom torus, or *gg.*, bare).

Thus a contrast: Ting, Li-ting, Earless Kuei, Yu > < Eared Kuei.

Pattern *bb.* (consecutive hooks) occurs exclusively on Mask T'aot'ie and is hence limited to the class Li-ting A. Here it obtains in a large, indeed predominant group.

Pattern *cc.* (scales) is likewise limited to the Li-ting class. It occurs principally on Bodied T'aot'ie in this class.

Thus a contrast: Ting, Eared Kuei, Earless Kuei, Yu > < Li-ting.

Observe here particularly the opposition Ting: Li-ting.

Pattern *dd.* (bottom torus) is confined to the classes of vessel Eared Kuei A and Yu A and is missing in Ting A, Li-ting A and Earless Kuei A — a very curious distinction.

Thus a contrast: Ting, Li-ting, Earless Kuei > < Eared Kuei, Yu.


Pattern *ee.* (C-hooked-quill border), so common and important in some other classes of vessels (see, for instance, Seikwa 10, Senoku 27, both Square Yi; Wuying 131, Trautmann Pl. 7; both Square Ying; Seikwa 45, 46, both Lei; Seikwa 19 Tsun; etc.) is almost entirely absent in the classes of vessel studied in the present article. There are only sporadic examples (like Pls. 72 b and 74 a; Dubosc No. 50).

Pattern *gg.* (bare) is likewise restricted to a few particular groups: a group of Li-ting A (with Disjointed T'aot'ie) and a group of Eared Kuei A (with Bodied T'aot'ie). As a rule no instances in Ting A, Earless Kuei A or Yu A.


Thus a contrast: Ting, Earless Kuei, Yu > < Li-ting, Eared Kuei.

V. THE FOREHEAD SHIELD

The ordinary shape of the hooked forehead Shield, so common, as we have witnessed, in the figure of the T'aot'ie, is the one shown, for instance, in our Pl. 1 a (fig. $\alpha\alpha$). But there exists a second variant with double hooks (fig. $\beta\beta$), as in our Pl. 44 a.



$\alpha\alpha$



$\beta\beta$

This latter occurs particularly often in the vessel class Tsun, for instance Seikwa 16, 19, 20, 24, 25 etc. but occasionally also in other classes, e. g. Hakkaku 3 (Square Ting), Seikwa 10 (Square Yi).

The interesting phenomenon is now this: the double-hooked Shield is common

in the class Eared Kuei A. Example: our Pls. 25 a, 44 a, 44 b, 74 a; further: Freer Pl. 19; Burchard No. 267; Paoyün 56; vessels in Staatl. Mus. Berlin, and Schoenlicht collection. It is, on the other hand, practically unknown in all the other classes of vessel studied here.

An exceptional case with double-hook is the Li-ting in our Pl. 72 a (Seligman Pl. 1).

Thus a contrast: Ting, Li-ting, Earless Kuei, Yu > < Eared Kuei.

VI. TORI FLANKING THE NOSE

This is likewise a feature that characterizes the Eared Kuei A, as against all the other classes. The nose-flanking Tori have a shape which reveals that they are reductions of the exceedingly frequent décor motif C-hooked quill. We find these Tori for instance in our Pls. 8 b, 24 a, 44 a and b; further: BMFEA 9 Pl. 11; Dubosc No. 28; Burchard No. 267; Paoyün 54, 56; Wuying 44; Si Ts'ing Shiyi 5; vessels in Museum of Fine Arts Boston, Staatl. Mus. Berlin, colls. Oeder and Schoenlicht. This feature, then, is a highly curious characteristic of the class Eared Kuei.

Thus a contrast: Ting, Li-ting, Earless Kuei, Yu > < Eared Kuei.

VII. BACKGROUND OF THE T'AOT'IE

We are still dealing only with the large T'aot'ie as décor on the belly.

The ordinary arrangement is that the décor motif, here the T'aot'ie, is raised in more or less high relief (sometimes in two planes) against a background completely covered with spirals in very thin and low thread relief (the pattern foolishly called the *leiwen* pattern). It shows very clearly in our Pls. 14 b, 22 a, 23 b, 29 b and *passim*. This background is the rule in the classes Ting A, Li-ting A, Earless Kuei A and it obtains in parts of the Eared Kuei A and the majority of Yu A. But here again there is a surprising contrast to be observed.

Vessels with a bare background occur to a very large extent in Eared Kuei A. Examples: our Pls. 8 b, 24 a, 25 a, 25 b, 44 a, 45 a, 52 b, 53 b, 74 a; further: BMFEA 9 Pls. 11, 12; Burchard No. 267; Lochow Pl. 11; Dubosc No. 28; Senoku 35, 107; Senoku zoku 180; Paoyün 54, 56; Wuying 44, 46; Tsun 1: 47; Sungchai sü 26; Si Ts'ing shiyi 5; Jung No. 205; vessels in Museum of Fine Arts Boston, Fogg Museum, Staatl. Mus. Berlin, colls. Oeder, Schoenlicht, Parish-Watson.

To a smaller extent we find the same phenomenon in the class Yu A. Examples: our Pls. 32 a, 48 b (particularly clear in the latter); further: Pillsbury Pl. 18; Eumorfopoulos I: 20; Nedzu 32, 33; Kobijutsu 10; Shuang-kien k'iwu shang 28.

In the other classes, on the contrary, this bare background does not occur.

For an isolated exception see the Li-ting in our Pl. 72 b (unusual in other respects as well).

Thus a contrast: Ting, Li-ting, Earless Kuei > < Eared Kuei, Yu.

CHAPTER FIVE: SOME OTHER DISTINCTIVE FEATURES

WHORL CIRCLE

This motif, the origin and meaning of which are quite obscure, is "neutral" in so far that it occurs in combination with both A-style and B-style motifs. It offers, however, some interesting points. We shall examine here its occurrence in a neck-belt, where it as a rule alternates with other motifs such as Cicadas, Birds, Dragons, T'ao't'ie, Squares with crescents. We find it as follows (we shall divide the materials into three paragraphs):

1. Here are examples from several classes:

Ting: our Pl. 54 a (Low-Beer coll.); further: BMFEA 9 Pls. 6, 33; Ibid. 20 Pl. 8 (two vessels); Burlington Arts Club Ill. Cat. Chin. Art 1915 Pl. 36; Voretzsch Pl. 5; Chungsung shang 7; Paoyün 20; Wuying 20; Shierkia XI: 18; Yechung I shang 10; Yechung III shang 10; Sungchai sü 2; K'ao ku hüe pao 7 Pl. 23; vessels in the Metropolitan Museum of Arts and the Low-Beer coll.; further some instances recorded under 2. below. In Sün hien yi k'i 3 it stands as the only décor in the neck-belt.

Li-ting: our Pls. 23 a (two vessels) and 42 b; further: Jung No. 15; vessel in Chang Nai-chi collection.

Eared Kuei: our Pl. 20 b; further: Exhibition Pl. 7; Tch'ou Pl. 8; Paoyün 48; Tsun 1: 40; Shant'u 58; vessel in Gutman coll.; many vessels recorded under 2. below.

2. In this paragraph we have assembled specimens of a certain type: those that have Whorl circles alternating with a particular kind of Dragon, the Head-turning dragon shown very clearly in our Pl. 45 a; some examples:

Ting: Chungsung shang 15; Shant'u 22.

Eared Kuei: our Pls. 8 b, 9 a, 27 b, 28 a; further: BMFEA 8 Pl. 13; Ibid. 9 Pl. 40; Menten Pls. 3, 5; Tch'ou Pl. 12; Heusden Pl. 21; Loo 1939 Pl. 7; Ill. Cat. 30; Bull. Metr. Mus. 1950 p. 105; Senoku 107; Paoyün 51; Wuying 69; Mengwei shang 23; Shant'u 64; Shierkia VI: 5; Sungchai 9; Sungchai sü 26, 35; Si Ts'ing shiyi 6; Jung Nos. 205, 217, 248, 259, 303; vessels in Fogg Museum, Museum of Fine Arts Boston, Staatl. Mus. Berlin, colls. Burchard, Gutman, v. d. Heydt, Chr. Holmes, Higginson, Knapp, Oeder, Rosencrantz, Yamanaka.

3. A small group closely akin to the preceding but in which the Head-turning dragon is more complicated and stylized:

Ting: Pl. 64 a (Lochow 4).

Eared Kuei: our Pl. 54 b (Senoku 38): further: our Pls. 9 b, 38 a; White Pl. 72; Loo 1940 Pl. 12.

Earless Kuei: Lochow 10.

A vessel with Whorl circles in Seikwa 102 is aberrant in several respects.

From the facts adduced we learn that the Whorl circle in neck-belts is a feature which appears on Ting and Li-ting and particularly frequently on Eared Kuei. It is almost entirely absent in Earless Kuei and Yu.

Thus a contrast: Ting, Li-ting, Eared Kuei > < Earless Kuei, Yu.

The category treated under 2. above presents another interesting phenomenon. The Head-turning dragon of the type illustrated in Pl. 45 a is limited to certain classes of vessel. The Ting offers a few instances only but the Eared Kuei has it to a very large extent. It is unknown in the other classes studied here.

Thus a contrast: Li-ting, Earless Kuei, Yu > < Ting, Eared Kuei.

A Yu with Whorl circles in J. Trübner, Yu und Kuang Pl. 17 has a very peculiar and atypical thread relief.

SQUARES WITH CRESCENTS

This B-style motif — a highly conventionalized and corrupted remnant of a Dragon figure, see Pillsbury pp. 35, 63, 66 and BMFEA 30, p. 192 — as a rule occurs in neck-belts or foot-belts or both, in the following way:

Ting: our Pl. 20 b; further: Shierkia XI: 18.

Eared Kuei: our Pls. 27 a, 27 b; further: BMFEA 9 Pl. 40; Exhibition Pl. 7; Menten Pl. 5; Loo 1939 Pl. 7; Paoyün 46, 48, 51; Wuying 69; Tsun 1: 40, Shant'u 58; Jung No. 259; vessel in Gutman collection.

An isolated case of Yu in Pl. 74 b (Hakkaku 12).

Thus we find that as décor element in the neck-belts or foot-belts this motif is frequent and important in the Eared Kuei class, but occurs only very rarely on Ting and practically not at all in the other B classes studied here.

Thus a contrast: Ting, Eared Kuei > < Earless Kuei, Yu.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding chapters we have described the principal typological groups of Ting (exclusive of Square Ting and Ting with supporting animals), Li-ting, Eared Kuei, Earless Kuei and Yu, in the bronze art prior to the Middle-Chou style, i. e. in late Yin and the first Chou century. The investigation has had its inevitable limitations; it has been based on some 700 specimens published in a series of bronze albums and articles and a fair number of available photographs, but it is obvious that there must be hundreds of unpublished items in various collections which have not been taken into account, and many of them may very well conflict with the "laws" established here. That risk had to be taken; the materials adduced have been sufficiently comprehensive to allow of general rules. No "laws" or "rules" in the artistic field can be absolutely binding and exceptionless. No artist was beheaded because he mixed two styles. But the "rules" in the sense of *clearly*

attestable tendencies are of paramount importance and interest. In Plates 1—54 we have exemplified the ordinary, regular types; in Plates 55—74 items which in one respect or other deviate from the normal types but are not violently divergent. Besides these categories there exist a considerable number of *eccentric* vessels, which defy every attempt at insertion into any of the “normal” categories. These strongly aberrant, atypical cases have simply been left out and disregarded, since they are not pertinent to our investigation of the ordinary types.¹⁾

It may seem bold or indeed methodically unsound to treat the entire bulk of the now known pre-Middle-Chou vessels as a whole and assort them up into typological groups: among them there are sure to be vessels of earlier and later types, successive stages in the evolution and hence not really comparable.²⁾ That is quite true, but the most important and interesting result of our inquiry above is precisely this: the very fact that the comprehensive material of vessels now available can be assorted into clearly definable categories in the way achieved above proves that they are on the whole fairly contemporary and that the differences in style brought about by a chronological evolution are not, after all, so very pronounced: the homogeneity of the material (the “eccentric” vessels disregarded) is such that we must conclude that the great majority fall within a quite limited era, say the last two Yin centuries and the first Chou century ($\pm 1200 - \pm 900$ B. C.).

And here we are brought up against the great and apparently insoluble problem: where are the earlier stages which led up to this magnificent late-Yin bronze art, and what do they look like? A few finds³⁾ have been made in recent years of pre-An-yang archaeological materials, but they are exceedingly scanty, poor and revealing little: a few early types of Tsüe and some other modest vessels which tell us practically nothing about the pre-An-yang bronze art.

We have had to surmise, hitherto, that after some preparatory centuries of primitive and elementary bronze art, An-yang meant a sudden powerful efflorescence in artistic capability: an exuberance of production in a perfect creative freedom: a score of classes of vessels infinitely varied in shape and proportions, adorned with an astoundingly rich décor, again with a score of motifs widely divergent and richly varied; the artist had a rich store of art elements from which he apparently could freely and happily choose for his creations.

Apparently only — for our investigation above offers quite a different picture. The late-Yin art was not the product of free artistic creative power, it was already sophisticated and conventionalized in an amazing degree. The artist was severely bound by all kinds of conventional norms and rules. We have examined a series of leading vessels (those with a rounded “belly”) and everywhere found restrictive rules: on such and such a class of vessel you were allowed to use such and such

¹⁾ Such aberrant specimens are for instance: BMFEA 24 Pl. 1; Pillsbury Pls. 9, 20, 53; Senoku 60; Seikwa 102—104, 112, 114, 119, 121; Dubosc No. 26; Jung Nos. 250, 251, 255, 287, 613, 634; Ackerman Pl. 14 b; Tsun 1: 23, 38; Ibid. 2: 7, 18; and so forth.

²⁾ A confident art historian has even seen fit to establish six (6!) successive “styles” in An-yang. (M. Loehr in Arch. Chin. Art. Soc. Am. 1953).

³⁾ See Cheng Te-k'un, *The Origin and Development of Shang Culture*, Asia Major 1957.

a kind of décor, but you could not at your will apply the latter to another class of vessel, on which it was conventionally disallowed. Thus, for instance, a bare background to the T'aot'ie on the belly was sanctioned in the Eared Kuei and the Yu classes, but absolutely not in the Ting, Li-ting and Earless Kuei classes. Mask T'aot'ie was allowed (indeed the most common form) on the belly of the Li-ting, but it was not applied to the Ting — there it always had to be a Bodied T'aot'ie. Disjointed T'aot'ie was the most common form on the belly of the Eared Kuei, but it was not allowed on the Earless Kuei, nor on the Ting. The Head-turning dragon of the type in Pl. 45 a. was common on the Eared Kuei and (sparsely used) on the Ting, but it was not permitted on the Li-ting, the Earless Kuei, the Yu. The important Cicada motif was common on Ting and Li-ting but was never allowed in the classes Eared Kuei, Earless Kuei, Yu.

Again, a certain décor motif was varied according to equally severe restrictions. Thus the Recumbent-C horn of the T'aot'ie, the predominant horn in all the classes, was decorated on the Bodied T'aot'ie of the Ting exclusively with the Single-hook pattern (with or without T scores), on the Bodied T'aot'ie of the Li-ting also with the Scale pattern, on the Mask T'aot'ie of the Li-ting with the Consecutive-hooks pattern, on the Disjointed T'aot'ie of the Kuei and Yu with the Bottom-torus pattern and on the Disjointed T'aot'ie of the Li-ting and Kuei also with a Bare surface. Another example: In the Ting and Li-ting classes when there was no separate figured neck-belt on top, the T'aot'ie on the belly had an Outcurving mouth; when there was a figured neck-belt, the T'aot'ie on the belly had an Incurving mouth.

Rules like these cannot possibly have different uses of the various vessels for their origin or background, they are frankly the restrictive rules of an already severely conventionalized art: a Mask T'aot'ie could just as easily have been applied to the belly of a Ting as to that of a Li-ting — but it simply was not. *Why* should the Ting invariably have Bodied T'aot'ie but the Li-ting in its largest category Mask T'aot'ie? Because it had become customary never to put a Mask T'aot'ie on the Ting's belly and it had become the fashion preferably to use the Mask T'aot'ie on the Li-ting. In the preceding chapters we have traced and defined scores of such conventional rules; wherever there is a contrast based on a difference in the class of vessel we have expressed it in italics (there are 45 such contrasts recorded above); and a series of other conventional rules not based on the vessel-class contrasts have been defined in the summaries at the end of the chapters.

How fundamentally these conventional rules have influenced the late-Yin art and determined its character may be aptly illustrated by a single example, chosen from the scores of above instances.

It has long been customary to consider the Ting and the Li-ting as being practically one and the same class of vessel, the three shallow depressions in the bottom of the Li-ting instead of the smoothly rounded bottom of the Ting being regarded as of practically no significance; for the rest, the two classes were regarded as one. They have all been called Ting in the albums from Sung time on; Jung Keng, in

his large compilation *Shang Chou yi k'i*, makes no distinction between them, placing Ting and Li-ting together pell-mell; and as late as 1956 Kidder places two Li-ting and one Ting under the same heading as "Ting". There is, however, a gulf between the Ting and the Li-ting:

1. The Ting has an important category with a shape (β) showing the S profile: the Li-ting has not.
2. The Ting has a large category with a shape showing a broadened-out bottom and slightly inward-sloping walls (γ); the Li-ting has not.
3. The Li-ting has a large category with T'aot'ie on the belly and a narrow band with spirals above it; the Ting has not.
4. The Ting has either Cicada or T'aot'ie but does not combine them on the same vessel; the Li-ting has a category with these motifs combined.
5. The Ting has an important category with plastic heads on the upper part of the legs; the Li-ting has not (but for some very rare exceptions).
6. The Ting has a category with bare belly and T'aot'ie in the neck-belt; the Li-ting has not.
7. Ting with T'aot'ie on the belly and no figured neck-belt mostly have Incised blades on the legs; Li-ting with the same décor mostly have no such blades.
8. Ting with T'aot'ie on the belly and no figured neck-belt have Bodied T'aot'ie, Flanges and often forehead Shield; Li-ting with the same décor scheme have a large category with Mask T'aot'ie and a smaller category with Disjointed T'aot'ie, both with no Flanges and no forehead Shield, to which categories the Ting has no counterpart.
9. Ting with T'aot'ie on the belly and a figured neck-belt have Bodied T'aot'ie, Flanges and forehead Shield; Li-ting with the same décor scheme have categories with Mask T'aot'ie and Disjointed T'aot'ie, both in part without Flanges.
10. The Ting have a category with the Head-turning dragons described above (Pl. 45 a); the Li-ting have not.

Finally and most important of all:

11. The Ting have a row of important categories in the B style (see Chap. II, Ting B); the Li-ting lacks corresponding B-style categories. We do not find Li-ting with, for instance, De-tailed birds, Squares with crescents Compound lozenges, Interlocked T's, Vertical ribs, nor (with a very few sporadic exceptions, see p. 295) Animal triple band or Circle band. Li-ting is thus practically always an A-style class of vessel. This marks an enormous contrast between Ting and Li-ting.

Our investigation of these fundamental classes: Ting, Li-ting, Eared Kuei, Earless Kuei, Yu has thus amply proved that the great bronze art of late Yin (and early Chou) was not, after some simple and primitive antecedents, a first great efflorescence, in which the artists worked with a full freedom, creating ever new types and motifs, unhampered by rules and conventions; the bronze art was not then in its creative, dynamic stage. On the contrary it worked in the straight-jacket of scores of conventional rules which restricted the latitude of variation in a most astounding way; in other words, it had already reached its apogee, it was an achieved art perfected in all its rules and conventions, it had arrived at a more static stage.

This exceedingly remarkable fact makes our problem as to the antecedents of the late-Yin art even more difficult of solution. It is no longer merely a question of finding some simple and comparatively primitive preliminary stages. It requires a good long time for a richly equipped dynamic art to become a sophisticated and conventionalized static art. Further back than An-yang we have to surmise not only primitive types like those at Cheng-chou but an era with a freer high bronze art, with a whole array of vessel types, décor motifs and ornamental constellations not yet bound by fixed conventional rules.

Where are the creations of this earlier high bronze age to be found? Will they be excavated some day in a now unknown early Yin or Hsia capital, at present buried many fathoms deep under the silt in the vicinity of the Yellow River?








a



b







6



6



a



b



a



b



a



b



a



b



a



b




a



b





a





b



















a




b



a



b







a



b



a



b



a



b



a



b



a



b



a



b



a




b



a



b







a



b



b



b



a



b




a



b



a



b



a




b




b




b








a



b



a



b



a



b



a



b



a



b




a



b




a



b







a



b



a



b



a




b




a



b





2




2











a



b





a



b



a




b



a



b







a



b



a



b



a




b




a



b





2



2



a



b



a



b



a



b

X



3 9015 01579 9474

FINE ARTS LIBRARY

